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act. Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the court, said, concerning the agreement, that it "restrained trade, for it narrowed the market for the sale of tiles in California from the manufacturers and dealers therein in other states, so that they could only be sold to the members of the association, and it enhanced prices to the nonmember."

the means whereby the interstate traffic was to be destroyed were acts within a state, and some of them were, in themselves, as a part of their obvious purpose and effect, beyond the scope of Federal authority, still, as we have seen, the acts must be considered as a whole, and the plan is open to condemnation, notwithstanding a negligible amount of intrastate business might be affected in carrying it out. If the purposes of the combination were, as alleged, to prevent any in

the means operated at one end before physical transportation commenced, and, at the other end, after the physical transportation ended, was immaterial.

Nor can the act in question be held inapplicable because defendants were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. The act made no distinction between classes. It provided that "every" contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade was ilsince August 20, 1902. Triest & Company will be retained on the unfair list as long as they handle the product of this unfair hat-manufacturing concern. Union men do not usually patronize retail stores who buy from unfair jobbing houses or manufacturers. Under these circumstances, all friends of organized labor, and those desiring the patronage of organized workers, will not buy goods from Triest & Company, 116 Sansome street, San Francisco. "Yours respectfully,

The averments here are that there was an existing interstate traffic between plaintiffs and citizens of other states, and that, for the direct purpose of destroying such inter-terstate transportation at all, the fact that state traffic, defendants combined not merely to prevent plaintiffs from manufacturing articles then and there intended for transportation beyond the state, but also to prevent the vendees from reselling the hats which they had imported from Connecticut, or from further negotiating with plaintiffs for the purchase and intertransportation of such hats from Connecticut to the various places of destination. So that, although some of liam C. Hennelly and Daniel P. Kelly, in behalf of all said defendants, and acting for them, demanded the firm of Triest & Company, wholesale dealers in hats, doing business in said San Francisco, that they should agree not to buy or deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs, under threats made by them to said firm of boycotting their business and that of their customers, and, upon their refusing to comply with such demand and yield to such threats, the defendants, by their said agents, caused announcement to be made in the newspapers of said city that said Triest & Company were to be boy. cotted therefor, and that the labor council of San Francisco would be addressed by them for that purpose, and that they had procured a boycott to be declared by said fabor council, and thereupon the defendants, through their said agents, Hennelly and Kelly, printed, published, issued, and distributed to the retail dealers in hats, in several states upon the Pacific coast, the following circular, to wit:

"San Francisco Labor Council, Affiliated with the American Federation of Labor,

Secretary's Office, 927 Market Street, Rooms, 405, 406, 407 Emma Spreckel's Building.

Meets every Friday, at 1159 Mission St. "Telephone, South, 447.

"Address all communications to 927 Market Street.

"San Francisco, July 3, 1903. "To whom it may concern:

"At a special meeting of the San Francisco Labor Council held on the above date, the hat-jobbing concern known as Triest & Company, 116 Sansome street, San Francisco, was declared unfair for persistently patronizing the unfair hat-manufacturing concern of D. E. Loewe & Company, Danbury, Connecticut, where the union hatters have been on strike, for union conditions,

"G. B. Benham, "President S. F. Labor Council. "T. E. Zant,

"Secretary S. F. Labor Council. [L. 8.] "W. C. Hennelly, "D. F. Kelley,

"Representing United Hatters of North

America."

"Also the following, to wit:

"San Francisco Labor Council, Affiliated with American Federation of Labor,

Secretary's Office, 927 Market Street, Rooms 405, 406, 407 Emma Spreckel's Building.

Meets every Friday, at 1159 Mission St. "Telephone, South, 447.

"Address all communications to 927 Market Street.

*302

legal. The records of Congress show that, several efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the operation of the act, and that all these efforts failed, so that the act remained as we have it before us.

character of the persons who entered into them. It is true this statute has not been much expounded by judges, but, as it seems to me, its meaning, as far as relates to the sort of combinations to which it is to apply, is manifest, and that it includes combinations which are composed of laborers acting in the interest of laborers.

In an early case (United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 26 L.R.A. 158, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 831, 54 Fed. 994) the United States filed a bill under the Sher- "It is the successful effort of the combinaman act in the circuit court for the eastern tion of the defendants to intimidate and district of Louisiana, averring the existence overawe others who were at work in conof "a gigantic and widespread combination ducting or carrying on the commerce of the of the members of a multitude of separate country, in which the court finds their erorganizations for the purpose of restraining ror and their violation of the statute. One the commerce among the several states and of the intended results of their combined with foreign countries," and it was contend-action was the forced stagnation of all the ed that the statute did not refer to combina- commerce which flowed through New Ortions of laborers. But the court, granting the injunction, said:

leans. This intent and combined action are none the less unlawful because they included in their scope the paralysis of all other business within the city as well."

The case was affirmed on appeal by the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit. 6 C. C. A. 258, 13 U. S. App.426, 57 Fed. 85.

