[1] Language is a medium for conveying ideas. Courts can give words a liberal interpretation, when construing an act such as the one now before us, in order to carry out its advanced humane intentions, as we have repeatedly done, and shall continue to do, in the administration of this law; but we have no power to depart from the clear meaning of a plainly expressed phrase. Actually" means "As an actual or existing fact"; and the word "actual" is used as "opposed to constructive." Century Dictionary. The phrase employed in the present statute "actually engaged in * the business or affairs of his employer's cannot be interpreted to mean "constructively" engaged, but must be read as it is written "actually" engaged. The law was expressed as it is by those having the sole power to write it, and thus the courts must read and administer it. * * A glance at our prior decisions will show that, in every instance where compensation was allowed for accidental injuries occurring off the premises of the employer, the facts warranted the conclusion that the employee sustained is injuries while actually on the errand of, or during a time set apart for the performance of, some as yet uncompleted business of his employer; in other words, while actually engaged in the transaction of the latter's business. In Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458, relied on by appellee, the claimant received injuries on the premises of his employer. As a result of these injuries, be became insane and subsequently committed suicide at his home. That case fairly fell within the provisions of the statute, because the accident which caused the injuries took place while the deceased was, as a matter of fact, engaged in the affairs of his employment, and the insane act of suicide followed as a consequence of the injuries thus incurred; whereas in the present case the accident happened after working hours, off the premises of the employer, and at a time when the employee was not engaged in the former's affairs. In Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889, we recently held that, whether one was killed in the "course of his employment," within the meaning of that term as used in the act, is a question of law, and as such open to review. The opinion there filed contains a full discussion of our prior rulings on this point. [2] For the reasons already stated, we cannot agree with the view of the court below and the Compensation Board that Maguire's death was due to an accidental injury incurred during the "course of his employment," as that term is defined in the act. It may be, were we constructing the statute, instead of construing it, we would write the law so that plaintiff, under the circumstances of this case, could be allowed compensation; but, unfortunately for her, the courts are confined to the words of the law as enacted by the Legislature, and here these are too explicit to permit of the interpretation given by the court below in adopting the view of the Compensation Board. The judgment of the court below and the award of the Compensation Board are reversed. Judgment is here entered for defendant. MORGAN v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 6, 1922.) 116 Atlantic Reporter, 891. MASTER AND SERVANT EVIDENCE IN COMPENSATION CASE HELD INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW INJURY CAUSED FATAL DISEASE. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, evidence held insufficient to show that death from bronchial pneumonia was traceable to a slight injury received nearly four weeks before the beginning of his illness. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; Henry O. Bechtel, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.), by Hannah M. Morgan, for compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, employer. An award of compensation was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and the employer appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for the employer. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. John F. Whalen and George Ellis, both of Pottsville, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre, for appellee. SCHAFFER, J. On October 1, 1920, the husband of plaintiff, for whose death she claims compensation, sustained some slight injuries, consisting of bruises to his chest, when the team he was driving fell over the edge of a bridge, precipitating him into the water and wetting him. He worked the remainder of the day and until about ten o'clock at night. The following day he remained at home and called in a doctor who treated him for a cold. On October 6th, acting on his own judgment and the physician's advice, he resumed work; the testimony of the physician was that he had returned to his normal condition. Deceased continued at his employment until and including October 27th, a period of 22 days, when he again called in the doctor, who found pain in his chest, a cough with bronchitis, and perhaps a slight pleurisy. The illness grew increasingly worse, and death resulted on November 11th, from bronchial pneumonia. The claim for compensation was filed on the ground that death by pneumonia was attributable to the accident on October 1st. The referee allowed the claim, his award was confirmed by the Compensation Board and by the common pleas on appeal, one of its judges dissenting; from the judgment there entered we have this appeal by defendant. If the claim is to be upheld, warrant for so doing must be found in the testimony of deceased's physician, Dr. Quinn; there is nothing else in the record to rest it on. When asked whether, in his opinion, the accident on October 1st caused the bronchial pneumonia, of which deceased died November 11th, six weeks later, he answered that the injuries then received were "indirectly responsible" for the pneumonia. This could be said of any injury, however slight, which was coincident with certain illnesses or with conditions leading up to them, in the sense that vitality would be lowered, although the injury might have no direct relation to the illness at all. The doctor further testified, the development of pneumonia is of short duration; that the form of the disease his patient had was bronchial pneumonia, which is not due to traumatism; that traumatic pneumonia would develop within a very short time after any injury which caused it; that the pneumonia was not caused by the bruise to the chest but "was secondary to his bronchitis and pleurisy"; and that he thought "the pleurisy was brought on indirectly from the blow in his chest." The doctor had not seen the deceased for three weeks after he had gone back to work, and admitteed the pneumonia might possibly have resulted from some cause other than the injuries; that he could not say it had not, but expressed the opinion: "I think it was indirectly due to his bruise of the chest, considering the condition of the man previous to his injury.” As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Koch in the court below: "The doctor is by no means positive of any opinion connecting the accident with the man's death. He does not say it is a case of traumatic pneumonia or traumatic pleurisy from which the pneumonia resulted. He only thinks that indirectly' the accident had something to do with the man's final taking-off." The testimony did not support the conclusion that the pneumonia was traceable back to the accident as a natural result therefrom. Dumbluskey v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 270 Pa. 22, 112 Atl. 745, is a case where death was due to pneumonia, and in which compensation was awarded, but there the family doctor testified the injury received by the deceased caused traumatic pleurisy, which latter developed into pneumonia, and thus the direct relation between the compensable cause