√ the

୮

the effect of shorter hours on piece-rates. It was assumed, at the outset, that the men on piece-work were doing their best, and that their earnings must be lessened by any reduction in hours. But though the piece-workers lost slightly during the year, their falling off diminished as the year advanced, showing a steady adaptation to the altered conditions of work. In order to judge the effects of the new system on piece-work, the year was divided into three approximately equal periods. In the first period, the surplus earned by piece-workers over day-work rates was 1.76 per cent less than the standard piece-work wages; in the second period it was 1.58 per cent less, and in the third it was 0.78 per cent less than the standard. This steadily diminishing loss made it reasonable to expect that at the end of the year the difference would entirely disappear, and that under reduced hours the piece-workers would earn exactly as much, hence produce as much, as in the longer day's work. Moreover, as the total output of the works was greater during the trial year than previously, the slight diminution in the piece-worker's production was more than compensated by increased production on the part of the day-workers.

In the light of our previous studies of fatigue and the strain upon men's energies in overwork, it is extremely significant that the management of the Salford Iron Works attributed the maintenance of full production during the trial year "solely to the unimpaired and cheerful energy on the part of every man and boy throughout the day."*

"We seem," says the report (and the statement is the more impressive because this investigation was not primarily concerned with the workers at all, but with the effect of shorter hours upon the output of "one of the great staple trades of the country" centering in Lancashire and Yorkshire), "we seem to have been working in harmony with a natural law, instead of against it. . . . The most economical production is attained by employing men only so long as they are at their best. When this stage is passed, there is no true economy in their continued work."t✓

* Italics added.

† Op. cit., pp. 25 and 26.

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As one result of the "unimpaired and cheerful energy" of the workers under the forty-eight-hour system, the improvement in respect to "time lost without leave" is an important item. Under the fifty-three-hour system, the proportion of such "time lost" to the total time worked averaged 2.46 per cent, while under the new arrangement it was only 0.46 per cent. This loss of time meant, of course, a serious inroad upon production, and the greater "promptitude," "steadiness," "life and spirit about commencing work," reported by the foremen of various departments* aided in bringing about the success of the forty-eight-hour week.

Eleven years after this experiment was tried, the United States Bureau of Labor inquired of Messrs. Mather and Platt whether their works were still upon an eight-hour basis, and received a reply dated May 24, 1904, stating that "our experience since the first year in which it (the eight-hour system) was tried has fully borne out the conclusions then arrived at, and we are fully satisfied that as regards the comparison between eight and nine hours per day, the balance of advantage is in favor of the shorter period."†

An interesting sequel to the success of the forty-eighthour week at the Salford Iron Works was Mr. Mather's determination, as a matter of public duty, to lay the results before the heads of various government departments. The then secretary of state for war, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, the first lord of the admiralty, Earl Spencer, and the postmaster general, Mr. Arnold Morley, invited Mr. Mather to explain the workings of the forty-eight-hour week to the chiefs of construction from the Woolwich Arsenal Works, and to the officials of the dockyards and the post office.

Subsequently, in 1894, the hours of labor of about 43,000 work people in government factories and workshops were reduced to an average of forty-eight hours in the week. Of

Op. cit, p 79.

Bulletin of the New York State Department of Labor. No. 25, June, 1905, p. 240.

British Board of Trade Labor Gazette, July, 1905.

these, 18,641 workers in war office establishments had their working time shortened by five and three-quarters hours per week.*

୮ In 1905, eleven years later, the war office stated that when the forty-eight-hour week was first introduced, the results of experiments tried out in private factories had led them to expect a saving in time through the greater promptness of men in stopping and re-starting work, a greater regularity of attendance, and an improvement in the men's physical condition, with a consequent increase in working capacity. The communication states that

"these anticipations have been justified and it is clear that no extra cost has been incurred by the public on account of the reduction of hours, nor has the output of work been diminished. On the other hand, the majority of the workmen being on piece-work, the average weekly earnings per man have not been sensibly altered, although piece-work prices have not been increased. The day-workers received an increased hourly rate of pay to make their earnings per week of forty-eight hours equal to those per week of fifty-four hours. It was not found necessary to increase the number of day-workers."

