994 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting the oil spill was caused by an act or omission of its independent contractor, the tugboat operator, and that the tugboat operator was a "third party" under § 1321 (f) (1). The District Court sustained the defense, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 625 F. 2d 524 (1980). The Court of Appeals relied on its earlier decision in United States v. LeBeouf Brothers Towing Co., 621 F. 2d 787, rehearing denied, 629 F. 2d 1350 (1980). In LeBeouf, the Court of Appeals concluded that the third-party defense contained in § 1321 (f)(1) must be narrowly interpreted. The statute's scheme for preventing and cleaning up oil spills would be undermined if barge owners could escape liability merely by hiring out their operations to tugs and independent contractors. The term "third party" was intended to refer to a complete outsider (e. g., a colliding vessel or a vandal), not an independent contractor whom the vessel owner was responsible for hiring in the first place. While no one can say that the decision of the Court of Appeals places a wholly unreasonable interpretation on the language contained in § 1321 (f)(1), that court itself stated that the term "third party" must be narrowly interpreted. The court's interpretation, however, is not supported by the plain language of the statute, which in its express terms provides a defense whenever the discharge is the result of an act of a "third party." The statute is entirely silent as to what judicial refinements, if any, were intended to be placed on the term "third party." Because the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is legislation of vital importance, and the furnishing of oil for the country's economy is likewise of vital importance, the question presented will continue to arise. The Court of Appeals' interpretation is at odds with the decision reached by the District Court in Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 907 (SDNY 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 584 F. 2d 1151 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, REHNQUIST, J., dissenting 451 U.S. 440 U. S. 959 (1979), where on almost identical facts the Government's claim against a barge owner was dismissed because the owner was found not to be responsible for the oil spill. There is no question that either the barge owner or the tug operator is liable for reimbursement to the Government for expenses incurred by the Coast Guard in cleaning up the oil spill. The Court of Appeals has decided that it should be the barge owner, while the District Court for the Southern District of New York has implicitly decided that it should be the tugboat operator. It seems to me that the Court of Appeals has supplied a good deal of gloss to the statutory language in reaching the result it has; perhaps it is justified in so doing, but certainly it has greatly narrowed the enacted language of Congress on the subject. Since it clearly was not the policy of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to prohibit the movement of oil in barges, but simply to fix responsibility as to which segment of the oil transportation industry should be responsible for reimbursement to the Government for the cost of cleaning up spills, I do not think this is the type of case in which the Court should await a conflict between two Courts of Appeals to resolve the question in point. Though it cannot be said with certainty on the basis of this record, it seems highly probable that contracts such as this, as well as the insurance coverage of the various parties, depend on the way this "third party" exception is construed. Insurance policies and contracts, unlike actual collisions, are frequently matters which are entered into consensually for a period of months or years in reliance upon one or another construction of applicable law. This factor is sufficiently important, when combined with the recognized importance of the enterprise being conducted and the evil at which the legislation is aimed, to justify the Court granting certiorari and giving the issue plenary consideration at this time. No. 80-1163. TRAPPER ET AL. v. NORTH CAROLINA. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 N. C. App. 481, 269 S. E. 2d 680. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id., at 494 (footnote omitted). The effect of this holding was to make this Court, on direct review, the only federal forum available to the accused to monitor state-court compliance with the Fourth Amendment. I dissented in that case and reminded my Brethren that "institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied federal law." Id., at 526. "[O]ur certiorari jurisdiction is inadequate for containing state criminal proceedings within constitutional bounds," because "federal review by certiorari in this Court is a matter of grace, and it is grace now seldom bestowed at the behest of a criminal defendant." Id., at 534. While the lower federal courts by way of habeas corpus are better suited than are we on direct review to assure state-court compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements, we are now duty bound by Stone v. Powell to fulfill this monitoring function. The denial of certiorari in this case demonstrates, however, that the Court will not discharge that duty, because the petition presents a substantial issue whether the North Carolina courts properly applied the Fourth Amendment. I, therefore, dissent from the denial of certiorari and would set this case for argument. I Petitioners were arrested for various crimes connected with the possession, sale, and delivery of marihuana. Deputy BRENNAN, J., dissenting 451 U.S. Sheriff Charlie Carawan, of Hyde County, N. C., first met petitioner Lombardo two years prior to his arrest when Lombardo purchased property about one-half mile from Carawan's home. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13. Lombardo's property is "located adjacent to a paved, rural road and adjacent to the main stream of Fortescue Creek" which is connected to the Intracoastal Waterway. Id., at 13-14. Improvements were made on the property, including construction of rock driveways and a metal gate. Several events caused Carawan to become suspicious of activities on the Lombardo property. First, "Carowan [sic] began to receive reports from some of his acquaintances in the neighborhood that they had begun to hear the sounds of heavy truck and boat engines on and near the Lombardo property," sounds which were "unusual in that area." Id., at 14. In addition, on December 21, 1978, Carawan assisted a boat which was stuck in the mud bottom of Fortescue Creek about one mile from the Lombardo property. Based on his knowledge of the channels of the creek and of the prevailing winds that day, Carawan disbelieved the story of the boat's skipper that he had become disabled in the Pungo River and then drifted into the creek where he ran aground. Id., at 14-16. Sometime thereafter, Carawan motored his small boat near the Lombardo property to observe activities thereon. While doing so, he heard two rifle shots which he believed came from the Lombardo property, one of which apparently passed near him. Id., at 16. These events led Carawan to suspect that the Lombardo property was being used for marihuana smuggling. Id., at 16-17. Accordingly, Carawan arranged for two state troopers to be stationed east and west of the intersection of the rural paved road leading to the Lombardo property and U. S. Highway 264. Id., at 17. On the night of January 13, 1979, Carawan secluded himself 50 yards from the Lombardo gate and observed the property until about midnight, when a truck which appeared to be heavily loaded left the Lom 997 BRENNAN, J., dissenting bardo property. Id., at 17-18. Carawan followed the truck past his own home, where he left his personal car and took his patrol car. He also radioed the two state troopers who were stationed on U. S. Highway 264. After following the truck, which was being driven by petitioner Trapper, Carawan and the state troopers eventually stopped it. Id., at 18. Upon reaching the truck, the two state troopers and Carawan smelled marihuana. Id., at 19. Trapper was then arrested and one of the troopers left for Swan Quarter to obtain a warrant to search the truck. Ibid. The trooper returned at 1:40 a.m. on January 14, 1979, with a warrant. The search of the truck revealed approximately 4,000 pounds of marihuana. Carawan then obtained a warrant "to search the Lombardo double-wide house trailer for marijuana," and "the Lombardo house and curtilage, including a metal storage building was searched and . . . a large quantity of baled and loose marijuana was found and seized from the aforesaid metal building." Id., at 19-20. Prior to trial, petitioners moved to suppress the evidence seized during the two searches on Fourth Amendment grounds. Their motion to suppress was denied. Petitioners then pleaded guilty to various marihuana-related crimes and received suspended sentences. They subsequently appealed the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial judge. 48 N. C. App. 481, 269 S. E. 2d 680 (1980). The court, taking judicial notice that "Hyde County is on the coast of North Carolina in an area which is regularly used by smugglers of marijuana," id., at 486, 269 S. E. 2d, at 683, held that Carawan, as an experienced law enforcement officer, had "reasonable suspicion" that a crime was being committed and thus was authorized to conduct a Terry stop of the truck. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979). The court further concluded that the stop was reasonable in extent and time, and that when the officers smelled marihuana from their outside inspection of |