300, and note, 81 N. W. 676; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 4 Met. 9, 81 Am. Dec. 521; United States F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Ramberly, 34 Md. 224, 6 Am. St. Rep. 325; Angier v. Western Assur. Co., 10 S. Dak. 82, 66 Am. St. Rep. 685, and note, 71 N. W. 761; Doud v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 141 Pa. 47, 23 Am. St. Rep. 263, 21 Atl. 805, 45 L. R. A. 204; Adair v. Southern M. I. Co., 107 Ga. 297, 73 Am. St. Rep. 122, 33 S. E. 78; Springfield F. & M. I. Co. v. Wade, 95 Tex. 598, 93 Am. St. Rep. 870, 68 S. W. 977, 58 L. R. A. 714; North B. M. I. Co. v. Union Stockyards Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep. 852, 87 S. W. 285; Springfield F. & M. I. Co. v. McLemans, 28 Neb. 846, 45 N. W. 171; Gates v. Madison County Ins. Co., 5 N. Y. 469, 55 Am. Dec. 360.

While in the case of Leggett v. Insurance Co., 10 Rich. 202, stress was laid on the fact that the action was for insurance on a stock of goods and not on the building in which they were contained, and that, therefore, some of the provisions of the policy similar to those here under consideration had no application, yet in that case the court of appeals approved a charge to the effect that an increase of risk permanent and continuous took away the benefit of the policy, even though it did not produce the loss, but that "an occasional temporary increase of risk took away only the right to complain of loss which it had occasioned, and did not affect the right to recover for a loss with which it was in no way concerned."

Some of the cases above cited from other states seem to go to the extent of holding that a temporary increase of hazard would not prevent a recovery on the policy even where the fire was occasioned by the increased hazard. As to that question we express no opinion as it is not involved in this case.

82 It follows from this discussion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover without respect to the question of waiver, on the facts as proved by the defendant, unless there is some material error as to another defense set up by the defendant.

In proving title to the property plaintiff offered in evidence a deed from William Moran to the Sumter Tobacco and Cotton Warehouse Company, and a charter issued by the Secretary of State to the Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Company, the charter reciting that the original declaration set forth the name of the corporation as the Sumter Tobacco and Cotton Warehouse Company, but this name had been changed to the Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Company. The objection made to the admission of this charter on the ground that section 1884 of Civil Code allows a certified copy of the charter to be received

in evidence, and, therefore, the original charter duly certified. was inadmissible, is so obviously without force that it requires no consideration. The original charter duly certified is of the highest evidence of the incorporation. The defendant could not avail itself of any alleged irregularity in complying with the law in changing the name of the corporation, because under section 1885 of Civil Code such irregularity is available only in a direct proceeding to annul the charter instituted on behalf of the state.

One of the grounds of the motion for a new trial was that the deed of conveyance to the Sumter Tobacco and Cotton Warehouse Company conveying the lot on which the building. stood was insufficient to prove title to the Sumter Warehouse Company. The deed was dated January 16, 1896, after the declaration looking to the charter of the Sumter Tobacco and Cotton Warehouse Company had been filed, but before the charter was actually issued in the name of the Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Company. It is the duty of courts to give effect to deeds made in good faith rather than destroy them on technical grounds. A deed to a corporation made before the charter will have effect as soon as the charter is obtained, on the ground that 83 its acceptance should be presumed as soon as the corporation is competent to accept it: 4 Thompson on Corporations, 5114, 5115. The slight change in the name of the corporation can make no difference. Certain it is that Moran, the grantor, would not be heard to allege against the validity of the deed on the ground taken by the defendant; and for a greater reason the defendant company, which had no interest in the land, after having issued its policy and having received its premium from the plaintiff as the owner of the property, cannot be allowed to do so. It would needlessly lengthen this opinion to review the cases relied on by the defendant; they are all different in their facts and are not applicable to this case. To hold that the slight change in the name of the corporation should defeat the deed would be to refuse to regard the intention of all parties concerned for the sake of an attenuated technicality.

It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

A Fire Insurance Company is liable if the premises are occupied when they are burned, although they may have been vacant during the life of the policy. The insurance is revived by the occupancy,

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 121-60

though suspended during the vacancy: Insurance Co. v. Pitts, 88 Miss. 587, 117 Am. St. Rep. 756. The temporary cessation of a mill for want of water-power does not avoid the insurance thereon: Waukan Mill Co. v. Citizens etc. Ins. Co., 130 Wis. 47, 118 Am. St. Rep. 998; and the mortgaging of insured property does not avoid the policy, provided the mortgage is discharged prior to a loss: Born v. Home Ins. Co., 110 Iowa, 379, 80 Am. St. Rep. 300, and see the note thereto.

COOPER v. RICHLAND COUNTY.

[76 S. C. 202, 56 S. E. 958.]

NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause.-If a horse while being driven along a public highway and across a b.idge catches his foot in a hole or break in the bridge, from which he cannot extricate it, his position is the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the county, and if the owner, acting as a reasonable and prudent man, goes to the assistance of his horse, and in attempting to rescue him is himself injured by the horse falling on him, his injury is also the proximate result of the negligence of the county. (p. 948.)

NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-Under a statute relating to liability for defects in highways, and providing that plaintiff shall not recover when he has in any way brought about the injury or damage by his own act, to bar a recovery the act of the person injured must be the efficient, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury. (p. 949.)

F. G. Tompkins and E. M. Clarkson, for the appellant.

Thomas & Thomas, for the appellee.

203 GARY, J. This is an action under section 1347 of the Code of Laws, which is as follows: "Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damage in his person or property through a defect or in the negligent repair of a highway, causeway, or bridge, may recover in an action against the county, the amount of actual damage sustained by him by reason thereof: Provided, Such person has not in any way brought about such injury or damage by his own act, or negligently contributed thereto. If such defect in any road, causeway, or bridge existed before such injury or damage occurred, such damage shall not be recovered by the person so injured, if his load exceeded the ordinary weight: Provided, further, That such county shall not be liable unless such defect was occasioned by its neglect or mismanagement."

The material allegations of the complaint are: That while the plaintiff was being driven in his buggy along the public

highway and across the bridge his horse caught his foot in a hole or break in the bridge, which became so firmly fastened that it became necessary for the plaintiff to go to the assistance of his horse in order to extricate his foot, and that while plaintiff was trying to get his horse out of said hole, the horse fell upon the plaintiff and thereby broke his leg; and that the said injury was caused by the negligent failure of the county to keep the said bridge in repair. That the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the negligence and mismanagement of the defendant as above set out, and without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, nor did he negligently contribute thereto.

The defendant demurred to the complaint on the following grounds: "1. It does not appear therein that the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was a defect in the repair of a highway or bridge; it appearing, on the contrary, that the proximate 204 cause of plaintiff's injury was his own act in trying to extricate his horse's foot from a hole in the bridge, in which it had become fastened, his horse falling upon him while so engaged, and thus causing his injury, for which injury so caused defendant is not liable; 2. It is not alleged therein that the plaintiff did not in any way bring about his injury or damage by his own act, nor negligently contribute thereto."

Both grounds of demurrer were sustained and the complaint dismissed.

The first question that will be considered is whether there was error in sustaining the ground of demurrer numbered 1.

What in law is a proximate cause is well expressed in the definition found in the case of Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 474, 24 L. ed. 256: "The primary cause may be the proximate cause of a disaster, though it operates through successive instruments, as an article at the end of a chain may be moved by force applied to the other end, that force being the proximate cause of the movement, or as in the oftcited case of the squib thrown in the market-place: Acott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Black. 892. The question always is, Was there any unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?" This definition is quoted with approval in Mack v. Railroad, 52 S. C.

324, 68 Am. St. Rep. 913, 29 S. E. 905, 40 L. R. A. 679. This court then says: "There may be a succession of intermediate causes, each produced by the one preceding, and producing the one following it. It must appear that the injury was the natural consequence of the wrongful act or omission. The new independent intervening cause must be one not produced by the wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Whether the natural connection of 205 events was maintained or was broken by such new independent cause is generally a question for the jury."

The rule is thus stated in Harrison v. Berkeley, 1 Strob. 525, 549, 47 Am. Dec. 578: "It is therefore required that the consequences to be answered for should be natural as well as proximate: 7 Bing. 211; 5 Barn. & Adol. 645. By this I understand not that they should be such as upon a calculation of chances would be likely to occur, nor such as extreme prudence might anticipate, but only that they should be such as have actually ensued one from another, without the occurrence of any such extraordinary conjuncture of circumstances, or the intervention of any such extraordinary result as that the usual course of nature should seem to have been departed from. In requiring concurring consequences that they should be proximate and natural to constitute legal damage, it seems that in proportion as one quality is strong may the other be dispensed with; that which is immediate cannot be considered unnatural; that which is reasonably to be expected will be regarded, although it may be considerably removed: Bennett v. Lockwood, 20 Wend. 223, 32 Am. Dec. 532." This language is quoted with approval in the case of Pickens v. South Carolina & G. R. Co., 54 S. C. 498, 32 S. E. 567.

Indeed, the rule is well settled, but the difficulty arises in its application to the facts of the particular case.

It unquestionably appears from the allegations of the complaint that the injury to the horse was the direct and proximate result of negligence on the part of the defendant. The conduct of the plaintiff, in attempting to rescue his horse from the dangerous position in which it was placed by the alleged wrongful act of the defendant, cannot be said to have been an independent agency in causing injury to the plaintiff if he acted in such a manner as was naturally and reasonably to be expected under the circumstances.