unauthorized, but, on the contrary, states that he gave his consent, and it nowhere appears from this record that such consent was ever afterward withdrawn or attempted to be withdrawn.

It is apparent from the facts presented on the two records that the decision in Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 230 Ill. 334, 82 N. E. 837, heretofore referred to, is conclusive as to the merits of the cross-bill in this case. In that case it is shown that appellant had been paid in full all that he is entitled to under said deed of trust, and he did not claim in that case, and has not alleged or claimed in this case, that he is in any way injured by the ruling of the court in the original proceedings. It is true that in this case, as in the other, he charges, in his brief, secret agreements between the Northern Trust Company and the Merrimac Building Company, and claims that the original bill to foreclose was brought solely for the benefit of said trust company and its attorneys, but he has not shown in that proceeding, or in this, how he has been injured thereby. The jurisdiction of a court of equity to give the relief asked for in the original proceedings in the other case or on this cross-bill even if it appeared (which it does not) that there had been collusion between the parties, as alleged-could only be invoked by appellant 28 if it was shown "that the collusive acts have done an injury" to him: First Baptist Church v. Syms, 51 N. J. Eq. 363, 28 Atl. 461; Central Trust Co. v. Peoria etc. Ry. Co., 104 Fed. 420, 43 C. C. A. 613.

As we understand this record, appellant's only basis of claim for injury by the issuing of said order of June 25, 1902, is, that the Northern Trust Company should have insisted on strict forfeiture of the lease. Appellant does not deny that he signed an agreement waiving this forfeiture, and that he authorized the bill of foreclosure in the original proceedings, which amounted to a waiver of notice to forfeit: Wood on Landlord and Tenant, sec. 46; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 382-384, and cases there cited. He complains that certain agreements of his attorneys in filing the bill for foreclosure in the original proceedings and in entering the decree therein were not authorized by him. He does not deny that they were authorized to act as his attorneys, and he does not here or in the original proceedings show wherein they misled him or in any way acted without authority. He signed the agreement of March 15, 1898, sub

stantially waiving any right which he may have had to a strict forfeiture, and never raised any question in this regard until he filed, years after, his answer and cross-bill herein. To insist upon a strict forfeiture of this lease under these circumstances would be most harsh and unjust. On the facts presented by this record we think this delay amounts to such laches as to preclude him from now raising this question.

The appellant is barred by his own acts from raising the question as to the right of the Merrimac Building Company to take an assignee under said lease (Coquard v. National Linseed Oil Co., 171 Ill. 480, 49 N. E. 563), as he is also barred from questioning the authority of the Northern Trust Company to act as trustee under said deed of trust.

The judgment of the appellate court will be affirmed.

The Nature and Objects of Cross-bills are discussed in the note to Hurd v. Case, 83 Am. Dec. 251. Cross-bills ordinarily grow out of matters alleged in an original bill or complaint, and are used to bring the whole dispute before the court, usually raising new issues which may present matters arising between codefendants, but which are not shown by the original bill or complaint: Jewett v. Iowa Land Co., 64 Minn. 531, 58 Am. St. Rep. 555. A cross-bill depends on the original suit, and can be sustained only on matters growing out of and germane to it: Griffin v. Fries, 23 Fla. 173, 11 Am. St. Rep. 351.

CULVER v. OSBORNE.

[231 Ill. 104, 83 N. E. 110.]

USURY-Recovery of Usurious Interest Paid.-If a note containing usury has been assigned before maturity, to an innocent purchaser, and the defense of usury thereby cut off, and compelling the maker to pay the note to the assignee, the usurious interest paid may be recovered of the assignor. (p. 303.)

USURY-Recovery of Usurious Interest.-If a note is given upon usurious interest and passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser before maturity without notice of the usury, and is by him collected, the payment by the maker to the assignee is regarded as compulsory and not voluntary, and equity will require the original payee to pay to the maker the usurious interest included in the note. (pp. 303, 304.)

Dickinson & Lee and Redmon & Hogan, for the plaintiff in

error.

C. E. Schroll, for the defendant in error.

107 SCOTT, J. The master found that there was usury in the contract, and that the principal of the promissory note, assigned by plaintiff in error to his brother, was not greater than the usurious accumulations of the interest with which defendant in error had been charged up to the time that note was given. It is here insisted that this finding is clearly against the evidence. We have examined the proof taken as the same is set out in the abstract, and are entirely satisfied with the finding of the master upon this question.

It is next contended that where usurious interest has been paid it cannot be recovered. This is not the rule where, as in this case, the promissory note containing the usury has been assigned, before maturity, to an innocent purchaser and the defense of usury thereby cut off, and where the maker has been compelled to pay the note to the assignee.

