MR. J. S. MILL AND THE INDUCTIVE ORIGIN OF FIRST A STEP TOWARDS PRINCIPLES. THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO SCHOOLS OF THAT it is of the highest importance to ascertain the true and infallible method of obtaining first principles, more especially in those departments of knowledge which are aiming to be sciences, but have as yet their first principles in an unsettled condition, will be readily acknowledged by every one who is keenly alive to the influence which ideas exert upon the progress of the human race. To describe this method in a general way, and in relation to the views of some of the leading writers on this subject in this country, is the object of this essay. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in criticizing Mr. J. S. Mill's views in relation to Dr. Whewell's test of necessary truth, remarks that, "If there be, as Mr. J. S. Mill holds, certain absolute uniformities in nature; if these absolute uniformities produce, as they must, absolute uniformities in our experience; and if, as he shews, these absolute uniformities in our experience disable us from conceiving the negation of them, then answering to each absolute uniformity in nature which we can cognize there must be in us a belief of which the negation is inconceivable, and which is absolutely true. . . . In nearly all cases this test of inconceivableness must be valid now, and where it is not, it still expresses the NEW SERIES.-VOL. IX., NO. XVII. B net result of our experience up to the present time, which is the most that any test can do.”ɑ Mr. Spencer holds, then, that what is contrary to absolute or unbroken uniformity of experience is inconceivable, and that this is the only test of the invariableness of a belief. Is a belief invariable? We know that it is so by the inconceivableness of its negation, by its firmly holding its ground against every possible attempt to upset it. But why is its negation inconceivable? Because the negation is completely opposed to our uniform and unbroken experience. But is this test absolutely perfect? Is it possible that a belief pronounced by it to be invariable should some time or other turn out to be variable? Mr. Spencer, in words which are quoted below, seems to admit that the test does not always preclude this possibility. Indeed, how can uniform experience, for example, our experience of the sun's rising, prove the impossibility of the cessation of this event? No induction from such experience is competent to establish a necessary and universal truth, and it is only the negation of such a truth which is absolutely inconceivable. Uniform experience supplies us with two kinds of convictions, those whose negation is conceivable, and those whose negation is not conceivable. But why is there this difference between them? Philosophy will not rest satisfied with the simple statement of the fact that some beliefs, when you attempt to dispel them by any means whatever, are discovered to be perfectly indestructible, but will seek to dive deeper into the matter, and look out for some explanation of this fact. In the controversy between Mr. Mill and Dr. Whewell (alas! now no more), in regard to inconceivableness as the test of necessary truth, it is contended by the former, owing to what, in imitation of Reid, may be called an error personæ, that certain beliefs were once held to be true, because their negation in some sense was inconceivable, which beliefs are now exploded, and, therefore, that such inconceivableness is no infallible criterion of the necessity of a truth. But the inconceivableness which Dr. Whewell had in view is that which we experience when we try to think the contradictory of a necessary truth, as, for instance, that 5+5 does not make 10. The inconceivableness which Mr. Mill has singled out is that which certain persons have felt when they attempted to undo firm, long-standing, but ill-founded associations. Mr. Spencer attempts to weaken the force of Mr. Mill's objection to Dr. Whewell's view, but does not perceive its irrelevant character. He writes: "Conceding the entire truth of Mr. Mill's position, that as during any phase of human progress, the ability or inability to form a specific conception wholly depends on the experiences men have had, they may by and-bye be enabled to conceive things before inconceivable to them; it may still be argued that as, at any time, the best warrant men can have for a belief is the perfect agreement of all pre-existing experience in support of it, it follows that, at any time, the inconceivableness of its negation is the deepest test any belief admits of. Though occasionally it may prove an imperfect test, yet as our most certain beliefs are capable of no better, to doubt one belief, because we have no higher guarantee for it, is really to doubt all beliefs." By inconceivableness, then, Mr. Spencer means much the same thing as Mr. Mill does, namely, that which is contrary to absolute or steadfast uniformity of experience. While, however, Mr. Mill, in opposition to Dr. Whewell, makes little of the test of inconceivableness, and exposes its weakness, Mr. Spencer makes the most of it; maintaining that our most certain beliefs are capable of no better. We think that Mr. Spencer is right in the main. Truths are known to be necessary and universal by its being found that they will not brook contradiction. For example, we know that 5+5 must always make 10, because it is impossible to conceive or even to suppose 5+5 making anything else than 10. So far we agree with Mr. Spencer; but we cannot hold with him that absolute uniformities in our experience are the sole root of convictions whose negation is inconceivable from involving contradiction, because uniform experience supplies us with some convictions whose negation is not inconceivable from involving contradiction, as, for example, our belief in the future rising of the sun or the alternations of day and night. How can Mr. Spencer account for the existence of the absolutely fixed conviction that 2+2 can by no possibility whatever make, at any time, anything else than 4? If we simply had the evidence of invariable experience for the truth of this conviction, we should have only precisely the same evidence for it as we have for the belief that the sun will continue to rise in future. But surely, if, from this evidence, we cannot infer that the sun will never cease to rise; neither can we conclude from similar evidence that 2+2 will never cease to make 4. We cannot, from precisely similar inductions, infer a contingent truth, as well as a necessary and universal truth. No; we can only draw, in both instances, the weaker conclusion which follows in one of them. Since, however, our conviction that 2+2 must always make 4, is as strong as it can possibly be, it must be Introduction, p. 21. |