the necessity of some other means of determining such controversies, were the primal causes for the institution of courts with power to adjudge between the parties to the strife, and, consequently, that originally the exercise of judicial power implied the existence of an actual present controversy to be determined. But the refinements of civilized life and the necessity for the orderly regulation, determination and protection of human affairs and rights of property have long required the extension of the judicial power beyond the settlement of controversies which have actually arisen, so as to include the function of providing security against disputes and claims which may arise. Hence, in modern times the power of the courts may be, and often is, exerted to protect property and rights from possible, though at the time unknown, hostile claims and pretensions, or to merely declare a status, or right, and thereby to forestall and prevent controversies which, but for the judicial declaration, might arise in the course of future transactions or proceedings. In the case provided for by the McEnerney act, the total destruction of all the public records and muniments of title had endangered all real property, had exposed land titles to any sort of false claims, and had made it impossible for any land owner to prove or exhibit his title in the usual manner, if he wished to dispose of or mortgage his land, or defend his title in court. It therefore became necessary to provide for the establishment of a new record 48 title. In the case of the Torrens law the plan for a new method of registering and transferring titles made it necessary that the absolute title should first be established and declared. In each case a status, or right, was to be established, declared and made conclusive, as the foundation for subsequent proceedings and transactions. This was a sufficient cause for placing the property to be thus affected within the jurisdiction of the court as a res, the ultimate right and title to which could be there adjudicated, after reasonable notice to all possible claimants to appear and assert their claims. Whether or not this is strictly an exercise of judicial power, as originally instituted, it cannot be denied that it is a power of the class which, from time immemorial, has been committed to and exercised by the courts. At the time the constitution was adopted this class of powers had long been usually exercised by the courts alone. It must be presumed that in providing therein for the division of governmental power into

three departments, legislative, executive and judicial, and declaring that no person charged with the exercise of the powers belonging to one of them should exercise functions appertaining to either of the others, this usual power of the courts was in mind, and that it was intended that the courts should continue to exercise these quasi-judicial powers, as they had previously been accustomed to do. A law which merely creates a new occasion and provides a new procedure for the exercise of this power cannot be said to transgress this clause of the constitution.

Furthermore, in such matters, there is always a possibility that there may be a hostile claim or dispute as to the right to be established. If it were necessary to find further justification for classing this power as judicial, this circumstance would be sufficient. A hostile claim being possible, there is, in contemplation of law, an adverse claim to be settled, a right to be protected against the possible claimant, for which a judicial decree is the only practicable and effectual remedy.

3. The claim is made, although not argued, that by sections 48, 49, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67 and 68 of the act the registrar is given judicial powers. These sections require the registrar to note upon the duplicate certificate of title 49 in his office the existence and general character of instruments creating liens, encumbrances, trusts, powers or leases affecting the land described in the certificate. The point is that the registrar is required to determine the legal effect of these instruments, and that this is a judicial function which can be given only to a judicial officer. There is no force to the objection. Every administrative officer is frequently called upon, in the discharge of his duties, to decide questions of law relating thereto. The recorder is required to determine whether an instrument presented for record. is a deed, a mortgage, a lease, a notice of action, or what not, so as to record it in its proper book. The sheriff must often determine, for his own guidance in making a levy, the ownership of property. The clerk must determine the nature and legal effect of papers filed with him, and perform the appropriate duty respecting them. The duties required of the registrar by these sections are of the same nature. His decision in the matter is not conclusive. If he decides wrongfully and refuses to perform the appropriate duty in the premises, he may be compelled to act Am. St. Rep., Vol. 121-7

properly by means of a writ of mandamus, the same as any other ministerial officer who mistakes his duty under the law and refuses to perform it. The exercise of such powers by ministerial officers is a necessary function of the executive department, and although it may require similar deliberation to that involved in the exercise of judicial power, the bestowal of such powers upon the executive department does not violate the provisions of the constitution forbidding that department to exercise the functions of any other department: People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L. R. A. 801; Land Owners v. People, 113 Ill. 296; 1 Story on Constitution, 5th ed., sec. 525.

4. It is claimed that the act is special because it makes special provisions regarding the statute of limitations, the rights of purchasers in good faith of land registered under the act, and other matters peculiar to the lands which are brought within its provisions. We perceive no merit in this contention. The fact that the land thus registered may be conveyed and transferred by means different from that required as to other lands, and the necessity of a special proceeding as a foundation for the system, creates a separate 50 class of such registered lands, and authorizes special provisions of law on the subject, applying only to such registered lands, the owners thereof, or persons interested therein, or to the procedure whereby the system is to be inaugurated.