"I think the congressional debates show that the statute had its origin in the evils of massed capital; but, when the Congress came to formulating the prohibition, which is the yardstick for measuring the complainant's right to the injunction, *it expressed it in these words: 'Every contract or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.' The subject had so broadened in the minds of the legislators that the source of the evil was not regarded as material, and the evil in its entirety is dealt with. They made the inter-ployees; that thereafter the four officers of diction include combinations of labor as well as of capital; in fact, all combinations in restraint of commerce, without reference to the

Subsequently came the litigation over the Pullman strike and the decisions Re Debs, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 163, 64 Fed. 724, 745, 755, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. The bill in that case was filed by the United States against the officers of the American Railway Union, which alleged that a labor dispute existed between the Pullman Palace Car Company and its em

the railway union combined together and with others to compel an adjustment of such dispute by creating a boycott against the Triest & Company, upon the Pacific coast, and to many others, thereby causing the loss of many orders and customers to said Triest & Company and to the plaintiffs, for the purpose of intimidating and coercing said Triest & Company not to deal with the plaintiffs, and thereby cause the loss of many orders and customers to said Treist & Company and to the plaintiffs.

"22. By means of each and all of said acts combination and conspiracy, they have greatdone by the defendants in pursuance of said ly restrained, diminished, and, in many places, destroyed the trade and commerce of said states other than Connecticut, by the the plaintiffs with said wholesale dealers, in resulting therefrom, and the plaintiffs have loss of many orders and customers directly been injured in their business and property by reason of said combination and conspiracy, and the acts of the defendants done in pursuance thereof, and to carry the same into effect, which are declared to be unlawful by said act of Congress, to the amount of eighty thousand ($80,000) dollars, to recover threefold which damages, under § 7 of said act, this suit is brought."

fact. We have given the declaration in full in the margin, and it appears therefrom that it is charged that defendants formed a combination to directly restrain plaintiffs' trade; that the trade to be restrained was interstate; that certain means to attain such

ployed to that end; that those means were so used and employed by defendants, and that thereby they injured plaintiffs' property and business.

At the risk of tediousness, we repeat that the complaint averred that plaintiffs were

cars of the car company; that, to make such light of the authorities, the only inquiry is boycott effective, they had already prevent-as to the sufficiency of the averments of ed certain of the railroads running out of Chicago from operating their trains; that they asserted that they could and would tie up, paralyze, and break down any and every railroad which did not accede to their demands, and that the purpose and intention of the combination was "to secure unto them-restraint were contrived to be used and emselves the entire control of the interstate, industrial, and commercial business in which the population of the city of Chicago and of the other communities along the lines of road of said railways are engaged with each other, and to restrain any and all other persons from any independent control or man-manufacturers of hats in Danbury, Connecagement of such interstate, industrial, or commercial enterprises, save according to the will and with the consent of the defendants." The circuit court proceeded principally upon the Sherman anti-trust law, and granted an injunction. In this court the case was rested upon the broader ground that the Federal government had full power over interstate commerce and over the transmission of the mails, and, in the exercise of those powers, could remove everything put upon highways, natural or artificial, to obstruct the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mails. But, in refer-dealers in states other than Connecticut, ence to the anti-trust act, the court expressly stated:

"We enter into no examination of the act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat. at L. 209, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200, upon which the circuit court relied mainly to sustain its jurisdiction. It must not be understood from this that we dissent from the conclusions of that court in reference to the scope of the act, but simply that we prefer to rest our judgment on the broader ground which has been discussed in this opinion, believing it of importance that the principles underlying it should be fully stated and affirmed."

And, in the opinion, Mr. Justice Brewer, among other things, said:

ticut, having a factory there, and were then and there engaged in an interstate trade in some twenty states other than the state of Connecticut; that they were practically dependent upon such interstate trade to consume the product of their factory, only a small percentage of their entire output being consumed in the state of Connecticut; that, at the time the alleged combination was formed, they were in the process of manufacturing a large number of hats for the purpose of fulfilling engagements then actually made with consignees and wholesale

and that, if prevented from carrying on the work of manufacturing these hats, they would be unable to complete their engagements.

That defendants were members of a vast combination called The United Hatters of North America, comprising about 9,000 members, and including a large number of subordinate unions, and that they were combined with some 1,400,000 others into another association known as The American Federation of *Labor, of which they were members, whose members resided in all the places in the several states where the wholesale dealers in hats and their cus tomers resided and did business; that defendants were "engaged in & combined "It is curious to note the fact that in a scheme and effort to force all manufac large proportion of the cases in respect to turers of fur hats in the United States, ininterstate commerce brought to this court cluding the plaintiffs, against their will and the question presented was of the validity of their previous policy of carrying on their state legislation in its bearings upon inter- business, to organize their workmen in the state commerce, and the uniform course of departments of making and finishing, in each decision has been to declare that it is not of their factories, into an organization, to within the competency of a state to legislate be part and parcel of the said combination in such a manner as to obstruct interstate known as the United Hatters of North Amercommerce. If a state, with its recognized ica, or, as the defendants and their confedpowers of sovereignty, is impotent to ob-erates term it, to unionize their shops, with struct interstate commerce, can it be that the intent thereby to control the employment any mere voluntary association of individ- of labor in and the operation of said facuals within the limits of that state has a tories, and to subject the same to the dipower which the state itself does not pos-rection and control of persons other than the owners of the same, in a manner exThe question answers itself; and, in the tremely onerous and distasteful to such own.

