INDEX.

ABATEMENT.

ABATEMENT, Plea of in Suit to Quiet Title.-An action to
quiet title is properly abated as to a defendant when it appears
that a prior action brought by the plaintiff against such defendant
to quiet title to the same property is still pending. (Cal.) Chapman
v. Moore, 130.

See Divorce, 10-12.

ACCRETIONS.

See Waters and Watercourses, 5.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

See Deeds, 4-6.

ACTIONS.

ACTIONS.-Advice of Counsel does not bar an action, nor is
it any defense to one for actual damages caused by a wrongful act,
but is limited to mitigation of vindictive damages. (Colo.) Richards
v. Sanderson, 167.

Note.

See State.

ADMINISTRATION.

See Executors and Administrators.

Administrators and Executors, forcible entry, whether and when may
maintain proceedings for, 376.

ADMIRALTY.

See Collisions.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE, Acquisition of Her Title by His Ad-
verse Possession.-A husband cannot acquire a prescriptive title to
the lands of his wife while they hold joint possession. (Ala.) Hin-
ton v. Farmer, 63.

2. PRESCRIPTIVE TITLE in Favor of a Tenant by the Curtesy.
The husband of a deceased owner of real property having as such a
title therein as tenant by the curtesy cannot acquire prescriptive
title as against the remaindermen. (Ala.) Hinton v. Farmer, 63.

3. HUSBAND AND WIFE Adverse Possession Between.-If a
husband claiming title to land under a void tax deed makes a quit-
claim deed thereof to his wife, and they jointly occupy the land, he
thereafter acquiring a patent title thereto, but not asserting title

(1075),

against his wife until after the statute of limitations has run in her
favor, the wife acquires title to the land by adverse possession.
(Neb.) McPherson v. McPherson, 835.

4. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Title by Prescription.-If a husban
has entered into possession of a tract of land under a void tax deed,
and is asserting title in such a manner as to have the benefit of the
occupying claimant's law and the statute relating to title by pre-
scription, and while the statute is running in his favor conveys to his
wife, he cannot interrupt the running of the statute in her favor by
buying in the legal title, unless he asserts that title to the same effect
that his grantor would be required to do. (Neb.) McPherson v. Me-
Pherson, 835.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Statute Requiring Inspection of
Livestock. A statute prohibiting the bringing of cattle into the state
from below its southern line at all seasons of the year unless in-
spected by some inspector authorized by the livestock commissioner
or by the bureau of animal industry of the interior department of
the United States, and passed under a health certificate, and making
persons violating the statute guilty of misdemeanor and punishable,
does not impose an unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce.
(Kan.) State v. Asbell, 345.

Lien for Keeping.

2. ANIMALS-Lien for Keeping-Chattel Mortgage-Priority.—
A chattel mortgage on a team of horses is superior to a lien for car-
ing for and feeding them, unless they were actually delivered to the
lien claimant for that purpose prior to the time of the filing of such
mortgage. (Mich.) Erickson v. Lampi, 607.

3. ANIMALS-Lien for Keeping-Chattel Mortgage Priority.—
If the owner of a team of horses keeps them in the barn of another.
who furnishes the feed to be fed to them on a promise that he shall
be paid therefor, while the team is fed and cared for by the owner's
teamster, there is no such delivery of the team to the owner of the
barn to be kept and cared for as gives him a lien for stable rent and
feed furnished as against a prior and duly filed chattel mortgage on
the team. (Mich.) Erickson v. Lampi, 607.

Grazing on Public or Unfenced Lands.

4. PUBLIC LANDS-Right to Graze Stock upon.-There is an
implied license that the public lands shall be free to the people who
seek to use them for the purpose of grazing stock, so long as the
government does not forbid such use. (Colo.) Richards v. Sander-
son, 167.

5. PUBLIC LANDS-Grazing Stock upon.-The privilege of graz-
ing stock upon the public lands cannot be monopolized by anyone di-
rectly or indirectly, or under claim that he is but protecting his own
land. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

6. ANIMALS-Unfenced Private Lands-Right to Keep Off Tres-
passing Animals.-A person has the right to drive the cattle of an-
other from the unfenced land of the former, exercising that degree
of care to prevent injury thereto that would ordinarily be observed
by a prudent person, but when the cattle cross the line of the land
of such owner onto land belonging to the government, the right to
drive them further ceases. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

7. ANIMALS-Trespassing-Uninclosed Lands.-The principle of
law derived from England, that the owner must prevent his stock
from going upon the uninclosed land of his neighbor, is not applicable
to the vast regions of the public domain which have long been open
to the use of stock-raisers. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

8. PUBLIC LANDS Stock-grazing Privileges-Usual Range.—
In an action to recover for the wrongful driving of cattle from their
usual range on government land, if it is undisputed that the vicinity
from which they were driven was their usual range, it is not neces-
sary to instruct the jury as to the quantum of proof which is re-
quired to establish the fact that the cattle had been willfully driven
from their usual range, nor is it necessary in such case to define the
word "range" when it is undisputed that the government lands from
which they were driven was their usual range. (Colo.) Richards v.
Sanderson, 167.

