with respect to Cuba, a like course of wise foresight and enlightened statesmanship. In the name of humanity, Spain can afford to arrest this war; and were it not for her traditional pride, and her recognized disregard of all considerations of mere interest where her honor is involved, an appeal might be made to these motives, which, after all, must be regarded by those who would wisely and prudently conduct the affairs of a nation.

History records but one issue to all the wars in North and South America waged during this and the last century by European states to compel the submission of colonies which had asserted their independence. Europe has found more advantage in the commerce of the rich and prosperous nations which have sprung from the colonies than in holding them in costly and precarious subjection. Not a few reasons might be assigned for the belief that, however the struggle in Cuba may be prolonged, it will end like those which have preceded it in America. And the undersigned, with the greatest respect for the enlightened judgment of the cabinet of Madrid, earnestly commends to its consideration the conclusion of the President, that now is the opportune moment for Spain to take the measures necessary for a prompt and satisfactory solution of the questions presented by the situation in Cuba.

After much consideration, and a careful survey of the question in all its relations, the government of the United States is convinced that it is its duty to exert its friendly influence to bring this unhappy contest to a close. Duty to its own citizens, and to their large interests jeoparded by the continuance of the war; the necessity of maintaining quiet within its borders, now seriously disturbed by a struggle carried on so near its shores; friendship for Spain, one of the oldest and earliest of our allies, with whom no interruption of friendly relations has occurred since our entrance into the family of nations; sympathy for the Cubans, who are our neighbors, all alike impel the government to this course.

The President, therefore, has directed the undersigned to offer formally to the cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States, for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war in Cuba, and to propose the following bases of negotiations:

I. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain.

II. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner to be agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and definite relinquishment by Spain of all her rights in that island, including the public property of every description. If Cuba should not be able to pay the whole sum at once in cash, the future payments by installments to be adequately secured by a pledge of the export and import customs duties, under an arrangement to be agreed upon for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of securing both principal and interest of those installments until their final discharge. III. The abolition of slavery in the Island of Cuba.

IV. An armistice shall take place so soon as the basis of the negotiations shall be agreed upon, and shall continue until the termination of the conference.

The undersigned reserves for a further communication, in case the good offices of the United States are accepted, the views of his government in relation to the proposed conference, and the manner in which the negotiation should proceed. The undersigned will not have complied with all the instructions of his government if he omits to invite the earliest attention of his excellency the minister of state to this communication, in order that the President may be informed, as soon as possible, of the decision of the government of Spain.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to convey to his excellency the minister of state assurances of the very distinguished consideration with which he has the honor to be, &c.

No. 22.

General Sickles to Mr. Fish.

No. 15.]

MADRID, September-8, 1869.

I have the honor to forward to you a copy of my note to Mr. Becerra, the minister of state ad interim, in relation to Charles Speakman and Albert Wyeth, executed at Santiago de Cuba. In the further execution of your instructions No. 10, I have in the same communication formally protested against these deplorable excesses, demanding, in the name of humanity, that the war in Cuba, if prolonged, shall not be conducted in disregard of the customs and usages of Christian nations.

The most extravagant rumors are current in relation to my note to

:

Mr. Becerra of the 3d. It seems the government gave out intimations of its purport, and these have been accepted as indicating the purpose of the United States at an early day to recognize the Cubans as belligerents, if our mediation be not at once accepted. No small degree of excitement has followed, and a sudden fall in the Spanish funds is attributed to the hostile tone of opinion echoed by several influential journals. I inclose some extracts from the "Epoca" and others, that you may see the spirit of the press on the subject.

The president of the council wrote me on the 3d instant from Vichy, expressing his regret that his sudden departure prevented him from seeing me before leaving town, and informing me that he would return about the 20th and resume our conferences. I replied, acquainting him with the urgent tenor of my instructions, and adding that, besides the principal question, recent events in Cuba had increased the solicitude of the President for the prompt action of the Spanish cabinet.

The republican organization shows increasing vitality and efficiency throughout Spain; the difficulties attending the choice of a king distract more and more the monarchical party; and the opinion gains ground that the further development of the revolution will be in a republican direction, to which public sentiment obviously inclines. Hence the monarchical organs are foremost in their efforts to provoke a misunderstanding with the United States, while the republican journals have been generally friendly, and have united with their leading partisans in deprecating any interruption of the good relations now existing between the two countries.

(For Mr. Sickles' note to Señor Becerra see page 104.)

No. 23.

Mr. Fish to General Sickles.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1869.

We hope there is no truth in the rumor that Spain is about to send additional troops to Cuba. It would exhibit a want of confidence in the pending negotiation that might compel the withdrawal of the offer of this government to attempt a reconciliation. It might prolong the struggle, and the destruction of life and property, with questionable influence on the result. It certainly would embarrass the negotiations.

