der the instruction given them by the court;

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

After even more than the usual number of pleas, additional pleas, replications, rejoinders, and demurrers, which are to be found in the pleadings in this District, the parties came to trial on the issues of fact, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict as stated. The judgment entered on the verdict was affirmed by the court of appeals. 27 App. D. C. 210.

The grounds submitted in this court for the reversal of the judgment are reduced to two, set forth in the brief for the plaintiff in error, as follows:

“First, that the testimony of all the plaintiff's witnesses who testified in respect of deficiencies in construction being as to the total damage sustained by the plaintiff as the result of structural defects, defective materials, and omissions, and the trial court having ruled that the jury should consider omissions alone, there was no basis upon which the jury could segregate damages caused by defective materials and damages caused by omissions, so as to reach a verdict in accordance with the court's ruling.

"Second, that under the building agreement, the architect's certificate of completion should have been held to be final and conclusive of such completion, there being no evidence of fraud or bad faith on his part."

In regard to this first ground of reversal the record is at first sight somewhat confused. The plaintiff in error asserts that there was no evidence given segregating the items upon which the sum total of the damage was arrived at; that the evidence given on the part of the plaintiff was that the houses were each worth between two and three thousand dollars less on account of the failure of plaintiff in error to fulfil the conditions of the contract, but that it is impossible to discover from that evidence what amount of the damage was due to omissions, what amount to structural defects, and what amount to defective material; and, as the court instructed the jury that in considering the question of structural defects they were not at liberty to consider anything but omissions, and were not entitled to consider substitutions of material or modifications of Construction made with the approval of the

the total diminution in value, as a result of the three items mentioned, omissions, structural defects, and defective material, while the court charged, agreeably to the twelfth request of the plaintiff in error, that they were at liberty only to consider damages resulting from omissions.

The twelfth prayer of the plaintiff in error, which its counsel asserts was granted by the court, is as follows:

"The jury are instructed that, in considering the question of structural defects, they are not at liberty to consider anything but omissions, if any they find, and are not entitled to consider substitutions of materials or modifications of construction made with the approval of the architect, under his interpretation of the plans and specifications."

There are several answers to the first ground urged by the plaintiff in error for a reversal of this judgment.

(1) It does not appear that there is any basis in the record for the assertion of the plaintiff in error that there was no evidence given showing the amount of damage sustained from each of the breaches of the contract, but only a statement of the sum total sustained by reason of all the breaches. The bill of exceptions does not purport to set forth all the evidence given upon the trial of the case. There is a general statement that the plaintiff gave evidence by several witnesses that the houses were not completed according to the plans and specifications in the contract, in the particulars set forth in the assignment of breaches, and that the value, by reason of the omissions, structural defects, and defective materials was from two to three thousand dollars less on each house than it would have been had they been completed according to the contract, plans, and specifications. This is not at all equivalent to saying that there is no evidence except as to the total damage. It is much more probable that on the trial such evidence was given, and that the statement in the bill is simply a summary of the total amount of damage, which the evidence showed in detail had been sustained from each particular breach. It does not mean that there was no evidence of the amount of the damage caused from each breach that was proved. It is very improbable that the case was tried in any such manner. The amount of damage on account of each breach

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It is part of the duty of a plaintiff in error affirmatively to show that error was committed. It is not to be presumed, and will not be inferred from a doubtful statement in the record. We think in this case the record fails to show the absence of the evidence as argued by the plaintiff in error. (2) If, however, we assume that there was no such evidence in detail and only a conclusion given as to the total amount of damage, and if we further assume that the twelfth request of the plaintiff in error was charged by the court, and the right of recovery was thereby limited as stated, it does not appear that the plaintiff in error made any point on the trial of the absence of the evidence of damage in detail, or that the court was asked to direct a verdict for the defendant on account of its absence. If there were no evidence of the amount of damage caused by each particular breach, but only of the total amount sustained, and the plaintiff in error desired to avail itself of that objection to a recovery for the particular damage permitted, counsel should have called the attention of the court to the point, and requested a direction of a verdict for the defendant on that ground. No such request was made, and nothing was said which would show that counsel for the plaintiff in error had any such objection in mind, and he cannot argue an objection here which was never taken in the trial court.

(3) In truth the court did not limit the recovery of damages, as is set forth in the above-mentioned twelfth request to charge, but permitted a recovery for the total sum of the various items proved.

The defendant in error insists that the twelfth request, instead of being charged, was in fact refused by the court. We think that in this assertion the defendant in error is perfectly right. Some little confusion at first appears on looking in the record, caused by a mistaken reference to the request which was charged, but a more careful perusal of all that appears regarding the charge of the court, and the requests and refusals to charge, bring us to the conclusion that there is not the slightest doubt that the court refused the twelfth request, instead of charging it. In such case there was no occasion for segregating the items of damage proved.

This leaves the argument of the plaintiff in error upon the first ground wholly without merit.

