to talk with you; found cable broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram," &c. To which Halleck replied, "I have read your despatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts there is now no difficulty .in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possible rapidity." ply was received to this communication, and no order was issued by the General-in-Chief, I conclude that my suggestion did not meet with his approbation." Of course the officials who treated McClellan thus did not imagine they should have any further occasion for his services. They calculated, no doubt, that, as an unsuccessful leader, he would, by popular consent, be consigned to the inevitable "Before I had time," says McClel- limbo destined for all who should ban, "to decipher and reply to this disappoint the expectations of the despatch, the telegraph operator in country. On arriving at WashingWashington informed me that Gene- ton he was deprived of his troops, ral Halleck had gone out of the of who were sent forward as they fice immediately after writing this arrived to help Pope; and had that despatch, without leaving any inti- incapable braggart defeated Lee, mation of the fact for me, or wait- McClellan would have been at once ing for any further information as set aside. But, as fugitives came to the object of my journey across pouring into Washington with tidthe bay. As there was no possibil- ings of disaster, it began to be clear ity of other communication with that McClellan, unsuccessful as he him at that time, I sent the follow- was, still possessed the confidence of ing despatch, and returned to Har- his men, and that he alone could rison's Landing: Your orders be trusted to lead them against the will be obeyed. I return at once. enemy. And when the wreck of I had hoped to have a longer the Federal corps sought shelter and fuller conversation with you from Lee behind the works of the after travelling so far for the pur- capital, and the scared Government pose." " besought him to save the country, this good citizen, forgetting all injuries and affronts, at once assumed the command, and, promptly reorganising the broken host, led it against his redoubtable opponent. There was not much encouragement to continue a correspondence with the official personage who, after the curtest reply, walked away, leaving his anxious interlocutor to pour forth his questions to the empty air. Yet McClellan, touched by the fidelity and misfortunes of his army, once more addressed the great man in its behalf. "Please say a kind word to my army," he says on the 18th August, "that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, &c. . . No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me; merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them, if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it." In his report he says, "As no re Lee, crossing the Potomac high up the stream, had moved his columns towards Pennsylvania, his flank being sheltered on the side of Washington by the mountains, the passes of which he held. McClellan moved towards these passes. Of course the nearer to the Potomac he could deliver a blow, the more effectual it would be. But he did not move on the pass which is on the very bank of the river, because the space between the mountain and the water, was too narrow to allow of the formation of a line of battle, and was swept by Confederate artillery on both sides of the stream. At South Mountain he attacked the next gap in the ridge and forced it, while the centre and right from Frederick assailed Turner's Gap, which was Fair Oaks and Seven Pines one abandoned by the Confederates in wing of the Federals was assailed the night. "It is believed," says unexpectedly, and the commanders McClellan, "that the force opposed of corps had to make good their to us at Turner's Gap consisted of ground as best they could. At D. H. Hill's Corps, and a part, if Williamsburg it was Sumner who not the whole, of Longstreet's, and commanded, and at Hanover, Porperhaps a portion of Jackson's; ter. At Gaines' Mill, again, it was probably some 30,000 in all. We General Porter who made the acwent into action with about 30,000 tual tactical dispositions on the men, and our losses amounted to field. But when the Federal ad1568, aggregate." This uncandid vance came upon Lee's line of battle method of computing the enemy's at Antietam, it was, McClellan says, force, and so making it appear equal too late to attack that day, and he to his own, as well as his glorifica- proceeded, after examination of the tion over the fancied victory, are the position, to employ the remainder of less excusable, as McClellan must the 15th in making deliberate dishave known that these detachments positions for the engagement. were placed in the gaps only to hold them till the main columns had 'concentrated, and that, this object effected, the sooner they retired the better. The mountain-ridge being passed, the Federal columns swung round on their left towards the river; and, nearing it, found Lee's army drawn up to bar the way. The Confederate leader had no doubt calculated on holding, at pleasure, undisturbed possession of the country north of the Potomac, thinking the Federal army too severely shaken by defeat to resume the offensive. But when McClellan moved against him, he had hastened to withdraw his columns towards Virginia, behind the detachments posted to hold the gaps of the ridge. The concentration being effected between the enemy and the Potomac, Lee might have continued his retreat without a battle. But to have retired in face of the enemy without a passage of arms, would have been inconsistent with the character of a commander always more ready to fight than to evade an action. Taking post behind the Antietam Creek, he awaited the onset, while he saw the long trains of his spoils pass the river behind him. This battle of Antietam may be considered the test of McClellan's fighting qualities. It is the only great action in which he directed all the main operations. For at Some months ago, in reviewing books on the American war, we commented