You are at liberty, in your discretion, to communicate this view to the Spanish government. You will advise me by telegraph of their intention with respect to the sending of additional troops.

No. 24.

General Sickles to Mr. Fish.

[Telegram.]

SEPTEMBER 14, 1869,

Telegram received. Have asked Motley to repeat parts not intelligible. Additional troops had been heretofore announced for fall cam

paign. Anticipated recognition of insurgents as belligerents causes much excitement and ill-temper. Press of all parties urge government to send large re-enforcements of men and ships at once. One batallion has sailed. No doubt active measures are hastened by fear of early recognition. It is reported that Spain has communicated my note of 3d of September to European cabinets and asked their advice and cooperation. I have asked interview with minister, and will report result immediately.

1

No. 17.]

No. 25.

General Sickles to Mr. Fish.

SEPTEMBER 14, 1869.

In a full and frank interview held to-day with his excellency Mr. Becerra, minister of the colonies and charged ad interim with the department of foreign affairs, I brought to his notice the rumor, which has been current for some days past, that the Spanish government had opened negotiations with other European powers on the subject of my note of September 3, and asked if there was any foundation for this statement.

His excellency at once replied that there was none; that the government had not communicated my note to any other power; that no answer had as yet been sent to me on account of the absence of the president of the council and the minister of state; and that, in a matter of such gravity, the government could take no definite action before the meeting of the Cortes.

I expressed my gratification that the statement to which I had referred was erroneous, adding that, as the overtures of the United States had been made in a friendly spirit, and with the greatest reserve, if the circle of discussion was to be widened by the introduction of other powers, the government of the United States would desire to be informed of this action.

I then said that, in view of the tender of good offices made by the United States government for the purpose of promoting a prompt and satisfactory termination of hostilities, the President would learn with regret of the intention of Spain to send large re-enforcements to Cuba, inasmuch as this would indicate either that Spain is indisposed to accept our friendly offices, or despairs of reaching a favorable result through the pending negotiations.

His excellency replied that the Cuban question was altogether domestic; that, highly as the government of Spain valued the friendly offices of the United States, it could only proceed in a legal and constitutional way; that it could not yield to the armed insurrection; that its first duty was to restore order in Cuba by force of arms; but, not restricting itself to this, it would at the same time extend to the island the fullest reforms and the widest liberties enjoyed in the peninsula; a general amnesty would be granted; it would make immediate preparations for the election of deputies in Cuba; on their arrival in Madrid the government and the Cortes could, in concert, determine the future destiny of the island, including a scheme for the gradual and entire abolition of slavery. The Spanish government had frankly and gratefully accepted the good offices of the United States; but the bases proposed in my note of September 3 were such as it was out of the power of the Spanish government to accept; that, while recognizing the friendly spirit and the loyalty with

which they were offered, they could not be adopted in the present state of public opinion in Spain. That the mediation of any nation in a purely domestic question was incompatible with the honor of Spain; that the permanent committee of the Cortes, representing all shades of politics, had unanimously voted that the independence of Cuba was inadmissible as a basis of negotiation; and that, by the terms of the constitution, no measure could be taken without the consent of the Cortes that might result in any alienation of Spanish territory. His excellency hoped that it might be possible for. me to withdraw the note of September 3. He said that this would relieve the Spanish government, and enable it to proceed more expeditiously with the liberal plan which it had adopted. I replied that the United States, in making the propositions in question, had no purpose of aggrandizement, and only desired to put an end to the calamities that now desolated the Island of Cuba; that if the bases proposed were not likely to accomplish this result, I had no doubt I would be authorized to withdraw the propositions.

In reply to my earnest representations of the necessity for an armistice as the essential preliminary to any satisfactory arrangement, his excellency said that no one could be more anxious for an armistice than he and his colleagues in the government; the difficulty was, how to bring it about in a proper manner.

His excellency then informed me that a report from the Captain General of Cuba had been called for in relation to the cases of Speakman and Wyeth, and, if the facts were as alleged, full reparation would be made to the families of the deceased; and he added that orders had been given to prevent such scenes of cruelty in the future conduct of the war.

The foregoing résumé of our conversation, which occupied more than an hour, having been sent to the minister of state ad interim for his revision, he has returned it to me with the following remarks: "The dispatch of your excellency contains in its ensemble a faithful and sufficiently exact résumé of the conference which we had on the 14th. For my part, I have only one point to rectify, and if I explain some others, it is with the desire that there shall be nothing which can give rise to doubts, and not because the explanation is absolutely indispensable, That which I wish to rectify is in regard to the resolution of the permanent commission of the Cortes. That commission unanimously decided to tender to the government all the means at its disposal to extinguish the rebellion, and also to oppose our treating on the subject of Cuba with any foreign power."