Bess ?"

⚫304

*306

ers, and to carry out such scheme, effort, and | hats from such customers, and filling the purpose by restraining and destroying the interstate trade and commerce of such manufacturers, by means of intimidation of and threats made to such manufacturers and their customers in the several states, of boycotting them, their product, and their customers, using therefor all the powerful means at their command as aforesaid, until such time as, from the damage and loss of business resulting therefrom, the said manufacturers should yield to the said demand to unionize their factories."

$309

*308

(208 U. S. 452)

PANY, Petitioner,

V.

made by the plaintiffs under threats of such | GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMboycotting; to falsely represent to said wholesale dealers and their customers, that the plaintiffs had discriminated against the union men in their employ, had thrown them out of employment because they refused to Statutes-repeal-saving clause.

ence

UNITED STATES.

1. Effect must be given, in construing a repealing act, to the general saving clause in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 13, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 6, prescribing the effect of repealing acts on existing penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities, unless, either by express declaration or necessary implication arising from the terms of the repealing law as a whole, set at naught by giving effect to such savit results that the legislative mind will be ing clause. Statutes fense.

repeal — effect on prior of

give up their union cards and teach boys, who were intended to take their places after seven months' instruction, and had driven their employees to extreme measures by their persistent, unfair, and un-American policy of antagonizing union labor, forcing wages to a starvation scale, and giving boys and cheap, unskilled foreign labor preferover experienced and capable union workmen,' in order to intimidate said dealers from purchasing said hats by reason of the prejudice thereby created against the 2. The exception from the operation of the plaintiffs and the hats made by them among provision repealing conflicting laws, which those who might otherwise purchase them; is made by the Hepburn act of June 29, 1906 to use the said union label of said the United (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Hatters of North America as an instrument Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 892), § 10, in favor to aid them in carrying out said conspiracy which "shall be prosecuted to conclusion in of causes pending in the Federal courts, and combination against the plaintiffs' and the manner heretofore provided by law," was their customers' interstate trade aforesaid, addressed solely to the procedure to be foland, in connection with the boycotting above lowed in pending cases, and such section, mentioned, for the purpose of describing therefore, does not supersede the general and identifying the hats of the plaintiffs and provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 13, saving singling them out to be so boycotted; to em- existing forfeitures, penalties, or liabilities ploy a large number of agents to visit said from repeal, so as to prevent future crimwholesale dealers and their customers, atkins act of Feb. 19, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 847, inal prosecutions for offenses against the Eltheir several places of business, and threat chap. 708, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. en them with loss of business if they should 880), committed prior to the adoption of the buy or handle the hats of the plaintiffs, and later statute. thereby prevent them from buying said hats, and, in connection therewith, to cause said 3. An objection to the sufficiency of an inlealers to be waited upon by committees dictment will not be considered by the Fedrepresenting large combinations of persons eral Supreme Court on certiorari, although in their several localities to make similar the grounds of the demurrer and the general threats to them; to use the daily press in language of the exceptions taken on the the localities where such wholesale dealers trial are broad enough to embrace such objection, where the conduct of counsel for the reside and do business, to announce and ad-accused in the courts below is wholly inconvertise the said boycotts against the hats of the plaintiffs and said wholesale dealers, and thereby make the same more effective and oppressive, and to use the columns of their said paper, the Journal of the United Haters of North America, for that purpose, and to describe the acts of their said agents in prosecuting the same." And then followed the averments that the Argued January 7, 1908. defendants proceeded to carry out their combination to restrain and destroy interstate trade and commerce between plaintiffs and their customers in other states by employing the identical means contrived for that purpose; and that, by reason of those acts, plaintiffs were damaged in their business and property in some $80,000.

We think a case within the statute was set up and that the demurrer should have been overruled.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with a direction to proceed accordingly.

Certiorari - questions reviewed.

sistent with any intention to rely upon such objection, and the point was not referred to in the petition for writ of certiorari, or in the brief submitted in support of that petition.

[No. 491.]

ary 24, 1908.

Decided Febru

N WRIT of Certiorari to the United

O`States Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which
affirmed a conviction in the District Court
for the District of Minnesota, for giving
rebates in violation of the Elkins act.
firmed.

Af

See same case below, 155 Fed. 945.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William R. Begg for petitioner.
Attorney General Bonaparte and Assist-

*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Statutes, § 874.