provide no judicial hearing upon the question of illegality; second, that they authorize the seizure of letters without discriminating between those which may contain, and those which may not contain, prohibited matter; and third, that they empower the Postmaster-General to confiscate the money of the addressee which has become his property by the depositing of the letter in the mails.

As to the first of these objections the court say: "It is too late to argue that the process of law is denied whenever the disposition of property is affected by the order of an executive department. Many, if not most, of the matters presented to these departments require for their proper solution the judgment or discretion of the head of the department, and in many cases, notably those connected with the disposition of the public lands, the action of the department is accepted as final by the courts, and even when involving questions of law this action is attended by a strong presumption of its correctness." 13 As to the second point that the law authorizes the detention of all letters of the firm, many of which may be purely personal and having no connection with the prohibited enterprise, the court say: "In view of the fact that by these sections the postmaster is denied permission to open any letters not addressed to himself, there would seem to be no possible method of enforcing the law except by authorizing him to seize and detain all such letters. A ruling that only such letters as were obviously connected with the enterprise could be detained would amount to practically the annulment of the law." As to the third objection that the Postmaster-General is authorized by statute to confiscate the money or the representative of money, of the addressee, the court say that this is based on the hypothesis, that the money or other article contained in a registered letter becomes the property of the addressee as soon as the letter is deposited in the post-office. As to this the opinion says: "The action of the Postmaster-General in seizing the letter does not operate as a confiscation of the money, or the determination

13 Citing Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; 48 L. ed. 894.

of the title thereto; but merely as a refusal to extend the facilities of the Post-Office Department to the final delivery of the letter. Congress might undoubtedly have authorized the postmaster at the depositing office to decline to receive the letter at all if its forbidden character were known to him, but as this would be impossible, we think the power to refuse the facilities of the department to the transmission of such letter attends it at every step, from its first deposit in the mail to its final delivery to the addressee; and as the character of the letter cannot be ascertained until it arrives at the office of delivery, the government may then act and refuse to consummate the transaction. If the letter and its contents become the property of the addressee when deposited in the mail, the subsequent seizure by the government would not impair his title or prevent an action by him for the amount of remittance. True, this might be of no practical value to him, but it is a sufficient reply to show that the title to the letter did not change by its seizure by the postmaster."

Though the judgment of the Postmaster-General, as granted him by statute, has thus been held to be final and conclusive with reference to the issuance of fraud orders, the Supreme Court held in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty14 that the law required that this judgment should be one founded on facts ascertained by evidence, and that it might not be simply the Postmaster-General's personal judgment as to the fraudulent character of the business whose mail is to be excluded. Thus, in this case, the Postmaster-General having issued a fraud order against a corporation which assumed to heal disease through the influence of the mind, and to give advice and treatment by letter, the court declared the order not properly issued. The court say as to the claims of the plaintiffs:

"There is no exact standard of absolute truth by which to prove the assertion false and a fraud. We mean by that to say hat the claim of the complainants cannot be the subject of proof as of an ordinary fact. We may not believe in the efficacy of the treatment to the extent claimed by the complainants, 14 187 U. S. 94; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; 47 L. ed. 90.

and we may have no sympathy with them in such claims, and yet their effectiveness is but a matter of opinion in any court. That the complainants had a hearing before the Postmaster-General, and that his decision was made after such hearing, cannot affect the case."

§ 756. Chinese Exclusion Cases.

In the various Chinese exclusion cases the same principles as those already laid down have been applied. Inasmuch, however, as their application has involved questions of personal liberty rather than of property, their adoption by the courts has seemed to some oppressive, and in the Ju Toy case,15 decided in 1905, earnest dissenting opinions were filed. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States' the court held valid the Act of 1888 prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States who had departed before the passage, having a certificate issued under the Act of 1882 as amended by the Act of 1884 granting them permission to return. This the court did, even though it recognized that the Act of 1888 was in contravention of express stipulations of the Treaties of 1868 and 1880 between the United States and China. In Fang Yue Ting v. United States the doctrine was again declared that the provisions of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority must be upheld by the courts, even though in contravention of an earlier treaty. The power to exclude or expel aliens it held to be vested in the political departments of the government, and to be executed by the executive authority except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or statute to intervene, or where some provision of the Constitution has been violated. Having this right, the executive department, it was held, might be authorized to provide a system of registration and identification of Chinese laborers, and to require them to obtain certificates of residence, and to provide for the deportation of those not so obtaining cer

15 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; 49 L. ed. 1040.

16 130 U. S. 581; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; 32 L. ed. 1068.

tificates within a year. The provision of the act that the executive officer acting in behalf of the United States should bring the Chinese laborer before a federal court in order that he might be heard and the facts upon which depended his right to remain in the country decided, was held valid, the duty that imposed upon the court being declared judicial in character. "When," the opinion declared, “in the form prescribed by law, the exccutive officer acting in behalf of the United States, brings the Chinese laborer before the judge, in order that he may be heard, and the facts upon which depends his right to remain in the country be decided, a case is duly submitted to the judicial power; for here are all the elements of a civil case-a complainant, a defendant, and a judge — actor, reus et judex."

In Ekiu v. United States' it was held that in reaching the determination whether an alien is lawfully entitled to enter the country, it is not necessary for the administration to take testimony. The court, however, say: "An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an Act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.18 And Congress may, if it sees fit, as in the statutes in question in United States v. Jung Ah Lung, just cited, authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts may be intrusted by Congress to exccutive officers; and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty

17 142 U. S. 65; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; 35 L. ed. 1146.

18 Citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; 28 L. ed. 770; United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; 31 L. ed. 591; Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U. S. 424; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729; 35 L. ed. 503.

to re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.19

It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor ever been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.20

The statute does not require inspectors to take any testimony at all, and allows them to decide on their own inspection and examination the question of the right of any alien immigrant to land. The provision relied on merely empowers inspectors to administer oaths and to take and consider testimony, and requires only testimony so taken to be entered of record.

The decision of the inspector of immigration being in conformity with the Act of 1891, there can be no doubt that it was final and conclusive against the petitioner's right to land in the United States. The words of section 8 are clear to that effect, and were manifestly intended to prevent the question of an alien immigrant's right to land, when once decided adversely by an inspector, acting within the jurisdiction conferred upon him, from being impeached or reviewed, in the courts or otherwise, save only by appeal to the inspector's official supervisors, and in accordance with the provisions of the Act."

In Lem Moon Sing v. United States 21 the contention was that while, generally speaking, the administrative officers might have jurisdiction under the statute to exclude an alien who was not by

19 Citing Martin v. Mott, 12 Wh. 19; 6 L. ed. 537; Philadelphia & T. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; 10 L. ed. 535; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1240; 32 L. ed. 234; Oteiza y Cortes v. Jacobus, 136 U. S. 330; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1031; 34 L. ed. 464.

20 Citing Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. 272; 15 L. ed. 372; Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U. S. 97; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; 28 L. ed. 83. 21 158 U. S. 538; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967; 39 L. ed. 1082.