excused by the fact that the description of the property was inserted in
the policy by the insurer's general agent, who knew that the building
insured stood upon leased ground. Manhattan Fire Ins. Co. v. Weill (Va.),
364, and note, 370.
4 Interest of assured - lien on property.] In an action on a policy of fire
insurance containing a condition that "if the interest of the assured in
the property be any other than the entire unconditional and sole owner-
ship of the property for the use and benefit of the assured, it must be so
represented to the company, and so expressed in the written part of this
policy, otherwise the policy shall be void," it appeared that the assured
had given a deed of trust of the property to secure a debt, and had not
divulged the fact to the insurer. Held, that this was not a breach of the
condition, because (1) the condition was not a warranty against liens and
incumbrances; (2) it did not relate to the legal title; and (3) the cestui
que trust was not a joint owner. lb.
5. On several subjects — fraud in respect only to one.] A policy of fire insur-
ance provided that all fraud or attempt at fraud, or false swearing, on the
part of the assured, should forfeit all claim under the policy; the pol-
icy insured $2,000 on buildings, $1,000 on machinery and fixtures, and
$2,000 on stock of grain, etc.; a loss having occurred, the insured, in
his sworn proofs of loss, made a false and fraudulent statement as to the
stock of grain, etc., but not as to the other subjects of insurance; held,
that the entire policy was forfeited. Moore v. Virginia Fire & Marine
6. Fraud vitiates.] A policy of fire insurance procured by fraud is void with-
out any provision to that effect, although it contains a provision that it
shall be void for fraud or false swearing in connection with the proofs of
loss. 1.
7. Additional insurance - waiver.] A policy of insurance provided that it
should be void for additional insurance, not consented to by the company
in writing on the policy; the agent of the company, in reply to a letter of
the insured, wrote him a letter stating that the company would allow
other concurrent insurance and would place it for him at the same rate.
Held, that this did not waive the condition of the policy, as it was not a
consent to specific additional insurance, and was a mere revocable offer.
Allemania Fire Ins. Co. v. Hurd (Mich.), 491.
8. Of patterns as tools.] Patterns for iron castings, used by the hands of a
single person, are "tools" within a policy insuring against fire, "fixed
and movable machinery, engine, lathes and tools," of a manufacturer of
machinery; and are not within an exception of "jewels, plate, watches,
ornaments, medals, patterns, printed music," etc. Lorewell v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. (Mass.), 671.
9. For benefit of mortgagee.] A mortgagor of land covenanted to keep the
building standing on the land insured for the benefit of the mortgagee at
a fixed sum; more than a year afterward; the mortgagor procured an
insurance for a less sum on the building and his furniture, in his own
name; the policy was not delivered to the mortgagee, and it was pro-
cured without his knowledge; after a loss on the building, the mortgagee
notified the insurer of his claim, but the latter, having no knowledge of
the terms of the mortgage, paid the amount to the mortgagor. In an
action at law by the mortgagee in the name of the mortgagor, held, that
his claim could not be enforced. Stearns v. Quincy Mutual Ins. Co. (Mass.),
647.
10. Of mortgagee's interest -- subrogation.] A mortgage contained a cove-
nant that the mortgagor would insure, and that in default thereof, the
mortgagee might insure and the premiums should be deemed secured by
the mortgage. The mortgagor failing to insure, the mortgagee insured
his interest as such, by a policy providing that in case of loss he should
assign to the insurer an amount equal to the amount of loss paid. A loss
having occurred, the insurer paid it, took an assignment of the mortgage,
and brought a suit for foreclosure. Held, that the insurance money was
not to be applied in payment of the mortgage debt, and that the action
was maintainable; also, held, that although the provision in the policy
was only in terms for the assignment of the mortgage, yet as it was the
evident intention to include the bond, and the bond was actually delivered,
both passed, and the payment to the mortgagee could not be held to be in
liquidation of the bond. Foster v. Van Reed (N. Y.), 544.
