The record was filed in this court on Sep-, with an ax some day and throw him in tember 24, 1906, and on application the case was advanced for hearing on January 21, 1907. No counsel appeared for plaintiff in error and no brief was or has been filed in his behalf. The case was submitted by the government on its brief. Although unaided by counsel for plaintiff in error, we have carefully examined the record and considered the assignments of error.

the water, or that he would make a fire and burn everything up. On October 28, the day on which Jaconi was last seen, the defendant was at Fairbanks, and said he was going to the cabin of one of his country. men to see if he could find anything in it. On October 29, between half past 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he arrived at a camp about 20 miles from Chena. He had

a Yukon ring and a gold watch and chain. He made different and contradictory statements about the watch. On November 5 he was arrested, having in his possession $5 and a gold watch. He said that he traded a nugget chain with two men for a sack of clothes and the watch. Later a sack of clothes was found where he had left it. He said that he and his partner had made the chain, and that he had bought his partner's interest in it. His partner testified that they owned the nugget chain, and that it had never been out of his possession after it was made. Several of these articles and others found in possession of the defendant were identified as the property of Jaconi. Other circumstances of a similar nature were also shown in evidence.

The testimony in the case was circum-a rifle and a canvas bag in his possession, stantial. No witness saw the killing. Indeed, the first and principal question is whether there was a homicide. Jaconi was a fisherman, living alone in a log cabin covered by a tent, about midway between Fairbanks and Chena, a distance of about 4 miles from each place. On October 28, 1904, the last time he was seen alive, he was at Fairbanks between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and had in his possession several nuggets, a Yukon gold ring, a gold chain, watch charm, and some money, part of which he deposited in a bank. In the early morning of October 29 the dogs of the deceased were heard barking, and two shots from a gun were heard in the direction of his cabin. On that day about noon one who had been the partner of Jaconi arrived at his camp and found the cabin in which the deceased had lived partially destroyed by fire and the fire still burning.

It is assigned for error that the court overruled a motion to instruct the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty for the reaIn the rear where the bunk had been he saw son that the corpus delicti had not been the back part of a head, a leg bone, and proved. This motion was made after the the trunk of a man. The head was sunken plaintiff had rested, and, upon its being on the chest. While the cabin was not to- overruled, the defendant proceeded to offer tally destroyed, it was burned more towards testimony. The motion was not thereafter the back where the bunk had been, and the renewed. Without resting upon the propground in the vicinity of the bunk was osition that introducing testimony after saturated with oil. It appeared that Jaconi such a motion has been overruled is a had in his cabin about one and one-half waiver of any exception to the action of the gallons of olive oil. On that day or the court (Union P. R. Co. v. Daniels [Union next several witnesses were at the cabin P. R. Co. v. Snyder] 152 U. S. 684, 38 L and saw the skull and the other parts of ed. 597, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Runkle v. the skeleton, still smoking, and the bones Burnham, 153 U. S. 216, 38 L. ed. 694, 14 so burned that they crumbled to pieces Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; Hansen v. Boyd, 161 when touched. Some two weeks before the U. S. 397, 40 L. ed. 746, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. fire the defendant had said to a witness 571), we are of the opinion that neither that he was broke, but knew where he at that time nor at the close of all the could get some money if he had a partner testimony would the court have been justito go with him, as there was a man who fied in withdrawing the case from the jury. lived about 5 miles from Chena who had While it is true there was no witness to $500, a watch and chain, a ring and a gun. On October 15 he was at the cabin of Ja- the homicide and the identification of the coni about daylight. At that time he said body found in the cabin was not perfect, to the former partner of Jaconi, when owing to its condition, caused by fire, yet, asked what he wanted, that he was travel- taking all the circumstances together, there ing and looking for a job. On October 20 was clearly enough to warrant the jury in defendant and a witness went to Chena finding that the partially burned body was and on their way stopped at the cabin that of Jaconi and that he had been killed of Jaconi. After leaving, defendant told by the defendant. Upon this question the witness that he had been there several case of Com. v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 times before, and that the deceased had a N. E. 1035, is closely in point and instructive. roll of money, and that he would lick him | While the particular facts are not identical,

06.

