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desires and the passions, and the endurance of hunger and thirst, and every kind of hardship; so that it was a precept with them, that the sufferer should not lessen, but rather add to, his burden. Their command over anger is justly celebrated, and an example of their observance of faith and friendship is shown in the well-known story of Damon and Pythias, who are numbered among the Pythagoreans.
Perhaps not the least merit of Pythagoras and his school is in the method of their philosophy. The Ionian school followed the inductive method. Pythagoras, on the contrary, held to the deductive. The Ionian philosophers observed the cause of life or motion in particular cases, and by induction concluded that the same was the cause of life to the whole. They were led to this by their attempts to explain the phenomena of the universe. Induction is only allowable in physical science, but not always even there may it be used. The science of the Ionians was purely physical, and they followed the rules of induction, and yet did not reach the truth. The Pythagoreans, on the contrary, adhering to the deductive process, sought to deduce their metaphysics from the principle, "Number is the essence and reality of all things." Admitting the truth of this principle, we must admit all that can be logically deduced from it. But this formula, taken in its literal meaning, is not true, though the method is the correct one. Intellectual intuition furnishes the mind with the necessary truths. These are the premises and the data of philosophy. Whatever may be deduced from them is true, for it is contained in them. It is a conclusion from the universal to the particular, and the truth of this conclusion is evident to reason. If, however, instead of taking our premises from reason, we endeavour to obtain them from observation and induction, we reverse the order of reason, and arrive at no certain conclusion. The inductive method is so much followed in our own days, that a few remarks on this subject may not be misapplied here. Though old as the oldest philosophy of Greece, we are nevertheless told that it is an invention of modern times, and constitutes the great superiority of modern science over that of the ancients. By it we are to get our premises, we are to discover universal principles. But if these are furnished by induction they are conclusions and not premises. Every induction must be an induction from something, it must have a ter
minus a quo which is prior to the principles which are induced. Consequently, the first principles with which the inductive philosopher starts, and from which he reasons, are first principles ex hypothesi, and are not first principles because there is something prior to them. Aristotle stigmatized induction as an imperfect syllogism, and says that it produces certainty only when the enumeration is complete. But this is never complete, and consequently the conclusion is never certain. There is more in the conclusion than in the premises, and this vitiates not only the syllogism, but every other process of reasoning. One of the conditions of induction is that the genus or kind should be known previous to the induction. This cannot be discovered by observation and experiment, for observation and experiment can only be made upon physical beings, or beings actually existing, whereas the kind or genus is neither a being actually existing, nor is it a quality of an actually existent being. Inductive philosophers here fall into a vicious circle, making the kind to be established by induction, and yet preceding induction as a necessary condition, which if not previously known, all induction is impossible. Nor would they help themselves by saying that it is obtained by reasoning, for then reasoning would be prior to induction, from which it takes its premises. As a process of reasoning induction does not give certainty, and on this ground, were all other reasons wanting, it should be rejected from philosophical science, which deals with certainty, not with opinions. It may lead the naturalist to new truths, provoke suspicions whereby he is influenced to make new observations, but it has no office in philosophy. The mind does not take its principles from induction, but, as we insist and repeat, in season and out of season," the first principles of reason are intuitively evident. Furnished to the mind by intuition, these truths are the matter of reflection. The mind may analyze them and dissect them, may turn them over and regard them under various aspects, and may deduce from them what is contained in them, but it cannot get from them what is not in them. Whatever principles the mind receives from another source are either intuitively evident, or are accepted on the authority of the teacher. None are obtained by a process of reasoning. Philosophy taken in its strictest sense is the science of reason, and under this view is not
THIRD SERIES.-VOL. III. NO. I.
distinguishable from logic. Its object is necessary truth, and the method of reasoning from this truth. But philosophy has always been joined with other sciences, most frequently with mythology and theology. It is not sufficient of itself to lead man to a complete knowledge of even natural truth. It requires the aid of revelation to be a full and complete guide to man, and has always been more or less closely connected with it; and where revelation has been corrupted and to a great extent lost sight of, was the case with the Gentile world generally before the coming of Christ, philosophy is insufficient to lead men to the truth, but, taking its doctrines from adulterated revelation, it is wholly employed in confirming an erroneous tradition, or in deducing from it new errors. This was the case in ancient Greece, where the traditions of the original revelation had become so corrupted that it is difficult to trace in its teachings the original dogma from which they were corrupted. For many of the errors of these philosophers were travesties of some great truth which had been revealed to man in the beginning, but by the lapse of time, the small number of learned men, and the absence of ancient writings, became transformed into a new expression, little resembling its original meaning. It is not to be wondered at that men living in the midst of Pagan nations, themselves Pagans like those around them, should fail in their attempt to seize the truth in all its plenitude. They erred, as it was but natural they should. But their errors may be of service to us if we but distinguish in them the true from the false, holding to the true but rejecting the false. The history of their errors would be to us as the chart to the sailor in an unknown sea, pointing out the rocks and shoals on which he may strike if not warned. The history of philosophy, regarded in this light, is not a barren study, but is as useful as any other branch of this science. If histories of philosophy were written by men who have correct views, and who would labor to point out what is good and separate it from what is bad in the system of each philosopher, such books placed in the hands of youth would do more towards the reforming of philosophy than the countless volumes on abstract theories, written in scarcely intelligible German or inaccurate and unphilosophic French, with which our libraries are filled.
