JUDGMENTS. OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

Continued.

2. Judgments against administrators in other States—what footing they
have in this State. See ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES, 6, 7.

3. What is a sufficient authentication of a transcript of a judgment ren-
dered by a justice of the peace in another State. See AUTHENTICATION, 1.
JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION.

4. Where to object for want of proof. Where a judgment is entered by
confession in vacation, under a power of attorney, more than a year and
a day after the power of attorney was executed, it is necessary for the de-
fendant to apply to the court in which the judgment was entered, to set
the same aside, and to show some equitable reason therefor, before it will
be reversed on the ground that no affidavit was filed showing the defend-
ant was still alive, and that the debt was due and unpaid. Stuhl v. Shipp,
133.

5. Where the judgment is entered for too much. And when the judg
ment is within the ad damnum laid in the declaration, it will not be
reversed because it may appear to be for an amount greater than the sum
due on the note which was the basis of the confession, no application hav-
ing been made in the court below to correct the error. Ibid. 133.

6. Under warrant of attorney—when void. Where, under a warrant
of attorney, to enter the appearance of the maker of a note bearing date
April 24, 1846, and confess a judgment thereon, the appearance was en-
tered and a judgment taken upon a note bearing date April 24, 1856,—held,
that the action was unauthorized, and the judgment entered therein a
nullity, and binding upon no person, either in a direct or collateral pro-
ceeding. Chase v. Dana, 262.

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.

7. By having set off the damages for which it was rendered, in another
suit. A plea proposing to set off damages for which a judgment has
already been obtained, pending an appeal therefrom, and the offering of
evidence under it, would be a satisfaction of the judgment already obtained,
and its collection may be enjoined in the event of its affirmance in the
appellate court. King et al. v. Bradley et al. 342.

JUDGMENT AGAINST AN ADMINISTRATOR.

Binds the personal estate. See ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES, 2.
JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER.

-

On overruling demurrer to a declaration — of evidence admissible on assess-
ment of damages. See PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, 3.

JUDICIAL ACTS.

SALE OF IMPOUNDED ANIMALS.

Must be a judicial ascertainment that a law has been violated. See IM-
POUNDED ANIMALS, 1, 2, 3.

JUDICIAL CIRCUITS.

OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH.

Concerning acts of 1859, 1865 and 1867, relative to the twenty-sixth
judicial circuit-Franklin county not deprived of the judicial system. The

JUDICIAL CIRCUITS.

OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH.

Continued.

act of 1859, arranging Franklin county into the twenty-sixth judicial cir-
cuit, and that of 1865, fixing the terms of court therein, are not repealed
by the act of 1867. This last named act is to be construed as merely add-
ing other counties to the twenty-sixth circuit, and not as depriving Frank-
lin county of the benefits of the judicial system. The People ex rel.
Freeman v. Barr, 198.

JUDICIAL SALES. See SALES, 15, 16, 17.

JURISDICTION.

OF LA SALLE COUNTY COURT.

Under the act of 1865. By an act of 1865, entitled "An act to extend
the jurisdiction of the County Court of La Salle county," that court acquired
equal and concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court, as to all matters
except crimes and misdemeanors. Bedard v. Hall et al. 191.

JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON.

In proceedings by quo warranto-how acquired. See QUO WAR-
RANTO, 1, 2.

SENDING PROCESS TO FOREIGN COUNTY. See PRACTICE, 9, 10, 11.
IN THE MATTER OF NATURALIZATION.

What courts have jurisdiction thereof. See NATURALIZATION, 1, 2.

JURY.

RECALLING A JURY.

1. After their discharge, or separation on sealing their verdict. Where
a jury is discharged, they cannot be again impaneled in the case, without
the consent of the parties. Williams et al. v. The People, 478.

2. So where, by agreement, on the trial of a party charged with larceny,
the jury found their verdict, sealed it, left it with the clerk and separated;
and it, when opened next day, was found to be defective in not finding
the value of the property stolen,—it is error, three days after they agreed
to their verdict, to get them together and have them supply the defect.
Ibid. 478.

