be maintained if brought or found after the expiration of the year, and it would seem to be clear that, if the admiralty adopts the statute as a rule of right to be administered within its own jurisdiction, it must take the right subject to the limitations which have been made a part of its existence. It matters not that no rights of innocent parties have attached during the delay. Time has been made of the essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to be treated as limitations of the right." A like case is Lewis v. Pawnee Bill's Wild West Co., 6 Pennewill (Del.) 316, 66 Atl. 471, 16 Ann. Cas. 903, where it is said, to quote from the syllabus: "The Delaware statute of 1897 * * providing that no action for personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of one year from the date when the injuries were sustained, being a special or independent statute of limitations, complete in itself, is not subject to the exceptions contained in the general statute of limitations, * * * and consequently the absence from the state of the person whose negligence caused the injuries does not extend the time limited for the commencement of such action." The subject is treated at large and well annotated in the last-named publication. See, also, Pomeroy's Petition, 33 Mont. 69, 81 Pac. 629; Rodman v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642, 59 L. R. A. 704; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 116, 47 C. C. A. 615, 56 L. R. A. 193; Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank, 99 Fed. 635, 40 C. C. A. 22, 48 L. R. A. 625; Rainey v. Grace, 216 Fed. 449, 132 C. C. A. 509, L. R. A. 1916A, 1149, note 47 at pages 1166 and 1167; Osborne v. Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 74; Swisher v. Ry. Co., 76 Kan. 97, 90 Pac. 812; Richards v. Carpenter (C. C. A.) 261 Fed. 724. Without making any exception in favor of the insane, the disabled, or the infant, the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe the terms upon which the bounty of the state may be enjoyed. Those who would avail themselves of the privilege thus extended must comply with its terms, and it does not lie within the power of any judicial tribunal, however beneficial it may be, to add terms that have not been put there by the law-making power. We may well regard this case as one of great misfortune, and yet we are powerless to extend relief where none is awarded by the statute. The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed. McCourt, J., did not participate in this decision. HORN v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO. 117 Atlantic Reporter, 409. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION AGREEMENT SENT TO BOARD HELD SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT FOR CLAIM. Where the widow of a deceased employee was furnished by an officer of the compensation board with a form for compensation board with a form for compensation agreement, which he designated as a blank form of claim and which, with unimportant exceptions, stated the facts which are required to be stated in the claim by Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, art. 4, § 402 (P. L. 750; Pa. St. 1920, § 22018), the return of the compensation agreement within the time required for filing of a claim by article 3, § 315 (section 22012), was a substantial compliance with the act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT - COMPENSATION CLAIM RECEIVED BY BOARD MAY DATE BACK TO TIME OF MAILING. Where a claim for compensation sent by mail to the board was deposited in the mail properly addressed and registered on the day before it was required to be filed with the board, and was actually received by the board, but on the day after the expiration of the time for filing the claim, the depositing of the claim in the mail can be considered a delivery on that date, though the subsequent actual receipt of the notice would be absolutely necessary to such delivery, and the making of the claim was in time, especially where an officer of the board had written to claimant erroneously stating that the claim must be mailed before the expiration of the time for delivery. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Northampton County; William M. McKeen, Judge. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Margaret Horn to recover compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, employer. An award of compensation was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and the employer appeals. Affirmed. Argued before Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. Edward J. Fox and James W. Fox, both of Easton, for appellant. Frank P. McCluskey and Dudley A. Giberson, both of Easton, for appellee. KEPHART, J. Plaintiff's husband died September 10, 1918, as the result of an accident received November 24, 1917. The chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board states in his opinion that claimant wrote to the board about presenting a claim against the defendant September 6, 1919. An answer was received by her, September 9, 1919, from an officer of the board, stating: "I am sending you blank form of claim petition, which must be mailed to Harrisburg on September 10, 1919." This was one year after the death of her husband. The letter contained an agreement for compensation, not a claim petition; and this agreement was sent to Harrisburg by registered mail September 9, 1919, registry receipt as of that date being in evidence. It was not received by the board until September 11, one day after the year had expired. This agreement was referred to defendant for execution, but was returned with a denial of liability; thereafter the formal claim petition was filed, based on facts contained in the compensation agreement in the board's