ART. III.-Gesammelte Schriften. Von J. V. RADOWITZ. Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1853. 1853. 5 Bde. 16mo.
In the last number of this Review we offered some remarks upon a work by Radowitz concerning Church and State. For the purpose of rendering our readers still more familiar with the writings of this author, we now turn to his collected works, published under his supervision a short time before his death. The last two volumes, which contain short fragments, particularly engage our attention at present. He here treats almost every subject of interest, or offers a few remarks as he proceeds on all the matters agitated for many years past. They are collected together in the order in which they were written, and therefore with little or no connection of subject, except that the fragments of the first volume are classed under the head of doctrines of politics and right, and those of the second are divided into religious or philosophic and literary or artistic. propose to translate here some of the fragments of the first volume, which contain the political doctrines or opinions of Radowitz.
Though we rarely disagree with the views of this distinguished author, we sometimes dislike his expressions. And yet even when this is the case, we can hardly find fault with the man. Firmly attached to his faith as a Catholic, he wished to be as gentle towards those who differed with him as he could consistently, and although he is not afraid to avow boldly his convictions, he is unwilling to wound unnecessarily the feelings of others. This is a laudable feeling, and we honor it. The expressions of such a writer should be taken in their strictest sense, while most readers would construe what he says in the most broad and liberal, and might interpret him as asserting or admitting what he would reject and deny. In reading his works, we often experience an unpleasant apprehension that we shall stumble upon an erroneous expression or false proposition, which, although quickly dispelled, destroys much of the enjoyment we should otherwise find in the perusal of his works. This objection, however, applies less to the present volume of his works than to any of the others.
The first of these fragments which we wish to lay before our readers is on "The most general view of Politics."
"All must return at last to this great question: Does the individual personality end with this life, or does it not? If the first is true, this life is its own end; if the second is admitted, this life is only a passage to, and preparation for, that which is to follow.
"Whoever asserts the former must suppose that the human mind is of itself capable and sufficient to know the full truth as regards that end and its destiny. He stands upon the autonomy of reason. The destiny of this present existence can then be no other than the happiness, the well-being, of all men. The realization of this end
is subject to a twofold natural limitation; first, as regards the amount of happiness, and second, as regards its participation by all. A more exact enunciation would therefore be: The greatest possible good for the greatest possible number. These limitations must, however, be only such as proceed from the nature of this life, and are unchangeable. Besides the natural limitations, let there be no other proceeding from any human regulations, and no hindrance coming from the order of the State or of religion. As man himself is composed of two parts, soul and body, so also his happiness is twofold; spiritual and corporeal. His happiness under the first aspect is exhibited in self-direction, freedom; his corporeal happiness consists in physical well-being. A political order of things aiming at the first only would be abstract democracy. A political order regarding only the second would run into a centralized despotism, for only in such an order is there complete unity of action. Both together constitute the problem which socialism strives to solve. Let society have absolute possession and unlimited power, but let its will proceed from the will of all. Identify freedom and constraint, state and religion, right and law, faith and morals.
All other political forms are then merely intermediate degrees, and approach nearest to one or the other of these terms. They obtain rule through accidental facts and temporary opinions; they have logic against them, and for them they have the antipathy to the naked truth and the anticipated impossibility of calling into life the consequences of the system.
'But if, on the contrary, this life is not sufficient for itself, but is a passage to another, the human mind does not possess in itself absolute truth, since it is organized only for this life. Therefore we must distinguish between the truth and the consequent necessity of revelation. The end of this earthly existence can therefore only be to live for the revealed order; or, as we may also express it, rightly to understand the contents of the Christian revelation in relation to the political order. The highest disclosure of revelation is that the destiny of man is to become happy, and that this life has no other object than to serve as the means to this end. Further examination shows that this means appears in a different form for the life of every individual, and there