The other ground taken for a reversal in this case is that the architect's certificate of July 29, 1901, was conclusive between the

Mr. Palmer, in his letter or certificate, reported the completion of the buildings according to his interpretation of the plans and specifications, and that where deviations had been made from them it was where the same were inconsistent and ambiguous, and in all cases of inconsistency and ambiguity the work had been done according to the interpretation most beneficial to the houses. We do not think this certificate was conclusive, and it did not, therefore, bar the maintenance of this action. The language of the contract, upon which the claim is based, is set out in the foregoing statement, and while it provides that the work shall be completed agreeably to the drawings and specifi cations made by M. D. Hensey, architect, in a good, workmanlike, and substantial manner, to the satisfaction and under the direction of Bates Warren, or the architect placed in charge by him, to be testified by writing or certificate under the hand of Bates Warren, or the architect placed in charge by him, it omits any provision that the certificate shall be final and conclusive between the parties. In other words, the contract provides that before the builder can claim payment at all he must obtain the certificate of the architect; but, after such certificate has been given, there is no provision which bars the plaintiff from showing a violation of the contract in material parts, by which he has sustained damage. A contract which provides for the work on a building to be performed in the best manner and the materials of the best quality, subject to the acceptance or rejection of an architect, all to be done in strict accordance with the plans and specifications, does not make the acceptance by the architect final and conclusive, and will not bind the owner, or relieve the contractor from the agreement to perform according to plans and specifications. Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 145, 10 Am. Rep. 449; Fontano v. Robbins, 22 App. D. C. 253. There is also in the contract the provision already mentioned in the statement of facts in regard to payments as the work progressed, which showed that a certificate was to be obtained from and signed by the architect in charge before the contractor was entitled to payment, but it was provided that the certificate should "in no way lessen the total and final responsibility of the contractor; neither shall it exempt the contractor from liability to replace work, if it be afterwards discovered to have been done ill, or not according to the drawings and specifications, either in execution or materials." There is the further positive agreement of the contractor to execute and complete all

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two others for conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of § 5440 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676), and the other was against him alone for knowingly attempting to enter certain Japanese silks upon payment of less than the amount of legal duty thereon, in violation of 5444, Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3677).

In January, 1904, he, in company with one of the others named in the indictment (the other having fled the jurisdiction), was tried in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York upon the indictment charging them with conspiracy. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison at Sing Sing, New York, for two years.

He appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, where the conviction was affirmed, and thereafter an application was made in his behalf to this court for certiorari to review the judgment of conviction, which application was denied in January, 1906.

After his trial and conviction, and pending a review of the judgment, the respondent had been enlarged on bail, and after the judgment was affirmed in the circuit court of appeals and a certiorari from this court had been denied, he was, on the 19th of January, 1906, duly called in the circuit court to submit himself to sentence, but did not appear, and his default was entered.

A few days subsequently he was found in the Dominion of Canada. This government then instituted extradition proceedings in Montreal to procure his rendition upon the judgment of conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and claimed it was an extraditable crime under the fourth subdivision of article 1 of the treaty or "extradition convention" of 1889, between the United States and Great Britain. [26 Stat. at L. 1508.] That subdivision reads as follows:

"4. Fraud by bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, or director or member or officer of any company made criminal by the laws of both countries."

The respondent was held for extradition by the Canadian*commissioner, but, on writ of habeas corpus, the court of King's bench held that the conspiracy to defraud the United States, as set forth in the indictment upon which respondent was convicted, was not such a fraud as was provided for in the subdivision of the article of the treaty above referred to. Extradition was therefore refused.

Thereupon the United States secured the rearrest of the respondent on another complaint, charging him with the offenses for

which he had been indicted under § 5444 of the Revised Statutes, and for which he had not been tried in New York. The Canadian commissioner held the respondent upon that complaint, and ordered his extradition, and, upon a writ of habeas corpus, the court of King's bench affirmed that order; and the respondent was then surrendered to the proper agent of the United States, who at once took him to the state of New York, and, having arrived within the southern district of that state, the marshal of that district, proceeding under the warrant for imprisonment issued by the circuit court upon the conviction of the respondent on the conspiracy indictment, took possession of him and delivered him into the custody of the warden of Sing Sing prison, there to be imprisoned for two years according to the sentence imposed upon him under the conviction as stated.

The respondent then obtained this writ upon a petition setting forth the above facts, and claimed that his imprisonment was in violation of the 3d and 7th articles of the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain. 26 Stat. at L. 1508. The warden of the prison made return August 7, 1906, that he held the respondent by virtue of the final judgment of the circircuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, rendered on the 9th of March, 1904, as above set forth.

Mr. W. Wickham Smith and Solicitor General Hoyt for appellant.

Messrs. Terence J. McManus, W. M. K. Olcott, and Black, Olcott, Gruber, & Bonynge for appellee.

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

It does not appear that any movement has been made or notice given by this government to try the respondent on the indictment for the crime for which he has been extradited, but his imprisonment in Sing Sing prison is upon a conviction of a crime for which the Canadian court had refused to extradite him, and is entirely different from the one for which he was extradited. In other words, he has been extradited for one offense and is now imprisoned for another, which the Canadian court held was not, within the treaty, an extraditable of fense.

Whether the crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter for the decision of the Dominion authorities, and such decision was final by the express terms of the treaty itself. Article 2, Convention of July 12, 1889, 26 Stat. at L. 1508; United