no whites are so drawn is not constitutionally objectionable, unless it affirmatively appear that the state officials intrusted with the administration of the law arbitrarily and with intent have given an unequal and discriminative effect to the law.18

§ 483. Yick Wo v. Hopkins.

The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins19 involved the validity of an ordinance of the City of San Francisco which required all persons desiring to establish laundries in frame houses to obtain the consent of certain municipal officials. Here the law or ordinance was not upon its face discriminatory, but it was held void for the reason that it gave to the designated officials "not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent not only as to places but as to persons," and because the evidence showed in fact " an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons [the Chinese] as to warrant and require the conclusion that whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances so adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the law which is secured to the petitioners as to all other persons by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The court then go on to declare the general doctrine: "Though the law be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." 20

18 See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904; 40 L. ed. 1075.

19 118 U. S. 356; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; 30 L. ed. 220.

20 This principle of interpretation is declared to have been sanctioned in Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; 23 L. ed. 543; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; 23 L. ed. 550; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; 25 L. ed. 676;

§ 483. Equal Protection of the Law does not Control the Grant of Political Rights.

The requirement as to equal protection of the law does not operate to prevent the States from restricting the enjoyment of political privileges to such classes of their citizens as they may see fit.21

$ 484. Classifications.

When there are reasonable economic or political or social reasons for doing so, certain ocupations or industries, or even classes of persons may be selected out for special regulation or for the enjoyment of special privileges.

Thus, for example, the practice of certain professions may be limited to persons of the male sex, or to those of a certain age, or to those possessing other qualifications that may reasonably be held to indicate a fitness for the profession.22

Thus also, as proper police measures, the States are permitted to impose special restrictions and liabilities upon railway corporations. Special modifications of the common-law doctrine of employer's liability with reference to them have been upheld, as have laws placing the presumption of negligence upon them when cattle have been killed by their trains, and laws making them responsible for fires kindled by sparks from their locomotives, though they may have taken every possible precaution to avoid such fires.2 23

However, in Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ellis a state law was held void which imposed an attorney's fee in addition to costs upon Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; 26 L. ed. 567; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; 28 L. ed. 1145. See also Grunding v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; 44 L. ed. 725. But see

as to doctrine declared in Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; 43 L. ed. 603.

21 Chapter XXXVIII.

22 Re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1082; 38 L. ed. 929; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130; 21 L. ed. 442.

23 See especially St. Louis, etc., Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; 41 L. ed. 611; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; 32 L. ed. 107.

24 165 U. S. 150; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; 41 L. ed. 666.

railway companies which should fail to pay certain claims within a certain time after presentation. Here the court held that there was no reasonable relation between the burden imposed and the peculiar character of the business done.25

485. Classifications Must Be Reasonable.

From what has gone before, it is clear that while classification of persons and businesses for purposes of regulation is not prohibited by the requirement of equal protection of the law, these classifications must in every case be reasonable ones. In Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ellis,26 already cited, it is declared: "It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in all cases it must appear not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one

25 The opinion declares: "A mere statute to compel the payment of indebtedness does not come within the scope of police regulations. The hazardous business of railroading carries with it no special necessity for the prompt payment of debts. That is a duty resting upon all debtors, and while, in certain cases, there may be a peculiar obligation which may be enforced with penalties, yet nothing of that kind springs from the mere work of railroad transportation. Statutes have been sustained giving special protection to the claims of laborers and mechanics, but no such idea underlies this legislation. It does not aim to protect the laborer or mechanic alone, for its benefits are conferred upon every individual in the State, rich or poor, high or low, who has a claim of the character described. It is not a statute for the protection of particular classes of individuals supposed to need protection, but for the punishment of certain corporations on account of their delinquency. Neither can it be sustained as a proper means of enforcing the payment of small debts, and preventing any unnecessary litigation in respect to them, because it does not impose the penalty in all cases where the amount in controversy is within the limit named in the statute. Indeed, the statute arbitrarily singles out one class of debtors, and punishes it for a failure to perform certain duties, duties which are equally obligatory upon all debtors; a punishment not visited by reason of the failure to comply with any proper police regulations, or for the protection of the laboring classes, or to prevent litigation about trifling matters, or in consequence of any special corporate privileges bestowed by the State. Unless the legislature may arbitrarily select one corporation or one class of corporations, one individual or one class of individuals, and visit a penalty upon them which is not imposed upon other guilty of like delinquency, this statute cannot be sustained." 26 165 U. S. 150; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; 41 L. ed. 666.

based upon some reasonable ground,

some difference which bears

a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, not a mere arbitrary selection."

and is

Thus in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.27 a discrimination made by a state anti-trust law exempting from its operations agricultural products or live stock in the hands of the producer or raiser, was held a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In its opinion the earlier decisions in point are carefully reviewed and distinguished. With reference to the specific law in question the court say: "To declare that some of the class engaged in domestic trade or commerce shall be deemed criminals if they violate the regulations prescribed by the State for the purpose of protecting the public against illegal combinations formed to destroy competition and to control prices, and that others of the same class shall not be bound to regard those regulations, but may combine their capital, skill, as acts to destroy competition and to control prices for their special benefit, is so manifestly a denial of the equal protection of the laws that further or extended argument to establish that position would seem to be unnecessary." 28

§ 486. State Laws and Judicial Systems Not Required to Be Uniform Throughout the State.

In Missouri v. Lewis29 the important principle was laid down that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the application by a State of different laws and different systems of judicature to its various local subdivisions.

27 184 U. S. 540; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; 46 L. ed. 679.

28 Generally upon the subject of classifications, see Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; 28 L. ed. 923; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; 33 L. ed. 1025; Magoun v. Illinois T. & S. Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; 42 L. ed. 1037; Orient v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; 43 L. ed. 552; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805; 43 L. ed. 91.

As to classifications of property for purposes of taxation see Bell's Gap, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; 33 L. ed. 892; Plumber v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; 44 L. ed. 998. 29 101 U. S. 22; 25 L. ed. 989.

In this case was questioned the constitutionality of a law providing a special court of appeals with conclusive jurisdiction for the City of St. Louis and a few specified counties. To the claim that this law denied to the people of these districts the equal protection of the laws in that they were denied access to the general court of appeals of the State the Supreme Court replied: "There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. . The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the bencfit of the same laws and the same remedies. Diversities which are allowable in different States are allowable in different parts of the same State."

§ 487. Equal Protection Requires Similar but not the Same Privileges.

Where similar or substantially similar conveniences and comforts are offered, transportation companies, inns, theaters, and other public service companies may by law be permitted or required to provide separate accommodations to the different races, colored, Mongolian, or white.3

30

In Plessy v. Ferguson the court say: "The object of the Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law; and in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinction based on color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, or even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency

30 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138; 41 L. ed. 256; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101; 45 L. ed. 244. The States may not, however, thus attempt the regulation of interstate transportation. See ante, section 312.

31 163 U. S. 537; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138; 41 L. ed. 256.