*501 ute, is also apparent from its terms, to wit: | volved in the contention that the defendant 'And any stipulation to the contrary shall in a criminal case was compelled to be a be void.'... The fact that the premi- witness against himself, contrary to the um warranted, and the policy guaranteed, 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitufull insurance in case of the death of tion, since this amendment does not operate as a restriction of the powers of the state, the insured for any cause not specified but was intended to operate solely upon the in the clause set up in the defendant's an- Federal government. swer, demonstrates that said clause was designed to modify the liability of the insurance company if the insured committed suicide. It necessarily follows, if this stipulation as to a decreased liability in the event of death by suicide is enforced, that it is some defense to the otherwise full liability agreed upon in the policy. As the statute in question declares that suicide, not committed as therein set forth, is 'no defense,' we cannot hold that the present stipulation can be enforced without violating the plain terms of a mandatory statute which the parties have no power to alter or abrogate." Error to state court-Federal question. States. Error to state court-Federal question. cifically informed of the nature and cause Without further discussion, we adjudge that, under the statute in question, any-lation of his constitutional right to be spething to the contrary in the policy issued by the insurance company notwithstanding, where liability upon a life policy is denied simply because of the suicide of the insured, the beneficiary of the policy can recover the whole of the principal sum, unless it be shown that the insured, at the time of his application for the policy, contemplated suicide. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion and consistent with law. Error to state court-Federal question. 6. The citizenship of the parties is immaterial as affecting the jurisdiction_of_the Federal Supreme Court, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 709, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 575, of a writ of error to a state court.† Error to state court-Federal question. 7. A decision of the highest state court that the defendant in a criminal case has been tried in accordance with the local procedure, although the names of all the witnesses were not indorsed on the indictment, cannot be reviewed in the Supreme Court of the United States on the theory that a meritorious Federal question was involved in the claim that the accused was a subject of Great Britain, and, by virtue of treaties, the law of nations, the laws and Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the state, was entitled to know who were the witnesses against him. [No. 493.] 1. The refusal of a state court to grant, for local prejudice, the change of venue asked for in a criminal case, cannot involve a Federal question of sufficient merit to sustain a writ of error from the Federal Supreme Court, where the highest state court, after reviewing the testimony, decided that Submitted April 8, 1907. such refusal was not an abuse of the discretion vested in the trial court. 22, 1907. Decided April Error to state court-Federal question-IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the when raised in 2. The suggestion of a Federal question, first made in a petition for rehearing, filed in the highest state court, is too late to sustain a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States. Error to state court-Federal question. 3. No Federal question which will sustain a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to a state court is in State of Missouri to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction of murder in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, in that state. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See same case below, 198 Mo. 23, 95 8. W. 235. The facts are stated in the opinion. error. Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 13, Cent. Dig. Courts, 1088, 484 Messrs. Herbert S. Hadley and John Ken- [it to be a well-settled rule of law in Misnish for defendant in error. souri that the granting of a change of venue in a criminal case rested largely in Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the the discretion of the trial court, and that opinion of the court: "where the trial court has heard the evidence in favor of and against the applica tion, and a conclusion reached adversely to granting the change, such ruling will not be disturbed by this court, and should not be unless there are circumstances of such a nature as indicates an abuse of the discretion lodged in such court." And the supreme court, after a full review of all the testimony, decided that the trial court had Plaintiff in error was found guilty of murder in the first degree in the circuit court of St. Louis county, Missouri, and after motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were made and overruled, judgment was rendered on the verdict and sentence passed accordingly. The case was carried to the supreme court of the state and the judgment was affirmed by division No. 2 of that court, having appellate jurisdic-acted properly in overruling the application tion of criminal cases. No Federal question was referred to in the opinion of the court. A motion for rehearing was filed, wherein Federal questions were sought to be raised. The court denied the motion without opinion. Plaintiff in error then moved for the transfer of the cause to the court in banc, setting forth certain Federal questions, and the cause was transferred. The court in banc adopted the opinion of division No. 2 as its opinion, and the judgment was again affirmed. 198 Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235. A motion for rehearing, assuming to raise Federal questions, was filed, and denied without opinion. This writ of error was thereupon brought and comes before us on motions to dismiss or affirm. No assignment of errors was returned with the writ, as required by § 997 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 712), nor is there in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error on these motions any specification of errors under Rule 21, but the brief does allege that certain Federal questions were duly raised and so disposed of as to sustain the jurisdiction of this court. But if these questions are wholly without merit, or are no longer open by reason of our previous decisions, it has long been settled that the writ of error should be dismissed. 