So much for the economic results of the shorter week in the army establishments. The testimony from the admiralty is less specific and definite. In 1894, 24,263 workers in the royal dockyards, the royal naval ordnance department, and H. M. victualling yard had their hours reduced to forty-eight in the week. In 1905 the admiralty stated that the cost of production at the dockyards where most of the workers affected by the change were employed, compared favorably with the cost previous to the introduction of the forty-eighthour week. But they were unable to state to what extent the cost had been affected by the reduction in hours, on account of improvements in machinery, changes in the methods

*This includes the Ordnance Factories, Ordnance Store Dept., Inspection Dept., Small Arms Inspection Dept., and Royal Army Clothing Dept.

of conveying stores within the dockyards, increases of pay in certain trades, and the like.

Such, then, was the result of one specific inquiry, fragmentary as it is, at the Salford Works, into the economic effects of the shorter workday. The later fruits of the experiment in shortening the hours of many thousand workers in government employ, give it an importance beyond its own narrower limits.

The Salford Iron Works and the government departments which followed its lead, settled on the forty-eight-hour week as the most profitable working period. Here we should state that, in this study of fatigue, we do not hold a brief for the eight-hour day, or for a day of any specified number of hours. Physiologically considered, even the eight-hour day is too long a period of work in some dangerous occupations. Sir Thomas Oliver, the leading expert on industrial poisoning, has recently reported that "a change from six- to eight-hour shifts of employment was in a Scotch factory found to be the only explanation of an outbreak of plumbism in a works which had hitherto been free."* Moreover, the eight-hour day, involving with the noon hour and time taken. in traveling to and from home usually ten or eleven hours' employment, does not leave too great a margin of leisure for any persons who are to be citizens of value to the state.

But for the moment we are not concerned with the claims of this or that specified number of working hours. We aim merely to answer the questions we have set ourselves in this chapter: What has physiology to do with production, fatigue with output? Can we learn the relative productivity of the long and the short day in operation-their market value? The Salford Iron Works and the reduced hours of 43,000 workers in English government employment have given us our first reply. For the next, we turn to a careful Belgian investigation of efficiency.

Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor, No. 95, July, 1911. Oliver, Sir Thomas, M.D., F. R. C. P.: Industrial Lead Poisoning in Europe, p. 9.

5. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ENGIS CHEMICAL WORKS NEAR LIÉGE, BELGIUM

In the year 1888 a joint stock company was formed in the Province of Liége, by a group of Belgian manufacturers of chemical products. The name of the company was La Société Anonyme des Produits Chimiques d'Engis. Its objects were two-fold: the reduction of zinc blend, and the simultaneous transformation of the liberated gases into sulphuric acid. The company's plant was located near a zinc works, and was designed to replace the latter's open air furnaces for the reduction of the blend, by a new system of muffled ovens. The old means of reduction (known as Freiburg ovens) allowed large volumes of anhydride of sulphur to escape, a gas peculiarly destructive to vegetation. The Engis Company installed the new system to save the payment of heavy damages to the vicinity and the waste of the gases liberated in the roasting process.

Originally, under the old system, work was carried on in twenty-four-hour shifts. Workmen were required to remain at their ovens from 6 a. m. to 6 a. m. on alternating days. Work was intermittent, and during the twenty-four hours on duty each man had time-off at irregular intervals, amounting to about seven hours in the twenty-four. This organization of work was naturally found intolerable, leading to inefficiency, exhaustion, and drunkenness among the workmen.

When the new stock company was formed, a twelvehour workday was introduced. Each week the day shifts and night shifts alternated, thus providing a twenty-fourhour workday and a twenty-four-hour day of rest on alternate Sundays. But this schedule of work was also found unsatisfactory and inhumane, and after four years a fundamental change was determined upon. L. G. Fromont, the engineer who founded the Engis works and was its manager for more than a dozen years, has described in detail the final reorganization of his labor force from a two-shift to a three