tolls paid its cost before then. The old bridge company was in effect destroyed, and sought an injunction from the state courts restraining its construction and use. The state supreme court failing to decide the case, a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court. In the meantime the Warren bridge had become toll-free.

The main question in the case was this: Can a state grant a charter destroying the effect and value of a previous one? Does it not constitute an impairment of the obligation of a contract?

The decision, given by Taney, embraced the following points:

1. There was no evidence that the state had given an exclusive franchise, and such an interpretation required stretching the words of the charter so as to arrive at such a construction.

2. The English courts restrain within strict limits the spirit of monopoly. There is no reason why we, having adopted the jurisprudence of England, should construe a statute in favor of monopoly, and against the public and the rights of the community.

3. It would be inconvenient and inexpedient to construe old franchises and contracts as preventing new ones, even conflicting with, the old, which introduce improvements and take advantage of modern science. Should the railways yield to the old turnpike corporations?

4. The limitations of state control of private corporations would threaten and render useless the continued existence of the government, when the powers necessary to accomplish its ends and the functions it was de

signed to perform were transferred to the hands of privileged corporations.

5. The charter must be strictly construed, and nothing can be claimed which is not clearly given. Ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the public, and against the corporation.

6. The rights of the community must be safely guarded, as are the rights of private property. In the course of the opinion, the Chief Justice made the following significant statement:

But the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established; and it can never be assumed that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created. . A state ought never to be presumed to surrender this power, because, like the taxing power, the whole community have an interest in preserving it undiminished. While the rights of private property are safely guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends upon their faithful preservation.

Taney, in this decision, began his construction of the Constitution freely for the state, and narrowly for the individual. While Marshall regarded the end of government and the purpose of the Constitution as protecting individual and private rights, Taney regarded the happiness and prosperity of the people and of the community as paramount. Moreover, Taney used the doctrine of political expediency in favor of the state governments as against individuals and corporations, much as Marshall used the same, doctrine in favor of the federal governments as against the state governments, and in protecting private rights.

Story gave a strong dissenting opinion. Kent, writing to Story, said: "The legislature is bound by everything that is necessarily implied in the contract." He (Story) feared

that no law of a state legislature or law of Congress would be declared unconstitutional, "for the old constitutional doctrines are fast fading away, and a change has come over our public mind from which I augur little good." He soon resigned, giving as his reason:

I have long been convinced that the doctrines and opinions of the "old court" were daily losing ground, and especially those on great constitutional questions. New men and new opinions have succeeded. The doctrines of the old Constitution, so vital to the country, which in former times received the support of the whole court, no longer maintain their ascendancy. I am the last member now living of the old court, and I cannot consent to remain where I can no longer hope to see these doctrines recognized and enforced.

READING

BEVERIDGE.-Life of John Marshall, Vol. IV, pp. 509-517, 582-593. WARREN.-The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. II, pp. 185-186, 206, 233, 250-312.

TYLER.-Memoirs of R. B. Taney.

STORY, W. W.-Life and Letters of Joseph Story.

HAINES. The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, pp. 246-263. Cases cited in this section as they appear in the United States Supreme Court Reports, or in Thayer's Cases on Constitutional Law.

CHAPTER XXIV

NULLIFICATION IN NEW ENGLAND AND SOUTH CAROLINA; SECESSION IN THE SOUTH

I. The Hartford Convention.

A. Reasons for the Convention. The Federalist party and New England opposed the War of 1812. It was asserted that its shipping interests had suffered during the war, and that embargoes had crippled it further; that the war had been declared and supported by people outside of and against the interests of New England; that the admission of new states in the west and south would soon give these regions complete control of the government; and that the government of the United States gave no thought to the interests of New England.

Gouverneur Morris, a member of the Constitutional convention, advocated that a new convention be held to determine whether the states of the North should remain in the Union. The Connecticut general assembly described the status of that state to the central government as "free, sovereign, and independent." The Massachusetts senate passed a resolution declaring that the war was without justifiable cause, and withheld its approval from military and naval plans unconnected with the defense of its seacoast and soil.

B. The Convention and the delegates. The Convention met at Hartford in October, 1814, at the call of

Massachusetts. The delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were authorized by the state authorities. The delegates from New Hampshire and Vermont represented certain counties of these states. The sessions were secret. The avowed purpose of the Convention was to consider the dangers to the eastern section growing out of the war, and to determine upon some plan to prevent the ruin of the commercial interests and resources of New England.

C. The resolutions of the Convention. These general principles were agreed to: Congressional acts violating the Constitution are void; in case of emergencies, the states must be their own judges, and execute their own decisions; and in case of dangerous and deliberate infractions, the state must intervene, and on its own authority, protect its citizens. Its specific proposals embraced a

quest to allow the New England states to devise a scheme of defense for themselves, to be paid for from taxes paid by these states, and the following suggested amendments to the Constitution: that new states should not be admitted to the Union without the consent of two-thirds of both houses of Congress; that slaves should not be reckoned in the apportionment of taxes and representatives; that war should not be declared or commercial intercourse broken off with other nations without the consent of two-thirds of both houses of Congress; that no embargo should exist for more than sixty days; that foreign-born citizens should not hold office; and, that the President should be declared ineligible to reelection.