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owner to restrain the dredging of sand and gravel from the bed of the river in front of her lands. The court said:

"This court has decided that it is a question of local law whether the title to the beds of the navigable rivers of the United States is in the State in which the rivers are situated or in the owners of the land bordering upon such rivers (Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661; 34 L. Ed. 819, 11 Sup. Ct. 210; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53; 57 L. Ed. 1063, 33 Sup. Ct. 667; Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay and M. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254; 35 L. Ed. 1004, 12 Sup. Ct. 173; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226; 34 L. Ed. 941, 11 Sup. Ct. 337; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1; 38 L. Ed. 331, 14 Sup. Ct. 548; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371; 35 L. Ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 838; Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. 41; 16 L. Ed. 604)."

In Scott v. Lattig et al. (227 U.S. 229; 57 L. Ed. 490), suit was brought to quiet title to an island in the Snake River in Idaho. The court said: "It was settled long ago by this court, upon a consideration of the relative rights and powers of the Federal and State Governments under the Constitution, that lands underlying navigable waters within the several States belong to the respective States in virtue of their sovereignty, and may be used and disposed of as they may direct, subject always to the rights of the public in such waters and to the paramount power of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce among the States and with foreign nations, and that each new State, upon its admission to the Union, becomes endowed with the same rights and powers in this regard as the older ones (St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 48, 68; 23 L. Ed. 59, 63; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338; 24 L. Ed. 224, 228; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434-437, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 1035–1037, 13 Sup Ct. 110; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-50, 58; 38 L. Ed. 331, 349, 350, 352, 14 Sup. Ct. 548; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70; 54 L. Ed. 95, 30 Sup. Ct. 27)."

(b) The State of Michigan, in the exercise of its sovereign power to determine this proposition has established the rule that the title to the submerged lands under the waters of the Great Lakes belongs to the State of Michigan, and the waters of the Great Lakes outside of the meander lines within its external boundaries belong to the State in its sovereign proprietary capacity, and that the lands laid bare by a recession of the waters of the Great Lakes do not belong to the riparian proprietors, but to the State of Michigan.

Ainsworth v. Munoskong Hunting & Fishing Club (159 Mich. 61).
State v. Venice of America Land Co. (160 Mich. 680).

Kavanaugh v. Rabior (222 Mich. 68).

In Ainsworth v. Munoskong Hunting & Fishing Club (159 Mich. 61), plaintiffs filed a bill to restrain defendant from interfering with their right to hunt on Munoskong Bay. The court held that this bay was a part of Lake Huron rather than of the Sault Ste. Marie River. The court said:

"It is the established law of this State that riparian owners along the Great Lakes own only to the meander line, and that title outside this meander line, subject to the rights of navigation, is held in trust by the State for the use of its citizens. Among these is the common right to fish and hunt (La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. City of Monroe, Walk. Cho. (Mich.) 155; People v. Silberwood, 110 Mich. 106 (67 N.W. 1087, 43 L.R.A. 694) ; Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 373 (19 N.W. 103, 51 Am. Rep. 116)). In these cases, and others cited therein, the subject has been fully discussed, and further discussion here would be unprofitable."

In State v. Venice of America Land Co. (160 Mich. 680), the State successfully maintained a bill to enjoin defendants from taking possession of platting and selling certain lands. It is said:

"The condition of this territory when the State was admitted into the Union is the condition which must control. That the State of Michigan holds these lands in trust for the use and benefit of its people-if we are correct in our conclusion cannot be doubted. The State holds the title in trust for the people, for the purposes of navigation, fishing, et cetera. It holds the title in its Sovereign capacity (People v. Silberwood, 110 Mich. 103 (67 N.W. 1087, 32 L.R.A. 694; State v. Fishing & Shooting Club, 127 Mich. 580 (87 N.W. 117)).

"An exhaustive discussion of the nature of the State's title to the land beneath the waters of the Great Lakes, and of the question whether any part of such territory can be acquired, as against the State. by adverse possession, will be found in the minority opinion of Justice Hooker in the last above case. It there clearly appears from an abundance of authority that title to submerged lands

in the Great Lakes held by the State can not be devested by adverse possession; it being held in trust for the public, according to the original cession from Virginia and the ordinance of 1787. The late case of Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot (109 Wis. 418, (84 N.W. 855, 85 N.W. 402, 83 Am. St. Rep. 905)), supports this view (Olds v. Commissioner of State Land Office, 150 Mich. 134 (112 N.W. 952); Ainsworth v. Hunting & Fishing Club, 159 Mich. 61 (123 N.W. 802)).”