11. Assignment of policy -- right of assignee.] The assignee of a policy of
life insurance cannot recover on the policy where he had no insurable
interest in the life. Missouri Valley Ins. Co. v. Sturges (Kans.), 761.
12. Warranty of seaworthiness.]
In every marine insurance there is an
implied warranty of seaworthiness, and an insurance on freight, by the
owners of the vessel, may be defeated by proof that the vessel was unsea-
worthy. Donnally v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co. (La.), 129.
13. Seaworthiness.] An anchor is not necessary to the seaworthiness of a
flat-boat navigating the Mississippi. It.
effect of constitutional repeal.] A sealed promissory
note was executed in Virginia, payable six months from date with inter
est at the rate of twelve per cent from date. The Constitution then fixed
the lawful rate of interest at six per cent, but permitted parties to agree
on any higher rate not exceeding twelve per cent. Subsequent to the
execution of the note the Constitution was modified and the conventional
rate was abolished. Held, (1) that the constitutional modification did not
affect the agreement in the note; and (2) that the note bore the conven
tional rate of interest until it was paid, although not paid at maturity.
Cecil v. Hicks (Va.), 391. ·
2. How affected by modification of usury law.] A promissory note, intended
to run for several years, was executed, payable on demand with interest
semi-annually at the legal rate of eight per cent. Subsequently the rate
of interest was by law limited to seven per cent. When the note was made
there was a statute that demand notes were to be considered as due in
four months from date. In an action by the payee against the makers,
after several years, held, that the statute relating to demand notes did
not apply to the original parties, but only to third parties, and that the
original rate of interest attached until payment of the note. Seymour v.
Continental Life Ins. Co. (Conn.), 469.
Usury - omissions.] An agreement between a commission merchant and
a dealer in produce by which the former is to advance money to the lat
ter, at legal interest, to enable him to buy and carry produce to be sold
by the former, and for the care, management and sale of which the
former is also to receive a percentage upon the amount advanced; held, not
usurious in itself, the commission charged not being unusual or unreason-
able, and the borrower not being in any strait; and also held, that the fact
that the borrower voluntarily took charge of and managed the produce
himself did not change the nature of the agreement. Matthers v. Coo
(N. Y.), 583.
1. Against deceased defendant - collateral attack.] A claim of title to
land under a sheriff's deed cannot be defeated in a collateral action to try
the title, by proof that the judgment defendant was dead at the time
when the judgment was obtained and the suit was commenced. Taylor
v. Snow (Tex.), 311.
2. Domestic judgment — impeaching for want of jurisdiction.] A judg
ment of a court of this State may be impeached collaterally by the defend-
ant, by proof that he was not served with process and did not appear,
although the record recites that he was served, and contains an apparent
appearance by attorney on his behalf. Ferguson v. Crawford (N. Y.), 589.
Collateral impeachment of.] See DIVORCE, 222.
Who may attack.] See DIVORCE, 495.
1. Sheriff's sale — warranty — mistake.] A purchaser at a sheriff's sale buys
at his own risk; there is no warranty, express or implied, in any such
sale. So where the real estate of one is by mistake mortgaged by another,
and is sold by the sheriff under a decree of foreclosure, an innocent pur-
chaser cannot, in an action against the sheriff and the judgment cred-
itor, set aside the sale and recover the purchase-money paid by him.
Neal v. Gillaspy (Ind.), 37, and note, 38.
2. Agreement of judgment creditor postponing his lien - effect on pur-
chaser.] It was agreed between a mortgagee and a judgment creditor
of the mortgagor whose judgment was a lien on the land prior to the
mortgage, that the judgment should be postponed to the mortgage. After-
JUDICIAL SALES- Continued.
ward execution was issued on the judgment, and the land sold under it to
a purchaser who had no notice of the agreement giving priority to the
mortgage. Held, that he was nevertheless bound by it, as he could have
no better title than the judgment creditor. Frost v. Yonkers Savings Bank
'N. Y.), 627.