3. To permit a jury to mingle three days after hearing the evidence,
with the community, and then to come together and find an essential fact
in the case, would be attended with danger to liberty, and in disregard
of all the safeguards thrown around the accused to secure a fair and
impartial trial. Ibid. 478.

4. When a jury is thus discharged, the further consideration of the case
is as clearly out of their power as if they had come into court and their
verdict received and they discharged. This seems to be supported by
reason as well as authority. Ibid. 478.

OF AMENDING A VERDICT.

5. Where a jury were to seal their verdict and separate — and if defective
it was to be amended. See VERDICT, 2.

JURY. Continued.

TRIAL BY JURY IN CHANCERY.

6. On a question of alleged insanity. See INSANITY, 1.
SEPARATION OF JURY.

7. In a capital case· -effect thereof. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3.

IN CRIMINAL CASES.

8. Officer having charge of a jury must be sworn. See CRIMINAL
LAW, 1, 2.

QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.

9. The fact of the readiness and willingness of a party to perform his
contract is a question solely for the jury to determine, and which it is
error for a court to attempt to pass upon, by its instructions. Cummings
v. Tilton, 172.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

WHO ARE SUCH IN WISCONSIN.

A police justice of the city of Janesville, in the State of Wisconsin,
is a justice of the peace. Belton, Admx., v. Fisher, 35.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

OF RE-ENTRY BY LANDLORD.

1. For non-payment of rent—forfeiture. At common law, a lease con-
taining a condition for a re-entry for non-payment of rent, the law not
favoring forfeitures, required of the landlord, before he could re-enter,
that he should demand the precise amount due; that it be made the
day it fell due; to be made at a convenient hour before sunset; on the
land at the most conspicuous place, unless a different place is named in
the lease, then, at that place; the demand must be made in fact, and,
to be availing, had to be pleaded and proved. The tenant had the
whole day in which to make payment, but, failing to do so, the reversioner
might then re-enter. Chadwick v. Parker, 326.

2. As leases of every kind frequently contain these conditions, in favor
of trade and agriculture, and as forfeitures are odious to the law, such
forfeitures are never enforced but upon a strict compliance with all the
requirements of the law. All leases having such conditions are, without
reference to the length or value of the term, attended with the same con-
sequences, and are liable to be swept away, if the rent is not paid on the
day it falls due, notwithstanding it may owe almost its entire value to the
expenditure of the labor and money of the tenant. It is only reasonable
that the landlord should, on the day his rent falls due, indicate his inten-
tion of terminating the lease, and the tenant have the entire day within
which to make payment. Ibid. 327.

3. Act of 4 George II, amendatory of the common law. The act of 4
George II, chapter 28, section 2, amended the common law, only requiring
the landlord, if a sufficient distress could not be found, to sue in ejectment,
and, if a recovery be had, and execution be had, without the tenant pay.
ing the rent, and failing to file his bill in six months, the term was ended,
unless the judgment should be reversed. Ibid. 327.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. OF RE-ENTRY BY LANDLORD. Continued.

4. The British courts, in construing this act, held that it gave an addi-
tional remedy to the landlord; that he might proceed under the statute,
or resort to the common law, as he might prefer, but, in adopting either
course, he must conform to the law regulating that mode of terminating
the lease. Chadwick v. Parker, 327.

5. Act of 1865 of notice to quit, for non-payment of rent. The act of
1865 declares that in all cases of tenancies, when default shall be made in
the payment of rent due, or in any of the covenants of the lease, it shall
not be necessary to give more than ten days' notice to quit, or of the termi-
nation of such tenancy; and it may be terminated on giving such notice
to quit at any time after default in any of the covenants of the lease. That
no other notice or demand shall be necessary. It also declares, that, in
all cases of a lease or contract, when all of its covenants are performed,
the lease or contract shall be notice of its termination, and no other notice
be required. Ibid. 327.