1. Before the trial of the cause was commenced, plaintiff in error applied for a change of venue on the ground of local prejudice. for a change of venue. In our judgment no Federal question was involved. Were this otherwise it would follow that we could decide in any case that the trial court had abused its discretion under the laws of the state of Missouri, although the supreme court of that state had held to the contrary. 2. It is also contended that plaintiff in error "set up and claimed that, under the Federal Constitution, as well as under the Constitution of Missouri, he could not be compelled to give testimony against himself, and that this exemption and protection were denied to him by the court in permitting to be given in evidence against him alleged extrajudicial admissions extorted from him while under arrest by the police officers of the state." Certain statements made by plaintiff in error, defendant below, were admitted in evidence on the trial, but it does not appear that counsel objected to the introduction of this testimony on the ground that any rights, privileges, or immunities of defendant under the Constitution of the United States were thereby violated. Counsel for the state offered in evidence certain articles taken from defendant's trunk, and this was objected to on the ground that they were taken in violation of the state Constitution and without defendant's consent. The objection was not passed upon, and the articles were withdrawn. The trunk and its contents were again offered in evidence and objected to, but the objection was based entirely upon, the ground of irrelevancy and immateriality, and the fact that a proper foundation had not been laid in the identification of the trunk. When the state offered in evidence the statements made by defendant following his arrest, the trial court excluded the jury and heard the testimony of the persons present at the time for the purpose of de The application was heard at length, and forty-one witnesses testified in its support and thirty-seven witnesses in opposition thereto; and the trial court decided that prejudice justifying a change of venue had not been made out, and denied the application. It is now contended that the refusal to grant the change of venue deprived plain-termining the competency thereof. After tiff in error of a fair and impartial trial, to which, under the Federal Constitution, he was entitled. The state supreme court held the examination of a number of witnesses, who detailed fully the circumstances under which the statements were made, counsel objected "because there is no foundation | quash had been disposed of, a plea in abatelaid for it and because it was [not] volun- ment was filed, averring that the prosecuttary." This objection was overruled and ing attorney intentionally refrained from the evidence admitted. indorsing the names of certain witnesses on the indictment; that defendant was a native of Great Britain and a subject of the King, and that, by virtue of treaties, the law of nations, the laws and Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Missouri, defendant was entitled to know who were the witnesses against him. The state supreme court held that the trial court, in admitting the testimony, did not commit error. This, notwithstanding the Constitution of Missouri provided "that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case." Its ruling upon that proposition is not subject to review in this court. A similar point, with like allegations, was made in the motion to quash. The court heard the evidence on the plea in abatement, and found the issues against defendant, except that it found that he was a native citizen and subject of Great Brit After the decision of the supreme court in banc, affirming the judgment, plaintiff in error filed a petition for rehearing which was denied without opinion. The third ground of that motion was as follows: "Because counsel for appellant, through neglectain. and inadvertence, failed to call the atten- The question of citizenship is immaterial tion of the court to the proposition that as affecting the jurisdiction of this court the cross-examination of appellant, com- under § 709, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. plained of as 'improper,' and the admission 1901, p. 575). French v. Hopkins, 124 U. as evidence of statements or 'confessions' S. 524, 31 L. ed. 536, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 589. made by appellant while in the 'sweat box' Nor are we aware, as Chief Justice Waite of the St. Louis police department, was in said in Spies v. Illinois (Ex parte Spies) 123 direct violation of the Constitution of the U. S. 131, 182, 31 L. ed. 80, 91, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. United States, article 5, Amendments to 21, of any treaty giving to subjects of Great the Constitution of the United States, in Britain any different measure of justice that it compelled the appellant to become than secured to citizens of this country. a witness against himsel." The suggestion And the general rule of law is that aliens came too late, and, moreover, article 5 of are subject to the law of the territory the Amendments, alone relied on, does not where the crime is committed. Wildenhus's operate as a "restriction of the powers of Case (Mali v. Keeper of Common Jail) 120 the state, but was intended to operate sole- U. S. 1, 30 L. ed. 565, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; ly upon the Federal government." Brown Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 21 v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, L. ed. 426; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377,0 20 Sup. C. Rep. 77. And if, as decided, the 37 Am. Dec. 328; Wharton, Confl. L. § 819.2 admission of this testimony did not violate the rights of the plaintiff in error under the | Constitution and laws of the state of Missouri, the record *affords no basis for holding that he was not awarded due process of low. