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through which he passes, and in all the operations in which he is engaged. He will find that when he is cognizant of perceptions, he is always cognizant of them as his. But this cogni. zance is equivalent to self-consciousness, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that our proposition is not only not overthrown, but, moreover, that it is corroborated by experience.

"But it is reason alone which can give to this proposition the certainty and extension which are required to render it a sure foundation for all that is to follow. Experience can only establish it as a limited matter of fact: and this is not sufficient for the purposes of our subsequent demonstrations. It must be established as a necessary truth of reason,—as a law binding on intelligence universally, as a conception, the opposite of which is a contradiction and an absurdity. Strictly speaking, the proposition cannot be demonstrated, because, being itself the absolute startingpoint, it cannot be deduced from any antecedent data; but it may be explained in such a way as to leave no doubt as to its axiomatic character. It claims all the stringency of a geometrical axiom, and its claims, it is conceived, are irresistible. If it were possible for an intelligence to receive knowledge at any one time without knowing that it was his knowledge, it would be possible for him to do this at all times. So that an intelligent being might be endowed with knowledge without once, during the whole term of his existence, knowing that he possessed it. Is there not a contradiction involved in that supposition? But if that supposition be a contradiction, it is equally contradictory to suppose that an intelligence can be conscious of his knowledge, at any single moment, without being conscious of it as his. A man has knowledge, and is cognizant of perceptions, only when he brings them home to himself. If he were not aware that they were his, he could not be aware of them at all. Can I know without knowing that it is I who know? No, truly. But if a man, in knowing anything, must always know that he knows it, he must always be self-conscious. And therefore reason establishes our first proposition as a necessary truth,-as an axiom, the denial of which involves a contradiction, or is, in plain words, nonsense."-pp. 83-85.

Whoever knows, knows that he knows. Nothing is more certain; and were this the only sense in which this proposition could be understood, no one could reasonably object to it. Undoubtedly, in all our intellectual acts, in every cognition we are cognizant of ourself, we are conscious of our own connection with the object by the act of intelligence. It is in this sense that the author explains his proposition in the passage we have just

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quoted. But it is necessary to take note that the cognizance of self which enters into the cognition is a cognizance of self as subject, not as object of the cognition. We cannot know that which is not; and if I know myself as the subject, I know myself as not the object of my cognition. Our intellect can never be its own object. Only the Divine Essence, which is pure act, is perfectly intelligible in itself, is its own full and adequate object. The human intellect knows itself, as the Schoolmen say, per suam præsentiam, which is nothing more than that the intellect is conscious of its presence, knows itself as the subject of the cognition. Nothing is thereby added to the object, for when I say the intellect is conscious of itself, or is present to itself in all its acts, I assert no more than when I say that it is the intellect which knows in all its acts. The object of cognition does not thereby become object plus subject, as the author contends, but remains simply the object, and nothing more. The intellect, he admits, cannot be its own entire object. It can know itself only in knowing something not itself; and in knowing that which is not itself, it knows itself. There must therefore, he contends, be two distinct and yet inseparable elements in the object of every cognition. This is asserted in the Second Proposition: "The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, -object plus subject,-thing or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." This is further explained by the following illustra

tration:

"The change which the condition of knowledge effects upon the object of knowledge may be further understood by considering how very different the speculative enumeration of ourselves and things as based on Proposition II. is from the way in which we usually but erroneously enumerate them. We are cognizant of ourselves and of a number of surrounding objects. We look upon ourselves as numerically different from each of these things, just as each of them is numerically different from its neighbors. That is our ordinary way of counting. The speculative computation is quite different. Each of the things is always that thing plus me. So that supposing the things to be represented by the figures 1, 2, 3,

4, and ourselves by the figure 5, while following the ordinary ciphering we should count them and ourselves as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; we should, following the speculative ciphering, count them and ourselves as 1+5, 2+5, 3+54 +5. And the result in each case equals me-in-union-with-the-thing, whatever it may be. Mein-union-with-it, this synthesis is always the total datum or object which I know. This 5 (illustrative of the ego) is the standard factor in every reckoning, is always part of the object apprehended, and is the necessary condition of its apprehension. If we consider the things 1, 2, 3, 4 as forming one complexus in that case, it is still 1+5=me-in-union-with-things."—pp. 96, 97.

