THE MOCKING-BIRD. BY CHAS. SANGSTER. HE mocking-bird sits in the old apple-tree, Who trills a daintier song than he? With a wilder gush, or a deeper glee, Fresh from his glad heart springing? Up steps my passionate oriole, And sings till you'd think the bird had a soul, So mellow, and deep, and rich the strainSong-mist and sweet showers of music rain. The mocking-bird hears, in the old apple-tree, When all at once, like a master, he, He has a rare touch of grave humour, too: Each for its own mate searching. My robin peers out from his cage in the hall, Rapid and clear is his morning call, Bird never sung more proudly. Back to the apple-tree flies my thrush, Strikes a fine chord through the calm and hush, That follows my robin's melodious strain, And gives him his strophes all back again. Bobolink whistles his treble note, Rossignol sings a minute; Let them all flutter in plumage bright, Still, my plain mocking-bird there in the tree THE CAVALRY CHARGES AT SEDAN.-THE AUTUMN MANŒUVRES.— THE MORAL THEY CONVEY. THE BY LT.-COL. G. T. DENISON, JUNR. HE years succeeding great wars have | time devoted to duty was occupied in learnalways been marked by an increased ing and continually repeating and practising impetus given to military science and litera- complicated manoeuvres conducted upon ture. The success of the victors and the the most rigid rules. This was all right as causes which produced it, as well as the les- far as it went, but instruction should not sons taught by the failure of the vanquished, have ceased there, as it practically did. The point out with equal force to those nations, system was bad in its results. The faculty which have occupied the position of by- of thought was never exercised, the power standers, the faults to avoid and the reforms of reasoning never brought into play. On to adopt. the contrary, they were distinctly and positively ignored and their use forbidden. Stolid obedience to orders, and a rigid adherence to routine and red tape were considered the highest type of military discipline and the best evidence of efficiency. The phrase "a soldier has no right to think" became a maxim the importance of which, it was supposed, could not be overrated. The victories of Frederick the Great caused his army to become the model for Europe, and revolutionized the tactical and to a certain extent the strategical science of war. His plummet line and pace-stick are still retained in modern armies, although, at the present day, we do not attain the precision of drill which gave to Frederick's army a power of tactical manœuvring which no other has ever acquired; although the system which arose out of it, and which required it, is a thing of the past. Napoleon also imprinted upon the warfare of his times the impetuous and dashing spirit of his military genius; while, in the Autumn Manoeuvres just completed in England, we see the effect of the late war between France and Germany. The English Government are taking a lesson from Prussia, and are imitating the field manoeuvres by which the Prussians obtained that skill in the real practical work of campaigning which contributed so much to their success. The system hitherto adopted in our army has been simply ridiculous. Officers and men were taught with great care the routine of interior economy, ele. mentary drill, field movements, &c., on rules laid down with mathematical precision. The The effect of this upon the intellect has never been properly appreciated. Officers living all their lives in an atmosphere where the repetition of apparently unmeaning duties forms the every-day occupation, where rule and line have laid down in advance the manner of performing every minute detail, cannot acquire that decisive, vigorous promptitude of judgment and fertility of resource so necessary in the ever-changing conditions. of active operations. The greatest natural talents must certainly feel the depressing and rusting effect of want of exercise. It is a common remark that old army officers or men rarely succeed in business undertakings in civil life; and it is as frequently said that life in the army, in time of peace, unfits men for ordinary employments outside of mere routine. How can it be otherwise with men carefully trained never to think? Nothing could be more ill-judged than the present system. One might as well teach a child his alphabet, teach him every letter and its pronunciation, make him go over it day after day and year after year, and then on examination expect him to read without ever having taught him to spell, as to make officers repeat manoeuvres year after year and expect them by inspiration to know how to apply them practically, in the ever-varying contingencies and trying straits of actual war. Sir Henry Lawrence well says, "No; it is not elementary knowledge "such as barrack life or regimental parades "that can give that which is most essential "to a commander-it is good sense, energy, "thoughtfulness and familiarity with inde“pendent action. * * * * "It is not by three times a day seeing "soldiers eat their rations, or