dered, on the 17th of February, to send detachments to Polk in Mississippi, moved against Dalton, and occupied Ringgold on the 22d. On the 25th he made an attempt against Buzzard Roost Pass, but found the enemy in strength. He then withdrew. His loss in this reconnoissance was 17 killed and 255 wounded.

part of Georgia.

This portion of Georgia, naturally poor, had already suf Condition of that fered much from the ravages of the preceding year. It is related by one who followed Thomas's expedition: "The march from Chattanooga to Ringgold was through a dreary pine forest, broken by small patches of cleared but unfenced land. Most of the houses were deserted. Here and there were some dirtylooking women and children peeping out." Speaking of the dilapidated aspect of the country, he says: "Before sundown we must have met at least a dozen wagons, drawn by blind and bony horses, broken-down mules, fleshless oxen. At 10 P.M. we descried our camp-fires shining red in the distance through the smoke and fog. A mass of ruins in the centre, a hundred uninhabited houses scattered around—such is now the town of Ringgold."

It was at Ringgold that the pursuit of Bragg after the battle of Chattanooga was stopped. Bragg's army then retired to a strong position near Dalton, behind Rocky Face Ridge, and remained there all winter. There Johnston relieved Bragg of his command. Ringgold was then held as an advanced position of the national army.

The dissensions between the Confeder

There were very serious misunderstandings between Johnston and the chiefs of the Confederate ate government and government. He was personally obnoxious General Johnston. to Davis and to the Secretary Benjamin. Bragg, on being relieved from the command of the army in Georgia-it being found impossible to withstand the public clamor against him-had been appointed to a posi tion analogous to that held by Halleck at Washington. His influence was exerted very strongly against Johnston.

With Davis, Seddon, and Benjamin, he insisted that Johnston should institute an offensive campaign into Tennessee. Johnston reported to them that it was impracticable. But, after Thomas's reconnoissance (February 27th), he suggested to Davis, through Bragg, that preparations for it might be made. Bragg, in reply, directed him to make such preparations, and on the 18th of March sent him a plan of operations. On his suggesting modifications, Bragg telegraphed him that troops could be drawn from other points only for the purpose of an advance. Johnston, on the 22d, in view of the probability of Sherman's advancing first, urged that troops should be sent him for defensive as well as offensive movements. No notice was taken of his communication. He renewed it, and on the 2d of May received 1400 men. Then he asked (May 4th) for a portion of Polk's command, and it was granted. He had asked for 1000 negro teamsters: none were received. It is no wonder that to such a beginning there should have been a fatal end.

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac crossed the Sherman's cam- Rapidan, and Grant, sitting on a felled tree, paign commences. telegraphed to Sherman at Chattanooga to advance. Sherman's armies were thus grouped: that of the Cumberland at or near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mills, on the Chickamauga; that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton. The Confederates lay in and about Dalton.

stages.

The great campaign now to be considered presents ten Its division into stages: (1), the turning of Dalton; (2), the turning of Resaca; (3), the passage of the Etowah; (4), the turning of Allatoona Pass; (5), the turning of Kenesaw; (6), the passage of the Chattahoochee; (7), the battles round Atlanta; (8), the turning of Atlan ta; (9), the capture of Atlanta; (10), the abandonment of Georgia by the Confederate army.

I shall therefore relate the details of it under those divi. sions. In anticipation, it may be said that the object of the campaign was accomplished: the army that had defended Georgia spontaneously abandoned that state, leaving it at the mercy of the invader, and the Carolinas and Virginia were uncovered.

(1.) The turning of Dalton.

Buzzard Roost
Pass.

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge, Rocky-Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost. This pass is a deep glen cleft in the overshadowing mountains, into which, throughout its length, projects spur after spur from its sides, and on its farther end a ridge like a traverse crosses it. On the left side of the glen is the railroad, on the right the common road, and separating them a rugged crag covered with pines. On the spurs, and indeed on every available point, batteries had been placed. To detain the assailants under fire, Johnston obstructed the glen with abatis, and flooded it by dams on Mill Creek. He might rest securely as to his right; if turned at all, it must be on his left: that was not only settled by the character of the region, but also by the direction of Sherman's ad

vance.

In the shady forests at the foot of the mountains the naOperations for the tional army lay waiting for orders. Its genturning of Dalton. eral carefully reconnoitred the pass. The ridges of the Roost looked dim and gloomy through the cold, cloudy atmosphere, for the air was damp and chilly. Concluding that it was impossible to force the pass, Sherman resolved to turn it by moving through Snake Creek Gap toward Resaca, 18 miles below Dalton, on the railroad. McPherson was accordingly ordered to move rapidly through Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton; to break the railroad, and fall back to Snake Creek,

and be ready to attack the enemy's flank when he retreated. During this movement Thomas was to make a strong feint in front, while Schofield pressed down from the north.

The plan, therefore, was to compel Johnston to recede from his strong-hold at Dalton, and, while he was moving, to bring on a general battle.

On the 7th Thomas marched from Ringgold, occupied Tunnel Hill, and pushed the enemy's cavalry through Buz zard Roost Gap; on the 8th McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap; and on the 9th Schofield pushed down nearly to Dalton from the north, Thomas renewing his demonstrations against the Gap and Rocky-Face Ridge nearly to a battle. The weather was very unpropitious; heavy showers were falling, but the troops were in the highest spirits; they made the valley ring with their huzzas, for news had come that Grant was compelling Lee to retreat to Richmond, and Rocky Face, remembering that she was an American mountain, joined with her glad echoes in the shouts of the men.

McPherson fails to

of the plan.

McPherson was now enabled to march to within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found that carry out his part Johnston had prepared for this event, and made the place too strong to be carried by assault, and, there being no road by which he could rapidly reach the railroad, he fell back and took position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. With his failure the general intention of the movement was frustrated. Strong re-enforcements were now sent him, and Howard, with the 4th Corps, being left to threaten Dalton in front, the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. The movement against Resaca was resumed, McPherson on the direct road, Thomas on his left, and Schofield on Thomas's left. McPherson drove the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, his left abreast the town. Thomas