Statutory action for death caused in another State.] Under a statute of
Kansas, conferring a right of action for damages for death caused by a
wrongful act, no action can be maintained where the death, although
occurring in Kansas, was caused by injuries inflicted in another State.
McCarthy v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. (Kans.), 742.
In actions for divorce.] See DIVORCE.
Impeaching judgment for want of.] See JUDGMENT, 589.
Of State court on application to remove cause to Federal court.] See
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 150.
1. Communication with, by judge after their retirement.] After a sheriff's
jury had retired to deliberate, they called upon the sheriff for, and received
in the absence of the parties and their counsel, an instruction on a matter
of law; held, that the verdict was invalid, although the sheriff certified
that after the jury were discharged, he submitted the instruction to the
respective counsel, and they approved it. Read v. Cambridge (Mass.), 690.
2. Trial by.] The provision of the Federal Constitution as to trial by jury
has no application to State courts. Joseph v. Bidwell (La.), 102.
1. Growing crops pledged by tenant to landlord for rent-right of posses-
sion-trespass by landlord's animals.] A tenant agreed that his landlord
should have for rent an individual half of a growing crop raised by the
former on the leasehold. Held, that the right of possession until harvest
and division continued in the tenant, and, therefore, that where, before
division, the landlord's animals, owing to his negligence, broke the inclos
ure and injured the growing crop, he was liable to the tenant in damages.
Frout v. Harding (Ind.), 18.
2. Agreement to work land on shares - discharge of tenant.] An agreement
to work land on shares does not constitute a partnership; the tenant is a
mere employee, liable to be discharged for cause. Jeter v. Penn (La.), 98.
-] A tenant working land on shares has no right to delegate his employ-
ment; but where he does so, being sick, he is liable to be discharged, sub-
ject to his right to recover such an amount of the proceeds of the crops
as is proportioned to the time which he worked. Ib.
4. Outgrowing crop-notice to quit-parol lease for more than one year.]
The plaintiff entered upon lands in the spring under a parol lease for two
years, with the privilege of harvesting a crop of wheat to be sown in the
LANDLORD AND TENANT - Continued.
second fall, and not to ripen until the expiration of the two years; in the
second summer the owner contracted to sell the premises to the defend-
ant, who had notice of the plaintiff's rights; before receiving his deed
the defendant notified the plaintiffs to quit at the end of the second year;
subsequently the plaintiffs sowed the crop of wheat, and the defendant
appropriated it; held, that the defendant was liable for the conversion,
notice to quit by the vendee being ineffectual. Reeder v. Sayre (N. Y.).
5 Negligence — duty to repair fire-escape.] A statute having required the
owners of tenement houses to provide fire-escapes, and keep them in
repair, under penalty for neglect, it is the duty of such owners, as between
themselves and their tenants, and in the absence of an agreement for
repairs, to keep the same in repair. McAlpin v. Powell (N. Y.), 555, and
note, 562.
-] A fire-escape attached to a tenement house consisted of a platform,
accessible only through a window, furnished with a railing around the
outside, and having at one end a trap door, communicating by a ladder
with a similar platform on the next story; the child of the tenant, ten
years old, who had been sitting on the sill of the open window, while his
father was at work in the same room, passed through the window to the
platform, and to the trap door, the hinges of which being rusty and fast-
ened only with a small wire and a string, gave way beneath him, and he
was killed. Held, that an action of damages therefor would not lie against
the owner of the premises. Ib.
Right of tenant to remove trade fixtures -renewal of term.] See Fix.
TURES, 694.
When action for use and occupation does not lie.] See ACTION, 538
Retail merchant- druggist.] Where a license is required to carry on the
business of a druggist, one cannot sell drugs and medicines under a license
as a retail merchant. State v. Holmes (La.), 110, and note, 113
Of vendor.] See VENDOR And Purchaser, 328.
Easement of.] See EASEMENT, 10.
1. Presumption of payment.] A statute of Virginia prescribes a limitation
of twenty years in actions on bonds, and provides that on bonds exe-
cuted before July 1, 1850, if a cause of action existed on that day, an
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