This act was amended by the 55 Geo. 3. c. 51, the principal object of which was to provide for the due proportioning of the rate on the several parishes; but by the 18th section, the treasurer is required, once in every year, to publish in some one of the county newspapers, a true and accurate abstract of his account under its several heads, signed by the Justices who shall have audited the same.

These are the provisions of the statutes material to the present question, which we have stated thus at length, because they appear to us to furnish very cogent inferences as to the right now in dispute. No one can read the clauses without being satisfied that, subject to the limitations specified, the legislature has placed the whole controul, as to the imposition and expenditure of the county rate, in the Court of Quarter Sessions: and with regard to the particular matter of publicity, they provide specifically for the preservation of the vouchers, and for their inspection by a particular class, the members, namely, of the court which controuls the expenditure; and provide also for information to be conveyed to the rate-payers in general, by annual publication of the receipts and payments, in such a form as was deemed sufficient for the purpose. This latter provision may, perhaps, throw some light upon the construction which the former ought to receive; but looking at the former by itself, it is difficult to understand why a specific provision should have been made for the inspection by the Justices without fee or reward, if, by the common law, the same right (and it is that same right which is now claimed) existed in favour of every rate-payer. markable, moreover, that in the same statute, 12 Geo. 2. c. 29. s. 14, respecting the repairs of public bridges, banks, &c., a similar provision is made for the preservation and deposit of contracts for the repairs; and as to these, the purpose is declared to be the inspection, not only by the Justices, but by any person employed by any parish, township, or place, contributing to the purposes of the act. The difference in the two clauses can hardly be conceived to have been unintentional.

It is re

It is also material to observe, that the duty of preserving the vouchers appears to have been first created by the 12 Geo. 2.

c. 29. Upon examination of all the statutes recited in the preamble, no such enactment appears among them, though the provision for the absolute discharge of the treasurer by the acquittance of the Justices, is copied from one of them-the 11 & 12 Will. 3. c. 19. s. 2. Independently of the statute, we know of no direct obligation on the Justices to preserve the vouchers of audited accounts, however prudent such a preservation might be; nor do we know of anything which should make it compulsory on the clerk of the peace to receive such documents, and preserve them among the county records. If this be so, and the statute which first directs their preservation and place of deposit, defines also the purpose of such preservation, and the persons who are to have access to them, what right can others have to inspect them for other undefined purposes? We are of opinion, therefore, upon a review of the provisions of the statutes, that they raise a direct inference against the existence of any such right. It is fitting, however, to consider the weight of the argument independently of these provisions. It is alleged, that these are public documents, and that every one having an interest in them has therefore a right to inspect them. It is not necessary to inquire whether these are, strictly speaking, public documents; and though most of the cases cited on this point were examples of the exercise of a power by the Court to compel one of two ligitating parties to make reasonable disclosures to the other, we are by no means disposed to narrow our own authority to enforce by mandamus the production of every document of a public nature, in which any one of the king's subjects can prove himself to be interested. For such persons, indeed, every officer appointed by law to keep records ought to deem himself for that purpose a trustee. But the difficulty is, to see that the present applicants have such an interest as brings them within the rule. During the argument, we inquired what interest in the applicants was relied on as entitling them to the inspection. In answer, it was conceded, that the rate-payers had no direct interest in ascertaining the expenditure of the by-gone rate, because, even if discovered to be illegal, the monies paid by

the treasurer could not be recovered from him; and it is obvious that they could not be recovered from the parties to whom they had been paid, nor from the individual Justices who had sanctioned the payments but it was said, that as the Justices at Sessions were prohibited from imposing a new rate until three-fourths of the former had been lawfully expended, the rate-payers were interested in ascertaining the nature of such expenditure, to enable them to oppose the imposition of a new rate. The answer to this is, that the rate-payers, as such, cannot by law interfere in the matter. Let it be assumed that the inspection prayed for should disclose an illegal expenditure of a former rate, or the fact that more than one-fourth of the former rate still remained unexpended, in the treasurer's hands, still no rate-payer, as such, could be heard in the Court of Quarter Sessions, to object to the imposition of a new rate- The King v. Nottingham. The subject-matter is not one which the rate-payer can bring before the Court as a litigant; nor is he, as such, a member of the Court. The utmost therefore that can be said, on the ground of interest, is, that the applicants have a rational curiosity to gratify, by this inspection, or that they may hereby ascertain facts useful to them in advancing some ulterior measure in contemplation, as to regulating county expenditure; but this is merely an interest in obtaining information on the general subject, and would furnish an equally good reason for permitting inspection of the records of any other county. There is not that direct and tangible interest which is necessary to bring them within the rule on which the Court acts in granting inspection of public documents.

