and Trader's Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall., 276; New Orleans v. The Steamship, 20 Wall., 387.

ELIGIBILITY TO THE OFFICE.

"No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States."

Persons born in the colonies before the Declaration of Independence, had a right to elect whether they would retain their native allegiance to the British Crown, or would become citizens of the several States. The right of election has reference to that date, but it is not necessary that the election should be manifested by any act prior to or at the very time of the Declaration of Independence, and prima facie, if born before July 4, 1776, and remaining here after that day the person is to be deemed a citizen but this presumption may be rebutted by acts showing an adhesion to the British Crown during the struggle. Inglis v. Trustees Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet., 99. A person born in England before the Declaration of Independence and always residing there is an alien. Dawson v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch, 321.

DEVOLUTION OF OFFICE.

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”

COMPENSATION.

"The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them."

OATH OF OFFICE.

"Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:-'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.'"

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT.

SECTION 2. "The President shall be commander-inchief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."

Powers as commander-in-chief.-The President, as the executive chief of the government and commanderin-chief of the army and navy, has a right to institute a blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635.

The President has power to make and repeal rules and regulations for the government of the army, in respect to compensation for extra services, Congress not having legislated thereon, and the Secretary of War is the regular organ of the President for publicly promulgating such rules and regulations. United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet., 291.

The President has power to supersede or remove an officer in the army by appointing another in his place by and with consent of the Senate (Keyes v. United

States, 109 U. S., 336; Blake v. United States, 103 U. S., 227), and this notwithstanding the act of Congress of July 13, 1866, Sec. 5, which provides that no officer shall be dismissed from the army or navy in time of peace except upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court martial to that effect or in commutation thereof. Mullan v. United States, 140 U. S., 240.

The Constitution does not prohibit the creation by military authority of courts for the trial of civil causes during civil war in conquered portions of the insurgent States. And where so established by a commanding general it will be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the President authorized it. Mech. and Traders' Bk. v. Union Bk., 22 Wall., 276.

The President, as commander-in-chief and vested with charge of hostile operations, may permit limited commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war, especially so, when he has the concurrent authority of an act of Congress, viz.: Act of July 13, 1861 (12 Stat. at L., p. 257); Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall., 73.

The proclamation of the President takes effect as of the beginning of the day of its date. So held of a proclamation annulling all restrictions to trade with States lately in rebellion in the territory east of the Mississippi, imposed under the Act of June 13, 1865 (13 Stats., 763). United States v. Norton, 97 U. S.,

The pardoning power of the President.-In order to ascertain what is meant by the power to grant reprieves and pardons resort must be had to the meaning of these words and the power as used in England under the common law. From these sources it appears that the power includes the right to commute the sentence of the court by substituting a milder punishment as imprisonment in place of sentence of death; and acceptance of such pardon binds the convict to the substituted punishment. Ex parte Wells, 18 How., 307.

Pardon of the President under Act of July 17, 1862 (13 Stat. at L., 592) by proclamation operates to grant oblivion, and removes all consequences of giving aid and comfort to those in rebellion (United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531) and entitles the persons pardoned to a restoration of all rights of property, except slaves, on condition of their taking and keeping inviolate the oath prescribed. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128. See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S., 202.

The President's proclamation of pardon and amnesty unconditionally and without reservation to all who participated, directly or indirectly, in the late rebellion relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of adhesion to the United States, during the late civil war. Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall., 156.

A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the