Public Service Commission, First District [Vol. 19] missions integrated directly with the State government, are merely part of the machinery employed in carrying out the affairs of the State (Greater New York Charter, § 1618); municipal corporations have only such rights and powers as are conferred upon them by the State, either through legislative action or directly by the people through constitutional provision, and in the absence of constitutional limitation on the legislative power in this respect, the powers granted to the municipality by the State acting through the Legislature may be enlarged or restricted through the same medium, at the will of the Legislature. Worcester v. Worcester Street Railway Co., 196 U. S. 539; People ex rel. City of New York v. New York Railway Co., 217 N. Y. 310. Powers possessed by the Legislature may be delegated by it to a municipality, a commis ion, or any other creature of the State, for their exercise in the public interest; powers thus delegated may in the same manner be withdrawn or modified; and if the Legislature's agent has, in pursuance to those powers, entered into agreements with corporations or individuals affected by the exercise of those powers, the undoubted weight of authority, under decisions to which I shall presently refer, is that the Legislature as the repository of power may, either directly or through a commission or other agency, modify the terms of any such agreement, at least upon the application, or with the consent, of the corporation or individuals with whom the agreement was made. This rule governs all situations as to which the Constitution has vested the legislative power exclusively in the Legislature." The act of 1860 expressly provided (§ 7) that "the Legislature may at any time modify, amend or repeal this act." The power reserved to the Legislature to modify, amend or repeal the act, authorizes it to make any alteration or amendment of the act which will not substantially impair the object of the grant, or any rights vested under it, and which the Legislature may deem necessary to secure either that object or any public right. The provision of the Railroad Law (§ 184) permitting the abandonment of a portion of a route of a street surface railroad in the manner [Vol. 19] Public Service Commission, First District therein provided, became a law after the passage of the act of 1860, and the Commission is now expressly empowered as the agent of the State to determine upon application of street surface railroad companies whether the convenience of the public requires any service on designated parts of the route of the petitioner. Assuming that the resolution of the common council created any contractual rights, it was subject to the paramount right of the Legislature to modify the contract when the convenience of the public no longer require the running of cars. The resolution of the common council expressly provides that the cars on the railroad shall run "as often as the convenience of the public shall require." As a result of the change in conditions along portions of the route traversed by the railroad, it appears that the convenience of the public no longer requires operation thereon, and the granting of the application herein would in no manner affect a violation either of the legislative act or the resolution of the common council. Neither the act of the Legislature nor the resolution requires operation for any fixed period after construction is completed. Such operation, however, is determinable upon the length of time that the public convenience requires the same. Any action taken by the common council, as the agent of the State, was subject at all times to the right of the Legislature to pass any law which might abrogate, amend, or repeal the act under which consent was given. The city's argument proceeds upon the erroneous assumption that it is a party to the contract for the construction and operation. of the street surface railroad, whereas in giving its consent it was acting merely as an agent of the State, and the State as principal and the railroad corporation alone are parties to the contract. Title to the streets, while in the city of New York, is held in trust for the people of the State, and the Legislature is the sovereign power that represents the people of the State. The case of City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railroad Company, 196 U. S. 539, involved the same question which is here presented. There the general laws of Massachusetts as existing from 1891 to 1893 provided that a street railway might apply to Public Service Commission, First District [Vol. 19] the board of aldermen of the city, or the selectmen of the town, for the location of the tracks of a company in the streets of the city or town, and it was provided that, after hearing, the board might grant the petition "under such restrictions as they deemed. the interests of the public may require." Section 32 of the same act made it the duty of every street railway company to keep in repair, to the satisfaction of the superintendent of streets of any such city or town, "the paving, upper planking or other surface material of the portions of streets, roads and bridges occupied by its tracks," etc. Under the provisions of the statute, the street railway obtained the privilege of extending the location of its tracks on various streets in Worcester. Subsequently, and in 1898, statutory provision was made for a somewhat different system of taxation than that which prevailed at the time these several extensions of locations were granted and accepted by the railroad company, and different provisions were made with respect to the duty of street railway companies as to paving of streets. The city