His excellency proceeds to explain the meaning of this resolution, and to amplify other points mentioned in the résumé. This communication may indeed be regarded as an expression of the views of the cabinet of Madrid in relation to the pending negotiation, and I shall inclose a copy of it with this dispatch.

Mr. Valera handed me yesterday the copy of the dispatch which you had the goodness to send him through the secretary of your legation, but the dispatch was delivered to me so late that I had not sufficient time to examine it with the necessary leisure, so as to make a slight correction and certain explanations which struck me as proper for the purpose which we propose; that is, to accomplish the pacification of Cuba, and to

terminate a civil war, which cannot but prove the more disastrous the more it is prolonged. I beg your pardon for this involuntary delay, and repeat my cordial thanks for the interest you have manifested that this matter may be ended promptly and well, a result which can hardly fail to be reached, those who are managing the matter being animated equally by good faith and the best desires.

The dispatch of your excellency contains in its ensemble a faithful and sufficiently exact résumé of the conference which we had on the 14th. For my part, I have only one point to rectify, and if I explain some others, it is with the desire that there shall be nothing which can give rise to doubts, and not because the explanation is absolutely indispensable.

That which is to rectify is in regard to the decision of the permanent commission of the Cortes. That commission unanimously decided to tender to the government all the means at its disposal to extinguish the rebellion, and decided to oppose the government's treating on the subject of Cuba with any foreign power. You will perceive that the idea of the commission was no other than to oppose a mediation or intervention in our domestic affairs, which would result in diminishing and tarnishing the sovereignty of the Spanish people, whom the Cortes to-day represent completely, and of whose honor and sovereignty they are so jealous; but the Cortes cannot oppose our coming to a friendly understanding for the termination of the struggle, the cabinet of Washington interposing its good offices, which we accept with gratitude, to induce the Cubans, who, residing in the United States, are in correspondence with the insurgents, to pursuade them to lay down their arms, assuring and promising them that Spain will give them amnesty and full liberties, and will summon to Madrid the legitimate representatives of that ultramarine province. These can set forth frankly their grievances, and make known their aspirations, which being, as they of course will be, those of the immense majority of the islanders, cannot fail to be satisfied without having recourse to violence, and solely by the infallible, legal, and peaceful means which a constitution so free as ours provides.

It is upon this point alone, I repeat, that a rectification is necessary. On the others I am agreed. You will, however, permit me to explain briefly a few of them.

In regard to the negotiations with other powers on the subject of your note, I said the current rumor was false. As Spain will not negotiate with the United States upon a subject like that of Cuba, which relates to its internal policy and government, neither will she negotiate with any other power. If Spain hopes to preserve Cuba united to the metropolis, it is because she trusts that a majority of the islanders regard it still an honor and a privilege to be Spaniards, and because she trusts that the few insurgents will soon be brought to terms, if not by persuasion, by force, however painful it would be to us to continue to employ this means. It is likewise inexact that we have transmitted a copy of your note to any foreign government.

As to the armistice, I do not think I said I desired it, but that I desired peace; but as it is evident that he who desires the end desires the means, it is also true that I desire the armistice if this is necessarily an effective means of obtaining peace. In this sense, I will write to the Captain General of Cuba, but can only suggest to him the propriety of an armistice, if it is to terminate in pacification. I cannot make it an order, because only he who holds the chief command of an armed force, and upon whom depend the lives of so many men and the issue of the campaign, ought to decide if an armistice is proper and opportune.

Finally, with or without armistice, you know what Spain promises and is disposed to grant to the insurgents. They have only to ask for peace, and they will have it ; and with peace, all the promises heretofore mentioned truly and loyally fulfilled. If they do not want peace, the war will continue with energy and activity on our part, but pardoning the vanquished and prisoners, and striving to avoid all shedding of blood through revenge, and all reprisals, however horrible and cruel may be the acts of the insurgents.

I have nothing more to add, except to beg anew that you will insist upon being authorized to withdraw your note, and that it may be withdrawn. This will be the best way to enable Spain, without its being said that she yields to any pressure, to give most freely what she offers. In this way it can be gratefully accepted in Cuba, and in this way our moderation (blandura) cannot be censured in Spain as unworthy weakness. Mr. Valera said it might be necessary to add a word or two which had been omitted in our yesterday's interview. Mr. Becerra might put in still stronger language the intention of the government to make full reparation for the outrageous execution of Speakman and Wyeth at Santiago. Admiral Topete was much incensed when he read General Sickles's note on the subject, saying that the matter must be instantly investigated, and if Palacios, the governor, had been guilty of the brutality charged, he should be removed and punished.

Another word might possibly be added in regard to the gunboat question. This is a much graver cause of preoccupation than General Sickles's note. It is true the bases contained in that note are not acceptable, and cannot be entertained; he could say this with certainty now, as both Messrs. Prim and Silvela had answered in that sense;