But if, as we have seen,

"one who has lost the power of resistance; | United States. one who surrenders himself to any power that denounces a condition possible for all whatever; as a slave to passion, to lust, to strong drink, to ambition," and servitude is by the same authority declared to be "the state of voluntary or compulsory subjection to a master."

races and all individuals, then a like wrong perpetrated by white men upon a Chinese, or by black men upon a white man, or by any men upon any man on account of his race, would come within the jurisdiction of Congress, and that protection of individual | rights which, prior to the 13th Amendment, was unquestionably within the jurisdiction solely of the states, would, by virtue of that Amendment, be transferred to the nation, and subject to the legislation of Congress.

It is said, however, that one of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a lack of power to make or perform contracts, and that when these defendants, by intimidation and force, compelled the colored men named in the indictment to desist from performing their con- But that it was not the intent of the tract, they, to that extent, reduced those Amendment to denounce every act done to parties to a condition of slavery, that is, an individual which was wrong if done to a of subjection to the will of defendants, and free man, and yet justified in a condition of deprived them of a freeman's power to per-slavery, and to give authority to Congress form his contract. But every wrong done to enforce such denunciation, consider the to an individual by another, acting singly legislation in respect to the Chinese. In or in concert with others, operates pro tanto to abridge some of the freedom to which the individual is entitled. A freeman has a right to be protected in his person from an assault and battery. He is entitled to hold his property safe from trespass or appropriation; but no mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation operates to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery. Indeed, this is conceded by counsel for the government, for in their brief (after referring to certain decisions of this court) it is said:

"With these decisions, and many others that might be cited, before us, it is vain to contend that the Federal Constitution secures to a citizen of the United States the right to work at a given occupation or particular calling free from injury, oppression, or interference by individual citizens.

"Even though such right be a natural or Inalienable right, the duty of protecting the citizen in the enjoyment of such right, free from individual interference, rests alone with the state.

"Unless, therefore, the additional element, to wit, the infliction of an injury upon one individual citizen by another, solely on account of his color, be sufficient ground to redress such injury, the individual citizen suffering such injury must be left for redress of his grievance to the state laws."

The logic of this concession points irresistibly to the contention that the 13th Amendment operates only to protect the African race. This is evident from the fact that nowhere in the record does it appear that the parties charged to have been wronged by the defendants had ever been themselves slaves, or were the descendants of slaves. They took no more from the Amendment than any other citizens of the

slave times in the slave states not infre quently every free negro was required to carry with him a copy of a judicial decree or other evidence of his right to freedom or be subject to arrest. That was one of the incidents or badges of slavery. By the act of May 5, 1892 [27 Stat. at L. 25, chap. 60, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1319], Congress required all Chinese laborers within the limits of the United States to apply for a certificate, and any one who, after one year from the passage of the act, should be found within the jurisdiction of the United States without such certificate, might be arrested and deported. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016, the validity of the Chinese deportation act was presented, elaborately argued, and fully considered by this court. While there was a division of opinion, yet at no time during the progress of the litigation, and by no individual, counsel, or court connected with it, was it suggested that the requiring of such a certificate was evidence of a condition of slavery, or prohibited by the 13th Amendment.

One thing more: at the close of the Civil War, when the problem of the emancipated slaves was before the nation, it might have left them in a condition of alienage, or established them as wards of the government, like the Indian tribes, and thus retained for the nation jurisdiction over them, or it might, as it did, give them citizenship. It chose the latter. By the 14th Amendment it made citizens of all born within the limits of the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. By the 15th it prohibited any state from denying the right of suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and by the 13th it forbade slavery or involuntary servitude

anywhere within the limits of the land., race or color, and without illegal interfer Whether this was or was not the wiser way ence or by violent means. to deal with the great problem is not a mat⚫ter for the courts to consider. It is for us to accept the decision, which declined to constitute them wards of the nation or leave them in a condition of alienage where they would be subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, but gave them citizenship, doubtless believing that thereby in the long run their best interests would be subserved, they taking their chances with other citi zens in the states where they should make their homes.