In Kavanaugh v. Rabior (222 Mich. 68) its is said:

"While it is generally held tht the title to lands under rivers and island lakes belongs to the riparian proprietors, a different rule has been made with reference to the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes have been classed with tidewaters, and the same rules applied (People v. Silberwood, 110 Mich. 103 (32 L.R.A. 694); Ainsworth v. Hunting & Fishing Club, 159 Mich. 61).

"In the last case cited it was said:

""It is the established law of this State that riparian owners along the Great Lakes own only to the meander line, and that title, outside this meander line, subject to the rights of navigation, is held in trust by the State for the use of its citizens' (citing authorities).

"The Wisconsin court has reached the same conclusion (Diedrich v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 248 (24 Am. Rep. 399)).

"In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois (146 U.S. 387 (13 Sup. Ct. 110)) will be found a very learned and exhaustive opinion on this question by Mr. Justice Field, and he therein reaches the conclusion that the States bordering on the Great Lakes own the title of the land in trust which is covered by their water." (c) A different rule prevails as to the rights of riparian proprietors upon the navigable rivers of the State of Michigan. Every riparian proprietor upon a navigable river in the State of Michigan, as an incident to his riparian ownership, owns to the middle line or thread of the stream, in the absence of an express reservation. This rule is applicable to the St. Marys River, the St. Clair River, the Detroit River, and the River Rouge.

Lorman v. Benson (8 Mich. 18).
Rice v. Ruddiman (10 Mich. 128).
Ryan v. Brown (18 Mich. 196).
Watson v. Peters (26 Mich. 508).

Richardson v. Prentiss (48 Mich. 88).

Bay City Gas Light Co. v. Industrial Works (28 Mich. 182).

Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co. (41 Mich. 466).

Pere Marquette Boom Co. v. Adams (44 Mich. 403).

Backus v. Detroit (49 Mich. 110).

Fletcher v. Thunder Bay River Boom Co. (51 Mich. 277).

Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co. (62 Mich. 636).

Butler v. Railroad Co. (85 Mich. 255).

Grand Rapids Ice and Coal Co. v. South Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. (102 Mich. 227).

Goff v. Gougle (118 Mich. 307).

Railroad Co. v. Butler (159 U.S. 87; 40 L. Ed. 85).

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. (209 U.S. 452; 52

L. Ed. 881).

Kemp v. Stradley (134 Mich. 676).

People v. Silberwood (110 Mich. 106).

Brown v. Parker (127 Mich. 392).

People v. Grand Rapids Power Co. (164 Mich. 121).

Scranton v. Wheeler (113 Mich. 565).

U.S. v. Chandler Dunbar Water Power Co. (209 U.S. 444; 52 L. Ed. 880).

G. R. & I. R. R. Co. v. Butler (159 U.S. 87; 40 L. Ed. 85).

Fuller v. Bilz (161 Mich. 589).

Scranton v. Wheeler (179 U.S. 133; 45 L. Ed. 133).

Nedtweg v. Wallace (237 Mich. 14).

Collins v. Gearnart (237 Mich. 38).

(d) The same rule applies in the State of Michigan to the ownership of the riparian proprietors upon the inland lakes within the State as applied to the ownership by riparian proprietors upon the navigable rivers within the State. Stock v. City of Hillsdale (155 Mich. 375).

Kennedy v. Niles Water Supply Co. (173 Mich. 474; 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 836).

Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. v. South Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. (102 Mich. 227; 47 Am. St. Rep. 516, 25 L.R.A. 815).

Kreig v. Kaufman (206 Mich. 622).

Hyatt v. Albro (121 Mich. 638).

People v. Hulburt (131 Mich. 156).
Rice v. Riddiman (10 Mich. 125).

VI. Riparian rights on a stream or lake are incidents of property, which are protected by the law of property:

The idea of property is difficult to define. It was imbedded in the jurisprudence of imperial Rome. Grotius and Puffendorf, writing in the days of colonial expansion and international disputes over distant lands, sought to base the idea on agreement or compact. Blackstone criticises the views of Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, Titius, and Locke, and insists that the basis of property is occupancy. Blackstone's views have been criticized by Sir Henry Maine, Chief Baron Pollock, and others. Herbert Spencer and Lorimer thought property was naturally created by the economic necessity of individual existence. Hegel conceived that it resulted from projecting the individual will over external objects. Von Ihring says, "Property is but the periphery of my person extended to things," and Kohler says, "the totality of a person's proprietary powers constitutes his property."