and death was established; in the instant case no direct relation whatever was shown. In Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 270 Pa. 476, 113 Atl. 666, we said, speaking through the present Chief Justice: "It is not enough for the doctors to say simply that the ailment in question might have resulted from the assigned cause, or that the one could have brought about the other; they must go further and testify at least that, taking into consideration all the attending data, it is their pro fessional opinion the result in question most probably came from the cause alleged." The testimony in that case was that paralysis "could be due to a blow on the head," and we determined this was not enough to justify or support a finding, that the blow or jar testified to caused the paralysis. In the instant case, the testimony relied on to establish a relation between the injury and death is not even as strong as it was in the case just cited. Here all that appears is that the injuries were "indirectly responsible for the pneumonia. This amounts to no more than saying it "might have resulted," which we held in the Fink Case is not sufficient. In cases such as this, there must be a probable, direct relation shown between the injury and the disease resulting in death, otherwise liability would be fixed by surmise. No such direct relation appears by the record before us. The judgment of the court below is reversed and is here entered for defendant. WATSON v. LEHIGH COAL & NAVIGATION CO: 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION BOARD'S FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE FINAL. On appeal from an award of compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Board, the inquiry is limited, as to the disputed facts, to the determination of whether there is competent evidence to support the board's finding. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-FINDING OF COMPENSABLE INJURY CAUSING DEATH BY TUBERCULAR PERITONITIS, SUSTAINED. A finding by the Industrial Board that the death of an employee from tubercular peritonitis resulted from an injury to his ankle three years before his death, which became infected and developed tuberculosis, thereby weakening his resistance to the disease in other parts of his body, held supported by the expert testimony, including that of a physician called by the referee. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-TIME BETWEEN INJURY AND DEATH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN AWARDING COMPENSATION. That death did not occur for a considerable time after the accident is not conclusive that it resulted from a cause other than the injury, where it occurred within the 300-week period fixed by Workmen's Compensation Act (Act June 2, 1915 [P. L. 738, art. 3, § 301, par. 2, Pa. St. 1920, § 21984]), though the lapse of time is an important factor to be considered. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; Charles E. Berger, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. John Watson to recover compensation for the death of her husband, John Watson, opposed by the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company, employer. A decree of the Workmen's Compensation Board awarding compensation was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and the employer appeals. Affirmed. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler, and Schaffer., JJ. George M. Roads, F. S. Riordan and P. B. Roads, all of Pottsville, and William Jay Turner, of Philadelphia, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre, for appellee. SADLER, J. On October 17, 1916, John Watson sprained his left ankle while employed in the ordinary business of defendant. For three months he was treated at his home, but in January, 1917, was removed to a hospital because of an apparent infection of the injured foo. Two operations were performed, and, in June of that year, he was discharged in an improved condition. Later, the wound became inflamed, and a "hole opened in it," which, however, disappeared upon treatment. The pain continued, and the use of the foot, to any extent, became impossible. From the time of the accident until death, on May 19, 1919, it was necessary for decedent to use crutches, and to refrain from his usual labor. A post mortem examination revealed a tubercular condition and a puss cavity was found in the injured ankle bone. After the injury, a compensation agreement was entered into with defendant company, and the sums stipulated for were paid continuously while Watson lived. The widow made application for a further allowance, and a hearing was had before the referee, who made findings based on evidence presented, and concluded that an award should be made to the claimant. On appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Board was not satisfied with the quality of the testimony upon which the referee depended, and awarded a hearing de novo. Additional evidence was received, and an expert for the board called, who expressed his opinion of the causal connection between the injury described and the death. An appeal was taken from the award made, and the correctness of the ninth finding of fact challenged. This was as follows: "9. The injury sustained by the said John Watson by this accident was violence to the physical structure of his body, and the osteomyelitis which developed was, under the circumstances, a natural result and the condition brought on due to the accident; that is, the ankle condition and the osteomyelitis following, so lowered the vital resistance of the said John Watson that a tubercular condition, which was in his system at the time of the accident was hastened to development, causing his untimely death on May 19, 1919. The cause of death was tubercular peritonitis, the quick development of which was, under the circumstances, a resultant effect of the violence suffered." [1] On the appeal, this finding was approved by the court below as were the other conclusions not the matter of contest. Under the wellsettled rules (Stahl v. Watson Coal Co., 268 Pa. 452, 112 Atl. 14), our inquiry as to the disputed fact is limited to the determination of whether there is sufficient competent evidence to support it. If justified, the legal conclusion of liability follows, for art. 3, § 301, par. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act June 2, 1915 [P. L. 738; Pa. St. 1920, § 21984]), provides in part: "Wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this act, it shall mean only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects, and occurring within 300 weeks after the accident." [2] Watson died within that period of time, and, if his decease was attributable to the injury received, his widow is entitled to compensation. Without reciting in detail the evidence of the doctors called, it is evident that Watson was suffering from disease (though apparently in good health) at the time of the injury, and the immediate cause of his death was tubercular peritonitis. It was hastened, however, by the osteomyelitis which developed in the left ankle. Indeed, the post mortem examination of the bone showed death might have resulted from the infection of the foot alone, though Watson had not been in bad physical condition. The testimony, particularly of Dr. Blakeslee, called as a witness by the referee, made proper the finding that death followed the quick development of the disease, a result of the injury which had ben sustained. The opinion expressed, as to the causal connection, was definite and not subject to objection on the ground of uncertainty, as was the statement considered in Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 270 Pa. 479, 113 Atl 666, cited by appellant. [3] That death did not occur for a considerable time after the ac |