on the excellent work of Captain Chesney on the campaigns in Virginia and Maryland. The reader will find, on consulting it, that it records facts, carefully and dispassionately adduced, which are in many important respects at variance with the report of McClellan. We find, for instance, that the troops which opposed him at South Mountain (the division of D. Hill) were 10,000 in number, instead of 30,000, as the Federal commander estimates their force. It will be found, too, that the force with which Lee barred the way at the Antietam consisted only of a part of Longstreet's corps. The whole of Jackson's force, 24,000, had been employed in the attack on Harper's Ferry, the relief of which post had been one special object of McClellan's advance. Now, the post surrendered at 8 in the morning of the 16th, and McClellan knew it from the cessation of the firing. He must also have known that Jackson's force was thus set free to join Lee. Had he, therefore, attacked at once on the evening of the 15th, when he had five corps at hand, he might have brought above 70,000 men against about a third of their numbers. But, imposed on by Lee's attitude, he contented himself with reconnoitring him that evening. The Antietam and Potomac both run southward for some distance in the neighbourhood of the battlefield, but before their junction the Potomac makes an eastward bend. In the hilly wooded space between them is Sharpsburg, at the junction of many roads leading from Maryland to Virginia. In front of Sharpsburg Lee had drawn up his lines, his right resting on the Antietam, which covered about two-thirds of his front, but its course then diverging, his left wing did not command the passages of the upper portion of the stream. Thus, of the three passages leading on Lee's right, centre, and left, that on his left was unguarded. McClellan, then, after a second reconnoissance, which lasted till two in the afternoon of the 16th, and which was, he says, rendered necessary by a change in the disposition of Lee's batteries, resolved to cross first by the unguarded passage (no doubt because it was unguarded) and to attempt to turn Lee's left, as the preliminary to an attack upon his other flank. Then, when his own left should have pushed back his enemy's right, it was to move along the crest towards the right, and the centre was finally to advance and connect them. Now, two roads led along Lee's rear from Sharpsburg across the Potomac. That on his left crossed at Williamsport, that on his right at Shepherdstown. If his left only was turned, he could still cross at Shepherdstown-if his right only, he could still retreat on Williamsport; which flank then was it best for McClellan to turn? We have said that the passage of the Antietam would be undisputed on Lee's left, and that it was therefore easiest to attack there. But it often happens that the point of an enemy's line which is weakest, and where it will be easiest to defeat him, is by no means that which offers the most decisive results. And it is a distinctive feature in the character of a great general that he always aims, if possible, not at the point where he may most easily gain the battle, and nothing more than the battle, but at that which will entail the most fatal result on the enemy. Now the Potomac from Williamsport to Shepherdstown runs nearly north and south. If Lee should be compelled to retreat by Williams-. port, McClellan, crossing at Shepherdstown, would interpose between him and the Shenandoah valley, between him and all Eastern Virginia, between him and Richmond-would in fact ruin him. But if he were compelled to retreat by Shepherdstown, his course down the Shenandoah valley (as was actually the case) would be unimpeded, and nothing would be gained beyond the ground he had stood on. Thus the result of an attack on Lee's right' would be enormously greater than that which would follow from an attack on his left. And had a successful attack been made on his right on the 16th it would have cut Jackson from the main body, for he did not join Lee till after midnight. But, though McClellan's plan contemplated an attack on both flanks, there can be no doubt as to which was the point he specially aimed at. Out of six corps he threw four against the enemy's left, while one only attacked the right, and one, opposite the centre, was not engaged. Now, an attack on the right was not impracticable, for it was made, and was so far successful that Burnside crossed there and held his ground on the further bank. If, then, the four corps had been massed there instead of on the left, and had been equally successful in forcing back by their weight the opposing line, Lee could not have retreated by Shepherdstown, but must have been driven on Williamsport, and the result would have been what we have indicated. We think, therefore,, McClellan's whole plan of battle false; and we believe that he was induced to adopt it because the attack on the left was so much easier than that on the right a consideration which, especially with such disparity in his favour as existed in the opposing forces, ought not to have controlled his decision. good reason why he should postpone the attack, was also an excellent reason why Lee should not await it. And when it is added that two fresh divisions joined McClellan on the morning of the 18th, while Porter's corps (in the centre) was still almost untouched, there is sufficient to account for Lee's retreat without attributing it to any success gained by McClellan in the action. He was preparing to reengage on the morning of the 19th, when he found that Lee had, during the night, withdrawn his whole force safely beyond the Potomac; and a strong detachment sent across to ascertain whether he was still in force in the neighbourhood of the river received convincing, if not satisfactory, proof of the fact in a severe disaster. It was so late on the 16th when McClellan began his attack that Hooker's corps only was engaged. It crossed by fords unopposed, attacked Longstreet's left, and at the close of some sharp, indecisive fighting, encamped close to it for the night. Jackson, arriving at