At the time of the separation of the American colonies from Great Britain the case of Entick v. Carrington (19 Howell's State Trials, 1030, 1066), had been decided. In that case, Lord Chief Justice Camden, speaking for the court, said: "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by positive law, are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, et cetera, are all of this de scription; wherein every man by common consent gives up that right, for the sake of justice and the general good. By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass."

This statement may be regarded as an accurate statement of the British law when the colonies severed themselves from the mother country.

Madison, in the 10th Federalist, spoke of "The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate," and he added, "From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately result."

Individual domination over land was not regarded as important, says Pollock and Maitland, in the early history of English law. Possession, not ownership, was the leading conception.

The Declaration of Independence asserted that man was endowed by the creator with inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Gouverneur Morris, in the constitutional convention, said that life and liberty were said to be of more value than property, "An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property was the main object of society."

John Rutledge expressed the view that property was the principal object of society. Rufus King reiterated the same opinion as Rutledge. Charles C. Pinckney spoke of this as "a government instituted for the protection of property." Pierce Butler called it, "A government instituted principally for the protection of property"; and, he “contended vigorously that property was the only just measure of representation." James Wilson did not agree "that property was the sole and primary object of government and society." So important was property regarded, at the time, that the fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

In Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis (30 Mich. 308, 319, 320), the court said: "Of what does property practically consist, but of the incidents which the law has recognized as attached to the title, or right of property? Is not the idea of property in, or title to lands, apart from, and stripped of all its incidents, a purely metaphysical abstraction, as immaterial and useless to the owner as 'the stuff that dreams are made of?' Is it not a much less injury to him, if it can injure him at all, to deprive him of this abstraction, than of the incidents of property, which alone render it practicably valuable to him? And among the incidents of property in land, or anything else, is not the right to enjoy its beneficial use, and so far to control it as to exclude others from that use, the most beneficial, the one most real and practicable idea of property, of which it is a much greater wrong to deprive a man, than of the mere abstract idea of property without incidents? This use, or the right to control it with reference to its use, constitutes, in fact, all that is beneficial in ownership, except the right to dis

pose of it; and this latter right or incident would be rendered barren and worthless, stripped of the right to the use. Property does not consist merely of the right to the ultimate particles of matter of which it may be composed, of which we know nothing, but of those properties of matter which can be rendered manifest to our senses, and made to contribute to our wants or our enjoyments." In 1 Lewis Eminent Domain, third edition, paragraph 63, it is said: "Property may be defined as certain rights in things which pertain to persons, and which are granted and sanctioned by law. These rights are the right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition."

In City of St. Louis v. Hill (116 Missouri 527), it is said:

"Property then, in a determinate object, is composed of certain constituent elements, to wit, the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal of that object."

In Bailey v. People (1990 I11. 28), it is said:

"The term 'property' includes every interest which one may have in anything and everything that is the object of ownership by man, together with the right to freely possess, use, and enjoy and dispose of the same."

In Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Englewood Connecting Railroad Co. (115 I11. 375), it is said:

"Property itself, in a legal sense, is nothing more than the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing which of course includes the use of a thing.'

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In City of Denver v. Bayer (7 Colorado 113), it is said:

*

"Property ** is not alone the chattel or land itself but the right to freely possess, use, and alienate the same."

In 12 C.J., page 945, it is said:

"The right of private property secured by guaranties in the Federal and State constitutions, includes the right to acquire, possess, protect, enjoy, and dispose of such property. Any statute, or ordinance, therefore, which constitutes an infringement of any of these rights is unconstitutional."

In Buchanan v. Warley (245 U.S. 71; 62 L. Ed. 149), it is said: "Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 306, 391; 42 L. Ed. 780, 790) * * * Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land."

VII. The State of Michigan, as the sovereign proprietor of all of the public domain within the territorial boundaries of the State, has a right to have the water of the Great Lakes, and of the connecting waters between the same, maintained at its natural and normal level. This right is a right of property, a right as sacred as the right to the soil over which the water flows-a right of which no one may be disseized but by lawful judgment of his peers or by due process of law. Such right is inseparably annexed to the soil, and passes with it as part and parcel of the land, subject only to the paramount right of the Congress to utilize and improve such waters for the purpose of navigation.

I Lewis Eminent Domain, 2d Ed. 54.

Old Colony & Fall River Railway Co. v. County of Plymouth (14 Gray 155).
Rice v. Ruddiman (10 Mich. 145).

Fuller v. Shed (161 Ill. 462, 52 Am. St. Rep. 380, 33 L.R.A. 161).

Gould on Waters, second edition, page 396.

Rigney v. Tacoma Electric Light & Water Co. (9 Wash. 576, 26 L.R.A. 425).
Gardner v. Newburgh (2 Johnson's Chancery, 165).