by marching “round barrack squares, that officers learn "to be soldiers, much less generals." One of the general officers in the late autumn campaign, speaking of the advantage of it to a correspondent of the "Times," said, "It teaches us to think," a remark almost pathetic in its honest simplicity. The Prussians found out the secret of this weakness, and seem to have been the only nation to have seriously set themselves to remedy the evil. They invented a method of exercising their armies as near as possible approaching the real operations of war, by opposing two forces against each other, and by employing a staff of umpires to decide disputed points and to settle which side was entitled to the credit of the victory. There was a continual struggle of wits between the officers and men of the opposing forces, and consequently they were obliged to think, and to decide promptly and clearly their course of action in difficult and continually changing circumstances and conditions. Their practice-campaigns were in fact grand dress rehearsals of the part they afterwards played in earnest, and with such marvellous success upon the plains of Bohemia and France. We regret to find that almost all the English papers make the same complaint, that the manoeuvres in Hampshire were not free enough-that even generals commanding were tied down to a great extent to certain fixed conditions. There seems to have been too much constraint-too little freedom and dash. It is nevertheless a matter of congratulation that a step has been taken in the right direction. The lesson conveyed to England on this point, applies with equal force to us in Canada. We have a well drilled volunteer force, thoroughly equipped and armed and composed of active and intelligent young men; but our staff officers are almost all imported from the regular service, and the whole English system, with its rules, regulations, manœuvres, uniforms and pipe-clay, has been adopted by us as closely as it can be imitated. In the Camp at Niagara last June, there were assembled nearly 5,000 men, consisting of one regiment of cavalry, 3 field batteries and 1 battalions of infantry. The force was in excellent condition, and the regimental and company officers deserve the greatest credit for the strength, efficiency and general good appearance of their corps. The management of the camp, however, and the method of drilling adopted, formed a brilliant illustration of the old-fashioned principles of routine and red tape. The whole sixteen days were occupied in continually repeating parade and field movements. It was professed that everything was done as if it were in actual war," yet there was no chain of outposts covering the camp as would be absolutely necessary before an enemy; there were no videttes posted, no patrols sent out, no reconnoitring or scouting duty explained or taught. There seemed to be no attempt made to instruct the force in those duties of covering a camp, a bivouac or a line of march, on the proper performance of which their safety would depend during nineteen days out of every twenty of active hostilities. Our authorities should take advantage of the experience of the late war in this particular, and give our volunteers an opportunity of learning, by field campaigning with umpires, those practical duties, the knowledge of which is so necessary to the safety of an army in the field. ments of Pappenheim's cavalry, who were completely cased in armour, with his own, who were for the most part destitute of such protection. The result proved that these iron-clad warriors were more formidable in appearance than in reality. Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, gave cuirasses to his cavalry, but it was as a protection against the Spanish lancers. We find also that the cavalry of Frederick the Great comprised 13 regiments of cuirassiers, 12 of dragoons and 10 of hussars. But Seidlitz, his great cavalry general, does not ap The war seems also to have settled conclusively the hitherto vexed question as to the inutility of cavalry of the line in modern warfare. Heavy cavalry has been continu-pear to have had much confidence in his cuirally decreasing in value in the same ratio as assiers. General Warnery, his bosom friend the weapons for the projection of missiles and compeer, in his " Remarques sur la have been improved. Before the invention Cavalerie," published in 1781, says, "Seidof gunpowder, the cavalry then (under the "litz, whose regiment ought for the useful feudal system) composed of knights and "(pour le solide) to serve as a model to all men-at-arms, formed the main portion of "the cavalry of the universe, Seidlitz, I say, armies, and infantry were practically power- “admitted that, in a march of moderate less to oppose them. "length, he could not with his regiment re"sist 600 good hussars." The invention of gunpowder gave the infantry a projectile weapon of far greater range and power. About the middle of the 16th century, the Spanish musquet was invented. It was a large unwieldy weapon, fired from a rest with a cushion