1. The Georgia legislature had no right to sell the

land.

2. The grant was void on account of fraud.

3. The state of Georgia rescinded the act.

4. The land belonged to the United States.

Counsel for the defendant set forth these points:

1. The state of Georgia had authority to sell the land. 2. Peck was innocent of any crime or wrong.

3. Peck was ignorant of any fraud in connection with the grant.

4. The land was owned by the state of Georgia.

Marshall's opinion and the decision of the Court:

1. Is the legislature of Georgia competent to annihilate the title vested in Fletcher, and to resume the property? The principle that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass, and that one legislature cannot abridge the rights of a succeeding one, is generally sound. But when a law. is in its nature a contract, and when absolute rights have been vested under it, a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights. "The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power."

2. What is a contract? Is a grant a contract? A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and may be executory, in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing, or executed, in which the object of contract is performed. A grant has the same elements, and in its own nature amounts to the extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a con

tract not to reassert that right. One is, therefore, estopped by his own grant.

3. Does a grant come within the meaning, and this case within the scope, of the provision of the Constitution that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts? A grant being a contract executed, and the words of the Constitution being general, and hence making no distinction as to kinds of contracts, is within the meaning of the provision.

4. If grants are comprehended under the term contracts, is a grant from the state excluded from the operation of the provision? The general terms being used, contracts of all descriptions are embraced, including grants made by the state, and to which it is a party. "Whatever respect might have been felt for the state. sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed."

5. Does the rescinding act have the effect of an ex post facto law? Yes, because it forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from whom he purchased.

6. Does the case come under the operation of the "impairment of contract" clause? The state of Georgia was restrained from passing a law impairing the purchase of the land, since the estate passed into the hands of the purchaser for a valuable consideration, and without notice of fraud.

III. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheaton, 518).

Facts. In 1769, one Rev. Eleazer Wheelock, having organized a school for religious instruction among the Indians, and desiring to establish in New Hampshire an institution to promote learning among the English, applied to the Crown for a charter, which was granted, incorporating the twelve persons mentioned therein by the name of "The Trustees of Dartmouth College," and granting to them and their successors the usual corporate privileges and powers, and authorizing the trustees, the governing board of the college, to fill all vacancies which might take place in their own body.

Under three different acts of the New Hampshire legislature, the charter was altered. The act of June 27, 1816, entitled, "An act to amend the charter and enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College," increased the number of trustees to twenty-one, gave the appointment of additional trustees to the governor, and created a board of overseers, consisting of twenty-five persons, with power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees. Certain state officials of New Hampshire and Vermont were made members ex-officio. Other members were to be chosen by the Governor and Council of New Hampshire, who were to fill all vacancies as they occurred.

The majority of the trustees having refused to accept the amended charter, brought suit for the corporate property held by Woodward under the acts of the New Hampshire legislature. The Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire rendered a verdict for the defendant, which judgment was brought before the Supreme Court by writ of error

Decision of the Court, and Marshall's opinion:

1. Is the charter a contract? In this transaction, every ingredient of a complete and legitimate contract is found. A charter is applied for, having as its object the incorporation of a religious and literary institution. It is therein declared that upon the creation of the institution large contributions will be made. The charter is granted, and on its faith the property is conveyed.

2. Is this contract protected by the Constitution of the United States?

a. The provision in the Constitution is understood to embrace only such contracts as respect property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. The term "contract" must therefore be interpreted in the more limited sense, and must be confined to cases within the mischief it was intended to remedy. It does not comprehend the political relations between the government and its citizens, public officials, and laws generally, which are subject to constant mutation.

b. Is the act of incorporation a grant of political power, creating a civil institution employed in the administration of government? Are the funds of the college public property? Is the government of New Hampshire alone responsible for the institution?

Or is the college a private eleemosynary institution, having the power to take property for private purposes, and to accept funds from donors who have themselves stipulated their future disposition and management?

It is a private and not a public institution:

1. As regards the source of its funds. Its founda

tion is purely private and eleemosynary, because its funds consisted entirely of private donations.

2. As regards the objects to which the funds are applied. Money may be given to education under private foundations, and trustees and professors employed in its administration are not public officers.

3. As regards the act of incorporation. Private corporations, artificial beings existing only in contemplation of law, are clothed with such properties as will best effect the object of their creation. The leading properties are immortality and individuality. This does not confer upon it political power or a political character. Its existence, powers, and capacities having been authorized by the state, it does not clothe the state with the power to change the form of property which it has authorized to be acquired, or to vary the purposes to which the property is applied.

4. As regards those for whose benefit the property donated was secured. The objects of the contributors and the incorporating act were the promotion of Christianity and education generally. The beneficial interest is not in the people of New Hampshire.

5. As regards the interests of original parties to the contract, and the potential right of beneficiaries. The original parties to the contract were the donors, the trustees, and the crown (to whose