this assistance to the State. This was, however, an exception to the usual patriotism of the Southern people: their unanimity in supporting their Government cannot be sufficiently admired; they had imbibed fresh confidence from the results of the autumn campaigns, and were now bracing themselves up for the renewed struggle which on all sides appeared imminent.

Neither did the heat of summer nor the cold of winter

bring any cessation to the war. As we have seen the battles of the Chickahominy fought under a sultry July sun, so shall we see the soil of Virginia stained with the blood of her children and her enemies contrasting with the white hoar frost which covered her fields.

CHAPTER X.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

SINCE the campaign of Maryland the army of the Potomac had remained encamped on the banks of that river, recruiting from the severe losses incurred in the several battles of the Chickahominy, of the second Bull Run, and of Antietam. Elated by the absence of defeat in the last of these battles, the President and his advisers urged General M'Clellan to an immediate recommencement of active hostilities; General Lee was to be driven back, forced to accept battle, and to be not only defeated but crushed. They ignored the demoralisation of the army consequent on the terrible campaigns in which it had been engaged; they showed little zeal in furnishing its general with stores, army equipments, and horses; but sending repeated orders for him to advance, seemed to seek an opportunity to represent him as slow and wanting in energy, and thus gradually to sap his greatly increased popularity. In all political principles M'Clellan was strongly opposed to the party to which the advisers of the President belonged and to which he himself inclined; and at a time when this party was incurring defeat in the elections, it appeared dangerous to allow a political opponent to possess the confidence and to hold the chief command of the main army. Thus whilst policy led many members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet to wish for General M'Clellan's re

moval, his own slowness of action and perhaps over great caution gave them not only a handle which they could use in biassing public opinion, but also a cloak which would conceal from themselves their own motives. The army under General M'Clellan continued to hold the left bank of the Potomac during the greater part of the month of October, whilst continuous correspondence passed between him and General Halleck, the commander-in chief; the latter urging an advance, the former repeating his requisitions for supplies and cavalry horses.

Two lines of march were open for the adoption of the general, either to advance up the Shenandoah Valley, in which case from 12,000 to 15,000 additional men would be furnished him, or crossing the Blue Ridge to interpose between the Confederates and Washington, when 30,000 would be sent as reinforcements. M'Clellan inclined to the first-mentioned plan, as by it he would cover Maryland, as well as have the advantage of the Harper's Ferry and Winchester rail for the conveyance of his supplies. The President was in favour of the latter, as he would then be relieved from all anxiety with regard to Washington. As however, from several causes, the army delayed its advance, and the fine weather of early autumn changed to the rain of a later period of the year, circumstances altered. The waters of the Potomac rose, the river became unfordable, and the roads into Maryland were rendered difficult for the movements of troops. These natural causes were considered sufficient to protect Maryland and the country bordering on the upper Potomac, and General M'Clellan therefore resolved to cross over to the south side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, and advancing parallel with the range and seizing each pass with detachments, to protect his own

line of communications at the same time that he threatened those of the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley.

On the 25th of October the movement commenced, and by the first week in November the whole army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Warrenton. General M'Clellan expressed his opinion that a general engagement would probably take place in a few days; he considered the troops under his command in admirable condition and spirits, and awaited the result with confidence. This was on the 7th of November, but in the evening of the same day, or rather during the night, a Brigadier General of the name of Buckenham arrived at the camp and delivered to M'Clellan an order to resign the command of the army to General Burnside, and to report himself at Trenton, a small town of New Jersey. The announcement was totally unexpected by both Generals M'Clellan and Burnside; it was evidently a coup d'état suggested by the fears of the dominant party in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet,-fears lest M'Clellan should use his vast influence in the army to assist with force the partial political triumph of the DemoThat such a course had been thought possible by some members of the party, both civil and military, there is ground for believing; but M'Clellan himself had given no encouragement to such expectations : during his active career as a soldier he had never interfered in politics, and had always loyally supported the President and Government to whom he owed allegiance. His character as evinced by his conduct was as a citizen irreproachable, and considered merely in respect to his own feelings, the method of his dismissal was harsh in the extreme; but if his admirers may be inclined to pass judgment on his political opponents, and to cry shame on the ingratitude of the nation, those

crats.

who carefully consider the circumstances of the case will possibly find that some excuse can be offered for the line of conduct adopted. The country, irrespective of the trials of war, was passing through a revolution, old landmarks were in course of removal, old restraints were being broken, and during such periods acts which might be termed violent in peaceful times must be excused, and a government and nation may even be commended which abstain from bloodshed, and refrain from the too common recourse to political executions.

General M'Clellan's ready compliance with the order he had received, his temperate address to his army, and his subsequent conduct in refusing to become the representative of a discontented party,* proclaim him to be a man actuated by higher motives than those of ambition; and if he cannot be numbered among the leaders of his age, he will yet be entitled to respect for his honesty of purpose, his moderation, and his capability for the organisation of an army; whilst his advance from Washington and the battles of South Mountain and Antietam will be considered as among the turning-points of the war, when defeat prevented was almost equal to victory gained.

His personal friend General Burnside was now invested with the command of the Potomac army. He was known as a man of high character, and although a Democrat, yet free from any decided political bias; he had been successful in North Carolina, and had distinguished himself at South Mountain and Antietam ; he, moreover, possessed the confidence of General M'Clellan, and was on terms of personal friendship with his staff and with that of the army, thereby possessing

*No reference is here intended to General M'Clellan's subsequent constitutional opposition to Mr. Lincoln's re-election.