under the Workmen's Compensation Act must be filed with the Industrial Commission within the time limited by the statute, it may be authenticated afterward. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-MOTION TO CORRECT RETURN ON CERTIORARI IN COMPENSATION CASE IMPROPERLY DENIED. On certiorari to review an order of the Industrial Commission, affirming an award of compensation by an arbitrator, where the return showed that no transcript was filed with the commission within the time fixed by the statute, but the affidavits alleged that a transcript was filed within such time, the court erred in denying a motion for leave to withdraw the return to make corrections, though the transcript was not made by an official reporter, and the attorney for the compensation claimant refused to authenticate it. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[4].) Error to Circuit Court, Du Page County; Adam C. Cliffe, Judge. Certiorari by the Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company to review an award of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the Industrial Commission. From a judgment quashing the writ and dismissing the proceeding, petitioner brings error. Reversed and remanded. Good, Childs, Bobb & Wescott, of Chicago (Dwight S. Bobb and F. M. Hartman, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error. Michael Kross, of Elmhurst, for defendants in error. CARTWRIGHT, J. Henry Zielski applied to the Industrial Commission for an adjustment of his claim for an injury suffered in the course of his employment by the Lombard Brick & Tile Company while shredding corn with a corn shredder, which resulted in the amputation of his left arm. The plaintiff in error, the Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, was joined with the Lombard Brick & Tile Company as an insurer against claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 48, § 126-152i). There was a hearing before an arbitrator, at which the applicant and the brick and tile company stipulated that on November 19, 1920, the applicant was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; that the employer had elected to provide and pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and was operating its plan tunder the same; that no dispute existed between the applicant and his employer concerning the amount of compensation, and that the applicant was injured while shredding corn, which was a part of the duties of his employment. The plaintiff in error refused to join in the stipulation and objected to its being made or considered, on the ground that the election to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act did not include farm laborers and the injury was not covered by the act, or by the policy of insurance against accidents within the act. It appeared at the hearing that the Lombard Brick & Tile Company was in the business of manufacturing drainage tile, brick, and hollow ware made of clay; that it had a farm of clay lands of about 125 acres, on which it raised corn, hay, rye, and wheat; that the applicant was a teamster engaged both in farm labor and the manufacture of tile, brick, and hollow ware, and that the employees were included in the same pay roll, whether working on the farm or in the brick and tile factory. The Lombard Brick & Tile Company filed an acceptance of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and elected to provide and pay compensation in accordance therewith, and in the acceptance gave the number of its employees as' 15 and the nature of the employment: "Teamsters, icemen, laborers in tile and brick factory and at retail coal and lumber yard." The plaintiff in error is an insurance corporation, and gave to the brick and tile company a policy of insurance covering obligations imposed upon the employer by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and stating the locality and character of the business as follows: "Fuel and material dealer, including drivers, chauffeurs and their helpers, brick and tile mfg., ice, harvesting, storing and dealing." The arbitrator made an award, and the plaintiff in error and the brick and tile company petitioned for a review of the decision by the Industrial Commission. At the hearing before the commission the applicant moved that the petition for review be dismissed, because the petitioners had not filed a correct stenographic report of the proceedings on arbitration, authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attorneys. The attorney for the applicant had refused to authenticate the transcript and still refused to do so. By leave of the commission a transcript made by the official reporter of the commission was referred to the arbitrator, who authenticated it, and on consideration thereof the commission affirmed the award. The plaintiff in error sued out a writ of certiorari from the circuit court of Du Page county, and, the brick and tile company refusing to join in the petition for the writ, it was made a defendant. In the circuit court the applicant filed a general appearance, which was withdrawn by leave of court and a special appearance was then entered for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court. A motion was made to quash the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction, because at the time of the hearing on review there had not been filed a stenographic report authenticated by the partis or the arbitrator, and also, for the reason that the record returned to the writ was incomplete in omitting the insurance policy offered in evidence, under which liability for the award was claimed. The plaintiff in error moved the court for leave to withdraw the return to the writ of certiorari for the purpose of making corrections and additions thereto, so as to show a correct