Such was the

15th and early part of the

the Antietam prevented the too near approach of reconnoitring parties, and batteries commanded the bridges over the stream. Such was the position of affairs on the night of the 16th. During the 16th, General Jackson, with a great portion of his corps, arrived as before stated at Sharpsburg, and was immediately pushed forward to the left of the line with orders to relieve Hood's division of Longstreet's corps. This division, previous to his arrival, had been warmly engaged with Hooker's corps, which had crossed the upper fords of the Antietam, and had succeeded in establishing itself within a short distance of the Confederate line of pickets.

Thus, on the night of the 16th, General Jackson held the left of the Confederate line, extending from near the Potomac to the Sharpsburg and Boonsboro' Road; in the centre was D. Hill's division, and the right was but thinly occupied by what remained of Longstreet's corps. General Hood supported Jackson, as the left, being the weakest part of the line in regard to the advantages of ground, required more troops than the centre and right. There were also other reasons which led General Lee to concentrate a stronger force on his left than on the other portions of his line; against the left General M'Clellan seemed to be massing the larger portion of his forces, and whilst it thus appeared more exposed to attack, it was also farther removed from the reinforcements which were hourly expected to arrive from Harper's Ferry. On the night of the 16th, neither had M'Laws, Anderson, Walker, or A. P. Hill effected a junction with General Lee; and on the morning of the 17th, not more than thirty-five thousand men were in line of battle.

It was indeed an anxious night for the leaders of the Confederate army. General Lee's tactics had been very bold, and it remained to be seen whether calculations based on the success of combined movements would prove correct, and whether his scattered army would be reunited in time to meet M'Clellan's onslaught. The men slept on their arms, frequently disturbed during the night by picket firing, and immediately on the appearance of the first dawn of light the skirmishing between the two armies commenced.

Before the smoke from the artillery had clouded the prospect it was a grand scene that dawned upon the eyes of those who stood on the hills overlooking the Antietam. In front was the wooded line of low heights, partially cultivated, on which were posted the several divisions of the Confederate armythe brown uniforms of the soldiers scarcely showing against the ground. Below lay the stream of the Antietam, flowing through a rich valley, and crossed by bridges carefully watched by advanced skirmishers, and commanded by guns whose muzzles gleamed from among the woods. Beyond rose the smoke from the numberless picket fires which marked the bivouacs of the Federal army, extending in a semicircle and enclosing on two sides the Confederate position; whilst in the background the wooded heights of South Mountain, stretching away southwards until they connected with the chain of the Blue Ridge, showed distinct outlines against the clear sky. Soon, however, was this scene hidden from view. As the sun rose the batteries on either side opened fire; the smoke hung heavily over the woods, and the stillness of the morning air was rudely broken by the boom of the artillery and the sharp rattle of musketry.

The action commenced by an artillery fire from the batteries in the centre of the Federal line posted on the left bank of the Antietam, which enfiladed and caused some loss to Jackson's division. Under cover of this fire, Hooker with three divisions, viz. Rickett's, Meade's, and Doubleday's, advanced to the attack, supported by Mansfield's corps of two divisions (Williams' and Green's), which had followed Hooker across the stream during the previous night. It was McClellan's intention to make the principal attack on Lee's left as being his weakest point, and to delay the assault on his right until he (General Lee) had drawn away forces from that portion of his line to strengthen the flank attacked. For this purpose M'Clellan had concentrated Hooker's, Mansfield's, and Sumner's corps on the right of his army. He held Porter's corps in reserve in the centre, and Burnside with one corps on the left, in readiness to advance when the order should be given. He had also ordered up Franklin's corps from Crampton's Gap, where it had been retained to watch the Maryland heights, and to prevent an attack on the left rear of the Federal army from Harper's Ferry, and directed it to march as rapidly as possible on the upper bridge and fords of the Antietam. Irrespective of the artillery which accompanied the several corps and divisions, he had placed several batteries on the low hills in the centre of his line to play on the Confederate position, and to distract attention from the attack directed against the left. Such were General M'Clellan's dispositions previous to the battle. His own statement shows that the numbers in the field on the morning of the 17th September were from ninety to ninety-five thousand; he had thus a large numerical superiority over his

opponent, even if the whole Confederate army had been united; but, as has been before stated, some of the divisions had not arrived on the ground, and when the action commenced only thirty-five thousand men were in line of battle under General Lee.

Against the left wing of this army Hooker's corps advanced, and entering the woods immediately in its front succeeded in driving back the skirmishers and occupying the belt of wood; here he placed his field batteries, and a contest ensued for the possession of the open ground between the wood he now held and another belt of trees near Dunker Church. The old Stonewall division opposed him, and under a terrible fire of shot, shell, canister, and musketry, held its ground. General Jones was wounded, and his place occupied by General Starke, who was killed almost immediately after he had taken the command. This was about 7 A.M., and the second line of the Federals, under General Mansfield, came up in support— Williams's division on the right, and Green's on the left. Still the Confederates held their ground, and the battle raged with varying success until 9 A.M., each side trying alternately to defend or possess themselves of the belts of wood. The Confederates had suffered terribly; more than half the brigades forming the first line had been either killed or wounded, together with nearly every regimental commander.* The Federals at length pressed forward and drove their opponents from the woods, taking possession of Dunker Church. About this time General Mansfield was killed, and his place taken by General Williams; General

See General Jackson's report. Pollard's Second Year of the War, page 132.

Hooker was also wounded, and compelled to leave the field, but the position of the Confederates was very critical, as already was the leading division of Sumner's corps approaching the scene of action, and no reinforcements had as yet reached them. Then General Early, taking the place of Lawton (wounded), put himself at the head of Ewell's* old division, and with the remainder of the Stonewall division withstood the enemy; the artillery also, under General Stewart, was concentrated in rear of the line, to support the infantry. Converting the defence into attack, Early led forward his brigades; the Federal line was shaken; but large reinforcements appeared coming up. At this juncture, portions of

Anderson's and M'Law's divisions reached the field. Inspirited by this addition to their force, the Confederate line rushed forward. They drove back Hooker's corps from Dunker Church; they followed the fugitives across the open, and nearly regained the position they had held in the morning. Hooker's corps were completely demoralised and put to flight, and portions of Sumner's (under Sedgwick) considerably shaken; but the retreat of the infantry unmasked the powerful artillery in the first line of woods, and the fire from these batteries checked the Confederate pursuit. Then were Richardson's and French's divisions of Sumner's corps brought forward, but did little more than hold the line of woods. In doing so Richardson was mortally wounded, and succeeded by Hancock. Franklin's corps. also came up

* General Ewell was badly wounded, and lost a leg at the second battle of Bull Run.

† General Sumner, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated that Hooker's corps were dispersed and routed; and subsequently he added, 'I sent one of my staff officers to find out where they were, and General Ricketts, the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise 300 men of the corps.'