9. PUBLIC LANDS-Stock-grazing Privileges - Driving from
Usual Range.-Under a statute providing that if any person shall
maliciously drive cattle from their usual range he shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be liable to the party injured in
three times the amount of the actual injury occasioned by the com-
mission of the offense, it is not necessary to establish a cause of ac-
tion that the cattle be driven beyond the limits of the territory with-
in which they may naturally range. Willful driving to any material
extent from public domain within such territory to another locality,
within or without such territory, is a driving from their usual range.
(Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

10. ANIMALS-Grazing Privileges-Uninclosed Lands.-One who
turns his cattle out to graze, unrestrained, upon lands where he has a
right to turn them, knowing that they will probably wander on the
uninclosed lands of another, is under no obligation to prevent them
from entering upon such premises, and if they do so enter through
following their natural instincts, he is not responsible for the dam-
ages occasioned thereby. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

11. ANIMALS-Maliciously Driving Cattle from Usual Range.-
Under a statute providing that if any person shall "maliciously"
drive cattle from their usual range he shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and liable in triple damages, the word "maliciously"
means a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or ex-
cuse. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. APPEAL-Nonprejudicial Rulings.-If a motion to make au
answer more definite and certain is overruled, and there is no restric-
tion as to the admission of evidence under the issues as framed, and
the appellant is not prejudiced by the action of the court, the ruling
will be sustained on appeal. (Colo.) Mosca Town Co. v. Wellington,
175.

2. APPEAL-Admission of Evidence.-A party cannot successfully
complain on appeal of the admission or rejection of evidence which

tends to prove an act that he himself admits he committed. (Colo.)
Richards v. Sanderson, 167.

3. APPEAL.-Findings of the Trial Court are entitled to the
same consideration at the hands of the appellate court as the ver-
diet of a jury. (Colo.) Caughlin v. Campbell-Sell Baking Co., 158.

4. APPEAL-Effect of the Destruction of the Record During the
Pendency of. The fact that the decision and judgment of the appel-
late court were made after the transcript on appeal had been de-
stroyed by fire and without any restoration of it does not make such
judgment or decision or the remittitur issued thereon void. (Cal.)
Estate of Davis, 105.

5. APPEAL.-A Bill of Exceptions Filed After the Time allowed
by order of the trial judge when the final judgment was entered is
not a part of the record. (Tenn.) Nashville Ry. etc. Co. v. Tra-
wick, 996.

6. APPEAL.-Minute Entries are a Part of the Record without a
bill of exceptions, so that assignments of error thereon based may be
considered on appeal. (Tenn.) Nashville Ry. etc. Co. v. Trawick,
996.

7. APPEALS-Class Legislation.-A Statute providing that the
city of Memphis, in prosecuting an appeal or writ of error, shall give
bond, but is released from the obligation of law to furnish security
therefor, is unconstitutional as class legislation. (Tenn.) Malone
v. Williams, 1002.

1.

ATTACHMENT,

ATTACHMENT OF TRUST FUNDS-Deposit in Bank-Knowl-
edge of Trust.-If an attorney collects money as collecting agent for
his clients and deposits it in a bank in his own name as "atty.,"
and the bank has no actual knowledge of the trust relation existing
and of the character of the fund so deposited, it is fully justified in
paying the money over to an officer levying an attachment in an ae-
tion for the collection of a debt against such attorney. (Idaho)
Cunningham v. Bank of Nampa, 257.

2. ATTACHMENT OF TRUST FUNDS-Deposit in Bank-Knowl-
edge of Trust-Right to Recover.-If an attorney collects money as
collecting agent for his clients and deposits it in bank in his own
name as "atty.," and it is afterward attached and levied on for
his debt, he, as trustee for such clients, may maintain an action
against the bank, having notice of the character of the fund, and
against the officer levying the writ, to recover the money for the
use and benefit of the persons beneficially interested therein. (Idaho)
Cunningham v. Bank of Nampa, 257.

Contracts.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Contract to Procure Legislation.-
A contract between a client and his attorney for purely professional
services to be rendered by the latter is not invalid because part of the
services is the procurement of legislative action by legitimate means,
nor because the contract provides for a contingent fee. (Neb.)
Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, 713.

2. CONTRACTS Between Attorney and Client.-An agreement be-
tween attorney and client for professional services to be rendered
by the former in collecting facts, preparing and submitting to the
proper authorities of the United States government arguments upon