and complete record of the proceedings before the arbitrator and the commission. The motion was supported by affidavits of attorneys for the plaintiff in error and the secretary of the commission, alleging that the record returned to the writ was incomplete and did not show all the proceedings; that on February 26, 1921, 19 days after the decision of the arbitrator, the plaintiff in error filed with the commission a stenographic report of the proceedings on arbitration made by Charles G. Palmer, a reporter who was not an official reporter of the commission; that the attorney for the applicant refused to authenticate the transcript; that W. P. Scanlon, who was an official reporter of the commission, prepared a stenographic report, and extensions of time were granted for the same, and his official report was authenticated by the arbitrator and filed on May 13, 1921, at the time of the hearing before the commission. The motion for leave to withdraw the return was denied. A motion was then made by plaintiff in error to remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for a trial de novo, as provided by the amendment of 1921, and that motion was also denied. The court made a finding that prior to May 13, 1921, when the commission heard the claim on review, the decision of the arbitrator had become final, that the commission had no jurisdiction at that time to review the decision, and that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause on the writ of certiorari. Accordingly the writ was quashed and the proceeding dismissed, and a writ of error was allowed by this court. [1] The record filed as a return to the writ of certiorari showed the facts already stated, and also showed that the insurance policy upon which the claim of liability of the plaintiff in error was founded was in evidence; but a copy of it was not in the record, which stated that the original policy was in the possession of the applicant. The parties attempted to supply that omission in this court by stipulating that the original policy should be sent by the secretary of the commission to the court, to be returned after the hearing and decision of the cause. The policy was sent to this court, but no consideration will be given to it. The court reviews the decision of the circuit court, and does not exercise original jurisdiction by considering evidence not before the trial court. [2] Errors or omissions in the record must be corrected in that trial court. The affidavits of the attorneys and secretary of the commission alleged material omissions in the return, among which was the fact that on February 26, 1921, within the time fixed by the statute, a transcript of the proceedings before the arbitrator was filed with the commission. It was made by Charles G. Palmer, and bore the notation, "Outside reporter," and the attorney for the applicant refused to authenticate it. It is not within the power of a petitioner for review to compel authentication of a transcript within the time specified in the statute, and if the statute had been so interpreted it would be impossible for either an applicant or an employer to obtain a review, if the opposite party or arbitrator desired to prevent it. Not being able to obtain an authentication of the transcript, it appears that plaintiff in error procured a transcript from the official reporter of the commission, which was authenticated by the arbitrator, but was materially defective, and, when leave was asked to have it made complete, permission was denied. [3, 4] While a transcript must be filed within the time limited by the statute, the law is that it may be authenticated afterward, so that a hearing before the commission shall be upon a correct transcript. Bloomingon, Decatur & Champaign Railroad Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 454, 114 N. E. 939; Illinois Midland Coal Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 333, 115 N. E. 527; People v. Andrus, 299 Ill. 50, 132 N. E. 225. A party seeking a review and acting in good faith complies with the law by filing a transcript within the time limited, and cannot be prejudiced by the fact that there are disputes as to its correctness. When a record is returned to a writ of certiorari, the court has power to authorize the withdrawal of the record to make additions and corrections, so as to make it speak the truth (Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Com., 298 Ill. 175, 131 N. E. 369), and having that power, should exercise it upon a showing that the return is incomplete or incorrect. [5] The return as filed showed that no transcript was filed with the commission within the time fixed by the statute, but the affidavits alleged that there was a transcript filed and within the time limited, and the court should have sustained the motion. If the return should be corrected, and it should then appear that a transcript was filed on February 26, 1921, although not made by an official reporter, and which the attorney for the applicant refused to authenticate, the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction, and the plaintiff in error would be entitled to a decision of the court on the evidence in the transcript. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. FRANK W. WILLIAMS CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (No. 14589.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 21, 1922.) 135 Northeastern Reporter, 758. MASTER AND SERVANT EMPLOYEE HELD ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT OF HAND. Where the hand of the index finger was cut by a ripsaw causing a permanent disfigurement of the hand, the employee was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8, par. (c), providing for payment of compensation for permanent disfigurement to the hand, although there was no showing of loss of earning power by reason of injury. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[13].) Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Frank Johnston, Jr., Judge. Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation by Leopold Paluch for injuries, opposed by the Frank W. Williams Company, employer. Award of Industrial Commission for claimant was confirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error. Affirmed. Gallagher, Kohlsaat, Rinaker & Wilkinson, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. THOMPSON, C. J. This writ of error is prosecuted by leave of court to review the judgment of the circuit court of Cock county, confirming an award of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation to Leopold Paluch for a serious and permanent disfigurement to the hand. Paluch was employed by plaintiff in error, which is a manufacturer of picture frames. He is married and has two children under the age of 16 years. December 3, 1919, the end of the index finger on his right hand was cut by a ripsaw. Dr. John B. Jack testified that he treated the injured hand; that an X-ray examination revealed a fracture of the terminal phalange without displacement of the fragments and without loss of any part of the bone; that the injured finger healed, and that, on the date of the hearing, there was a scar extending across the end of the finger, which was slightly discolored; that the nail-forming tissue was destroyed by the injury and that there remain two small fragments of nail, each about twice as large as a pin's head; that, because of the loss of flesh from the end of the finger, it has a slightly crooked appearance; that there is approximately a quarter of an inch of the finger gone; that there is no impairment of the joint function and that there is no involvement of the large nerves. It was the opinion of the physician that there was no loss of use of the finger. The arbitrator examined the injured finger and read into the record a similar description. Paluch testified that, before the injury, his hand was in good condition but that he is now unable to pick up small articles because the end of his finger is tender. Paragraph (c) of section 8 of the Compensation act (Laws 1913, p. 342) provides that compensation may be paid for any serious and permanent disfigurement to the hand, the amount fixed not to exceed one-fourth of the amount of the compensation which would have been payable as a death benefit if the employee had died as a result of the injury. The award in this case is the sum of $14 a week for 15 weeks, which is slightly more than one-fifth of the maximum award permitted by the statute. There is no contention that there is not a disfigurement and that the disfigurement is not permanent, but the contention is that it is not serious. Plaintiff in error argues that, before a disfigurement can be said to be serious, it must involve a loss of earning power. While the evidence shows that Paluch at the time of the hearing was earning more than he was earning at the time he was injured, it does not follow, as a proposition of law, that his capacity to earn has not been reduced. The statute does not require that there shall be a showing of loss of earning power before compensation can be made for a disfigurement, and we are not authorized to read such a provision into the statute. The Court of Appeals of New York has sustained a similar provision of the New York law (Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82), and its decision has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States (250 U. S. 596, 40 Sup. Ct. 44, 63 L. Ed. 1161). We agree with the Industrial Commission in its conclusion that the disfigurement to Paluch's hand is both serious and permanent, and the amount of the award seems to be within a reasonable limit. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. HEAPS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 14587.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 21, 1922.) 135 Northeastern Reporter 742. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY BLINDING ONE-EYED EMPLOYEE HELD COMPENSABLE AS TOTAL "PERMANENT LOSS" OF BOTH EYES. Where an employee, blind in one eye, was injured so that the other eye remained closed, except when held open by artificial means, in which case he had only 12/200 vision, amounting practically to blindness, which condition made it impossible for him to work, he was entitled to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act for total disability, having sustained the "permanent loss" of use of both eyes, within the act; "permanent loss" meaning the taking away of the normal use. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[11]) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT EVIDENCE HELD TO SHOW COMPENSATION CLAIMANT'S INJURY CAUSED BLINDNESS. In proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, evidence held to sustain finding of the Industrial Commission that employee's blindness was the result of the injury, and not of cataract growing at the time of the injury. (For other cases, see Maser and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Error to Circuit Court, Lee County; Harry Edwards, Judge. Proceeding by W. F. Betow for compensation for injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Law, opposed by C. E. Heaps, employer. Award for claimant was confirmed by the Circuit Court on certiorari, and employer brings error. Affirmed. Gallagher, Kohlsaat, Rinaker & Wilkinson, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. H. A. Brooks, of Dixon, for defendant in error. DUNCAN, J. On July 2, 1920, W. F. Betow, defendant in error, filed his claim with the Industrial Commission against C. E. Heaps, plaintiff in |