Understanding the first proposition in the sense in which we have admitted its truth, there is no logic by which we can obtain this conclusion. The author, in fact, seems to regard it as only the first proposition differently enunciated. The assertion which it contains, that object is object plus subject, stands in direct opposition to the author's "law of identity," which he calls the criterion of necessary truth,-A is Å. If A is A, then A is not A+B. Object is object, equal to itself and nothing more than itself. If object equals object plus subject, subject must be equal to zero; and if subject equals zero, object must also equal zero; for there can be no object without a subject, and if there is no subject to act, there can be no object acted on. Thus in confounding subject and object the learned Professor destroys the subject and thereby puts an end to the whole question, as there is no longer either subject or object. The only knowledge of itself which can be asserted is the consciousness of self as the subject of the cognition. But this is only to assert, that when the intellect knows, it knows that it knows, or is present to itself in its act, and does by no means constitute the intellect an element or part of the object known.

Another great error of our author is in reasoning from what he considers the conditions of our knowledge to the absolute conditions of all knowledge. In the demonstration of his propositions he speaks of our knowledge, and afterwards astutely substitutes the term all knowledge. "It is absolutely indispensable," these are his words, "for the salvation of our argument from beginning to end, that these necessary laws should be fixed as

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authoritative, not over human reason only, but as binding on all possible intelligence It should be added, that the system does not assume, at the outset, that there is any intelligence except the human. Such an assumption is not necessary to enable it to get under weigh, and would therefore be altogether irrelevant. But it maintains that, if there be any other intelligence (either actual or possible) besides man's, that intelligence must conform to the necessary laws, these being the essential conditions and constituents of all intellect and of all thought." The author therefore starts with the conditions of human knowledge, and afterwards assumes that these are the necessary laws of knowledge. nowhere proves this, but by frequently substituting the one expression for the other he seems at last to have convinced himself that the whole matter has been satis

factorily demonstrated. This is a point of great importance in his system, as he confesses, and we are surprised that he has not taken more pains with it, though we really cannot see by what process of argument he would prove the conditions of our knowledge to be equally binding on all intelligence. all intelligence. If there be but so much as one intelligence not subject to these conditions, the whole system falls to the ground. Now God, who is a self-sufficient being, dependent on no creature either for his being or for his knowledge, is the adequate object of his own understanding. The laws of our knowledge are not binding on him, for man to know requires an object not himself. The conditions of our knowledge are not therefore the necessary laws of all intelligence, but there is an intelligence not subject to these conditions. God is both the subject and the object of his own intelligence. The synthesis of object and subject, the ego, together with whatever it apprehends, is in him resolved into mind in synthesis with itself, which is no synthesis at all, but is simply the Divine Mind; and the whole of Professor Ferrier's volume results in the assertion that God is absolute existence, a great truth, certainly, yet one which no one would have denied, if he had placed it at the commencement instead of the conclusion of the work, and which did not require five hundred pages of close argument to establish its certainty. These doctrines the error of which we have endeavored to point out

are the fundamental institutes, the basis of the author's Epistemology, the first and by far the largest of the three parts into which the work is divided. A much smaller space is devoted to his Agnoiology, or Theory of Ignorance, and his Ontology, or Theory of Being. Agnoiology is a new section of philosophy, and is a remarkably curious and original treatise, and apparently quite in harmony with his Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. substance of the Agnoiology is, that we can neither be ignorant of self per se, nor of anything else per se. His reasoning is as follows:

"PROPOSITION I.

The

"Ignorance is an intellectual defect, imperfection, privation, or short-coming.

"DEMONSTRATION.

"The deprivation of anything whose possession is consistent with the nature of the Being which wants it, is a defect. But ignorance is a deprivation of something which is consistent with the nature of intelligence: it is a deprivation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is an intellectual defect, imperfection, prition, or short-coming."-p. 397.

Therefore,

"PROPOSITION II.

"All ignorance is possibly remediable.

"DEMONSTRATION.

"No kind of knowledge is absolutely inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence. But unless all ignorance were possibly remediable, some kind of knowledge would be inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence, to wit, the knowledge by which the ignorance in question might be remedied. Therefore all ignorance is possibly remediable.

"Or again, All defects are possibly remediable, otherwise they could not be defects. But ignorance is a defect. (Prop. I.) Therefore all ignorance is possibly remediable."-p. 402.

Proposition III. follows close on the heels of these two:"We can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.

“DemonstraTION.

"If we could be ignorant of what could not possibly be known by any intelligence, all ignorance would not be possibly remediable. The knowledge in which we were deficient could not be

THIRD SERIES.-VOL. III. NO. III.

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