5. The claim is also made that the act violates the provision of section 24 of article 4 of the constitution, that "Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title."

The title of the act is "An act for the certification of land titles and the simplification of the transfer of real estate. The act makes it a felony to fraudulently procure a false certificate of title under the act, or to fraudulently obtain any false entry thereunder: Secs. 111, 112. The county recorder is constituted the registrar under the act, and required to perform the duties of registrar: Sec. 1. The official bond of the recorder is made to cover his duties as registrar: Sec. 2. The registrar is prohibited from practicing law: Sec. 4. The filing of the petition to establish title operates as a lis pendens: Sec. 11. The decree is made final and conclusive: Sec. 17. Liens are not to become effective on registered land until their entry on the duplicate certifi

cate in the recorder's office: Secs. 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95. Claims to registered lands cannot be obtained by adverse possession: Sec. 35. Four weeks' constructive notice is all that is required with respect to persons who are unknown: Sec. 12. These provisions relate to the subjects of felonies, county officers, county government, principal and surety, attorneys at law, judgments, liens, procedure and adverse claims, respectively, and it is claimed that the act is void because none of them are mentioned in the title. And it is intimated that if they were mentioned, the law would be contrary to the mandate of the constitution that the act shall embrace but one subject. If the first proposition is well taken, it is certain that the second is also established. But the mere statement of the objection is almost sufficient to refute it. While it is true that none of the subjects thus designated is expressed in the title, they are all germane to the general subject there expressed, and, taken together, they compose a part of the general scheme, and are appropriate to effect the main object of the law. Further examination would have disclosed 51 a large number of such "subjects" in the body of the act which are not mentioned in the title. The same criticism might be made of many acts on a general subject which have always been considered as valid. The act establishing the scheme is the appropriate place for provisions necessary to make it effective and symmetrical. If it were necessary to mention every subdivision of the general subject of an act in the title to the extent here claimed, our statutes would present a somewhat ludicrous appearance. The statement of the subject in the title would generally occupy almost as much space as the act itself. Furthermore, if subjects, as intended by the constitution, must be so minutely subdivided, it would be impracticable to enact any comprehensive law on any general subject, by reason of the necessity of dividing it into so many separate acts. The provision must receive, and it has received, a more liberal construction. The word "subject" is given a broader meaning: People v. Mullender, 132 Cal. 217, 64 Pac. 299. All the provisions objected to as constituting a different subject are reasonably necessary as means for attaining the object of the act indicated by the subject which is expressed, and hence they are considered as included in the title, as subdivisions of the general subject there stated: People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251;

Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057; People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477, 61 Pac. 86; Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73, 74 Pac. 28. We think the title to the act sufficiently expresses the subject to which it relates, and that it embraces but one general subject. We find no sufficient ground for holding the law unconstitutional.

Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed for.

Sloss, J., Henshaw, J., Angellotti, J., McFarland, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.

The Constitutionality of Statutes providing for suits against unknown owners to quiet title to land is discussed in the recent case of Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199, and in the note to McClymond v. Noble, 87 Am. St. Rep. 358. It has been affirmed that a statute which provides that if the owner of land shall fail to pay all arrearages of taxes thereon, the land shall be forfeited to the state without judicial proceedings, has been held unconstitutional as depriving the owner of his property without due process of law: Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co., 133 N. C. 478, 98 Am. St. Rep. 718.

The Constitutionality of the Torrens Land Act has been admitted in State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571; People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175; but denied in State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756.

The Sufficiency of the Title of Statutes within the requirements of the constitution is discussed in the notes to Lewis v. Dunne, 86 Am. St. Rep. 267; Crookson v. County Commissioners, 79 Am. St. Rep. 267; Bobel v. People, 64 Am. St. Rep. 70.

ESTATE OF PLUMEL.

[151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192.]

A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL in Which Some of the Figures Composing the Date are printed is not wholly in the handwriting of the testator, and is therefore void. (pp. 101, 102.)

WILLS, Referring to and Incorporating Therein Other Documents. A will executed in accordance with the requirements of the statute may by appropriate reference incorporate within itself a document or paper not so executed. (p. 102.)

WILLS.-To Incorporate Another Paper in a Will, such paper must be in existence at the execution of the will, and must be referred to therein as an existing paper, so as to be capable of identification. (p. 102.)