midnight, took post opposite Hooker. Next day the general engagement began. All day the four corps in succession were hurled against the left of Lee, which, at the close of the battle, had fallen back about a mile, after varying fortunes, and heavy loss on both sides. Burnside, after failing in two attempts, had also crossed on Lee's right, gained a footing on the crest, and was then driven back upon the bridge, re- Accepting, then, the battle of maining on the right bank. Antietam as a fair criterion still held Sharpsburg in the centre. McClellan's fighting quality, On the morning of the 18th, the cannot estimate it very highly. armies faced each other, but the Sagacious and sound in combining battle was not renewed. McClel- the movements of a campaign, he lan's troops were not in a condition would always be apt to forfeit any to attack. Hooker's corps and part advantages which his plan had of Sumner's on the left were de- gained by irresolution in striking moralised, and Burnside's was so the blows which his previous operashaky that, after demanding sup- tions could only have placed him port, he retired, though unassailed, in a good position to deliver. It is to the left bank. McClellan had not that we think him deficient in lost by his own account more than determination-his conduct of the 12,000 men; but he omits to count among them about 6,000 of Hooker's men who abandoned the field, and did not rejoin their colours till the 22d. Lee of we seven days' retreat, when, fiercely pressed by an undoubtedly stronger foe, he kept throughout a firm countenance, and was SO little damaged that at the first pause he Such, then, were the results ac- was ready to resume with spirit his complished by the deliberately ar- advance, proves that disaster and ranged attack of 87,000 men on, at peril cannot daunt him. But his the most, 70,000. They had caused resolution has only been exhibited one wing of the opposing line to in circumstances where there was recede a short distance, at the ex- no alternative, and where to give pense, per contra, of a loss of about way was to be destroyed. It does 20,000 men, and the demoralisation not appear to be of that kind which of part of the army. Nevertheless, induces great generals to disregard as the Confederates ultimately re- present risk for the sake of adetired, McClellan claims a signal vic- quate future advantage, and which tory. But he tells us, in excusing alone can achieve brilliant strokes himself for not renewing the battle in war. He is eminently a prudent on the 18th, that be expected large and safe general; and it would be reinforcements from Pennsylvania. difficult probably to inflict upon This, which might of itself be a him any disaster which foresight could prevent; but, on the other explained, is most discreditable to hand, he appears to have radical McClellan, is in his comparison of defects of character which will forces at Antietam. He gives the hinder him from ever achieving following summary :— notable successes. In support of this estimate, we would point to his tendency constantly to overrate the strength of his adversary-a tendency which is absolutely fatal to enterprise or to a happy audacity. On first land ing in the Peninsula, he immensely exaggerated the force opposing him. in the lines of Yorktown; and his false estimate was the means of detaining him there when some of the advantages he had aimed at in his original plan might have followed from a bolder course. Throughout his subsequent operations, up to the battle of Gaines' Mill, he was always crippled by the expectation of being attacked by superior numbers; and we have seen that at South Mountain and Antietam he ridiculously overrated his enemy. "An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee, made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows:General T. J. Jackson's Corps, 24,778 James Longstreet's Corps, 23,342 D. H. Hill's two divisions, 15,525 J. E. B. Stuart's Cavalry, 6,400 Ransom's and Jenkins's "These estimates give the actual numbers of men present and fit for duty. "Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows:-. 1st Corps, 2d Corps, 14,856 18,813 5th Corps (one div. not arrived), 12,930 12,300 13,819 10,126 4,320 The statements by which he supports his estimates of the enemy's strength and comparative losses in battle, are, to say the least, uncandid. Thus at Fair Oaks he had at first four, and afterwards six divisions, against three of the ConfeTotal in action, 87,164" derates-viz., Longstreet's, Hill's, Now, when we observe that the and Smith's; and in summing up artillery, liberally estimated at 400 the results of the two days' en- guns, with a further liberal estimate gagement, he gives his own loss as of fifteen men per gun, are counted 5700, the enemy's as 6700. But in on the Confederate side, while none a despatch some days after the bat- appear on his own, and that D. H. tles he places his own losses for the Hill's division, raised from its real two days at 7000. It is probable, number 10,000 to 15,000, formed therefore, that the first more fa- part of Longstreet's corps, and apvourable balance is obtained by pears thus to be counted twice giving the Confederate losses for over, we may well regard with both days, and his own only for the added suspicion the very doubtful first day. For he quotes, in con- item of forty-six regiments not firmation of the Southern casual included in above," and discredit ies, the report of General John- entirely the preposterous balance ston, the Confederate commander; of 10,000 men on the side of the and it is most likely that the report Confederates in the statement thus would include the two consecutive manufactured with the "examinaengagements, since the intervening tion of prisoners, deserters, spies, night would afford no opportunity for ascertaining and reporting the results of the first action. But the example of this kind of manipulation of numbers which, while un 66 &c.," as its trustworthy basis. We think, therefore, that we are justiged in regarding this manner of measuring his strength with his enemy's as a habit and a great |