Anyone who reflects on the subject could cite a dozen instances in which Government has expressed kinship with our religious heritage. Our military services all employ chaplains, and attendance at religious services is compulsory at West Point, Annapolis, and at the Air Force Academy.

Both the Senate and the House employ chaplains and under our rules every day's session must open with prayer.

Since 1954, the Pledge of Allegiance has contained the words "under God."

The use of the phrase "In God we trust" on all our coins has been authorized for almost a hundred years.

Since 1956, our national motto has been officially declared to be "In God We Trust."

Each of our Presidents, from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, upon assuming his office, has asked the protection and help of God.

The preamble to the New York State Constitution begins "We the people of the State of New York, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom," and I understand that similar references to the Almighty appear in every State constitution.

The Declaration of Independence expresses "a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence.'

On the day after the first Congress passed the resolution which became the first amendment, it adopted another resolution calling for the designation of "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer."

In 1952, Congress enacted legislation calling upon the President each year to proclaim a National Day of Prayer.

The income tax laws have always exempted religious organizations and contributions to religious organizations are deductible by individual and corporate taxpayers.

These examples could be multiplied endlessly. They indicate that religion has always been part of the fabric of American life—both private and public. They demonstrate that not since the founding of the Republic has the separation of church and state been held to require rejection of religion by the state.

Under these circumstances, few would anticipate that an attempt. by the New York State Board of Regents to encourage an expression of reverence to God at the beginning of each school day would be assailed as an infringement upon the first amendment. In the words of Chief Judge Desmond, in his opinion for the highest State court in New York upholding the regents' prayer, such a holding is "in defiance of all American history."

Compared to all of the other governmental practices which we have sanctioned for decades, the first amendment implications of this case were inconsequential. While I would like to limit the Court's decision as narrowly as possible, I cannot avoid the apprehension that it has put a new gloss on the first amendment under which every public or governmental manifestation of kinship with religion will be in jeopardy.

Some observers, while avoiding any direct appraisal of the validity of the decision, have suggested that it may be a good decision because it will encourage greater emphasis on religion in the home and church. Of course, the church and family have the primary responsibility for teaching the young the principles of their faith.

The issue raised in this case, however, is not the extent to which religion is to be promoted at home and at church, but the extent to which religion is to be confined to the home and church and excluded from other areas of public life.

In my view it should be a permissible part of the educational curriculum of our schools to promote reverence to God just as it may promote patriotism and other spiritual and moral values. The Supreme Court has held that a student cannot be forced to salute the flag of the United States if it is against his religious principles, but this has never been taken to mean that those who wish to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance must be denied the opportunity.

The Supreme Court would certainly have been expected to strike down any compulsory participation in the regents' prayer by students who objected, but in striking down the prayer itself it has allowed not only dissent, but control of this phase of our educational process by the dissenters. This goes beyond neutrality between the faiths or between believers and nonbelievers and I do not myself understand how any such negation of religion in the public schools will serve to stimulate an interest in and awareness of religion among young Americans.

It is for these reasons that I am sympathetic to proposals for a constitutional amendment. I recognize, at the same time, that we are in a very delicate area and I will say to those who have used this decision as an excuse for another massive assault upon the Supreme Court that nothing could, in my judgment, be more misguided or destructive of any hopes for action. One can disagree with a decision of the Court without impugning the motives, integrity of good faith of the Justices of our High Tribunal. Vituperative denunciation of the Court or any of its members is out of harmony with the subject matter of our concern and will completely discredit attempts to modify or clarify the Court's decision.

There are two axioms which I insist upon as a predicate for action: First, that we must not weaken the status or independence of the Supreme Court and, second, that we must not impair the true doctrine of church-state separation rather than isolation. If we proceed in a constructive and moderate spirit, I am confident we can deal with this problem without undermining either the first amendment or the Supreme Court. If, on the other hand, we proceed recklessly or vindictively, only harm can result and these hearings will have served no useful purpose.

