the said Eleanor Rodman, and that his error "was not known or discovered until daughter was, in March last, fifteen years after the appraisement of the estate had old, and has been employed in the Silk Mills been made and filed of record."

of the Shehli Silk Mills Corporation, for | The prayer of the petition is that an which service she is receiving nine dollars order issue directed to the register to correct per week. For these reasons, he asks for the record to "conform to the true facts" the revocation of the said decree. In an therein set forth. answer filed by Eleanor Rodman, all of the above allegations are admitted, except the one relating to the wages earned by the daughter. It is said that she is now employed by Follmer, Clogg & Company, and is paid from $3.00 to $3.50 per week. As no depositions have been taken, we must assume that this latter claim is correct.

If this court had jurisdiction to grant the prayer of the petition without notice, as is proposed, several difficulties lie in the way. It is not disclosed what records are to be corrected. It is asserted that letters were issued by the register, a bond was filed by the petitioner and an inventory was made and filed. If a renunciation was filed and proof of death submitted these papers are probably on file, and neither copies of these papers, or any other papers. are attached to the petition so that it could be ascertained what corrections should be made in this record.

Of course, the defendant is no longer liable for the maintenance of his late wife, a legal separation having been decreed between them. But he must support his child. As she is only earning from $3.00 to $3.50 per week, it is necessary for him to add to this amount for her proper maintenance. This application should have been made We think, as the order was made for the to the register, who has power to revoke mother and child, he should be allowed letters improvidently issued, Neidig Estate, something because of the divorce, and that 183 Pa. 492. the order should be reduced to $2.00 per week from this date, on condition that all the back money be paid. To this extent, we make this rule absolute.

Rule made absolute.

O. C. of

Letters of administration are improvidently granted when the proofs of death were made in the name of a man who did not exist; that letters were granted in that name upon the petition of a woman who was not the widow of a man of that name. While it is possible for error of this charSchuylkill Co., acter to be corrected in record papers upon proof after proper notice, larger difficulties lie in the path of correcting the bond filed. so that its value as protection to the estate may not be impaired.

ORPHANS' COURT

Smith's Estate Error in Name of Decedent-Jurisdiction. The register of wills has jurisdiction in all matters relating to letters which have been issued improvidently; error in the name of the decedent may be corrected by him.

Petition.

E. W. Shoemaker for Petition.

The petition is dismissed..

Gettel's Petition

Judicial Sales-Enforcement and Validity. Nov. 12, 1917. WILHELM, P. J.-This Respondent and decedent's administratrix petition sets out that James Edward Smith agreed upon a private sale to the former of dedied on the 22nd day of August, 1917, and cedent's real estate; but, upon exceptions filed, it can be inferred from the caption in the the Court refused to confirm the sale and ordered a public sale, at which petitioner bought the proppetition, notwithstanding there is no aver-erty. The sale was duly confirmed and deed ment to that effect, that letters of administra- executed and delivered; but respondent, having tion were issued in said estate in the name of entered into possession before the public sale, Joseph E. Smith. It is presumed that the refused to vacate, whereupon, a petition was filed under the Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 239, and name of Joseph E. Smith was represented to citation was granted. HELD, that judgment must the register as being the name of the decedent. be entered against the respondent. The petition further states that the widow, Minnie Smith, renounced her right to administer in favor of Thomas H. Snyder, who filed his bond for the faithful performance of his duties as adminstrator.

It is also alleged that there was error in the first name of the decedent and that said

The facts plainly disclose that the petitioner is the owner of the real estate in question, having Orphans' Court, and from all the facts, he has a his title through an order and decree of the present right of the possession thereof.

Citation issued to Howard Bollinger, commanding him to appear and answer and show cause, if any he has, why possession of

certain real estate described in the petition, sold the same at said sale to Frank M. should not be delivered to the petitioner.

8. After the said Howard Bollinger had agreed to purchase the said real estate for the price or sum of $8100.00 and before said public sale, he entered upon said prem3. Subsequent to the granting of said ises and tract of land and took possession letters of administration, there was an agree- thereof, and there remains and claims posment made with Howard Bollinger, the session thereof, although he has had due present respondent, to sell to him the said real estate for the sum of $8100.00.

Dork Legal Record summary of the material facts relied upon by

the plaintiff.

Those facts seem to be embodied in separate paragraphs which together form a chronological recital of the facts which the plaintiff is bound to prove at the trial, if the defendant denies them.

Each of the paragraphs can readily be denied or affirmed by the defendant. If de

Practice-Act of 1915-Sufficiency of State- nied, the plaintiff, of course, must produce

ment.

Plaintiff's statement, in numbered parapraphs, set forth that the contract was in writing; that plaintiff resided in York; that defendant was a beneficial association in York; decedent's membership and death; designation of plaintiff as beneficiary; authority for such designation: notice and proof of death and failure of payment by defendant. HELD, that a motion to strike off the statement as not in conformity with the Practice Act of 1915 must be refused.