It is then contended, that these vouchers are substantially parcel of the orders which relate to them. But what in truth is the form of the orders, and whether the vouchers are or are not, by any reference or otherwise, so incorporated with them as to become parcel of them, is not disclosed either in the writ or return. The applicants, prior to the date of the writ, had a full opportunity of inspecting the orders; it is therefore their fault that we have not this information, the language of their own writ raises a presumption against

them, and there is every reason to suppose that in truth the orders are perfect instruments without the vouchers.

Lastly, however, we are strongly pressed with the authority of The King v. the Justices of Leicester, in which Lord Tenterden and this Court made a rule absolute in the very terms of the present. The great authority attached to that decision rendered it necessary for us to grant the writ, and see what return should be made, that the principles on which it rested might undergo the most deliberate revision. We cannot adopt the argument urged at the bar, by which that case was sought to be distinguished from this; because though the refusal of the Justices there was too extensive, and the return therefore properly quashed, the Court obviously intended to decide the present question also. After much consideration, we think in that respect it cannot be supported. It is observable, that although the material arguments at the bar against the mandamus received no answer from the other side, and that no reason is stated for the judgment of the Court, yet it appears that no argument was permitted upon the return. Our Brother Littledale, who was a member of the Court at the time, permits us to say that he disapproves of that case.

Upon the whole, we conclude that this return is sufficient in law. Much has been said upon the practical irresponsibility which our decision may occasion as to the expenditure of the county rate by the Justices. If this consequence really flowed from our refusal of the writ, that would be no reason with us for straining the law to prevent it. The law must be altered by the proper authority, if too much discretion is now vested in the Court of Quarter Sessions.

But in truth, considering the number of the Magistracy in every county, the large attendance usual on the days of transacting the county business, that the court in which it is transacted is an open court, that all these accounts are there publicly considered, and an abstract of the whole expenditure afterwards publicly circulated, and that the law is most explicit as to the matters to which the county rate is applicable,-it appears to us very unreasonable to apprehend any evil consequences from

holding that the Magistrates are not compellable to grant to rate-payers generally this inspection. If any abuse exist, it can hardly be supposed that among so many no one Magistrate will be found to bring the order before this Court; and the law has given already to him every advantage which the granting of a peremptory mandamus would afford to the present applicants. On the other hand, no slight inconvenience might result from holding that in every county all its thousands of ratepayers, with no interest and without fee or reward, have a right to the inspection now contended for; nor can we believe that such a power would have been given by doubtful implications. We disclaim, however, the being influenced on either side by these considerations, and have attended only to the legal principles, which appear to us applicable, in pronouncing that this return is sufficient.

Peremptory mandamus refused.

Note. By the Reform Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 45. ss. 38, 44, it is expressly enacted, that the overseers who make out the lists of voters shall allow an inspection of the lists so made out by any person; and section 46 makes a similar provision for the town clerk. And in the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 15, the overseers who make out the burgess lists are to keep copies, and allow a perusal thereof by any person.

An indenture of apprenticeship was made in Newfoundland, by an English sailor, who thereby agreed to serve on board his master's ship:-Held, that a settlement was gained by a service and inhabitancy in England for forty days under that indenture.

Held also, that the party relying on the indenture, was not bound to prove that it was valid by the law of Newfoundland.

