matter. So long as the area of slavery is not extended, it cannot signify to us whether San Domingo is in the hands of revolted or reconciled colonists. In one way we may rejoice at what has happened. Spain is rising in the world, and if she rises much more she will claim to be consulted in European affairs; but this claim can hardly be allowed so long as she parades her insolvency, and she may therefore gladden the hearts of English bondholders by paying her debts, in order to gain admission into the councils of Europe.

The Schleswig-Holstein dispute still rages without any appearance of approaching a conclusion. The Danes have unfortunately committed the folly of resorting to an unworthy subterfuge. They have long ago acknowledged the right of Germany to interfere to see that justice is done to Holstein, and they have been brought to allow that justice to Holstein involves a permission to the Holsteiners to have a voice in fixing their own taxation. About a year ago the Federal Diet issued a series of demands, which ended in a peremptory claim that the budget of the current year should be submitted to the estates of Holstein. The Danish Government kicked hard at this, but Germany, through Prussia, appealed to the sense of justice in the three powers, England, France, and Russia, who were endeavouring to put an end to the dispute; and these powers decided against Denmark, by saying that the budget must be submitted to the estates. To the surprise of every one, the Danes replied that it had been submitted already. 'To no one was this more unexpected news than to the members of the estates. They asked the Royal Commissioner present at the sitting, whether it had been submitted or not, and he replied that he did not know. Afterwards it turned out that what the Danish Government meant was, that a general proposal for the submission of the budget, not of this year, but of a different period, had been put as a clause into a bill of a more gene

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ral character. It is not by such poor artifices as this that Denmark will avert a war if she dreads one, or enlist the sympathy of Europe on her side in case war breaks out in accordance with her wishes. The whole business looks very much as if Denmark longed for a war in which her powerful friends would secure her from harm, while the mere fact of war would release her from her engagements to Germany. On the other hand, it must be allowed that the estates of Holstein are equally disinclined to treat Denmark fairly, and to come to a peaceful and honourable settlement. They have announced their intention of rejecting all proposals whatever made by Denmark, until they get their way as to the union of Schleswig. This is abandoning all the sure ground of legal claims for the vague region of national sympathies, and we cannot expect that Denmark should waste her time further in efforts at reconciliation which are beforehand doomed to failure. It is now incumbent on Prussia, as the representative of Germany, to discountenance the Holsteiners in a course of resistance that is open to so many objections.

Prussia has very good reason for avoiding war if she can. She has now ceased to act cordially with Austria, and her demand for the leadership of the Northern Federal troops in time of war has been rejected by the Cabinet of Vienna. Unless, therefore, she is prepared to defy Austria, it cannot be to her advantage to provoke a contest in which Federal rules and feelings would necessarily play so large a part, and where the pettiness of the enemy would prevent the inclination to let Prussia lead, which might arise in the crisis of a great war. Posen, too, must make Prussia anxious. It is true that the disturbances at Warsaw have ended in the easy triumph of the military and in the massacre of a great number of unarmed citizens. Russia has no immediate danger to fear from Poland; neither has Prussia. But it is a source of immense anxiety to every country, and espe

X X

cially to a country so weak as Prussia, to feel that there is a vulnerable heel in one province; and that a portion of the nation cannot be depended on in the hour of need.

The Hungarian Diet met at Buda on the 6th of April. After an hour's sitting at that place it adjourned to Pesth. This circumstance, trifling in itself, assumes a considerable importance as a sign of the relations between Austria and Hungary. By the laws of 1848, it was provided that the Diet should meet at Pesth; but the Emperor had announced that it was to meet at Buda, which, as a fortified place, was considered more favourable to the Government. The Emperor some time ago is said to have intended to have been present in person at the opening of the Diet, but he subsequently abandoned the intention of placing himself in a position where anything like defeat or opposition might so easily have compromised his dignity. As the Emperor was not to be there, and as no Palatine can assume a legal footing before the king has been crowned, the proper functionary to open the Diet was the Judex of the Hungarian curia. The question whether so peculiarly local and legal a functionary should be created, was long and anxiously debated at Vienna. The Ministers most anxious for the preservation of the supreme authority of the Emperor strenuously resisted a concession that they considered inconsistent with their general policy. But the party that advocated concession prevailed, and Count Apponyi was appointed Judex. When he arrived at Pesth he was informed by the deputies that they unanimously requested to be allowed to sit there, and not at Buda. The matter was referred by telegraph to Vienna; and after a short hesitation the request was granted, although, in order to save the Emperor's honour, it was ordered that the Diet should be formally opened at Buda. When the Diet was opened, the Emperor proved his title to be king by presenting the