For these reasons we think that the United States court had no jurisdiction of the wrong charged in the indictment. The judgments are reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the indictment.

The indictment was based primarily upon § 5508 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3712), which provides: "§ 5508. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Con. stitution or laws of the United States, org because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi lege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United

Mr. Justice Brown concurs in the judg- States."

ments.

Other sections of the statutes relating to civil rights, and referred to in the discusMr. Justice Harlan (with whom concurs sion at the bar, although not, perhaps, vital Mr. Justice Day), dissenting:

The plaintiffs in error were indicted with eleven others in the district court of the United States, eastern district of Arkansas, for the crime of having knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully unlawfully conspired to oppress, threaten, and intimidate Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, persons of African descent and citizens of the United States and of Arkansas, in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege-alleged to be secured to them respectively by the Constitution and laws of the United States-of disposing of their labor and services by contract and of performing the terms of such contract without discrimination against them because of their

|

The indictment charged that "the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, being then and there persons of African descent, and citizens of the United States and of the state of Arkansas, had then and there made and entered into contracts and agreements with James A. Davis and James S. Hodges, persons then and there doing business under the name of Davis & Hodges, as copartners carrying on the business of manufacturers of lumber at White Hall, in said county, the said contracts being for the employment by said firm of the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton, as laborers and workmen in and about their said manufacturing establishment, by which contracts the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton |

to the decision of the present case, are as follows: "8 1977 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1259). All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, and be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 1978. All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. § 1979. Every person who, were, on their part, to perform labor and services at said manufactory, and were to receive, on the other hand, for their labor and services, compensation, the same being a right and privilege conferred upon them by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, and being a right similar to that enjoyed in said state by the white citizens thereof; and while the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton were in the enjoyment of said right and privilege the said defendants did knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully conspire as aforesaid to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate them in the free exercise and enjoyment of said right and privilege, and because of their having so exercised the same, and because they were citizens of African descent, enjoying said right, by then and there notifying the said

That those persons, in execution of their contract, entered upon and were actually engaged in performing the work they agreed to do, when the defendants-the present plaintiffs in error-knowingly and wilfully conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate such laborers, solely because of their having made that contract, and because of their race and color, in the free exercise of their right to dispose of their labor, and prevent them from carrying out their contract to render such service and labor; That, in the prosecution of such conspiracy, the defendants, by violent means, com

under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-, for compensation, service and labor in and lation, custom, or usage of any state or ter- about the manufacturing business in that ritory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, state of a private individual; any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." "§ 5510 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3713). Every person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punish-pelled those laborers, simply, "because they ments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than one year, or by both."

were colored men and citizens of African descent," to quit their work and abandon the place at which they were performing labor in execution of their contract; and

That, in consequence of those acts of the defendant conspirators, the laborers referred to were hindered and prevented, solely because of their race and color, from enjoying the right by contract to dispose of their labor upon such terms and to such persons as to them seemed best.

A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and the defendants having pleaded not guilty, they were tried before a jury, and some of them-the present plaintiffs in error-were convicted of the crime charged, Was the right or privilege of these laborwere each fined $100, and ordered to be im-ers thus to dispose of their labor secured to prisoned for one year and a day. A motion for new trial having been denied, they have brought the case to this court.

In our consideration of the questions now raised it must be taken, upon this record, as conclusively established by the verdict and judgment,—

That certain persons-the said Berry Winn and others above named with him citizens of the United States, and of Arkansas, and of African descent, entered into a contract whereby they agreed to perform,

them "by the Constitution or laws of the United States?" If so, then this case is within the very letter of § 5508 of the Revised Statutes, and the judgment should be affirmed if that section be not unconstitutional.