This was an appeal against an order of two Justices of the county of Somerset, for the removal of R. Bartlett and Elizabeth his wife, and three children of said R. B. by a former wife, and three children of said Elizabeth by a former husband, and

one illegitimate child, from the parish of Closworth to the parish of Pendomer; and the Court of Quarter Sessions quashed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court

on a

:

CASE,

which set out the order which adjudged the settlement of the pauper, his wife, and his children, to be in Closworth, and then stated that the pauper and his wife had married after the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76, and that the husband was liable to maintain the other children, and ordered that all should be removed to Closworth. The case then stated the circumstances of the settlement to be these previously to the year 1817, the pauper R. B, an Englishman, being then of age, was at Twillingate, in Newfoundland, in the employ of Messrs. Colbourne & Son, of Sturminster Newton, in Dorsetshire, who had a mercantile establishment in Newfoundland, and at Poole, in Dorsetshire, and were Newfoundland merchants. John Colbourne, the son, occasionally resided in each place, and the home of Colbourne's vessel, on board of which the pauper served, was the port of Poole. In the beginning of the year 1817, the bound himself to Mr. J. C, by pauper an instrument which was set out in the case. (The pauper bound himself thereby to serve his master as a sailor for three years, and it contained the usual covenants in apprentice deeds.)

The instrument was not executed in England, but in Newfoundland, and signed and siding in Newfoundland. It was not stamped sealed by the pauper and his master, then re

at the time of its execution, nor within two months afterwards; but, at the hearing of the appeal, was given in evidence with an English 17. stamp, and a receipt for the penalty indorsed. No evidence of the law of Newfoundland, relating to such instruments, was given; but it was admitted, that legal indentures executed in Newfoundland do not, according to the laws of that island, require a stamp to render them valid there. The pauper inhabited and served under the above instrument for more than forty days in the parish of St. James, in Poole. It was admitted, and the Sessions adjudged that the instrument, if executed in England, duly stamped, was a valid indenture of apprenticeship; and the question was, whe

ther the binding was a valid one, so as to confer a settlement by service under it in England.

Another question was, whether the children of E. B, by her former husband, and her illegitimate child, were removable under the said order (1).

Sir F. Pollock, in support of the order of Sessions, was stopped by the Court.

Kinglake, contrà.-The indenture in this case is not proved to have been a valid indenture, according to the law of Newfoundland, and if not, the pauper could not gain a settlement by a residence under it. Newfoundland is a foreign country, and the rule of law is, that contracts entered into abroad, even by subjects of this country, must be construed according to the law of the country where made, and will be of no avail here, unless valid in such country. It was incumbent, therefore, upon the appellants to prove, that by the law of Newfoundland. this indenture was valid-The Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales (2). Then it cannot be said, that the statutes by which the settlement by apprenticeship was given, can apply to this identure. The 5 Eliz. c. 4. evidently regulates apprentices in England only. The 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12, which admits apprenticeship, as a mode of settlement, must refer to that statute. The 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 11. s. 8, which treats of the settlement by apprenticeship, requires it to be by indenture, and speaks of the inhabiting in any town or county, which can only refer to an indenture executed in England. But if these statutes do apply to such an indenture as the present, at least it is requisite that it should conform to the requisites of them, which it does not. It is not therefore shewn that this apprenticeship was a valid contract where made; and if it were, yet a foreign indenture of apprenticeship will not confer a settlement in England.

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-It appears to me, that a good settlement has been gained, in this case, by the service under the inden

& 14 Car. 2. c. 12, which required that a party should be an apprentice, in order to gain a settlement, and at that time no party could be deemed an apprentice unless he had complied with the requisites of the statute of Elizabeth. To what extent those requisites must have been complied with, it is not now necessary to inquire, for this part of the statute has been repealed by the 54 Geo. 3. s. 2, in the following terms: "that it shall and may be lawful for any person to take, retain, or become an apprentice, though not according to the provisions of the said act." Then we come to that part of the 5 Eliz. c. 5, which applies to seamen's indentures, and which requires them to be bound in a particular way, and that the indenture shall be enrolled at the next town. But even with respect to indentures under this statute, it has been held in The King v. Gainsborough (3), that non-compliance with all the requisites of the statute shall not vitiate an indenture of apprenticeship. Then we have the authority of Lord Holt, who, in Barber v. Dennis (4), held that an apprentice, though his indentures were not properly enrolled under the 5 Eliz., was yet a legal apprentice for the purpose of conferring on the parties the rights which would flow from that apprenticeship. Thus we find, that in England itself, the provisions of that statute have never been strictly enforced. With respect to the law of Newfoundland, it is said, that there is nothing here to shew that these indentures would be lawful there. It is not necessary that the lawfulness of this contract should be distinctly stated; for a contract of teaching and learning is prima facie lawful, and it is here expressly found, that the apprentice was of age when he entered into the contract. I do not see that there is any other difficulty in the case. When this statute was repealed as to all that affects indentures made under it, it followed that all indentures must be good as between third parties, if they would have been good before its repeal, and the cases I have referred to, shew that these indentures would have been valid for this purpose, even under that statute itself. I am, therefore, of