of Worcester asserted that, inasmuch as the rights of the street railway company in public streets had been granted and accepted under the statute as it stood from 1891 to 1893, the Legislature had no power to substitute different paving and tax regulations in 1898. The Supreme Court said: "In the view we take of this subject, it may be assumed, for the purpose of argument, that the city of Worcester had power, under the legislation of the State, to grant the right to extend the location of the railroad company's tracks upon the restrictions or conditions already mentioned. It may also be assumed, but only for the purpose of the argument, that the restrictions or conditions contained in the orders or decrees of the board of aldermen, upon their acceptance by the company, became contracts between the city and the company. "The question then arising is, whether the Legislature, in the exercise of its general legislative power, could abrogate the provisions of the contract between the city and the railroad company with the assent of the latter, and provide another and a different method for the paving and repairing of the streets through which [Vol. 19] Public Service Commission, First District the tracks of the railroad company were laid under the permit of their extended location. We have no doubt that the Legislature of the Commonwealth had that power. A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the State, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative department. 66% % If these restrictions or conditions are to be regarded as a contract, we think the Legislature would have the same right to terminate it, with the con ent of the railroad company, that the city itself would have. *** The Legislature had the right to modify or abrogate the conditions on which the locations in the streets and public ways had been granted, after such conditions. had been originally imposed by it." And see Englewood v. Denver Electric Railway, 248 U. S. 294, 296. The act of 1860 did not in any manner affect the proprietary rights of the city and there are no private rights of the city that will be prejudiced or taken away if the application of the corporation is granted. The recent decision in Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Commission, 223 N. Y. 244, does not apply to the question now before the Commission. The matter there at issue was a railroad rate fixed by a city charter and contained in the street franchise to the company. The court there held that, in view of article III, section 18, of the Constitution, requiring the consent of the local authorities to the construction of a railroad that the power given to the Commission to modify the rate should be distinctly and expressly conferred and that such power had not been delegated. The question as to the power of the Legislature to deal with such rates or to delegate its power was specifically reserved and not decided, but the opinion clearly intimated that such power did exist. See People ex rel. Village of South Glens Falls v. Public Service Commission, 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. Rep. 776. The case last cited involved the right of a gas corporation to increase its rates over those fixed in the municipal franchise despite the objection of the municipality. Gas corporations are authorized in subdivision I of section 61 of the Transportation Corporations Public Service Commission, First District [Vol. 19] Law to furnish gas, lay conductors in the streets of cities, towns and villages "with the consent of the municipal authorities thereof and under such reasonable regulations as they may prescribe." One of the regulations imposed in the city's consent was that the company's charge should not exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents per 1,000 cubic feet of gas. The company later, in view of war conditions, increased its rate above the amount fixed in the franchise. The village made complaint to the Commission and the questions presented were whether the franchise was a contract that could be abrogated by the State and if so whether the power to abrogate had been delegated to the Commission. The Commission decided it had power to regulate the rate irrespective of the franchise and dismissed the complaint. The court held that the franchise did not constitute a contract beyond the inherent police power of the Legislature to modify for the public welfare and that the Legislature had delegated its power to the Commission. Crane, J., in the majority opinion of the court, states: "The terms and conditions upon which a village may permit a public service corporation to use its streets may prove unsafe, unhealthy and extremely improper, as the community expands and grows. New inventions and contrivances in common use may necessitate a change. To say that such conditions were beyond the legislative control would bind the public to the facilities of our forefathers and be contrary to the numerous statutes which have been passed and recognized as legal requiring service corporations to change their plants." And again: "A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the state and exists by virtue of legislative enactments. Rate regulation is a matter of the police power of the state and the terms and conditions such as here in question contained in a franchise to a service corporation may be modified without impairing the obligation of a contract within the provisions of the Constitution." Citing cases. This latter case, if authority were needed, is conclusive against the contentions of the city herein. The Legislature has the undoubted power to approve the abandonment of the petitioner's franchise and that power having been expressly and unmistakably |