In conclusion, I would like to read into the record one letter from a constituent which sums up very well my own sentiments. It was sent to me by Mr. and Mrs. Arthur W. Carney just 1 day after the Court's decision. Art Carney is a well-known television artist. This is what their letter says:

JUNE 26, 1962.

DEAR SENATOR KEATING: The recent constitutional interpretation passed by the Supreme Court of the United States of America regarding prayers said in the public schools is an intolerable one. It is hard to believe that any peoples who truly acknowledge and love a supreme being, no matter what their religious affiliation, could possibly interpret our Constitution in this manner, when it was written not to eliminate or reduce our spirtual concepts, but to incorporate them into the very fabric of America. The United States has been tireless in its efforts to desegregate the public schools, because, in "God's sight," all are created equal, and should have equal opportunity. We recognize the importance of "God's sight" and yet ignore it when it involves God himself. To pray is to

communicate with God.

If this is made unconstitutional in any area of the lives

of Americans, we feel our country is in jeopardy.

Very truly yours,

(S) Jean and Arthur W. Carney,
Mr. and Mrs. ARTHUR W. CARNEY.

I would add to the letter from the Carneys only one thought in conclusion. That is that the officials in New York will obey the Court's decision unless and until it is modified by a subsequent ruling or a constitutional amendment. This they have already made clear and I respect them for their forbearance and respect for the law of the land. It is in this wholesome spirit that our difficulties can be most wisely resolved and progress most clearly assured.

Senator JOHNSTON. We are glad to have these remarks from the Senator from New York, Mr. Keating.

We will now hear from the Senator from Mississippi.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN STENNIS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I indeed welcome this opportunity to join with you today in seeking a solution to the problem created by the unfortunate decision of our highest Court in Engel v. Vitale. As we all know, the Court held in that case that a simple and denominationally neutral prayer used in the opening exercises of New York's public schools violated the first amendment's ban on the establishment of a religion even though student participation in the prayer was voluntary.

It will not be my purpose today to attempt to give a detailed historical or legal discussion of the issues involved in this case. I propose to limit my discussion, first, to the problems which have arisen and will arise from the Court's decision and, second, to what action, if any, should be taken on the matter.

The prayer involved in the decided case was composed and recommended by the State board of regents, but its use was optional with the local school boards. No student was required against his wishes to join in it and each child had the option to refrain from participating or even to leave the room during the recitation. The prayer was in the following language:

Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence on Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teacher, and our country.

Under other circumstances it might be that the Court's decision could and should be restricted to the specific facts involved and that it should not be viewed as a forerunner of things to come. In this instance, however, there is sound reason to believe to the contrary. The logic and language of the majority opinion and the general trend of prior decisions on this subject lend credence to the belief that Court will go far beyond its actual holding in the Engel case when future cases are decided. This belief is particularly reinforced by the extreme position taken in the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas who, of course, participated in the conferences of the Justices prior to the decision. He declared that many other governmental "aids" to religion similarly violate the first amendment. I have a grave apprehension, therefore, that the decision in this case will shortly be followed by others which increasingly erode our spiritual heritage.

Although almost 175 years elapsed after the adoption of the first amendment before the Court felt compelled to outlaw prayer in public schools, we may be sure that other decisions in this area will not be long in coming. Already two additional cases involving prayer and religion in the public schools are pending in the Supreme Court, and I am advised that a third is on its way.

One of these is a case from the Maryland Court of Appeals which held, in a split decision, by a 4-to-3 majority, that the constitutional rights of a student and his mother were not violated by the opening exercises in Baltimore public schools which involved the reading of the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. As in the New York case, participation was noncompulsory.

Another case now in the Supreme Court comes from a U.S. district court in Pennsylvania. In this case, I point out an opposite conclusion was reached. The court there held that a Pennsylvania law requiring Bible reading in public schools violated the first amendment, notwithstanding that the statute provided that a child, upon request, should be excused from participating.