(3) Burr. S.C. 586.

(4) 1 Salk, 68; s. c. 6 Mod. 69.

opinion, that a settlement has been gained in this case.

WILLIAMS, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. It appears clearly on the face of the instrument, that it created the relation of master and apprentice between these parties, and was a contract for teaching and learning. It was an indenture of apprenticeship in the proper sense of the term. We have no evidence that the law in Newfoundland would require anything different from what has been done here. It has been argued, that nothing can be valid in England as a contract, but that which is in compliance with the statutes in force here. That doctrine, however, has not been strictly applied even to English contracts of apprenticeship made under the authority of those very statutes; and I cannot think that it should be strictly applied here. I think that the pauper gained a settlement.

COLERIDGE, J.-I am of the same opinion. Taking the two statutes, 13 and 14 Car. 2, and 13 W. & M. together, I think that there must be one mode of settlement by binding and service. It is said, that the settlement is not made out here, as it is not proved that this is a contract of apprenticeship shewn to be valid as such in a foreign country. That is true. But this is said to be a written contract for teaching and learning. We have a right to look into the instrument, and see whether the language used is such as to import that it is a contract of that nature. Now the instrument, upon the face of it, does appear to be such a contract. But then it is said, that as it was made in a foreign country, it does not fall within the statutes of apprenticeship; and the statute of Elizabeth is referred to, for the purpose of shewing that our law cannot recognize any but such as are made within the limits of this country. It seems to me, that that statute has no application to the present contract, but refers only to contracts which are actually made in this country. The argument could only be good, if it were true to say that no contract of apprenticeship would be valid but such as was made in actual compliance ́with the statute of Elizabeth. No lawyer will make such an assertion. The statute of Elizabeth certainly says, that "any apprentice taken otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this act, shall NEW SERIES, VI.-MAG. CAS.

render the indentures null and void to all intents and purposes;" yet the cases say, that for the purpose of settlement, indentures made not in conformity with its provisions shall still be valid. So that the very thing relied on to shew that the contract can only be valid, if made in strict conformity with the law of the country, decides the case against the argument it is cited to support. Order of Sessions confirmed (5).

1836.

THE KING V. THE INHABITANTS
OF MILVERTON.

Nov. 19. S
Highway-Stopping up.

An order of Justices under 55 Geo. 8. c. 68, for stopping up more than one highway, or for stopping up part only of a highway, is void.

Justices have no authority to narrow a highway.

What is the proper course to be taken for the purpose of stopping up a highway which runs into different counties, or different divisions of a county.

Indictment for the non-repair of a common highway in the parish of Milverton. The road out of repair was called Blackgrove's Lane, one part of which was wholly in the parish of Milverton, the remain ng part was half in the parish of Milverton and half in the parish of Oak.

At the trial of this indictment, at the Summer Assizes for the county of Somerset, in 1835, a special verdict was taken, setting out, among other facts, an order made at a special sessions, held at Milverton, 1818, by two Justices of the Peace for the county of Somerset, acting within the hundred of Williton, in which, after reciting that it appeared to them, on view, that a highway in the parish of Milverton, called Cook's Lane, was useless and unnecessary; and that another highway, called Blackgrove's Lane, was useless and unnecessary, the entirety of which last highway, to a certain point mentioned in the order, was in the parish of Milverton, and the southern side thereof from the said parish was also in Milverton, and the northern side thereof was in the parish of Oak, in the same

(5) The 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 67. enacts that, "in future, settlements shall not be acquired by apprenticeship to the sea service."

K