itself establish the fact of his death. It is only a circumstance which, taken in connection with the other facts in the case, tends to prove the death. It is merely one link in a long chain, and the court is seldom called upon by special instructions to sin

the character and scope of the testimony | sumption of his death." Singling out a are substantially the same. single matter and emphasizing it by special Again, it is alleged that there was er- instruction as often tends to mislead as to ror in overruling a motion made by defend-guide a jury. Doubtless the isolated fact ant to strike out all the testimony given by that Jaconi had not been seen would not of a deputy marshal of conversations between him and the defendant. As these conversations were not induced by duress, intimidation, or other improper influences, but were perfectly voluntary, there is no reason why they should not have been received. Other matters referred to in the assign-gle out any single link in a chain, and afment of errors require but slight notice. One is that the court erred in refusing to appoint an interpreter when the defendant was testifying. This is a matter largely resting in the discretion of the trial court, and it does not appear from the answers made by the witness that there was any Objection is made to the instruction in abuse of such discretion. reference to reasonable doubt. This inError is also alleged in refusing an instruction is taken from the charge of Chief struction as to the evidence necessary to Justice Shaw to the jury in Com. v. Webestablish the corpus delicti. It is enough, in answer to this objection, to refer to the summary of the testimony we have already given, and to note the fact that the court instructed that the evidence must be such as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defense asked one or two instructions, such as this: "The fact that Jacob Jaconi has not been seen since the 28th day of October, 1904, does not create a pre

firm either its strength or weakness. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 433, 36 L. ed. 485, 494, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679; Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Leak, 163 U. S. 280, 288, 41 L. ed. 160, 162, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1020.

ster, 5 Cush. 295, 320, 52 Am. Dec. 711, and that case has been cited with approval by this court. Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 304, 312, 26 L. ed. 481, 484.

These are all the questions which we deem it necessary to notice, and while we should have been glad to have had the assistance of counsel for plaintiff in error, yet we are satisfied from our examination of the record that the defendant was properly, convicted, and the judgment is affirmed.

Habeas corpus-Federal interference with state administration of criminal law.

Relief by habeas corpus should not be accorded by a Federal court to a person held in custody by the state authorities under an order of commitment entered by a state court after a jury had returned a verdict of "not guilty, by reason of insanity," although the prisoner may be so held in violation of the Federal Constitution, since he should be left to his remedy by writ of error from the Federal Supreme

Court to review the final action of the highest court of the state.

[No. 266.]

as follows: "When any person indicted or informed against for an offense shall, on trial, be acquitted by reason of insanity, the jury, in giving their verdict of not guilty, shall state that it was given for such cause; and thereupon, if the discharge or going at sidered by the court manifestly dangerous large of such insane person shall be con. to the peace and safety of the community, the court may order him to be committed to prison, or may give him into the care of his friends, if they shall give bonds, with surety to the satisfaction of the court, conditioned that he shall be well and securely kept; otherwise he shall be discharged" Ballinger's Anno. Codes & Statutes, § 6959.

Subsequently, the accused, being in the custody of the sheriff under the above order, made an original application to the su

Argued March 7, 1907. Decided March 18, preme court of Washington on the 13th day

A

1907.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington to review an order discharging, on habeas corpus, a person held in the custody of the state authorities under an order of commitment entered by a state court after the jury had returned a verdict of not guilty, by reason of insanity. Reversed, with directions to deny the writ, with leave to apply for a writ of error to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, affirming the

order of the trial court.

See same case below, 139 Fed. 846. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. E. C. Macdonald, John D. Atkinson, A. J. Falknor, and J. R. Buxton for appellant.

No counsel for appellee.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

of June, 1905, for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was unlawfully detained and imprisoned, in that the statute under which he was held was in violation of both the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of the state.

its final judgment, entered July 14th, 1905, The supreme court of Washington, by held that the statute was constitutional, and that the order of the trial court was in strict conformity with its provisions. Re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 540, 109 Am. St. Rep. 868, 81 Pac. 552. That court accordingly denied his application to be discharged. The appellee then, on July court of the United States for the western 18th, 1905, made application to the circuit district of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus. In his answer to this application the sheriff, having the appellee in custody, referred to the proceedings in the supreme court of the state, and alleged that the mental condition or capacity of the applicant was in no wise different or improved than it was on the 23d of December, 1904, at the time he killed his father. That court grant. ed the writ, and, the case being heard, the court, by its final order, entered January 10th, 1906, discharged the appellee from custody. The circuit judge held that the statute, although constitutional, was not properly administered by the superior court in rendering its judgment, and that the imprisonment of the petitioner with sanction of the judiciary of the state, without arraignment, and a fair opportunity to defend himself against charges lawfully preferred, and to produce evidence in his defense, was deprivation of his liberty by the In making this order the court acted on state, without due process of law, and viothe authority of a statute of Washington,lated the national Constitution; and for

This appellee, Brown, was charged in the superior court of Lewis county, Washing ton, with the crime of murder, and was acquitted. The verdict of the jury was: "We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty, by reason of insanity."