6. The second section of the act of 1865, designed to dispense with the
necessity of demanding the rent on the very day it falls due or the breach
of covenant occurs, and to extend the right when the lease contains no
clause for a re-entry; and it contemplates a notice to quit, and one of the
landlord's intention to terminate the lease. While it does not in terms
require ten days' notice of an intention to terminate a lease, it declares
that more than that need not be given, and thereby renders ten days'
notice before the lease terminates sufficient. Ibid. 327.

7. It was the intention of the legislature to give the tenant ten days'
notice, within which he might pay the arrears of rent, and thus prevent
a forfeiture. It could not have been the legislative intention to bring
even future leases under so rigid a rule as to permit a landlord to declare
an instant forfeiture of a lease, because the rent was not paid on the day
it falls due, although payment may have been prevented by accident or
uncontrollable necessity, but rather to give a reasonable opportunity to
avoid such disastrous consequences. Ibid. 327.

8. When ten days expires after the notice and demand without the pay-
ment of the rent in arrear, the tenancy is terminated, and the landlord
may sue and recover possession. Ibid. 328.

9. In such a case it is not error to reject evidence that the tenant offered
to pay part and was ready on the premises to pay the balance when it
became due, as he had the opportunity of paying when the demand was
made and the notice given, and for ten days after. Ibid. 328.

OF THE LENGTH OF TERM OF a lease.

10. Construction of a lease in that regard. A lease bearing date on the
22d of May, 1860, provided that the lessee should have certain land, "forty
acres of said land being now broken, and the balance of said tillable land,
estimated at one hundred and twenty acres, said lessee is to break, this
season, if practicable, from which said lessee is to have three crops off of
said forty acres, and four crops off the balance of the land he breaks, esti-

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

OF THE LENGTH OF TERM OF A LEASE. Continued.

"

mated at one hundred and twenty acres." The crops taken off of said
land, leased as aforesaid, shall be as follows, to wit: From the forty acres
now broken, in three years from the 1st day of March, 1860, and from the
one hundred and twenty unbroken, in four years from the 1st day of March,
1861, and at the end of said time, or sooner if the number of crops pro-
vided for in said lease are had and obtained from said land, the said land
to be surrendered to the lessor." Held, that the lease terminated on the
1st day of March, 1865. The provision that the unbroken land should be
broken in 1860, "if practicable," did not authorize the lessee to occupy
such portion as it might not be "practicable" for him to break that sea-
son, beyond the four years from the 1st of March, 1861. Burris v. Jackson,
et ux. 345.

DISTRESS FOR RENT.

11. Warrant cannot issue after six months from the time of termina
tion of lease. By the act of 1857, the common law relative to proceedings
for distress for rent is so modified as to authorize distress to be made for
the period only of six months after the expiration of the lease; and, where
a distress warrant issues more than six months after rent has become due,
and the lease terminated, and the demised premises abandoned, such
warrant is without authority of law, is null and void, and affords no pro-
tection to the officer levying it. Werner v. Ropiequet, 522. ✓

LEASE FROM A MORTGAGEE.

12. Payment of the mortgage debt, by a mortgagor, terminates the right
of possession of a lessee from the mortgagee. Holt et al. v. Reese, 30.

LA SALLE COUNTY COURT

OF ITS JURISDICTION.

As extended by the act of 1865. See JURISDICTION, 1.

LEASE-LESSOR-LESSEE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LEGALIZING ILLEGAL ACTS.

BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION.

From what time the legalization will operate. Where by a decree of court,
a town ordinance has been declared invalid, and afterward, by an act of
the legislature, such ordinance was declared valid, the ordinance will
become valid only from the time of the passage of the act. Town of Lake
View v. Letz et al. 82.

LIEN.

VENDOR'S LIEN.

1. To what it extends. Where a mill, which is the possession of a sub-
sequent purchaser, is destroyed by fire, the machinery saved from the fire,
being a part of the mill, is subject to a prior vendor's lien upon the prem
ises for unpaid purchase money. Hammer v. Johnson et al. 193.