acts of abdication of his uncle and father, and thus acknowledged that ever since his accession to the Imperial throne he has governed as a conqueror, and not as a legal and constitutional sovereign. There was nothing on which the Hungarians had more fixed their hearts than on obtaining this acknowledgment; and thus the very opening of the Diet involved concessions being made to them on three points.

Europe may well ask where will concession stop? How can the Emperor avoid the great dilemma which now stares him in the face? The Hungarians, with very few exceptions, all want the same thing. Both those who are called moderates, headed by M. Deak, and those who are called ultras, headed by Count Teleki, agree in asking that the union between Hungary and Austria shall be merely a personal one. The Emperor of Austria is to be King of Hungary exactly as George I was King of England and Elector of Hanover. This is to be the only connexion between the two countries. Hungary is to be perfectly independent, vote its own taxes, raise its own soldiers, and keep them within its own borders. There can be no doubt that if the constitutional law of Hungary and the Pragmatic Sanction are to be the bases on which the relations of Austria and Hungary are to rest, the Hungarians are perfectly justified, so far as their technical rights amount to a justification, in asking for this. If the Emperor refuses to grant it, he abandons the position of legality, and invades the Hungarian Constitution: if he grants it, the Austrian Empire is at an end. Unless Hungary forms an integral portion of the Empire, the power and prestige of the Empire are gone.

This dilemma presses very hardly, we may be sure, on the Vienna Cabinet, and in order to escape from it two courses are suggested which divide the opinions of the highest Austrian authorities. A portion of the Cabinet urges that it is better to concede everything that the Hungarians can constitutionally

ask, and stake the future of Austria on the chance that the Hungarians, when no longer irritated by the denial of their rights, may see how much they themselves have to gain by the continuance of the Empire, and may be willing to send members to a central representative body. Unfortunately, there seems daily less chance that this policy would prevail if the Hungarians had a free ehoice. It would be advocated probably by M. Deak and the moderate party, including the vast majority of the great landowners. But the more advanced party cherish dreams of patriotic ambition which would not permit them to come to any terms with Austria. They are perfectly willing that the Austrian Empire should fall to pieces. The German provinces would, they think, fall to Prussia, and Venetia to Italy, and all the Sclavonic provinces would cluster round a new and great kingdom of Hungary, which might have a magnificent future before it, and might hope to increase its territory and its importance at the expense of Turkey. This view of the future of Hungary may be very chimerical.

It certainly seems to Englishmen that the disruption of the Austrian Empire would be a great calamity to Europe, and that the Hungarians are throwing away an excellent opportunity of permanently guiding the counsels of a great existing Empire, in order to build up a weak and hypothetical kingdom.

But

however mistaken the view of the more liberal Hungarians may be, yet if they entertain it, and power is placed in their hands by the concessions of Austria, they will succeed in ruining Austria, although they may ruin themselves at the same time.

No wonder, then, that some of the more energetic advisers of the Emperor, among whom General Benedek is the most conspicuous, contend that any further concessions would be a great mistake; and General Benedek has given expression to his opinion in an order addressed to his troops, which speaks of the Hungarian leaders with great contempt, tells the sol

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diers not to trouble themselves about politics, and takes a very military view of the problems of constitutional law. This has given the gravest offence in Hungary, and has largely increased the ill-will that previously existed. General Benedek does not, probably, much regret this. He, and those with whom he acts, call on the Emperor to take a bold course. They wish to look the worst in the face, and to fight, if fighting must come. They think that Austria must be ruined if she does not fight, and may possibly come off tolerably well if she boldly confronts her enemies. Russia is, they think, bound to her by the Polish difficul ties they have in common, and the Germans will not quietly allow the Danube to pass out of the control of a German power, if they once see clearly whither Hungary is tending. Italy will at least give the vast and admirably organized army of Venetia an easy triumph at first, and as to remoter contingencies, Austria must trust to the good fortune that has so often befriended her before.

