the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed by acts of Congress.1 1 Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By the court: "The only question which this case presents is, whether the circuit courts can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. . . . The general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of the general government are made up of concessions from the several States; whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions: that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other courts, created by the general government, possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer. It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of their creation." United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32. See United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. "It is clear there can be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption." Per McLean, J., in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658. See also Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean, 568; U. S. v. Lancaster, ib. 433; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 435; U. S. v. Wilson, 3 Blatch. 435. As to the adoption of the common law by the States, see Van Nest v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144, per Story, J.; post, p. 23, and cases cited in notes. [ 23 ] [* 21] * CHAPTER III. THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. THE Constitution of the United States assumes the existence of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its authority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen for the purpose. Each of these States was then exercising the powers of government under some form of written constitution, and that instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would come in conflict; and as to those, the latter would modify and control the former. But besides this fundamental law, every State had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obligations of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those minute rules for the various relations of life which cannot be properly incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regulation of the ordinary law-making power. By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws consisted of the common law of England, which had been transplanted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists, now become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at last to so fortunate a conclusion. The common law of England consisted of those maxims of freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, control, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time as those State v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R.R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new inventions introduced new wants and conveniences, and new modes. of business. Springing from the very nature of the people themselves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously the body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they took with them their nature, so also they would take with them these laws. whenever they should transfer their domicile from one country to another. *To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [22] ent purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh. and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism. The feudal system, which was essentially a system of violence, disorder, and rapine,1 gave birth to many of the maxims of the common law; and some of these, long after that system has passed away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules which govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real estate. The criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd features, some of which have clung to it with wonderful tenacity, even after the most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with justice and civilization. But, on the whole, the system was the best foundation on which to erect an enduring structure of civil liberty which the world has ever known. It was the peculiar excellence of the common law of England that it recognized the worth, and sought especially to protect the rights and privileges of the individual man. Its maxims were those of a sturdy and independent race, accustomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought and action, and to a share in the administration of public affairs; and arbitrary power and uncontrolled authority were not recognized in its principles. Awe surrounded, and majesty clothed the king, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him, and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.2 The system was the opposite of servile; its 1 "A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a state of war against each other, and of rapine towards all mankind, in which the king, according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery." History of England, c. 3. Mackintosh, 2 * See post, p. 299. features implied boldness, and independent self-reliance on the part of the people; and if the criminal code was harsh, it at least escaped the inquisitorial features which fastened themselves upon criminal procedure in other civilized countries, and have ever been fruitful of injustice, oppression, and terror. For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Originally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and re-affirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usurpations and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which, [* 23] therefore, *needed to be authoritatively announced, that king and subject alike might understand and observe them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promulgated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King John. Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,2 and the Bill of Rights, each of which became necessary by reason of usurpations. But further statutes also became needful because old customs and modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things, when property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce more extended, and when all these changes had brought with them new desires and necessities, and also new dangers against which society as well as the individual subject needed protection. For this reason the Statute of Wills, and the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries 5 became important; and the Habeas Corpus Act was also found necessary, not so much to change the law, as to secure existing principles of the common law against being habitually set aside and violated by those in power. It is justly observed by Sidney that "Magna Charta was not made to restrain the absolute authority, for no such thing was in being or pretended (the folly of such visions seeming to have been reserved to complete the misfortunes and ignominy of our age), but it was to assert the native and original liberties of our nation by the confession of the king then being, that neither he nor his successors should any way encroach upon them." Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27. 21 Charles I. c. 1. 3 1 William & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2. ♦ 32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 and 35 Henry VIII. c. 5. 5 29 Charles II. c. 3. 6 31 Charles II. c. 2. 7 "I dare not advise to cast the laws into a new mould. The work which I From the first the colonists in America claimed the benefit and protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the common law as then existing in England was not suited to their condition and circumstances in the new country, and those particulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them. They * also claimed the benefit of such statutes as from time to [* 24] time had been enacted in modification of this body of rules. And when the difficulties with the home government sprung propound tendeth to the pruning and grafting of the law, and not the plowing up and planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innovation." Bacon's Works, Vol. II. p. 231, Phil. Ed. 1852. 1" The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their condition." Story, J., in Van Nest v. Packard, 2 Pet. 144. "The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with them the laws of the land as being bound by them wherever they should settle. They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under, where some of these laws were in force; particularly ecclesiastical laws, those for payment of tithes and others. Had it been understood that they were to carry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their friends, unexposed to the risks and toils of a new settlement. They carried with them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous or useful to them; a right to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right to make such others as they should think necessary, not infringing the general rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as might be to the laws of England." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271. See, also, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 435; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 122; Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H: 58; Houghton v. Page, 2 N. H. 44; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 356 ; Lindsey v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 245; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 390 ; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 330; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 757; Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 9; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. 356; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 184; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pierson v. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Hamilton v. Kneeland, 1 Nev. 40. The courts of one State will presume the common law of a sister State to be the same as their own in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v. Marley, 29 Ind. 458. 2 The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Commonwealth v. Lodge, 2 Grat. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey, 5 Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280. Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in |