408 do not control, and the court erred in enforcing the penalty. If, however, it was a purely local shipment, the judgment below was right and should be sustained. The facts are settled by the special find pany, and F. L. Atkins, as agent for ulations of the state railroad commission the Hardin Grain Company, and were for shipment of the corn to Goldthwaite, Texas, consigned to 'Shipper's order, notify, etc.' giving the numbers and initials of cars, which information had been furnished by the Harroun Commission Com-ings, those findings being conclusive upon pany, and on January 14, 1902, the reshipment having been made as per instructions, the bills of lading duly executed by the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. were by Harroun delivered to Hardin Grain Company, who thereupon paid the Harroun Commission Company $1,779.64, the purchase price previously agreed upon for the corn, and the receipt of said blank bills of lading by the Harroun Commission Company was the first information had by that company of the intended final destination and disposition of the corn. this court. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658, 38 L. ed. 305, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188, 41 L. ed. 680, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Thayer v. Spratt, 189 U. S. 346, 47 L. ed. 845, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Adams v. Church, 193 U. S. 510, 48 L. ed. 769, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512; Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. & Land Co. 194 U. S. 220, 48 L. ed. 944, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632. The corn was carried from Texarkana, Texas, to Goldthwaite, Texas, upon a bill of lading which, upon its face, showed only a local transportation. It is, however, contended by the railway company, that this local transportation was a continuation of a shipment from Hudson, South Dakota, to Texarkana, Texas; that the place from which the corn started was Hudson, South Dakota, and the place at which the trans that such transportation was interstate commerce, and that its interstate character was not affected by the various changes of title or issues of bills of lading intermediate its departure from Hudson and its arrival at Goldthwaite. "14. Neither Hardin Grain Company nor Harroun Commission Company had any store or warehouse at Texarkana, but, under the agreement between the two companies (Hardin and Harroun), one F. L. Atkins, who was the agent of the Harroun Commission Company, and stationed at Texarkana, re-portation ended was Goldthwaite, Texas; shipped the corn at Texarkana for the Hardin Grain Company. That shipment was to Goldthwaite, Texas, over the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. and the G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co., by bill of lading reciting its receipt from Hardin Grain Company, and consigned to 'Shipper's order, notify Saylor & Burnett, Goldthwaite, Texas,' and was transferred under original seals and without breaking packages, to the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., after having remained in Texarkana five days; the only thing done by F. L. Atkins was to surrender the Kansas City Southern bill of lading, have the cars set over on the T. & P. Ry., and take a bill of lading from the latter company. The corn reached Texarkana January 7th, 1902, and was shipped out from Texarkana January 13th, 1902; the defendant was not a party to the bill of lading executed at Texarkana. "15. On December 31st, 1901, Hardin Grain Co. mailed to Saylor & Burnett an invoice of the corn in the form of an account, stating the car numbers and initial, the amount of corn, and price to be paid by Saylor & Burnett." Messrs. Gardner Lathrop, A. B. Browne, and J. W. Terry for plaintiff in error. Mr. Robert Vance Davidson for defendant in error. It is undoubtedly true that the character of a shipment, whether local or interstate, is not changed by a transfer of title during the transportation. But whether it be one or the other may depend on the contract of shipment. The rights and obligations of carriers and shippers are reciprocal. The first contract of shipment in this case was from Hudson to Texarkana. During that transportation a contract was made at Kansas City for the sale of the corn, but that did not affect the character of the shipment from Hudson to Texarkana. It was an interstate shipment after the contract of sale as well as before. In other words, the transportation which was contracted for, and which was not changed by any act of the parties, was transportation of the corn from Hudson to Texarkana,—that is, an interstate shipment. The control over goods in process of transportation, which may be repeatedly changed by sales, is one thing; the transportation is another thing, and follows the contract of shipment, until that is changed by the agreement of owner and carrier. Neither the Harroun nor the Hardin * Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion company changed or offered to change the of the court: contract of shipment or the place of delivThe single question in the case is whether, ery. The Hardin company accepted the as between Texarkana and Goldthwaite, this contract of shipment theretofore made, and was an interstate shipment. If so, the reg-purchased the corn to be delivered at Tex *413 arkana, that is, on the completion of the existing contract. When the Hardin company accepted the corn at Texarkana the transportation contracted for ended. The carrier was under no obligations to carry it further. It transferred the corn, in obedience to the demands of the owner, to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, to be delivered by it, under its contract with such owner. Whatever obligations may rest upon the carrier at the terminus of its transportation to deliver to some further carrier, in obedience to the instructions of the owner, it is acting not as carrier, but simply as a forwarder. No new arrangement having been made for transportation, the corn*was delivered to the Hardin company at Texarkana. Whatever may have been the thought or purpose of the Hardin company in respect