an offence to engage with France, combating for liberty against the combined despots of Europe." As the trial approached, a great degree of sensibility was displayed, and the verdict in favour of Henfield was celebrated with extravagant marks of joy and exultation. It be reaved the executive of the strength to be derived from an opinion, that punishment might be legally inflicted on those who should openly violate the rules prescribed for the preservation of neutrality; and exposed that department to the obloquy of having attempted a mea· sure which the laws would not justify." The verdict was considered by Washington of such moment, as to lead him to enumerate it as a principal reason to be considered in the question of calling an extra session of Congress, respecting which he asked the opinion of his cabinet on August 3, 1793. (See 10 Wash. Writ. by Sparks, 362.) In a letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, then in England (3 Jeff. Cor. 271), it is said: It has been pretended, indeed, that the engagement of a citizen in an enterprise of this nature, was a divestment of the character of citizen, and a transfer of jurisdiction over him to another sovereign. Our citizens are entirely free to divest themselves of that character by emigration, and other acts manifesting their intention, and may then become the subjects of another power, and free to do whatever the subjects of that power may do. But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen must disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country. Accordingly, in the case of Henfield, a citizen of these States, charged with having engaged, in the port of Charleston, in an enter. prise against nations at peace with us, and having joined in the actual commission of hostilities, the Attorney General of the United States, in an official opinion, declared that the act with which he was charged was punishable by law. The same thing has been unanimously declared by two of the Circuit Courts of the United States, as you will see in the charges of Chief Justice Jay, delivered at Richmond, and Judge Wilson, delivered at Philadelphia: both of which are herewith sent. Yet Mr. Genet, in the moment he lands at Charleston, is able to tell the Governor, and continues to affirm in his correspondence there, that no law of the United States authorizes their government to restrain either its own citizens or the foreigners inhabiting its territory, from warring against the enemies of France. It is true, indeed, that in the case of Henfield, the jury which tried, absolved him. But it appeared on the trial, that the crime was not knowingly and wilfully committed; that Henfield was ignorant of the unlawfulness of his undertaking; that, in the moment he was apprized of it he showed real contrition; that he had rendered meritorious services during the late war, and declared that he would live and die an American. The jury, therefore, in absolving him, did no more than the constitutional authority might have done, had they found him guilty; the constitution having provided for the pardon of certain offences in certain cases, and there being no case where it could have been more proper than where no offence was contemplated. Henfield, therefore, was still an American citizen, and Mr. Genet's reclamation of bim was as unauthorized as the first enlistment of him." (See generally, Wait's State Papers, 85, 86, 143.) Mr. Genet's proceedings during the trial were marked with his usual turbulence. Starting with the inception of the prosecution, he addresses the Secretary of State as follows: "I have this moment been informed that two officers in the service of the republic of France, citizens Gideon Henfield and John Singletary, have been arrested on board the pri vateer of the French republic, the Citizen Genet, and conducted to prison. The crime, laid to their charge-the crime which my mind cannot conceive, and which my pen almost refuses to state-is the serving of France, and defending with her children the common glorious cause of liberty. * Being ignorant of any positive law which deprives Americans of this privilege, and au• thorizes officers of police arbitrarily to take mariners in the service of France from on board their vessels, I call upon your intervention, sir, and that of the President of the United States, in order to obtain the immediate releasement of the above mentioned officers, who have acquired by the sentiments animating them, and by the act of their engagement, anterior to every act to the contrary, the right of French citizens if they have lost that of American citizens." Keeping even pace with the prosecution, at every fresh step taken by it he sends in a fresh protest; and immediately on the rendition of the verdict, issues cards to a dinner party to meet Citizen Henfield;" following up this last stroke by announcing that "the citizen" had been formally taken under the protection of the French republic. Unfor tunately, however, for Henfield, this "protection" was not very potent, for, elated with the honour of French citizenship, he sallied forth in a new excursion, which resulted in his capture by a British cruiser. TRIAL OF JOSEPH RAVARA, FOR SENDING THREATENING LETTERS TO THE BRITISH MINISTER. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT. PHILADELPHIA, 1793.* THE defendant, a Consul from Genoa, was indicted for a misdemeanour, in sending anonymous and threatening letters to Mr. Hammond, the British Minister, to Mr. Holland, a citizen of Philadelphia, and to several other persons, with a view to extort money. Before the defendant pleaded, his counsel (Mr. Heatly, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Dallas) moved to quash the indictment, contending that to the Supreme Court of the United States belonged the exclusive cognizance of the case, on account of the defendant's official character. By the 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution, it is expressly declared, that, "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." By declaring in the sequel of the same section, "that in all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction," the word original is rendered tantamount to exclusive, in the specified cases. But, surely, an original jurisdiction established by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, cannot be exclusively vested by law in any inferior courts. The 13th section of the judicial act provides, that "the Supreme Court shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice-consul shall be a party." This provision obviously respects civil suits; but the 11th sect. declares, that "the Circuit Court shall Reported in 2 Dallas 297. have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein." This is a criminal prosecution, not