The verdict having been entered of record, an order was made which recited that the court, by reason of the verdict, the evidence, the proceedings in the trial, and the demeanor of the defendant, "finds that the discharge or going at large of said Thomas Brown would be and is considered by the court as manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the community;" also, that he be committed to the county jail until the further order of the court.

181

*182

that reason the application for the writ of of the United States, he could have brought habeas corpus was granted. 139 Fed. 846. the ease by writ of error directly from The order of commitment under which the that court to this court.t In Reid v. appellee was held was adjudged by the cir- Jones, 187 U. S. 153, 47 L. ed. 116, cuit court to be illegal and void, but the 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, it was said that judgment was without prejudice to any law-one convicted for an alleged violation ful proceeding to have the prisoner restrained, if he should be adjudged to be a dangerous person by reason of insanity. From that judgment the present appeal was prosecuted.

of the criminal statutes of a state, and who contended that he was held in violation of the Constitution of the United States, "must ordinarily first take his case to the highest court of the state, in which It is the settled doctrine of this court the judgment could be reviewed, and thence that, although the circuit courts of the Unit- bring it, if unsuccessful there, to this court ed States, and the several justices and by writ of error; that only in certain exjudges thereof, have authority, under exist- ceptional cases, of which the present is not ing statutes, to discharge, upon habeas cor- one, will a circuit court of the United States, pus, one held in custody by state authority or this court, upon appeal from a circuit in violation of the Constitution or of any court, intervene by writ of habeas corpus in treaty or law of the United States, the advance of the final action by the highest court, justice, or judge has a discretion as court of the state." So, in the recent case to the time and mode in which the power of United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 so conferred shall be exerted; and that, in U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, view of the relations existing, under our it was said that, in cases of the custody by system of government, between the judicial state authorities of one charged with crime, tribunals of the Union and of the several the settled and proper procedure was for `states, a Federal court or a Federal judge a circuit court of the United States not to will not ordinarily interfere by habeas cor-interfere by habeas corpus, “unless in cases pus with the regular course of procedure of peculiar urgency, and that, instead of under state authority, but will leave the discharging, they will leave the prisoner to applicant for the writ of habeas corpus to be dealt with by the courts of the state; exhaust the remedies afforded by the state that, after a final determination of the case for determining whether he is illegally re- by the state court, the Federal courts will strained of his liberty. After the highest even then generally leave the petitioner to court of the state, competent under the his remedy by writ of error from this court. state law to dispose of the matter, has fi- The reason for this course is apparent. It nally acted, the case can be brought to this is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given court for re-examination. The exceptional to the Federal courts by which a person uncases in which a Federal court or judge may der an indictment in a state court, and subsometimes appropriately interfere by ha- ject to its laws, may, by the decision of a beas corpus in advance of final action by the single judge of the Federal court, upon a authorities of the state are those of great writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the urgency, that require to be promptly dis- custody of the officers of the state, and fiposed of; such, for instance, as cases "in-nally discharged therefrom." volving the authority and operations of the general government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations." The present case is not within any of the exceptions recognized in our former decisions. If the applicant felt that the decision, upon habeas corpus, in the supreme court of the state, was in violation of his rights under the Constitution or laws

†Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251, 29 L. ed. 868, 871, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; Ex part Fonda, 117 U. S. 516, 29 L. ed. 994, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89, 39 L. ed. 80, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Re Wood (Wood v. Brush) 140 U. S. 278, 35 L. ed. 505, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; Re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 37 L. ed. 653, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793; Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100, 39 L. ed. 84, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34; Re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211, 39 L. ed. 401, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331; Whitten v. Tomlin

|

Without now expressing any opinion as to the constitutionality of the statute in question, or as to the mode in which it was administered in the state court, for the reasons stated the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, with directions to set aside the order discharging the appellee, and to enter an order denying the applica tion for a writ of habeas corpus, leaving son, 160 U. S. 231, 40 L. ed. 406, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 42 L. ed. 748, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 104, 43 L. ed. 91, 96, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 Ù. S. 184, 44 L. ed. 124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 45 L. ed. 639, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455; Riggins v. United States, 199 U. S. 547, 50 L. ed. 303, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147; Re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178, 50 L. ed. 984, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602.