Where the plaintiff's statement is uniform and clear, every defence whether of fact or of law, must be clearly set up in the affidavit of defence. Allegations that the statement "presupposes and rebuts theories of the defence," and that to answer the statement would require the defendant "to divulge its entire defence, to answer matters that may not be material to the issue and to argue matters that are questions of evidence," are beyond comprehension and cannot be considered at this time.

No. 201, August Term, 1917.

proof at the trial; but they seem to be such plain allegations of fact, that the only inference to be drawn is that they are true, unless they are denied by the defendant as specifically as they are stated by the plaintiff. It is our opinion, that the Act of 1915 means that where the plaintiff's statement is uniform and clear, every defence whether of fact or of law, must be clearly set up in the affidavit of defence.

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th reasons raised by the defendant's affidavits are therefore dismissed.

The 5th and 6th reasons given by the defendant are beyond comprehension and therefore. cannot be further, considered at this time,

The prayer of the defendant's affidavit "to strike from the records the plaintiff's statement as not being in conformity with Question of Law raised by Affidavit of the "Practice Act, nineteen fifteen," is Defense.

refused.

The defendant is ordered to file its affidavit of defence within fifteen days from this date.

C. P, of

Allegheny Co. Ayres et al. v. John Dunlap Co. Workmen's Compensation--Minors--Action at Law-Liability of Employer-Child's Labor Act of May 13, 1915, P. L. 286. One who employs a minor contrary to the Child's Labor Act of May 13, 1915, P. L. 286, is an action at law. Such an employe is not within liable in damages for injuries to such employe in the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915.

1. It "is not in concise and summary form of the material facts on which the plaintiff rests her case." 2, That "it introduces apparently all the evidence of the plaintiff's case." 3, That it "contains conclusions of The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, relaw." 5, That it "presupposes and rebuts ferring as it does to parties legally competent to theories of the defence." 6, That "if defend-contract, must not be construed as destructive of ant is required to file an affidavit of defence in accordance with the ** Act, ** to the statement of claim as filed, ***** the defendant will be obliged to divulge its entire defence, to answer matters that may not be material to the issue in this case and to argue matters that are questions of evidence."

An inspection of the plaintiff's statement leads to the conclusion that it is a concise

| statutes enacted for the protection of employes of whom many are under legal disability, so that the Compensation Act does not deprive such emplayes of their rights at common law.

A statutory demurrer under the Practice Act of 1915 was overruled in an action for damages for injuries received by a minor while employed contrary to the Child's Labor Act of May 13, 1915, P. L. 286, in that such an employe was not sation Act, which does not vest minors with within the provisions of the Workmen's Compenpower to contract.

Statutory Demurrer.

"After all, it is a question of legislative

E. T. Adair and R. P. & M. R. Marshall, intention and since that intention was writfor plaintiff. ten into the very first section of the act in Rose Eichenauer and James H. Gray, sent case, a construction giving the act a language broad enough to include the pre

for defendant.

January 7, 1918. CARPENTER, J.-The question of law raised by the affidavit of defense is Does the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 preclude recovery of damages by the plaintiff's in a common law action?

more restricted meaning would make an arbitrary distinction not warranted by the language used."

I have quoted at length, that no misapprehension may exist as to the ground upon which my conclusion is based.

"The term 'employe' as used in this act is declared to be synonymous with servant and includes all natural persons who perform services for another for a valuable consider

It is contended by counsel for defendant The facts out of which the question arises, that inasmuch as the legislature has, in the as set forth in the statement, are: Thomas Workmen's Compensation Act, defined the Ayres, Jr., when a minor fifteen years of word "employe" the court is bound to adopt age, was employed by defendant and work- the definition, and if so, plaintiffs are preing as a helper on a press or stamping ma- cluded from maintaining this action. Secchine used in sheet metal manufacturing, tion 104, so far as material to the present and while so employed was seriously injured. discussion, reads: The question never has been before our court and counsel state they have not found any decision in this State in which it has been discussed. Assuming, as we must, that plaintiffs' statement presents a cause of ac-ation," etc. tion at common law, the effect of the statute This is a comprehensive definition and if is, alone, before the Court. The Act defines certain words and phrases used therein. The power of the legislature, in this particular, is not questioned and is expressly recognized in McElhone v. Philadelphia Quartette Club, 53 Sup. Ct., 263, opinion by Judge Henderson, in which the court say:

taken literally embraces minors under fourteen years of age whose employment “in and about or in connection with any establishment" is expressly prohibited by the Act of May 13, 1915 (P. L. 286), and minors under 16 years of age who, by Section 5 of the Act, are prohibited employment in oper"In the construction of a statue, words, chines used in sheet metal manufacturing. ating or assisting in operating stamping maif of common use, are to be taken in their Section 8 of the same act provides that natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signifi- before any minor under the age of 16 years But it must be conceded that it is shall be employed, permitted or suffered to clearly within the power of the legislature work in or about or in connection with any to declare in the statute the sense in which establishment or in any occupation, the perkeep on file an employment certificate. In son employing such minor shall procure and

cance.

it used certain words words therein contain

many

ed, and that the legislature has an inherent right to prescribe the legality of its own. definition or language. A construction put have been enacted which in their general States workmen's compensation laws upon an act of the legislature by itself, by means of a provision embodied in the same, a large number the words "lawfully employscope and purpose are similar to ours, but in that it shall not be construed in a certain ed," legally permitted to work under the designated manner, is binding upon the laws of the State, or qualifying phrases of courts, although the latter without such a similar import are used. direction would have understood the language to mean something different; Com. v. Curry, 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. 356; Getz v. Brubaker, 25 Pa. Sup. Ct. 303; 27 Cyc.

