the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century upon American jurisprudence like a straight jacket which could only be unloosened by constitutional amendment. It would be, as declared by Justice Matthews in Hurtado v. California, "to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." 14

§ 462. Rules of Evidence and Procedure May Be Changed.

Thus it has been held that, so long as the fundamental rights of litigants to a fair trial, as regards notice, opportunity to present evidence, etc., and adequate relief are provided, and specific requirements of the Constitution are not violated, Congress has a full discretion as to the form of the trial or adjudication, and the character of the remedy to be furnished. Thus, the States not being bound by the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments, grand and petit juries may be dispensed with by them.15 So also, within limits, legislatures may determin what evidence shall be received, and the effect of that evidence, so long as the fundamental rights of the parties are preserved.16

No person has a vested right to a particular remedy. "The State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the federal Constitution." 17 Statutes of limitations, if reasonable, are not unconstitutional as denial of property or contractural rights. The 14 See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; 42 L ed. 780.

15 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; 28 L. ed. 232; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448; 44 L. ed. 597.

16 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; 37 L. ed. 905, and authorities there cited. In Adams v. New York (192 U. S. 585; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372; 48 L. ed. 575), it was held that due process of law was not denied by a state law making possession of policy slips prima facie evidence of "possession thereof knowingly," and as such a crime.

17 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; 44 L. ed. 119.

authorities as to this are so uniform and numerous as not to need citation.

In Twining v. New Jersey18 it is declared that due process of law does not include exemption of an accused from compulsory self-incrimination.

In Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas19 it was held that due process of law is not denied by a state court striking from the files the answer of a foreign corporation and rendering a judg ment by default against it, as permitted by state law when the defendant disobeys an order to secure the attendance as witnesses of certain of its officers and agents, and the production of papers and documents in their possession or control.

The case was distinguished from that of Hovey v. Elliott20 in which it had been held a denial of due process for a court, as a punishment for contempt, based upon a refusal to obey an order of the court, to deny a right of the defendant to defend, and to give judgment without more ado to the plaintiff. The court in the Hammond case say: "Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend as a mere punishment. This case presents a failure by the defendant to produce what we must assume was material evidence in its possession, and a resulting striking out of an answer and a default. The proceeding here taken may, therefore, find its sanction in the undoubted right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of the fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer to be gotten from the suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered, when such proof concerned the rightful decision of the cause. In a sense, of course, the striking out of the answer and default was a punishment, but it was only remotely so, as the generating source of the power was the right to create a presumption flowing from the failure to produce. The difference between mere punishment, as illustrated in Hovey v. Elliott, and the power exerted in this, is as follows: In the former, due process of law was denied by the refusal to hear. In

18 211 U. S. 78; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; 53 L. ed. 97.

19 212 U. S. 322; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; 53 L. ed. 530. 20 167 U. S. 409; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 841; 42 L. ed. 220.

this, the preservation of due process was secured by the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense. The want of power in the one case and its existence in the other are essential to due process, to preserve in the one and to apply and enforce in the other. In its ultimate conception, therefore, the power exerted below was like the authority to default or to take a bill for confessed because of a failure to answer, based upon a presumption that the material facts alleged or pleaded were admitted by not answering, and might well also be illustrated by reference to many other presumptions attached by the law to the failure of a party to a cause to specially set up or assert his supposed rights in the mode prescribed by law. As pointed out by the court below, the law of the United States, as well as the laws of many of the States, afford examples of striking out pleadings and adjudging by default for a failure to produce material evidence, the production of which has been lawfully called for."

§ 463. Appeal not Essential to Due Process.

Due process of law does not require the provision of a right of appeal from a trial to a superior court. In McKane v. Durston" the court declared that " a review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not now a necessary element of due process of law." 22 In Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Backus,23 with reference to a right of appeal in a matter of tax assessment, the court say: "If a single hearing is not due process, doubling it will not make it so."

21 153 U. S. 684; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 913; 38 L. ed. 867.

22 This is quoted with approval in Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; 47 L. ed. 563; also in Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; 39 L. ed. 422; Fallbrook v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; 41 L. ed. 369.

23 154 U. S. 421; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; 38 L. ed. 1031.

§ 464. Confronting Witnesses.

It is not essential to due process of law that in criminal causes the accused shall be confronted at the time of trial with the witnesses against him. This is specifically required by the Sixth Amendment in the federal courts, but in West v. Louisiana it is held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not lay this obligation upon the States. In this case the court admitted a deposition of a witness not present at the trial, but which had been given at a preliminary examination at which the accused was present and had had an opportunity to cross-examine.25

§ 465. Trial in Courts of Law not Essential.

It is not essential to due process of law that proceedings and adjudications, though admittedly of a judicial nature, should be had in courts of law. It not infrequently happens that administrative. boards or officers in the discharge of their duties are compelled to consider and decide upon matters of a judicial character, and, provided an adequate opportunity is offered to the parties to appear and defend, due process of law is not denied by making the administrative determinations they reach conclusive and not open to further consideration in the courts, except, of course, as to the matter of the jurisdiction of the officers or boards in question, or as to whether adequate notice and opportunity to 21 194 U. S. 258; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; 48 L. ed. 965.

25 The court say: "We are of opinion that no federal right of the plaintiffs in error was violated by admitting this deposition in evidence. Its admission was but a slight extension of the rule of the common law, even as contended for by counsel. The extension is not of such a fundamental character as to deprive the accused of due process of law. It is neither so unreasonable nor improper as to substantially affect the rights of an accused party, or to fundamentally impair those general rights which are secured to him by the XIV Amendment. The accused has, as held by the state court in such case, been once confronted with the witness, and has had opportunity to cross-examine him, and it seems reasonable that when the State cannot procure the attendance of the witness at the trial, and he is a non-resident and is permanently beyond the jurisdiction of the State, that his deposition might be read equally as well as when his attendance could not be enforced because of death or of illness, or his evidence given by reason of insanity."

defend has been given the parties affected. In short, " due process is not necessarily judicial process." 26 This subject is more fully discussed in Chapter LXIV of this treatise.

§ 466. Unessential Statutory Formalities.

The mere failure to comply with certain formalities prescribed by a state law is not, without reference to what those formalities are, a denial of due process. When, then, a state court decides that a particular formality was or was not essential under a state statute, such decision presents no federal question, providing always that the statute as thus construed does not violate the Constitution of the United States by depriving of property without due process of law. This paramount requirement being fulfilled, as to other matters the state interpretation of its own law is controlling and decisive." 27

§ 467. Fixed Interpretation of Laws not Guaranteed.

So also it has been held that due process of law does not protect the individual who, in obedience to an interpretation given by executive officers to a statute, takes action which is later held by the courts to be unwarranted by that statute. Thus, with reference to a state tax law the court in Thompson v. Kentucky28 declare: "Due process of law does not assure to a taxpayer the interpretation of laws by the executive officers of a State as against their interpretation by the courts of a State, or relief from the consequences of a misinterpretation by either. It is the province of the courts to interpret the laws of the State, and he who acts under them must take his chance of being in accord with the final decision. And this is a hazard under every law, and from which or the consequences of which we know of no security."

26 Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; 47 L. ed. 563. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; 24 L. ed. 616; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272; 18 L. ed. 372; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435; 42 L. ed. 865.

27 Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; 42 L. ed. 622. See also French v. Taylor, 199 U. S. 274; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; 50 L. ed. 189.

2 209 U. S. 340; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; 52 L. ed. 822.