possession. [1] Article 3, section 315, of Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736, 748; Pa. St. 1920, § 22012), provides: "In cases of death all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within one year after the death, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation under this article; or unless, within one year after the death, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in article 4 hereof." Article 4, section 402 (P. L. 750; Pa. St. 1920, § 22018): "All proceedings before the board or any referee, and all appeals to the board, shall be instituted by petition addressed to the board. All petitions shall be in writing and in the form prescribed by the board." An examination of the compensation agreement and the claim petition shows the facts necessary to each, with unimportant excetpions, are alike. It is not material in what form the claim petition appears, as long as it presents a demand or claim for an injury that, on the facts as stated, appears to be compensable. Filing the agreement, then, was a substantial compliance with section 402. [2] The letter from the board directed the petition to be mailed not later than September 10. This was the last day it could be filed with the board, and, of course, the direction as to mailing was a misstatement. Where a person is unintentionally deceived as to his rights by one who has authority to act in the premises, courts will not, if it is possible to prevent it, permit such deception to work an injury to the innocent party. Here the widow was misled by the statement of the board's officer. She, no doubt, could have had the paper delivered in Harrisburg on the date named, had she known that was necessary. While the governing sections are mandatory, and she is presumed to know the law, we have held, where a party has been prevented from doing an act through fraud or circumstances that amount to fraud, the court might extend the time within which to do the act. Wise v. Borough of Cambridge Springs, 262 Pa. 139, 144, 104 Atl. 863. But we need not rest the case on this conclusion. [3] The time limit in which claims might be filed was placed in the act not only to produce uniform practice, but to enable employers to know the period of time they could be called upon to respond for just claims, so that they might not be constantly expecting stale claims of doubtful merit being made. The compensation act, then, contemplated the board would come in contact with legal claimants from every section of the commonwealth, and that certain agencies of the government (mail service), as the agent of all parties, would, in reason, be used to facilitate this end, to carry out the purposes and directions of the act. It was not intended to cut out meritorious claims by harsh rulings as to the manner of filing. Claimant's husband was an engineer who had worked for this company for 30 years or more; it is now argued his widow is not entitled to compensation because she did as the compensation board told her when she filed her claim too late, forgetting the fact that the compensation board's knowledge and notice of the claim is the important thing to establish, and bears strongly on the merit of her position. It is to be noted she sent her claim petition by registered letter on next to the last day, and, although it was not received by the board until the day following the last day, the date of sending, the manner by which it was sent, and the fact of its receipt within the ordinary time required to carry a letter to its destination, though after the time limit—these circumstances combined cause the receipt to be referred back to the date when the petition was deposited in the mail, and to be considered as delivered on that date, it being within the year. A delivery of a claim petition to the United States mails, on the last day to be filed or the day before, duly stamped, properly addressed, sent by registered mail, followed by a receipt by the compensation board within the time usually required to carry a letter to its destination-these combined circumstances constitute a delivery of the petition when it was deposited in the mails. The actual receipt at the home office within the time mentioned is not absolutely necessary to complete the delivery; the law must be reasonably construed. Attention is called to parallel reasoning in Giordano v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 575, 578, where Judge Henderson correctly states the law as to notice of loss by insurance. The order of the court below is affirmed, with a procedendo, costs to be paid by appellant. LENGLE ET AL. V. NORTH LEBANON TP. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. April 17, 1922.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-TRIAL-EVIDENCE OF COMPENSATION FOR DEATH INADMISSIBLE FOR DEFENSE IN ACTION AGAINST WRONGDOER. In action against a third person for death of plaintiffs' father, evidence of compensation received by plaintiffs under Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.) is inadmissible for the defense and injures the chance of recovery. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 354; also see Trial, Dec. Dig. § 127.) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Lebanon County; Charles V. Henry, Judge. Action by Francis Lengle and others, by their guardian and next friend, the Lebanon County Trust Company, against the Township of North Lebanon. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. ` Reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. Paul G. Adams and Warren G. Light, both of Lebanon, for appellants. Dawson W. Light and Walter C. Graeff, both of Lebanon, for appellee. KEPHART, J. Joseph Lengle, employed by Donmoyer, was killed while driving a two-horse wagon on a public highway, in North Lebanon township. The wagon skidded from the road into a declivity, somewhat lower than the surface of the highway. The declivity or sharp descent was a part of a private lane, where it joined the main highway and connected with the traveled portion. The public road, at this point, was only nine feet in width; immediately to the east and west it widened to 15 feet. Defendant was charged with negligence, in that the road was not kept "in reasonable repair and in a reasonably safe condition for public travel." This charge was evidenced by a failure to erect barriers or take other precaution at the intersection of the roads, to prevent accident, and by permitting a grass plot in or along the side of the road to be in a dangerous condition. In the action to recover damages the jury found against the plaintiff, and this appeal followed, charging principally trial errors. [1, 2] There was admitted in evidence a compensation agreement under which deceased's children received compensation. Not only was the fact of an agreement admitted, but much testimony was taken showing the amount of money received under it. The offer was for the purpose of showing plaintiff could not maintain the action in right of the children. The real purpose (not part of the offer) was to convey to the jury the fact that the children were already being taken care of under the compensation laws of the state, and the amount received by them. No further suggestion was necessary to convince them the township should not be asked to pay more to the children or any sum in relief of the employer Under such circumstances, plaintiff's chance of recovering anything was materially injured the moment the evidence was delivered. The court endeavored to correct its mistake in its charge, but the mischief was already done. Corrective instructions had little chance to get this idea out of the jurors' minds. The evidence was not competent, in any view of the case. While the Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.) provides a certain means of relief to a person injured, or those surviving a decedent, which, from a legislative viewpoint, is ample, it cannot be regarded as representing total compensation, or that which the injured person or the decedent's dependents are entitled to receive from others than the employer causing the injury. Under the act, the employer or insurance company has the right to be subrogated, in any verdict recovered for the amount to be paid by virtue of the compensation agreement or order of the board. The procedure necessary for subrogation has been pointed out in a prior decision of this court, so that, in no view of the case, was this evidence admissible; on the contrary, it was harmful to plaintiff's action. See Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 550, 112 Atl. 752, for comment on evidence of a similar nature. The first four assignments of error are sustained. [3] The testimony of Winters as to the wagon tracks on the ground, seen by him a week after, is rather remote. We are inclined, however, to agree with the court below the objection went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The tracks were identified as having been made by the deceased's wagon. Just how this was known does not appear, but, as the record stood, we do not think error was committed in the admission of the testimony. [4] A lane connects with the public road at the place of the accident. An adjoining property owner has the right to join his premises with a public highway, by means of a private road or lane, under such regulations as to safety as the supervisors may prescribe; the supervisors have no power to erect a guard rail or barrier or prevent such connection; but, where the lane immediately adjoining a part of the public highway is so dangerous as to become a public nuisance, there is an obligation resting on the supervisors to abate it. As public officials, they must make the highway reasonably safe for travel, and, if to do so requires the lane to be filled or otherwise taken care of, the supervisors certainly have power to compel such measures. The safety of the traveling public cannot be subordinated to the convenience of the individual property owner. The authority of the supervisors may not extend beyond the highway and the necessary embankments, but, if there is a precipitous descent to the lane adjoining, making travel along the public highway dangerous, and the only way to cause the owner of the lane to put it in proper shape is to barricade the highway or erect a gate at this point, in the interest of public safety, they have the power to do it, and continue it until the menace is removed. If it is contended the conditions imposed for opening are unfair or burdensome, the courts can quickly settle that question. But, primarily, it must be understood the safeguarding of these thoroughfares is in the hands of the supervisors. [5] The court charged the jury that, in arriving at a verdict, they must, in passing on damages, award separate amounts to each of these children. "You must by your verdict, if you assess damages, find what damages each of these children would have suffered, you must take each one separately." This was error. The jury renders a verdict for a definite sum, and a distribution of this sum, in the present case, is of no concern either to the court or jury. The law was correctly stated with respect to the elements entering into the question, and the various matters to be considered by the jury with respect to the award the children should receive. This was sufficient enlightenment for them to reach a conclusion as to what amount, if any, should be recovered. The ninth assignment is sustained. The assignments not covered by this opinion are overruled. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. |