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 48 L. ed. 121, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49. As to the allegation that the prosecuting attorney intentionally refrained from indorsing the names of certain witnesses on the indictment, in the motion to quash as well as in the plea in abatement, the state courts held that the charge was not sustained by the evidence. The right of the accused to the indorsement of names of witnesses does not rest on the common law, but is statutory, and provided for in Missouri by § 2517 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, whereby the right of the state to use other witnesses not so indorsed is recognized. The state supreme court discussed the matter at length, held there was no error, and added: "Aside from all this it is manifest that the defendant has no right to complain of any prejudicial 3. Plaintiff in error filed a demurrer to the indictment, one of the grounds of which was: "Because of the inconsistency, multiplicity, and repugnancy of said counts, the defendant is being proceeded against in violation of the state and Federal guaranty of due process of law, and in violation of his constitutional right to be specifically informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The demurrer was overruled. And also a motion to quash assigning similar grounds, which was like-error upon the action of the court upon wise overruled. this motion. This motion was filed October 6, 1903, and the record discloses upon the showing made upon such motion and plea in abatement that appellant had notice of these additional witnesses which were introduced by the state at the trial. The 4. After the demurrer and motion to trial did not occur until the 23d of Febru These rulings in respect of the sufficiency of the indictment present no Federal question. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 135, 48 L. ed. 121, 124, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49, and cases cited. Decided April 29, 1907. ary, 1904, some three or four months subse- | Argued February 28 and March 1, 1906. quent to the time of which the record discloses that he had notice of these witnesses." [198 Mo. 70, 95 S. W. 250.] The decision of the supreme court that defendant had been tried in accordance with the procedure provided by the statutes of Missouri is not open to revision here in the circumstances. We have not been astute to apply to these motions the rigor of our rules, and have explored the record with care; but have not found therein any denial of fundamental rights, of due process of law, or of the equal protection of the laws. The Federal questions asserted in the brief or sug. gested by the record are wholly inadequate to justify our interference. Writ of error dismissed. (206 U. S. 1) ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD V. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the IN State of North Carolina to review a judgment which, reversing a judgment of the Superior Court of Wake County, in that state, sustained an order of the state corporation commission requiring the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to restore a connection at Selma with a train of the Southern Railway Company. Affirmed. See same case below, 137 N. C. 1, 49 S. E. 191. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. John G. Johnson, Warren G. Elliott, and Frank P. Prichard for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Robert D. Gilmer and F. A. Woodard for defendant in error. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion* of the court: Did the order of the North Carolina Corporation Commission, the enforcement of NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COM- which was directed by the court below, in MISSION. Error to state court-questions reviewable. 2. The power of the state to regulate railroads extends to securing to the public reasonable facilities for making connections between different carriers. Constitutional law-due process of law equal protection of the laws-state regulation of connecting carriers. vade constitutional rights of the Atlantic spoken of as the Coast Line, is the quesCoast Line Railroad Company, hereafter tion which arises on this record for decision. A sketch showing the situation of the railway tracks at and relating to the place with which the controversy is con. cerned was annexed by the court below to its opinion, and that sketch is reproduced to aid in clearness of statement. [See next page.] Coast Line operated daily an interstate For years prior to October, 1903, the train from Richmond, Virginia, through North Carolina to Florida. This train, known as No. 39, moved over the main track thence by the track designated as the cutfrom Richmond to Wilson, North Carolina, 3. An order of the North Carolina Cor-off via Selma and Fayetteville to Florida. poration Commission requiring the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to restore the connection at Selma with a train of the Southern Railway Company which afforded the principal means of travel between the eastern and western parts of the state is not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a denial of due process of law, or to a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws, if other connections are inadequate for the public convenience, although compliance with the order may necessitate operating an extra train at a loss, or extending, with like result, the run of a local train, so long as the income of the railroad company, from its business in the state, affords adequate remuneration after allowing for any possible loss resulting from operating either of such trains. [No. 15.] The train (No. 39) was scheduled to reach Selma at 2:50 in the afternoon and to leave at 2:55. The Southern Railway owned or controlled a road in North Carolina which crossed the Coast Line main track at Goldsboro and the cut-off track at Selma. On this road there was operated daily a train from Goldsboro via Raleigh to Greensboro, North Carolina, at which point connection was made with the main track of the Southern road. This Southern* train,* known as No. 135, left Goldsboro at 2:05 in the afternoon and Selma at 3 o'clock. Thus at Selma it connected with No. 39 of the Coast Line. The Coast Line also operated in North Carolina the branch lines shown on the sketch, which radiated easterly, and served a considerable area of territory. These branches connected with the |