r

د:

Le mur head that the South Carolina

e wala the permision of the Act, adding the manufacture, sale, or use of

attempted to restrain the introduction Lo que fom ther rates and Territories. format, vold mot properly be described as a police

ต่อ

end the measure be upheid as an inspecnonon of the importation of wines and a si bene di South Carolina for their own kud loes not depend on the purity or im

I was held that the terms of the Wilson of interstate commerce to state police

la meh State meant, not upon crossing on the songmmation of their shipment, that are to whom ensimed. In this case it was, 4. Tai bie moving of certain consignments of liquor so de partirm if the railway station to the freight warehouse, of Lonemerate tommore transportation and done before The onstitutionally attach to the goods thus

£ 24. 17 915. Ct. Rep. 265; 41 L. ed. 632.

akta av purporting to forbid the importation, manufacture, sale Ing Spurs as articles detrimental to the welfare of the itate and a the lead of the inhabitants, and hence it is not within the ece and venation of the act of Congress of August, 1990. That law was It stented a monter upon any State the power to discriminate injuriously st de ir ciets of other States in articles whose manufacture and use formiden, and wilch are therefore the subjects of legitimate comThe question whether a given state law is a lawful exercise jele power is still open, and must remain open. to this court. Such must forbid entirely the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors Tall Or it may provide equal regulations for the inspection and aer al domestic and imported liquors to be vali But the State cannot, c. e migreses nal legislation referred to, establish a system which, in Derminates between interstate and domestic commerce in commodities ise and use which are admitted to be lawful."

$8.42; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664; 42 L. ed. 1088.

In Scott v. Donald the court had said that the Dispensary law "is not a law purporting to forbid the importation, manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquor, as detrimental to the welfare of the State and to the health of the inhabitants, and hence it is not within the scope of the operation of the Wilson Act." This had generally been understood as intimating that only state laws totally prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within the State would be held to come within the provisions of the Wilson Act. In Vance v. Vandercook,15 however, the court held that because a state law permits the sale of liquors subject to particular restrictions it does not follow that the law is not a police measure and, therefore, beyond the permissive provisions of the Wilson Act. Also it was held that the state law was not discriminative against interstate commerce because it gave to state authorities an exclusive right to purchase all liquor sold in the State, which right they might employ to purchase from whomsoever they might please.

The state law was, however, held invalid in so far as it attempted to prevent the residents of the State from importing liquors for their own use, the permission of the Wilson law being held to extend only to the prohibition of the sale in original packages of importations of intoxicating liquors. And, in fact, it is declared that Congress could not constitutionally give to the States this power to prohibit importation of goods for the importer's own use, because, as the opinion declares, this right "is derived from the Constitution of the United States and does not rest on the grant of the state law." 16

15 170 U. S. 438; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674; 42 L. ed. 1100.

16 Commenting upon this last statement, Justice Shiras, Chief Justice Fuller, and Justice McKenna declare that, once concede that Congress may authorize the States to forbid the sale of original packages, it would, by a parity of reasoning, follow that Congress might permit the States to forbid importation for use. As a matter of fact, however, these justices denied that Congress could do either and asserted that the permission of the Wilson Act was intended to apply only to those cases in which the States, as a police measure, should find it necessary to declare that the use of intoxicating liquors of any kind is against morality, good health and the safety of the community, and wholly to prohibit their manufacture and sale.

ar terised that a Stare could not, even when *idet sy the season of a Wilson Act, prevent its inhabitants Iom con for their own me and consumption, the weer 'nia principle would, notwithstanding rabdate C. O. D. shipments of liquors, that were gumenta sť liq tors which were to be paid for on *ted that as to these the nature of the contract A far he residence of the consignees and made the agent of the consignors, and that the sale ▼thin the control of the State, the express coma laule to the penalties of the state prohibition