In Woodworth v. Huntoon, 40 Ill. 131, 89 Am. Dec. 340, it was held that where a promissory note is given upon usurious consideration and passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the defense and is by him collected, the payment by the maker to the assignee will be regarded as compulsory and not voluntary, and equity will require the 108 original payee to pay to the maker the usurious interest included in the note,

In the case of House v. Davis, 60 Ill. 367, promissory notes containing usury had been assigned before maturity and by the assignee reduced to judgment against the maker, who then filed a bill against the original payee and the assignee, charging that the assignee had notice of the usury at the time the notes were transferred to him, and seeking an injunction to prevent the collection of the usury. In the circuit court it was held that the proof did not sustain the charge that the assignee had notice of the usury when he acquired the notes, and for that reason the bill was dismissed as to him, and thereafter that court rendered a decree requiring that the original payee of the notes bring into court the amount of the usury, and that the maker of the notes bring into court the balance of the judgment, by a day named, for the purpose of satisfying the debt to the assignee. The original payee appealed to this court, where the decree of the lower court was reversed, for the reason that the case made by the evidence was not that stated by the bill, and for the further reason that the court required the payment of money for the satisfaction of the judgment

of the assignee after the latter had been dismissed and when no control could be exercised over him by the court. It was said, however, that the bill should be amended to correspond with the facts, when the maker of the notes should be permitted to bring the amount of the judgment, and interest thereon, into court for the benefit of the assignee, and then he (the maker) would be entitled to recover the usury from the payee.

It follows that the judgment of the appellate court is correct, and it will accordingly be affirmed.

The Defense of Usury cannot, according to some decisions, be asserted against a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument: Lynchburg Nat. Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652, 50 Am. St. Rep. 860, but see the cases cited in the cross-reference note thereto.

BENES v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF

HONOR.

[231 Ill. 134, 83 N. E. 127.]

BENEFIT SOCIETIES-Estoppel to Plead Suicide By-law.If a by-law of a benefit society preventing the recovery of the benefit of a member who commits suicide is in force at the time that a person becomes a member of such society, the fact that it was not contained in a printed copy of the constitution and by-laws of the society furnished such person before he joined the society, and that the other members of his lodge did not know of the existence of such by-law, does not estop the society from pleading it in defense to a suit to recover the benefit of the member who committed suicide. (p. 305.) BENEFIT SOCIETIES-Presumption as to Member's Knowledge of By-laws.-Persons belonging to a mutual benefit association are conclusively presumed to know what the provisions of the laws adopted by the association are, where such laws are a part of the contract of insurance. (pp. 305, 306.)

Action to recover the amount of a benefit certificate issued by the Supreme Lodge, Knights and Ladies of Honor, to one John Benes, who, while a member of such organization, died by committing suicide. Among the by-laws of such organization was one providing that, "If any member of the order whose relief fund certificate bears date after this section goes into effect, shall, within five years after becoming a member, die by his or her own hand, whether at the time of the act sane or insane, the relief fund certificate of such member shall

become null and void and the payment of no part of the sum named therein shall be made."

Such by-law was in full force and effect at the time that Benes became a member of such organization and received his benefit certificate, and it continued to remain in full force and effect up to and including the time that he committed suicide. Judgment for the defendant organization and the plaintiff appealed by writ of error.

C. D. Lusk and D. C. Jones, for the plaintiff in error. Ashcraft & Ashcraft and E. M. Ashcraft, for the defendant in error.

138 SCOTT, J. The laws adopted by defendant in error fixing the rights and obligations of its members were a part of the contract made with John Benes. Under those laws there could be no recovery in this case, for the reason that the insured took his own life. Plaintiff in error contends that the association is estopped to interpose this provision of its laws as a defense by reason of facts averred by her replication, to the effect that prior to the time when Benes made application for membership in the order he applied to the officers of the subordinate lodge of which he afterward became a member for a copy of the constitution and by-laws of defendant in error, and that these officers gave to him a document which purported to be, and which they represented to be, a printed copy of the constitution and by-laws of defendant in error; that the defendant in error had caused the pamphlet to be printed and issued to subordinate lodges and distributed among the members thereof for the purpose of acquainting them with the constitution and by-laws and with all the laws, rules and regulations of the order; that, relying upon the printed copy so furnished him as containing all the laws of the order, Benes made application and became a member of the subordinate lodge, and neither he nor any other member of the lodge which he joined knew of the existence of any law of the order other than such as were contained in the said printed copy, and that there was 139 therein no law, rule or regulation from which it appeared that suicide by a member would under any circumstance bar a recovery upon his benefit certificate.

Persons belonging to a mutual benefit association, or a fraternal beneficiary society, as it is denominated by our Am. St. Rep., Vol. 121-20