the appellee in the custody of the state, | Massachusetts, individually and as trustee with liberty to apply for a writ of error to to H. C. Long & Company, composed of H review the above judgment of the Supreme C. Long and Frank A. Sanderson. Court of Washington.

It is so ordered.

(205 U. S. 170)

ROBERT J. TRACY, Piff. in Err.,

V.

ALBERT A. GINZBERG, Individually and as Trustee in Bankruptcy of H. C. Long & Company.

Constitutional law-due process of law.

The case made by the bill of complaint is as follows: On the 23d of December, 1902, the plaintiff sold to Long and Sanderson the personal property used in carrying on hotel business at a certain place in Boston, and assigned to them the lease of the payment therefor he took back a mortgage realty occupied by the hotel. As partial on the personal property for the sum of $7,500, running to the James Everard's Breweries, a corporation of New York. The 1. The police board of Boston, by is- mortgage covered not only a part of the suing a liquor license, on a vacancy created purchase price, but also $3,000 in cash, by bankruptcy, to the nominee of the which the plaintiff paid for the liquor litrustee in bankruptcy of the original license, which, on or about the above date, censees, does not deprive a co-licensee, to he procured to be assigned to Long and whom the original license had been assigned Sanderson and to himself, as joint owners, as security, of property without due process and also the sum of $1,400 in cash, which of law, where his so-called property right depends wholly upon the practice of the the plaintiff paid to the city of Boston as a board to reissue licenses to the old holders fee for the liquor license issued by the until refused for cause, since such right, be- board of police of that city to Long and ing of the board's creation, is subject to Sanderson and to the plaintiff. That liany limitations which the board may im- cense expired by limitation on May 1st, pose.

Constitutional law-due process of law.

2. The decision of a state court involving nothing more than the ownership of property, with all parties in interest before it, cannot be regarded by the unsuccessful party as a deprivation of property without due process of law, simply because its effect is to deny his claim of ownership in such property.

[No. 204.]

Argued February 26, 1907. Decided March 18, 1907.

IN

'N ERROR to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts to review

a judgment which affirmed a decree of the trial justice of that court, dismissing a bill to recover from a trustee in bankruptcy moneys received from the sale of an unex pired liquor license to one desiring a renewal. Affirmed.

See same case below, 189 Mass. 260, 75 N. E. 637.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Harry J. Jaquith and Thomas J. Barry for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. A. W. Putnam, William B. Sullivan, and Lourie & Ginsberg for defendant in

error.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was instituted in the supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts by the plaintiff in error, a citizen of New York, against the defendant in error, a citizen of

1903.

In consideration of the advance, by plaintiff's procurement, of the above sums of $3,000 and $1,400, Long and Sanderson, on the above date, by writing, assigned their right, title, and interest in said license to the plaintiff, covenanting and agreeing that all future applications for renewals of the license should be in the names of Long and Sanderson and the plaintiff, and that, upon such renewal being granted, they would assign, transfer, and set over any such license.

Long and Sanderson being without money for the purpose, the plaintiff paid $1,400 to the city as the renewal fee, and thereupon a new first and fourth-class license was is

sued by the board of police to Long and Sanderson and the plaintiff to sell intoxiThis license was taken by the plaintiff into cating liquors in the said hotel building. his possession, and he had it in his possession at the bringing of this suit.

On the payment of the license fee for 1903, 1904, Long and Sanderson, by an instrument of writing dated April 24th, 1903, assigned, transferred, and set over to the plaintiff their interest in that license, and further agreed to assign and set over to him their interest in any renewal of the license so long as they should be indebted to James Everard's Breweries. The plaintiff alleged that that assignment was for present and valuable consideration, and that by reason thereof he became the sole owner of the license.

Long and Sanderson were adjudged bankrupts on the 23d of July, 1903, being at the