De vodite Besraan Co. v. Iowa," however, the court declared the vien die to the liquors passed to be irrelevant, the batman gut #ing whether, in point of fact, interstate commerce

and to be interfered with. This they declared would frm an artempt on the part of the States to restrain or rawn be wellvery of such C. O. D. shipments. After observing bat dere vi a diversity of opinion as to when title to C. O. D. durmente Tasses, the court say: “But we need not consider this Beyond possible question, the contract to sell and ship -mpleted in Illinois. The right of the parties to make a conmer in Dlincia fr the sale and purchase of merchandise, and, in Letne to fx by agreement the time when and condition on winch the empleted title should pass, is beyond question. The 4mm the State of Illinois into the State of Iowa of the Beanie constituted interstate commerce. To sustain, therefore, the mling of the court below would require us to decide that the law of Iowa operated in another State so as to invalidate a

vil eontract as to interstate commerce made in such other State; and. in leed, would require us to go yet further, and say that, although, under the interstate commerce clause, a citizen in he State had a right to have merchandise consigned from another State delivered to him in the State to which the shipment was made, yet that such right was so illusory that it only obtained in

#26 U. S. 147; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; 49 L. ed. 424.

18

cases where, in a legal sense, the merchandise contracted for had been delivered to the consignee at the time and place of shipment. In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw19 it was held that, under the operation of the Wilson Act, a state inspection law was valid which provided for an inspection of beer and other malt liquors shipped into the State and held there for sale or consumption. The fact that an inspection fee was charged which was greater than the cost of the inspection itself, and that this inspection which was provided was inadequate as a protection against fraud or impurity, was held immaterial.20

18" When it is considered," the opinion continues, "that the necessary result of the ruling below was to hold that, wherever merchandise shipped from one State to another is not completely delivered to the buyer at the point of shipment so as to be at his risk from that moment, the movement of such merchandise is not interstate commerce, it becomes apparent that the principle, if sustained, would operate materially to cripple, if not destroy, that freedom of commerce between the States which it was the great purpose of the Constitution to promote. If upheld, the doctrine would deprive a citizen of one State of his right to order merchandise from another State at the risk of the seller as to delivery. It would prevent the citizen of one State from shipping into another unless he assumed the risk; it would subject contracts made by common carriers, and valid by the laws of the State where made, to the laws of another State; and it would remove from the protection of the interstate commerce clause all goods on consignment upon any condition as to delivery, express or implied. Besides, it would also render the Commerce Clause of the Constitution inoperative as to all that vast body of transactions by which the products of the country move in the channels of interstate commerce by means of bills of lading to the shipper's order, with drafts for the purchase price attached, and many other transactions essential to the freedom of commerce, by which the complete title to merchandise is postponed to the delivery thereof."

The opinion further declares that the point involved had, in fact, been substantially decided in Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; 47 L. ed. 336, and Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Sims, 191 U. S. 441; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151; 48 L. ed. 254. See a discussion of these cases post, p. 706.

19 198 U. S. 17; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; 49 L. ed. 925. 20 The court say: 66 Conceding that the law in question may be inadequate to accomplish the purpose designed, and produces a large revenue to the State over and above the cost of inspection, this affords no federal ground upon which to hold that the police power of the State would not be brought into play in making the enactment where the law does not operate upon a subject within the federal control. This becomes evident when it is borne in mind that, whether the statute be regarded as a prohibition, as a regulation,

bad abonar so a regulation of com

By at one and the

mi mill att be exercised But

2012re wrists result, since to elor de telariia ferreen direct and inmeme by means of which the

grandial pre Las been made

and to mater power up the States to 2 seter to be measured by the

Bet parts, a flate, and not a

Taf the Constitution. Sɔ

chemi se name is i mekend by a decision of 11 the day, der the state

1756 17 that the law in quesf t the law evald rightly be 1.6 more for an adequate inspecTe kis mere fra i not afford protecand fully toy entlaste the fart that the

mes the enst of inspection.

man my de zwanted for up n the

at va meded for the purses of revenue and not for S1 At the Essenting justices

11 de rigin of onert since the right was Idependent of the art and had been applied and

mum pole powers of the Sux wild it was at liberty to PACHETE TË Ery federal statute fre the protection of the Te Tan At meter meltes, adds to, takes from, 1 x 2 jobs jovers of the State with respect to inspection in any

ཆོས་ཀྱི་