otherwise provided for; and if the jurisdiction can be exclusively vested in the Circuit Court, it destroys the original jurisdiction given by the Constitution to the Supreme Court. In justice to the Legislature, therefore, such a construction must be rejected; and the cognizance of the case be left, upon a constitutional footing, exclusively to the Supreme Court. The argument is the more cogent from a consideration of the respect which is due to consuls, by the law of nations. Vatt. b. 2, c. 2, s. 34. Mr. Rawle, the District Attorney, stated in reply, that there was a material distinction between public ministers, and consuls; the former being entitled to high diplomatic privileges, which the latter, by the law of nations, had no right to claim; and he contended, that the Supreme Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of offences committed by consuls: That the District Court had jurisdiction (exclusively of the State Courts) of all offences committed by consuls, except where the punishment to be inflicted exceeds thirty stripes, a fine of one hundred dollars, or the term of five months imprisonment: And that the Circuit Court had, in this respect, a concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court as well as the District Court. If, indeed, this is a crime "cognizable under the authority of the United States," it is within the express delegation of jurisdiction to the Circuit Court. Wilson, Justice. I am of opinion, that although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court an original jurisdiction, in cases like the present, it does not preclude the Legislature from exercising the power of vesting a concurrent jurisdiction, in such inferior courts, as might by law be established: And as the Legislature has expressly declared, that the Circuit Court shall have "exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States," I think the indictment ought to be sustained. Iredell, Justice. I do not concur in this opinion, because it appears to me, that for obvious reasons of public policy, the Constitution intended to vest an exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, upon all questions relating to the public agents of foreign nations. Besides, the context of the judiciary article of the Constitution seems fairly to justify the interpretation, that the word original, means exclusive, jurisdiction. Peters, Justice:-As I agree in the opinion expressed by Judge Wilson, for the reasons which he has assigned, it is unnecessary to enter into any detail. The motion for quashing the indictment was accordingly rejected, and the defendant pleaded not guilty; but his trial was postponed, by consent, until the next term. The defendant was tried in April Session, 1794, before Jay, Chief Justice, and Peters, Justice; and was defended, by the same advocates, on the following points: 1st. That the matter charged in the indictment was not a crime by the Common Law, nor is it made such by any positive law of the United States. In England it was once treason; it is now felony; but in both instances it was the effect of positive law. It can only, therefore, be considered as a bare menace of bodily hurt; and, without a consequent inconvenience, it is no injury public or private. 4 Bl. C. 5; 8 Hen. VI. c. 6, 9; Geo. I. c. 22; 4 Bl. C. 144; 3 Bl. C. 120. 2d. That considering the official character of the defendant, such a proceeding ought not to be sustained, nor such a punishment inflicted. The law of nations is a part of the law of the United States; and the law of nations seems to require, that a consul should be independent of the ordinary criminal justice of the place where he resides. Vat. b. 2, c. 2, 8. 34. 3d. But that, exclusive of the legal exceptions, the prosecution had not been maintained in point of evidence; for, it was all circumstantial and presumptive, and that too, in so slight a degree, as ought not to weigh with a jury on so important an issue. 2 Hal. H. P. C. 289; 4 Smol. Hist. Eng. p. 382, in not. Mr. Rawle, in reply, insisted that the offence was indictable at common law; that the consular character of the defendant gave jurisdiction tó the Circuit Court, and did not entitle him to an exemption from prosecution agreeably to the law of nations; and that the proof was as strong as the nature of the case allowed, or the rules of evidence required. In support of his argument he cited the following authorities. 4 Bl. Com. 142, 144; 1 Lev. 146; 1 Keb. 809; 4 Bl. C. 180; Stra. 193; 4 Bl. C. 242; Crown Circ. 376; Fost. 128; Leach 204; 1 Dall. Rep. 338; 1 Sid. 168; Comb. 304; Leach 39; Ld. Ray. 1461; 1 Dall. Rep. 45. The Court were of opinion in the charge, that the offence was indictable, and that the defendant was not privileged from prosecution, in virtue of his consular appointment. The Jury, after a short consultation, pronounced the defendant guilty; but he was afterwards pardoned, on condition (as stated by Mr. Dallas) that he surrendered his commission and Exequatur.* As to the question of common law jurisdiction involved in this case, see ante, Hen field's case, and note thereto, p. 85. TRIAL OF JOHN ETIENNE GUINET ET AL., FOR FITTING OUT AND ARMING A FRENCH ARMED VESSEL. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT. PHILADELPHIA, 1795.* ON May 11, 1795, the following indictment was found:- The Grand Inquest of the United States of America for the Pennsylvania District upon their respective oaths and affirmations do present, That John Etienne Guinet, late of the City of Philadelphia, yeoman, and John Baptist Le Maitre, late of the same, yeoman, on the first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, within the Port of Philadelphia, being a port of the United States, to wit, in the said District of Pennsylvania, knowingly and unlawfully were concerned in furnishing, fitting-out and arming a certain ship or vessel called Les Jumeaux, then lying and being within the port aforesaid, to wit, by advising, superintending and directing the furnishing, fitting-out and arming the same and by advancing money to pay in part for the said furnishing, fitting-out and arming the same with intent that the same ship or vessel should be employed in the service of the French Republic, being a foreign State with whom the said United States are and then were at peace, to cruise and commit hostilities upon the subjects and property of the King of Great Britain, being a foreign prince with whom the United States are and then were at peace, and on the subjects, citizens and property of other foreign princes and States with whom the said United States are and then were at peace to the evil example of others in like cases offending against the form of the act of the Congress of the said United States in such case • Reported 2 Dallas 321. |