to the further disposition of the corn was a matter immaterial so far as the completed transportation was concerned. Again, it appeared that this corn remained five days in Texarkana. The Hardin company was under no obligation to ship it further. It could, in any other way it saw fit, have provided corn for delivery to Saylor & Burnett, and unloaded and used that car of corn in Texarkana. It must be remembered that the corn was not paid for by the Hardin company until its receipt in Texarkana. It was paid for on receipt and delivery to the Harain company. Then, and not till then, did the Hardin company have full title to and control of the corn. and that was after the first contract of transportation had been completed. It must further be remembered that no bill of lading was issued from Texarkana to Goldthwaite until after the arrival of the corn at Texarkana, the completion of the first contract for transportation, the acceptance and payment by the Hardin company. In many cases it would work the grossest injustice to a carrier if it could not rely on the contract of shipment it has made, know whether it was bound to obey the state or Federal law, or, obeying the former, find itself mulcted in penalties for not obeying the law of the other jurisdiction, simply because the shipper intended a transportation beyond that specified in the contract. It must be remembered that there is no presumption that a transportation when com In this respect there is no difference between an interstate passenger and an interstate transportation. If Hardin, for instance, had purchased at Hudson a ticket for | interstate carriage to Texarkana, intending all the while after he reached Texarkana to go on to Goldthwaite, he would not be entitled, on his arrival at Texarkana, to a new ticket from Texarkana to Goldthwaite at the proportionate fraction of the rate prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commenced is to be continued beyond the state mission for carriage from Hudson to Goldthwaite. The one contract of the railroad companies having been finished, he must make a new contract for his carriage to Goldthwaite, and that would be subject to the law of the state within which that carriage was to be made. The question may be looked at from another point of view. Supposing a car load of goods was shipped from Goldthwaite to Texarkana under a bill of lading calling for only that transportation, and supposing that the laws of Texas required, subject to penalty, that such goods should be carried in a particular kind of car,-can there be any doubt that the carrier would be subject to the penalty, although it should appear that the shipper intended, after the goods had reached Texarkana, to forward them to some other place outside the state? To state the question in other words, if the only contract of shipment was for local transportation, would the state law in respect to the mode of transportation be set one side by a Federal law in respect to interstate transportation, on the ground that the shipper intended, after the one contract of shipment had been completed, to forward the goods to some place outside the state? Coe Errol, 116 U. S. 517-527, 29 L. ed. 715-718, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475. limits, and the carrier ought to be able to depend upon the contract which it has made, and must conform to the liability imposed by that contract. We see no error in the proceedings, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas is affirmed. Indians-new remedy by review in citizenship cases-vested rights. 1. Congress could constitutionally empower the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, created by the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 641, chap. 1362), to review and annul, for irregularities, the judg ments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in Indian citizenship cases, although, by the terms of the act of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 339, 340, chap. 398), those judgments had become final. Judgments-test case-effect as to persons not parties. 2. A decree of the Choctaw and Chicka *419 *418 saw citizenship court in the test case against case is to be found in the opinion of the ten persons who had been admitted to citi-United States circuit court of appeals. An zenship or enrolment by the United States entire restatement of these matters is, therecourts in the Indian territory, vacating, for fore, unnecessary. certain irregularities, the judgments of those courts, is binding on a person similarly situated who was not made a party, but who did not avail himself of his privilege, under the act of July 1, 1902, to transfer his individual case from the territorial court to the citizenship court, but chose to abide the outcome of the case against the ten representatives of his class. [No. 260.] There is but a single matter to be determined. As counsel for plaintiffs in error say: "The assignment of errors presents but one question. If the decree of the ChoctawChickasaw citizenship court, in the test case known as the Riddle Case, vacated the decree that defendant, Hill, had, theretofore, procured in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, Argued December 21, 1906. Decided Febru- wherein he was adjudged to be a member of ary 25, 1907. IN ERROR to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, which had, in turn, affirmed a judgment of the United States Court for the Southern District of that territory, in favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover the possession of real property. Affirmed. See same case below. 143 Fed. 716. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. A. C. Cruce, Jackson H. Ralston, Frederick L. Siddons, William E. Richardson, W. I. Cruce, and W. R. Bleakmore for plaintiffs in error. the Choctaw tribe of Indians, this case should be affirmed. If it did not, it should In order to divide the lands of these Indian nations an enumeration of the individuals entitled thereto became necessary. By the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 645, chap. 209, § 16), the commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, generally known as the Dawes Commission, was empowered to negotiate and extinguish the tribal title to the lands and to make an allotment thereof to the members of the tribe in severalty. By that of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. at L 339, 340, chap. 398), the commission was authorized to hear the application and determine the right of each applicant for Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion citizenship in either of these tribes. of the court: Messrs. George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melven Cornish (by special leave) for Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. This was an action commenced in September, 1904, by Mrs. Ella Adams, for herself and her minor children, defendants in error, in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, to recover possession of a tract of land in that territory. Defendants answered, and, upon trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was sustained by the United States court of appeals of the Indian territory, and, on further appeal, reaffirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. 143 Fed. 716. The case arises out of the legislation of Congress designed to secure the disintegration of the tribal organization of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian territory, and the distribution of the property of those tribes among the individual Indians. A full résumé of this legislation and the general litigation following it is to be found in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722, and a full statement of the facts in this The act also granted an appeal to the proper se "The contention is that the act of July 1, 1898, in extending the remedy by appeal to this court, was invalid because retrospective, an invasion of the judicial domain, and destructive of vested rights. By its terms the act was to operate retrospectively, and as to that it may be observed that while the general rule is that statutes should be so construed as to give them only prospective operation, yet, where the language expresses a contrary intention in unequivocal terms, the mere fact that the legislation is retroactive does not necessarily render it void. this act many of these cases were appealed In the opinion (page 477, L. ed. page 1052, to this court, which affirmed the judgments. Sup. Ct. Rep. page 734) we said: Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, supra. On March 21, 1902, an agreement was made between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, which was confirmed by act of Congress July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 641, chap. 1362). This agreement and act were substantially that a court known as the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court should be created, and that that court should have power, in a suit in equity brought by either or both of these tribes against any ten persons who had been admitted to citizenship or enrolment by the terms of the judgments of the several United States courts in the Indian territory, as representatives of all persons similarly situated, to determine whether the judgments of those courts should be annulled on account of certain alleged irregularities. The agreement and act also provided that, in case the citizenship courts should decide that those judgments should be annulled the papers in any action in those courts, wherein such a judgment had been rendered, should, upon seasonable application of either party, be transferred to the citizenship court, which should proceed to a hearing and determination of the question of citizenship. Under this agreement and act the court was established and test suit brought, in which a decree was entered to the effect that the judgments of the United States courts in the Indian territory, whereby persons were admitted to citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations under the act of June 10, 1896, were annulled and vacated. Hill was not named a party in that test suit, nor did he thereafter apply for a transfer of his case to the citizenship court. The above statement of facts is sufficiently full for an understanding of the single question presented for determination. That single question may be divided into two. First, was the decree in the Indian territory court declaring Hill a citizen a finality, beyond the power of Congress to in any manner disturb? This was answered in the Stephens Case, supra. In that case we held that Congress could authorize a review of the judgments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in citizenship cases, and this although, by the terms of prior legislation, those judgments had become final. While sustaining the act authorizing such review and providing for appeals to this court, we construed it as limiting the appeals to the question of the constitutionality or validity of the legislation, and not as bringing before us the facts in the instances of all applications for citizenship. "And while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of courts, compel them to grant new trials, order the discharge of offenders, or direct what steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry, the grant of a new remedy by way of review has been often sustained under particular circumstances. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222, 8 L. ed. 665; Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160, 17 L. ed. 922; Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196, 22 L. ed. 612; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. ed. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 763; Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. ed. 446, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790. "The United States court in Indian ter ritory is a legislative court and was authorized to exercise jurisdiction in these citizenship cases as a part of the machinery devised by Congress in the discharge of its duties in respect of these Indian tribes; and, assuming that Congress possesses plenary power of legislation in regard to them, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, it follows that the validity of remedial legislation of this sort cannot be questioned unless in violation of some prohibition of that instrument. "In its enactment Congress has not attempted to interfere in any way with the judicial department of the government, nor can the act be properly regarded as destroying any vested right, since the right asserted to be vested is only the exemption of these judgments from review; and the mere expectation of a share in the public lands and uted, if the applicants are admitted to citimoneys of these tribes, if hereafter distribzenship, cannot be held to amount to such an absolute right of property that the original cause of action, which is citizenship or not, is placed by the judgment of a lower court* beyond the power of re-examination by a higher court, though subsequently authorized by general law to exercise jurisdiction." This decision established that no such *424 first decided, and the appropriation made afterwards. But in principle there is no difference between these two special jurisdictions created by acts of Congress for special purposes, and neither of them possesses judicial power in the sense in which those words are used in the Constitution. The circumstance that one is called a court and its decisions called judgments cannot alter its character nor enlarge its power. Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor impose on it the author. ity or duty of hearing and determining an appeal from a commissioner or auditor, or any other tribunal exercising only special powers under an act of Congress; nor can Congress authorize or require this court to express an opinion on a case where its judicial power could not be exercised, and where its judgment would not be final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties, and process of execution awarded to carry it into effect." vested right was created by the proceedings | priation afterwards made. In the case beof the Dawes Commission or the judgments fore us the validity of the claim is to be of the courts of the Indian territory on appeal from the findings of the commission as prevented subsequent investigation. The power of Congress over the matter of citizenship in these Indian tribes was plenary, and it could adopt any reasonable means to ascertain who were entitled to its privileges. If the result of one measure was not satisfactory it could try another. The fact that the first provision was by an inquiry in a territorial court did not exhaust the power of Congress or preclude further investigation. The functions of the territorial courts in this respect were but little more than those of a commission. While the act of July 1, 1898, provided for an appeal to this court, and appeals were taken in many cases, yet our inquiry stopped with the question of the constitutionality of the legislation. In other words, we entertained and decided the purely judicial question of the validity of the means Congress had adopted for determining the matter of citizenship. We did not attempt to pass upon the question of citizenship in any particular case, nor determine whether the applicant was or was not entitled to be enrolled as a citizen. It is unnecessary to consider what would have been the effect of a judgment of this court, a court provided for in the Constitution, on the question of the right of a litigant to citizenship. The distinction between this court and the courts established by act of Congress in virtue of its power to ordain and establish inferior courts is shown in Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697, Appx. in which we held that while Congress could give to the court of claims jurisdiction to inquire and report upon claims against the government, it could not authorize an appeal from such report to this court unless our decision was made a final judgment, not subject to congressional review. In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice Taney said (pp. 699, 702): This decree was followed by legislation which, in a general way, provided that the rulings of this court on appeals from the judgments of the court of claims should be in effect judgments. While that case is not entirely parallel to this, yet the line of, thought pursued in the opinion is suggestive. We do not feel called upon to enlarge upon it. It is enough now to hold that Congress, in giving to the Indian territory courts jurisdiction of appeals from the action of the Dawes Commission, did not place the decisions of these courts beyond the reach of further investigation. Hence the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, creating the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, and giving to it power to examine the judgments of the Indian territory courts, and determine whether they should not be annulled on account of irregularities, was a valid exercise of power. The other question is one of procedure, and not of power. It is objected that the defendant Hill was not made a party to the proceeding instituted in the citizenship court, but there were a multitude, according to the report of the Dawes Commission, probably one thousand, in whose favor judg "Congress may undoubtedly establish tribunals with special powers to examine testimony and decide, in the first instance, upon the validity and justice of any claim for money against the United States, subject to the supervision and control of Congress, or a head of any of the executive departments. In this respect the authority of the court of claims is like to that of an auditor or comp-ments of citizenship have been entered in troller, with this difference only: that in the latter case the appropriation is made in advance, upon estimates furnished by the different executive departments, of their probable expenses during the ensuing year; and the validity of the claim is decided by the officer appointed by law for that purpose, and the money paid out of the appro the Indian territory courts, and the act provided that ten should be selected as representatives of the class. It further authorized any individual, in case of an adverse judgment by the citizenship court, to transfer his case from the territorial to that court. Now, it is undoubtedly within the power of a court of equity to name as de |