In Plessy v. Ferguson36 in which the attempt was made to have declared void as contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment a law of a State requiring separate accommodations for white and colored persons on the railroads, the court say: "That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment is too clear for argument. A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must. always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection." 37 and regulate the entire body of the civil rights which citizens enjoy, or may enjoy, in the several States. But I hold that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against them because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races." 36 163 U. S. 537; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138; 41 L. ed. 256. 37 Notwithstanding the opinion of the majority of the court that the question was one not open to argument, Justice Harlan vigorously dissented and declared that the judgment would in time prove as pernicious as the decision in the Dred Scott Case. The Thirteenth Amendment, he declared, "not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude." To the argument that the act in question did not discriminate between the races, that what it forbade to the one, it forbade to the other, he said: "But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons." And he continued: "It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from travelling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to occupy the same passenger coach. If a State can prescribe as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so § 458. Seamen. In Robertson v. Baldwin's the court upheld certain provisions of the Revised Statutes providing for the apprehension of deserting seamen, and the compulsory fulfilment by them of their contracts, as not in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.3 39 regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of the street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or in open vehicles on a public road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign whites to one side of a court-room and blacks to the other? And why may it not also prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the political questions of the day? Further, if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?" 38 165 U. S. 275; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326; 41 L. ed. 715. 39 In its opinion the court say: "The question whether Sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, depends upon the construction to be given to the term 'involuntary servitude.' Does the epithet 'involuntary' attach to the word 'servitude' continuously, and make illegal any service which becomes involuntary at any time during its existence; or does it attach only at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because unlawfully entered into? If the former be the true construction, then no one, not even a soldier, sailor, or apprentice, can surrender his liberty even for a day; and the soldier may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle, and the sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea, provided only he can find means of escaping to another vessel. If the latter, then an individual may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose, and subordinate his going and coming to the will of another during the continuance of the contract. Not that all such contracts would be lawful, but that a service which was knowingly and willingly entered into could not be termed involuntary. Thus if one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a particular capacity during his life, and never to leave his estate without his consent, the contract might not be enforceable for the want of a legal remedy, or might be void upon the grounds of public policy, but the servitude could not be properly termed involuntary. Such agreements for a limited personal servitude at one time were very common in England, and by statute of June 27, 1793 (4 Geo. IV, chap. 34, § 3) it was enacted that if any servant in husbandry or any artificer, calico printer, hands-craftsman, miner, collier, keelman, pitman, glassman, potter, laborer, or other person, should contract to serve another for a definite time, and should desert such service during the term of the contract, he was made liable to a criminal punishment. In Plessy v. Ferguson36 in which the attempt was made to have declared void as contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment a law of a State requiring separate accommodations for white and colored persons on the railroads, the court say: "That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment . . . is too clear for argument. A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection." 37 and regulate the entire body of the civil rights which citizens enjoy, or may enjoy, in the several States. But I hold that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against them because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races." 36 163 U. S. 537; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138; 41 L. ed. 256. 37 Notwithstanding the opinion of the majority of the court that the question was one not open to argument, Justice Harlan vigorously dissented and declared that the judgment would in time prove as pernicious as the decision in the Dred Scott Case. The Thirteenth Amendment, he declared, "not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude." To the argument that the act in question did not discriminate between the races, that what it forbade to the one, it forbade to the other, he said: "But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons." And he continued: "It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from travelling in the same public conveyance, and to punish office permitting persons of the two races to a State can prescribe as a rule of ci not travel as passengers in the sa § 458. Seamen. In Robertson v. Baldwin's the court uphel et of the Revised Statutes providing for the apprec ing seamen, and the compulsory fulmen: tracts, as not in violation of the Thirteen a い Ti regulate the use of the streets of its cities an TV: T 38 165 U. S. 275; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32- If the former be the true construction, a § 459. Contracts for Personal Services: Enforcement of. The Thirteenth Amendment renders unenforceable contracts for personal services, suits for damages in cases of breaches of such contracts being the only remedy left the ones to whom such services have been promised. A more doubtful question is as to the power of the States or of the United States to provide punishment for the breach of contracts for personal services. Various cases have been decided in the state and federal courts with reference to this point. In general it may be said that the doctrine is established that statutes making criminal the mere breach of The breach of a contract for personal service has not, however, been recognized in this country as involving a liability to criminal punishment, except in the cases of soldiers, sailors, and possibly some others, nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to that effect. But we are also of opinion that, even if the contract of a seaman could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude. The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments of the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. The prohibition of slavery. in the Thirteenth Amendment is well known to have been adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in certain States of the Union since the foundation of the government, while the addition of the words 'involuntary servitude' was said in Butchers' Benev. Asso. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. P. Co ("Slaughter House Cases," 16 Wall. 36; 21 L. ed. 394), to have been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical revival of which might have been the revival of the institution of slavery under a different and less offensive name. It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always been treated as exceptions, such as military and naval enlistments, or to the right of parents and guardians as to their minor children or wards. The amendment, however, makes no distinction between a public and a private service. To say that persons engaged in a public service are not within the amendment is to admit that there are exceptions to its general language, and the further question is at once presented, Where shall the line be drawn? We know of no better answer to make than to say that services which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional shall not be regarded as within its purview. From the earliest historical period the contract of the sailor has been treated as an exceptional one and involving to a certain extent, the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract." |