That a war might possibly suit Austria now, and that the prolongation of peace may give her enemies all they want on very cheap terms, is an opinion that is evidently shared by one of the shrewdest judges of European politics. Count Cavour says distinctly enough that he reckons on getting Venetia without a struggle. Why should the Italians fight, if the Hungarians are going to break in pieces the yoke that presses on the north-east of Italy Time must run in favour of Victor Emmanuel and his subjects, if the Hungarians succeed in virtually separating themselves from Austria. If Hungary is independent, there will be no Austria, and out of the ruin of the Empire Count Cavour can easily pick up the fragment that he wants. This is so obvious, that the Italians have by an overwhelming majority supported the Prime Minister in his policy of delay.

The dissension between Cavour and Garibaldi, which has ended so triumphantly for the former, was

at one time a cause of much anxiety to all the friends of Italy. It might have led to much more serious evils than it has done if Baron Ricasoli had not boldly summoned Garibaldi to declare himself, and no longer to leave it doubtful whether he intended to assume a position incompatible with the authority of the King and inconsistent with the duties of a private citizen. Probably no other man in Italy would have had the courage and moral weight to make such a demand in a shape that forced Garibaldi to announce distinctly what he meant and wished to do. It appeared that what he wanted was that there should be a distinct army of the South of Italy, which would have been an irregular force of volunteers under the command of himself and his captains. To have conceded this would have been to concede that an authority independent of the King should levy troops, regulate their movements, and declare war at any moment he pleases. It would also have been to revive under another and very dangerous shape the old separation of the North and South. Count Cavour therefore resisted it with all his energy, and plainly set before the Parliament what was the real issue submitted to them. A very large majority proved that the Italians are capable of understanding the first elements of good government, and there is reason to hope that Garibaldi himself has now arrived at a conviction that he must avoid a rupture with the King's Government, unless he wishes to undo all that he has done.

In the masterly State Paper which Count Cavour has sent for the consideration of Lord John Russell, and which contains an elaborate statement of the present position and policy of Italy, he expresses a confident hope that the day is not very distant when the breach between the Papacy and the kingdom of Italy will be healed.

He expects that before long the present Pope or his successor will accept the proposal, to have a complete ecclesiastical independence secured on condition of the surrender of the temporal power. It appears that only a few weeks ago this proposal was actually entertained not unfavourably by the Court of Rome itself, and negotiations were entered into with Count Cavour in order to ascertain whether the preliminaries of a final arrangement could be agreed on. Subsequently the Pope got frightened, and was overborne by those among his advisers who counsel unbending and unvarying resis tance to every project of change. The negotiator was disavowed and even exiled, and the Pope is as furious as ever against the robber of the Church. But it is not impossible that Count Cavour may succeed after all in effecting an amicable arrangement. A very large, influential, and increasing section of the Italian clergy, numbering even members of the Pope's household, are strongly bent on attaching themselves to the national cause, and abandoning the temporal power as superfluous and a cause of endless embarrassments. The time must also soon come when the Pope will cease to be able to pay his way. It is a marvel how he has found money up to the present time. But as his whole territorial income is less than one half of the interest of his debt, the end of his solvency cannot be very far off, and this end will undoubtedly be hastened by the great expenses of the army which, in defiance of the dictation of the commonest prudence, his more warlike counsellors insist on being kept up. When his money is gone and he finds how many of the clergy among his countrymen are in favour of surrender on equitable terms, it is not impossible that he may return to the frame of mind in which he despatched Dr. Pantaleone to Turin.