Another case which I am advised will ultimately reach the Supreme Court is a decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. In this case, the complaint was made of the reading of the Bible in the public schools, distribution of sectarian literature to schoolchildren, the recitation of the Lord's Prayer, and other religious activities. In a unanimous opinion written by former Gov. Millard Caldwell, the court held that these activities were not in violation of the 1st or the 14th amendment to the Constitution.

The U.S. Supreme Court itself said, as recently as 1951 (Zorach v. Clausen), that "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." That quotation and that thought, Mr. Chairman, is the key to this whole problem, to this whole matter. However, if future decisions are consistent with the rationale of the Engel case, I am convinced that the holding will sooner or later be extended so as to forbid and prohibit many of our traditional, respected and timehonored practices. Among these which will almost certainly fall within the Court's ban are the use of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of the Bible in the public schools. I do not see how in the world, with any degree of consistency, the Court could possibly avoid ban ning or outlawing the Lord's Prayer and the reading of the Bible.

Senator HART. If I may, you say that you can see no basis for permitting or prohibiting?

Senator STENNIS. If the Court is going to follow its present logic and is to be consistent with their recent holding, I see no escape from their banning and outlawing the reading of the Bible or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Certainly, they are closer to denominationalism or to the establishment of a religion than is this simple prayer from New York. In the same category, I would classify, under the logic and the reasoning of the Court, the opening of sessions of the Senate and the House of Representatives with prayer by the Chaplains; the opening of State legislatures and city councils with prayer; the administration of oaths to witnesses which include the use of the Bible or the phrase "so help me God"; the opening of sessions of court with the traditional cry; and the recital of prayers in public schools by the children as a group or as individuals if the prayer is led or suggested by the teacher, who, of course, is an official representative of the State.

In every public school, however small the group in the room, the teacher there is the embodiment for that date of the State and is the direct agent and representative of the State. If she takes any part or any position as to the saying of a prayer, or as to what prayer should be said, or any exercise of that kind, it would fall under the ban and the prohibition of the present holding of the Court. As I see it, you would have to send them out beyond the playground, even to engage in any religious exercise of that kind.

Indeed Justice Douglas has already declared in his concurring opinion that it was his view that the use of the traditional cry in the opening of the Supreme Court, the practice of opening the sessions of the Congress with prayer, and many other religious exercises are violative of the first amendment.

If the Court should extend its decision only slightly, many other religious activities may be banned by future decisions. Among these are: compulsory chapel services in military academies, religious services in Federal prisons and hospitals, the issuance of religious proclamations by the President, payment of GI bill educational benefits to church-affiliated schools; Federal aid for school lunches and buses in parochial schools; governmental aid to church-affiliated hospitals; tax exemptions for religious organizations; the use of chaplains in the Armed Forces; the requirement that the President, Members of Congress, and the Justice of the Supreme Court subscribe to an oath in which the aid of the Deity is invoked, the inscribing of the words "in God we trust" upon the currency of the Nation, the singing of our national anthem which proclaims our trust in God; and the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance which contains the words, "one Nation under God."

Mr. Chairman, while these last items which I have enumerated do not necessarily come within the present ban of the Supreme Court, I emphasize that with the slightest extension of the holding, they will be banned.

Senator HRUSKA. Will you yield?

Senator STENNIS. I will be glad to.

Senator HRUSKA. I call the Senator's attention to the footnote in the decision of the majority of the Court, which is found on page 14 of the slip opinion. Does not that footnote in part negate some of the matters you have just read?

Senator STENNIS. In part, but far from conclusively. I say here, with emphasis, that if the Court extends its decision or its logic, many of these religious activities may be banned by future decisions. This applies to the last group of activities which I enumerated. The first group that I cited, in my opinion, will certainly be banned under the logic of the present Supreme Court decision. That is the distinction

I make.

Senator HRUSKA. The only reason I called the footnote to the attention of the Senator is that there has been so much comment on this point and, unfortunately, the early press releases omitted the reference entirely. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask consent, at this point, in order that the record will read more intelligently, that we set out the substance of that footnote.