or pad to relieve the force of the recoil. Its bullets pierced the best coats of mail. The Duke of Alva introduced it into the war in Flanders about the year 1550, and, soon afterwards, opinion so completely changed that defensive armour was for a time looked upon with contempt. Cavalry were consequently much lightened in their equipment, in order to increase their mobility and enable them to diminish the effect of the bullets as much as possible, by shortening by increased speed the interval between their arriving within range of fire and the moment of contact in the charge. Cuirasses were afterwards re-introduced, and have been often used since that date. It is stated that Gustavus Adolphus, at the battle of Leipsig, could not conceal his uneasiness when he compared the accoutre The Emperor Napoleon revived the heavy cuirassier at the commencement of the Empire, by giving cuirasses to several of his cavalry regiments, and by decree of the 24th December, 1809, he also gave them to the regiments of carabineers. Great as is Napoleon's authority on all military questions, his opinion on this point is now entirely out of date. From the first use of gunpowder, for some three hundred years, the infantry musket had not attained any great perfection of precision, rapidity or range. The flint-lock muskets of Napoleon's era, were much the same as they had been since their invention, which took place so far back as 1630, and were not much more deadly than the matchlock which preceded them. It is only of late years that rifles have been brought into use, which seem to have arrived at perfection of aim, range and rapidity of fire. These rifles render it almost impossible for cavalry to charge over the space which intervenes between a line of infantry and the extreme range of their weapons, without being destroyed in the attempt. Cavalry officers have lately theorized to a great extent upon the question of the effect of the breech-loading rifle upon the future employment of heavy cavalry. Some of them admit that, under most circumstances, charges of cavalry against the long-range rifle could not be made, but hold the view that contingencies must occur and chances arise where the impetuous charge would be followed with great results. We have shut our eyes too long to the fact that while the speed of the horse and weight of the man have remained stationary, the precision of aim, length of range, and rapidity of fire of the new rifle have increased to such an extent, as to destroy the conditions which formerly made cavalry charges so important an element in winning battles. An article in the "Saturday Review" of the 7th October last, on "the tactical lessons of the Autumn Campaign," is a good illustration of the theories held on this question of cavalry charges. It says: 66 66 upon them before they could complete "the movement, and had the contest been “a real one, would have sabred them to a man. The Highlanders have been "blamed for forming squares. They ought, it "is said, to have remained steady, and have "trusted to the effect of their fire. Setting "aside, however, the moral effect of the "sudden appearance of a body of horsemen 'charging down at full speed, the High"landers could not at the outside have fired "more than twice, and that hurriedly, and, under any circumstances, they would have "been annihilated." The above is the most common theory on this subject. We will now quote an account of the French cavalry charges at Sedan, from a letter received by the writer of this article from a distinguished officer who was with the Prussian army during the earlier battles of the war. This officer, who has himself seen much service, says: 66 "We have learnt that cavalry of every description is as necessary a component of an army as it ever was, but that it must "be handled and organized in a new fash❝ion. At present our cavalry leaders are "but mere apprentices, and the glorious arm at their disposal was in the recent campaign "rather an incumbrance to the army than "otherwise. In the intervals between the "battles, the light cavalry very imperfectly "performed their duty as purveyors of intel"ligence, and on the day of battle, the "chief object of every one appeared to be to "get our squadrons out of the way, both of "harm and of the other branches of the ser"vice. It is very evident that masses of 66 cavalry will for the future be only used ex"ceptionally, and that they must be kept in 66 "The question of cavalry charging infan'try with breech-loaders is, I think, settled "conclusively by this campaign. Where"ever it has been tried-by the 8th and 9th "French cuirassiers at Woerth, by the 7th "Prussian cuirassiers at Vionville, on the "16th of August, or by the two French "Light Cavalry brigades on their extreme left "at Sedan-the result has been the same— a fearful loss of life with no result whatever. 66 "General Sheridan was an attentive eye"witness of the four charges made by the "French Light Cavalry, at Sedan, and gave me a most minute account of them. "examined the ground most carefully only I |