But I need not stop to discuss the constitutionality of § 5508. It is no longer open to question, in this court, that Congress may, by appropriate legislation, protect any right or privilege arising from, created or secured by, or dependent upon, the Constituthreats and otherwise, to remove from said place of business, to stop said work, and to cease the enjoyment of said right and privilege, and by then and there wilfully, delib

Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe | Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton that they must abandon said contracts and their said work at said mill, and cease to perform any further laborerately, and unlawfully compelling said thereat, or receive any further compensation for said labor, and by threatening, in case they did not so abandon said work, to injure them, and by thereafter then and there wilfully and unlawfully marching and moving in a body to and against the places of business of the said firm while the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton were engaged thereat, and while they were in the performance of said contracts thereon, the said defendants being then and there armed with deadly weapons, threatening and intimidating the said workmen there employed, with the purpose of compelling them, by violence and

Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton to quit said work and abandon said place and cease the free enjoyment of all advantages under said contracts, the same being so done by said defendants and each of them for the purpose of driving the said Berry Winn, Dave Hinton, Percy Legg, Joe Mardis, Joe McGill, Dan Shelton, Jim Hall, and George Shelton from said place of business and from their labor because they were colored men and citizens of African descent, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States."

this court has said: 'In the exercise of this general power of legislation, Congress may use any means appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.' Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 283, 36 L. ed. 429, 435, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, 622."

tion or laws of the United States. That is | fender shall suffer such punishment as is what that section does. It purports to do attached to such felony or misdemeanor by nothing more. In Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 the laws of the state in which the offense is U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, committed. No question has been made— it was distinctly adjudged that § 5508 was a indeed, none could successfully be madevalid exercise of power by Congress. In Lo- as to the constitutionality of these statgan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 286, 293, utory provisions. Ex parte Yarbrough, su36 L. ed. 429, 437, 439, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, pra; United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 623, 626, this court stated that the validity 28 L. ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. Referring of 5508 had been sustained in the Yar- to those provisions and to the clause of the brough Case, and, speaking by Mr. Justice Constitution giving Congress authority to Gray, said: "In United States v. Reese, 92 pass all laws necessary and proper for carU. S. 214, 217, 23 L. ed. 563, 564, decided at rying into execution the powers specifically October term, 1875, this court, speaking by granted to it, and all other powers vested in Chief Justice Waite, said: 'Rights and im- the government of the United States, munities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and the manner of the protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected." After referring to prior adjudications the court in the Logan Case also unanimously declared: "The whole scope and effect of this series of decisions is that, while certain fundamental rights, recognized and declared, but not granted or created, in some of the amendments to the Constitution, are thereby guaranteed only against violation or abridgment by the United States or by the states as the case may be, and cannot therefore be affirmatively enforced by Congress against I come now to the main question,unlawful acts of individuals, yet that every whether a conspiracy or combination to right created by, arising under, or depend- forcibly prevent citizens of African descent, ent upon, the Constitution of the United solely because of their race and color, from States, may be protected and enforced by disposing of their labor by contract upon Congress, by such means and in such man- such terms as they deem proper, and from ner as Congress, in the exercise of the cor- carrying out such contract, infringes or viorelative duty of protection, or of the legislates a right or privilege created by, derived lative powers conferred upon it by the Con- from, or dependent upon, the Constitution of stitution, may, in its discretion, deem most the United States. eligible and best adapted to attain the object."

In Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 44 L. ed. 1150, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993, the language of the court was: "We have seen that by § 5508 of the Revised Statutes it is made an offense against the United States for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the punishment prescribed being a fine of not more than $5,000, imprisonment not more than ten years, and ineligibility to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. And by § 5509 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3712), it is provided that if, in committing the above offense, any other felony or misdemeanor be committed, the of- I

In view of these decisions it is unnecessary to examine the grounds upon which the constitutionality of 5508 rests; and I may assume that the power of the national government, by appropriate legislation, to protect a right created by, derived from, or dependent in any degree upon, the Constitution of the United States, cannot be disputed.

Before the 13th Amendment was adopted the existence of freedom or slavery within any state depended wholly upon the Constitution and laws of such state. However abhorrent to many was the thought that human beings of African descent were held as slaves and chattels, no remedy for that state of things as it existed in some of the states could be given by the United States in virtue of any power it possessed prior to the adoption of the 13th Amendment. That condition, however, underwent a radical change when that Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land, and, as such, binding upon all the states and all the people, as well as upon every branch of government, Federal and state. By the Amendment it was ordained that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist

lished freedom and conferred upon every person within the jurisdiction of the United States (not held lawfully in custody for crime) the privileges that are fundamental in a state of freedom, and which were violently taken from the laborers in question solely because of their race and color.