Hall v. Ionia (38 Mich. 493).

2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 144.
Rudolph v. Pa., S.V.R. Co. (186 Pa. 541, 47 L.R.A. 782).
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway (67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 788).

Yates v. Milwaukee (10 Wallace 497, 19 L. Ed. 984).

United States v. River Rouge Imp. Co. (269 U.S. 411, 70 L. Ed. 339). In Old Colony & Fall River Railway Co. v. County of Plymouth (14 Gray 155 to 161), Justice Shaw said:

"The word 'property' in the tenth article of the bill of rights, which provides that whenever the public exigencies require that the property of an individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive compensation therefor, should have such a liberal construction as to include every valuable interest which can be enjoyed as property and recognized as such.”

In Rice v. Ruddiman (10 Mich. 145), Justice Manning said:

"They are natural rights incident to location and of kin to the right of the owners of such land of the lake breeze, or to the exuberant fertility of the soil, should it prove to be more luxuriant than the soil back from the lake. No one would for a moment think of taking away either of these rights from the owners of the land."

In Fuller v. Shed (161 Ill. 462, 52 Am. St. Rep. 380, 33 L.R.A. 161), the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

"Riparian proprietorship is a property right of value and to it are attached rights and privileges confered by law of which the owner cannot be deprived of by an illegal proceeding."

And as said in Gould on Waters, second edition, page 396:

"The right to the use water in its natural flow is not a mere easement or appurtenance but is inseparably annexed to the soil itself."

As pointed out in Rigney v. Tacoma Electric Light & Water Co. (9 Wash. 576, 26 L.R.A. 425):

"The right to the use of water flowing over land is identified with the realty and is a real and corporal hereditament, and this right is a substantial one and may be the subject of sale or lease like the land itself."

This was the rule laid down by Chancellor Kent in Gardner v. Newburgh (2 Johnson's Chancery, 165), where he said:

"A right to a stream or water is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it flows. It is a part of the freehold, of which no man can be disseized, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of law."

And in Hall v. Ionia (38 Mich. 493), where it is said:

"The ownership of water cannot be confined to the mere right in the nature of the license, but it is as well recognized a title or interest of a real nature as land itself."

In 2 Poland and Maitland, History of English Law, second edition, 144, the learned authors, speaking of things appurtenant to land, say:

"These rights are as much property as the trees that grew out of it, or the houses that are built upon it."

In Rudolph v. Pa. S.V.R. Co. (185 Pa. 541; 47 L.R.A. 782), it is said: "Chancellor Kent in Gardner v. Newburgh (2 Johns, Ch. 162, 7 Am. Dec. 526), says: 'A right to a stream of water is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it flows. It is a part of the freehold, of which no man can be disseized but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of law.'

"In a note in this case (7 Am. Dec. 527), after citing cases following it, it is said: "The right to the use of water is a right of property, depending on the ownership of the land over which the water flows." "

In Crawford Co. v. Hathaway (67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 788), it is said (p. 340): "The riparian proprietor, say all the books and the authorities, has a right to the flow of the water of the natural stream passing through or by his land; such right being inseparably annexed to the soil, and passing with it, not as an easement or appurtenance, but as a part and parcel of the land. This property right can be regarded only as a corporeal hereditament belonging to and incident to the soil, the same as though it were stones thereon, or grass or trees springing from the earth. Gould, Waters, section 204, and authorities there cited. The riparian right to the use of the water flowing in a natural watercourse is a property right, which should be regarded as such, and to protect which the owner may resort to any or all instrumentalities which may be employed for the protection of private property rights generally (Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 442; Ashley v. Pease, 18 Pick. (Mass.), 268; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 23 Am. Dec. 504; Kenney & Wood Mfg. Co. v. Union Mfg. Co., 39 Conn., 576, 582, Beissel v. Sholl, 4 Dall. (U.S.), 211 1 L. ed. 804)."

"The property in water belonging to a riparian proprietor and his right to the reasonable use thereof, as we have seen, is a part and parcel of the land, inseparably annexed to the soil, and is property within the meaning of that word, of which the owner cannot be divested save and except by some lawful method, which would apply alike to all species of real property and appurtenances belonging thereto" (p. 346).

In Yates v. Milwaukee (10 Wallace 497; 19 L. ed. 984), it is said: "Whether the title of the owner of such a lot extends beyond the dry land or not, he is certainly entitled to the rights of a riparian proprietor whose land is bounded by a navigable stream; and among those rights are accesses to the navigable part of the river from the front of his lot, the right to make a

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