232 SCHEUER v. RHODES Opinion of the Court 247 than not to arise in an atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events and when, by the very existence of some degree of civil disorder, there is often no consensus as to the appropriate remedy. In short, since the options which a chief executive and his principal subordinates must consider are far broader and far more subtle than those made by officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion must be comparably broad. In a context other than a § 1983 suit, Mr. Justice Harlan articulated these considerations in Barr v. Matteo, supra: "To be sure, the occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive department will be protected by the privilege are doubtless far broader than in the case of an officer with less sweeping functions. But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of discretion, it entails. It is not the title. of his office but the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted the relation of the act complained of to 'matters committed by law to his control or supervision,' Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 498 which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive officer with immunity from civil defamation suits." 360 U. S., at 573-574. These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent. upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light 248 OCTOBER TERM, 1973 Opinion of the Court 416 U. S. of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct. Mr. Justice Holmes spoke of this, stating: "No doubt there are cases where the expert on the spot may be called upon to justify his conduct later in court, notwithstanding the fact that he had sole command at the time and acted to the best of his knowledge. That is the position of the captain of a ship. But even in that case great weight is given to his determination and the matter is to be judged on the facts as they appeared then and not merely in the light of the event." Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 85 (1909). (Citations omitted.) Under the criteria developed by precedents of this Court, 1983 would be drained of meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high executive officer have "the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal Government." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U S., at 397. In Sterling, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes put it in these terms: "If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases, the futility of which the State may at any time disclose by the simple process of transferring powers of legislation to the Governor to be exercised by him, beyond control, upon his assertion of necessity. Under our system of government, such a con . 232 SCHEUER v. RHODES Opinion of the Court 249 clusion is obviously untenable. There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution. When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression.' Id., at 397-398. " Gilligan v. Morgan, by no means indicates a contrary result. Indeed, there we specifically noted that we neither held nor implied "that the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether by way of damages or injunctive relief." 413 U. S., at 11-12. (Footnote omitted.) See generally Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1972); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946). IV These cases, in their present posture, present no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive officials nor, because of the absence of a factual record, do they permit a determination as to the applicability of the foregoing principles to the respondents here. The District Court acted before answers were filed and without any evidence other than the copies of the proclamations issued by respondent Rhodes and brief affidavits of the Adjutant General and his assistant. In dismissing the complaints, the District Court and the Court of Appeals erroneously accepted as a fact the good faith of the Governor, and took judicial notice that "mob rule existed at Kent State University." There was no opportunity afforded petitioners to contest 250 OCTOBER TERM, 1973 Opinion of the Court 416 U. S. There was no the facts assumed in that conclusion. evidence before the courts from which such a finding of good faith could be properly made and, in the circumstances of these cases, such a dispositive conclusion could not be judicially noticed. We can readily grant that a declaration of emergency by the chief executive of a State is entitled to great weight but it is not conclusive. Sterling v. Constantin, supra.. The documents properly before the District Court at this early pleading stage specifically placed in issue whether the Governor and his subordinate officers were acting within the scope of their duties under the Constitution and laws of Ohio; whether they acted within the range of discretion permitted the holders of such office under Ohio law and whether they acted in good faith both in proclaiming an emergency and as to the actions taken to cope with the emergency so declared. Similarly, the complaints place directly in issue whether the lesser officers and enlisted personnel of the Guard acted in goodfaith obedience to the orders of their superiors. Further proceedings, either by way of summary judgment or by trial on the merits, are required. The complaining parties are entitled to be heard more fully than is possible on a motion to dismiss a complaint. We intimate no evaluation whatever as to the merits of the petitioners' claims or as to whether it will be possible to support them by proof. We hold only that, on the allegations of their respective complaints, they were entitled to have them judicially resolved. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the decision of these cases. Exhibit 45: United States v. Barker, 514 F. 2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 208 514 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES KEY NUMBER SYSTEM UNITED STATES of America Bernard L. BARKER, a/k/a Frank or Fran Carter, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America V. Eugenio R. MARTINEZ, a/k/a Gene or Jene Valdes, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America V. Frank A. STURGIS, a/k/a Frank Angelo Fiorini, a/k/a Edward J. Hamilton, a/k/a Joseph DiAlberto or D'Alberto, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America V. Virgilio R. GONZALEZ, a/k/a Raul or Nos. 73-2185 to 73-2188. Argued June 14, 1974. Defendants filed motions to withdraw their guilty pleas to seven counts of indictment charging offenses arising out of break-in of political party headquarters. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, John J. Sirica, J., denied the motions and the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, en banc, J. Skelly Wright, J., held that where the defendants filed their motions after provisional sentencing but before final sentencing, the motions would be judged by the "fair and just" standard applicable to presentence withdrawal motions; and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motions to withdraw where the pleas were voluntary and knowing, the defendants, on allocution, deliberately and repeatedly deceived the court, the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the pleas eight months after they were entered and the defendants' supposed national security reasons for their guilty pleas were based on entirely subjective beliefs which were patently unreasonable. 1 |