Let us see whether these principles do not find abundant support in adjudged cases.

within the United States or any place sub- | deprive any person of life, liberty, or propject to their jurisdiction;" and "Congress erty without due process of law. To deshall have power to enforce this article by prive any person of a privilege inhering in appropriate legislation." Although in words the freedom ordained and established by the and form prohibitive, yet, in law, by its own 13th Amendment is to deprive him of a force, that Amendment destroyed slavery privilege inhering in the liberty recognized and all its incidents and badges, and estab- by the 14th Amendment. It is true that lished freedom. It also conferred upon every the present case is not one of the deprivaperson within the jurisdiction of the United tion, by the Constitution or laws of the States (except those legally imprisoned for state, of the privilege of disposing of one's crime) the right, without discrimination labor as he deems proper. But it is one of against them on account of their race, to a combination and conspiracy by individuals enjoy all the privileges that inhere in free-acting in hostility to rights conferred by dom. It went further, however, and by its the Amendment that ordained and estab 2d section, invested Congress with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions. To that end, by direct, primary legislation, Congress may not only prevent the re-establishing of the institution of slavery, pure and simple, but may make it impossible that any of its incidents or badges should exist or be enforced in any state or territory of the United States. It therefore became competent for Congress, One of the earliest cases arising under under the 13th Amendment, to make the the 13th Amendment was that of United establishing of slavery, as well as all at States v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308, 318, 320, tempts, whether in the form of a conspiracy Fed. Cas. No. 14,897. It became necessary or otherwise, to subject anyone to the in that case for Mr. Justice Bradley, holdbadges or incidents of slavery, offenses ing the circuit court, to consider the scope against the United States, punishable by and effect of the 13th Amendment and the fine or imprisonment or both. And legisla- extent of the power of Congress to enforce tion of that character would certainly be its provisions. Referring to the 13th appropriate for the protection of whatever Amendment, that eminent jurist said that rights were given or created by the Amend-"this is not merely a prohibition against the ment. So, legislation making it an offense passage or enforcement of any law inflicting against the United States to conspire to in- or establishing slavery or involuntary servijure or intimidate a citizen in the free exer- tude, but it is a positive declaration that cise of any right secured by the Constitu- slavery shall not exist. So, untion is broad enough to embrace a conspir-doubtedly, by the 13th Amendment, Conacy of the kind charged in the present in-gress has power to legislate for the entire dictment. "A right or immunity, whether eradication of slavery in the United States. created by the Constitution or only guar- This Amendment had an affirmative operaanteed by it, may be protected by Congress." tion the moment it was adopted. It enfranThis court so adjudged in Strauder v. West chised four millions of slaves, if, indeed, Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310, 25 L. ed. 664, they had not previously been enfranchised 666, as it had previously adjudged in Prigg by the operation of the Civil War. Congress, v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 10 L. ed. 1060, therefore, acquired the power not only to and in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, legislate for the eradication of slavery, but 23 L. ed. 563. The colored laborers against the power to give full effect to this bestowwhom the conspiracy in question was di- ment of liberty on these millions of people. rected owe their freedom as well as their All this it essayed to do by the civil rights exemption from the incidents and badges of bill passed April 9, 1866 (14 Stat. at L. 27, slavery alone to the Constitution of the chap. 31), by which it was declared that all United States. Yet it is said that their persons born in the United States, and not right to enjoy freedom and to be protected subject to a foreign power (except Indians, against the badges and incidents of slavery not taxed), should be citizens of the United is not secured by the Constitution or laws States; and that such citizens, of every of the United States. race and color, without any regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, should have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and

It may be also observed that the freedom created and established by the 13th Amendment was further protected against assault when the 14th Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land; for that Amendment provided that no state shall

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