112."

acted a law forbidding the employment of Having, at the same session (1915), enchildren under 14 years of age, and forbidding the employment of persons between the ages of 14 and 16 years in certain specified In McNabb v. Clear Springs Water Co., occupations and in others permitting their 239 Pa. 502, the meaning of the word "es-employment under certain restrictions, it is tablishment" as used in the Factory Act of but reasonable to assume our legislators 1905, was under discussion and Mr. Justice deemed it necessary to declare the CompenElkins, speaking for the Court, said: sation Act applicable to persons "lawfully

"The legislative mandate is that machinery of every description shall be properly guarded, and customary disregard of this is but customary negligence rendering everyone guilty of it responsible for the consequences resulting directly and solely from it."

employed." The Act of May 13th, supra, length from Hrabchak v. D. &. H. Co., and declares it unlawful to employ, (a) minors says that where compliance with the Act under the age of 14; (b) minors between (1915) is possible it is the only justification the ages of 14 and 16 in certain occupations, whicn the law will accept. In Jones v. and (c) in permitted occupations between American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644, Mr. Isaid ages, without first obtaining an employ- Justice Brown says: ment certificate. The logical conclusion from defendant's contention is, "the Work men's Compensation Act applies to all employes regardless of age." If this condition is sustained it emasculates the Child Labor Act to which attention has just been called, by declaring lawful that which, at the same The several Acts relating to the general session, was made unlawful. Not only so, question herein discussed are either mandabut in the face of positive prohibitions in tory or inhibitory or both. Three parties one Act the Court is asked to hold that in are interested in and affected by these the other the legislature intended to, and statutes-the employer, the employe, and did in fact, impose an inhibited contract the State; and the Compensation Act, referupon persons incapable of making any con-ring as it does, to parties legally competent tract. For if the word "employe" includes, to contract, must not be construed as desliterally, "all natural persons" and one who tructive of statutes enacted for the protection is employed contrary to law is declared an of employes of whom many are under legal employe within the meaning of the Com- disability. pensation Act, a child under 14 years of age The State is vitally interested in the may make a valid contract of employment. physical, mental and moral welfare of its A construction which leads to such results children and has from time to time enacted cannot be adopted. Nor can it be held that laws for their protection. These laws are because Section 23 of the Child Labor Act the garnered fruits of experience. An provides a penalty for violation thereof, an eminent educator has said: "No social conemployer is relieved from iiability in dam-science ever was or can be static. The ages; Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine almost unanimous testimony of human exCo, 220 Pa. 617. This case came before perience shows that the lawmaker does not. the Supreme Court a second time, 225 Pa. precede but follows the developing social 348, and the Court then said the father and son could recover damages.

conscience. What the law-giver enacts into formal precept or law must previously have It is held in Kelliher v. Brown & Co., proved its worth in the collective experi242 Pa. 499, that the provisions of the ence." Keeping in mind the trend of legisFactory Act of May 2, 1905, P. L. 352, lation relating to child labor, the conclusion requiring the owner to provide belt-shifters, is, it seems to me, irresistable that our legisis mandatory and in Valjaco v. Carnegie lature, notwithstanding the comprehensive Steel Co., 226 Pa: 514, that the provisions terms used in defining "employe," had in of the same Act requiring that machinery be mind such persons only as are by law capasafeguarded cannot be impliedly waived, Mr. Justice Potter saying:

"In Pennsylvania we are committed to the view that the requirements of a statute adopted in the exercise of the police powers of the State for the protection of its citizens cannot be impliedly waived by the parties to the contract of employment."

This statement of the law is adopted by the Superior Court in Hrabchak v. D. & H. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 626, in which Rice, P. J., after quoting the above adds: "Particularly is this true of statutory provisions intended for the protection of children." In Kruthies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162, Mr. Justice Moschzisker quotes at

ble to make valid agreements. The language employed in Sections 301 and 302 sustains this view. Section 301 refers to employer and employe who shall by "agreement" accept the provisions of Article 3, and Section 302, says:

ex

"In every contract of hiring press or implied * it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties have aćcepted the provisions of article three of this act and have 'agreed' to be bound thereby, unless there be at the time of the making, renewal or extension of such 'contract' an express statement in writing from either party to the other that the provisions of article three of the act do not apply."