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be legitimately sundered, and where is the line beyond which it is not lawful to go.

Then he should show that we do transgress, and in what respect we transgress, that line. We have to regret that he has done neither. We set the object over against the subject, it seems. But the

definition of object, taken simply as object, is that which is over against the subject, or that which stands facing the subject. The very word itself says as much. " In the character of another nature altogether.” Subject and object are of the same nature, or they are of different natures. By nature here we must understand that which constitutes the thing what it is, and distinguishes it from every other. In this sense, it is incommunicable, and its presence always asserts identity, and excludes diversity. You cannot then assume that subject and object are, as subject and object, partly of the same nature, and partly of diverse natures. You must either assert them as one and identical, as does the pantheist, or you must assert them as differing by nature altogether. The same is the same, and things different are different, then not the same. Are then object and subject the same, one and identical? The Reviewer says, “We recognize their difference." Very good, what more do we ourselves do? We assert their difference, and maintain that they are really as well as apparently distinct.“ Under a wholly outward form.” We do not know what this means. The Reviewer is perpetually talking about “inward” and “outward.” We wish he would explain himself, and tell us in what sense he uses these words ; for, as the case now stands, he seems to us to be frightened by apparitions raised by his own fancy. In the sense of distinct from one another, we oppose subject and object to each other under an outward form, if you please, and so does the Reviewer ; for he recognizes their difference; but we are not aware that we distinguish them in any other respect in an outward form. We recognize an intelligible world distinct from the sensible, and hold that the intelligible exists a parte rei, and is as truly objective as the sensible. The law pertains to the intelligible world, as the object of the intellect, not of the senses. But it is not for that reason any more one with the intellect that apprehends it, than a tree is one with the sense of sight by which we behold it. As the tree does not become subject by our beholding it, so the law does not become subjective, or cease to be purely objective, by our apprehending or understanding it. Here is all the 16 outward form” we assert, and we are very much mistaken if our outward is more outward than the Reviewer's inward. *

very

“ But still we object just as strenuously to this abstract separation.” What abstract separation? The abstract separation which he understands us to make? What is that? We are sure

* The Reviewer seems to us to reason throughout as if he held that the activity of the subject transforms the object into subject, that the fact of knowledge identifies the intellectual subject and the intelligible object, and that the act of willing identifies the voluntary subject with the object willed; hence he never objects that we distinguish the subject and object, but that we assert them to be wholly distinct, and he never denies the objectivity of the object altogether, but simply that it is merely objective. So, again, he does not deny that the distinction between subject and object is outward, or that they exist as distinct under an outword form, but denies that the form is wholly outward. The two may be sundered, but must not be sundered too far. It is remarkable that throughout he never dares affirm or deny any thing absolutely. At the tail of his affirmations or denials there always comes in a qualification, which takes off at least one half of the assertion or the negation. He never makes a strictly categorical statement, and hence there is not a single definition, properly so called, in either of his articles against us. Whence comes this? Ît certainly comes not from his ignorance of the categories, or from his want of logical capacity or discipline ; but it comes, in our judgment, from a vicious ontology, which he has been led to adopt, partly by modern philosophers, but still more from his having plunged deeply into the study of mystical theology before having devoted sufficient time to the study of speculative or dogmatic theology. He seems to mistake everywhere mystical union for substantial unity, or identity of substance; or if he does not do this, he assumes that the denial of this unity or identity, or the assertion of the distinction of substances, is a denial of the mystical union itself. The soul in the Christian life is certainly mystically united to God, and its life consists in an ineffable union with him; but there is no identification of substance. The creature remains in the category of created things, and the Christian's highest life, here or in the beatified state, is never the identical life of God, for the promise is, not that when he shall appear we shall be God, but that “we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is "'; and likeness always implies difference, as the Reviewer must have learned from the old controversy between the homoöusians and the homoiousians. Love makes us one with God, we concede, but mystically, not physically, for we remain always creature, and he always Creator. So in the fact of knowledge the subject and object are united, but not unified, or made identical. They remain — Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, and Schelling and Hegel, to the contrary notwithstanding — as distinctly two things in the fact of knowledge, as they are out of that fact. This the Reviewer seems to us to overlook, and hence the pantheistic character of his own statements, and his apprehension that we, in asserting the two to be distinct a parte rei, and also in conceptu, are denying, not only their union in the fact of our life, but the very possibility of such union. This apprehension is idle, for union is inconceivable without distinction and difference.

we make no abstract separation ; if we make any separation at all, it is real, not abstract. We do not deal in abstractions. But wha: separation do we make between object and subject? We d'stinguish them one from the other as different a parte rei, and so does the Reviewer ; but to distinguish is not to separate. The doctrine we have insisted on in our Review is, that the object, regarded as existing a parte rei, is distinct from and independent of the subject, but that the subject, though really distinct from the object, is dependent on it, and does and can live only by union with it. We deny in no sense the intimate relation of the subject to the object, but we do deny that the relation is reciprocal, that the dependence is mutual. The object is God, the only intelligible object per se, and all else that is object to us is so only mediately, as made intelligible to us by his intelligibility. To make the dependence mutual would be to make God as dependent on man as man is on God, and would, as we showed in our former reply, involve Buddhism, and finally nullism. God is separable from man, for he can annihilate man and be all that he now is, but man cannot be separated from God, and live ; for it is in him we live, and move, and are, and our separation from him would be our annihilation.

One more point we must consider, and then we will await the Reviewer's response. The Reviewer, after disavowing the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him, adds :

“But now, as we take it, the truth, in opposition to these several pantheistic consequences charged upon us by Mr. Brownson, does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction. There is another class of conceptions in this form, and which the common understanding is always prone to lay hold of as the necessary and only alternative in the case, that go just as directly and surely in the end to exclude God from the world, and to unsettle all the foundations of religion. These are comprehended collectively in the idea of dualism, or abstract deism, which may be taken as the immediate reverse of what is properly pantheism in the bad and false sense. It may be said that dualism involves a great truth, the actual distinction of God and the world; and this we are freely willing to admit; but it is just as certain, on the other side, and just as necessary too to be affirmed always, that pantheism also involves a great truth; such a truth indeed as may be said to meet us on almost every page of the Bible, as well as from the inmost and profoundest depths of our own religious nature. That is a poor and cheap orthodoxy, in any case, which stands barely in the rejection of error in some one direction, while it makes no ac

count of the danger, always at hand, of falling under the power of its natural counterpart in a direction just the opposite. We are bound to do justice, in the case before us, to the truth which underlies pantheism, as well as to that which underlies dualism; and we are not more bound to fear and avoid heresy in the first shape, than we are bound to avoid and fear it also in the second shape. It has been our wish at least, and our honest endeavour, to keep clear of both extremes, as well as to acknowledge and honor the great truths out of which both grow. Mr. Brownson, we are sorry to say, in common with a large amount of what we conceive to be bad Protestantism, (the almost universal thinking, we might say, perhaps, of New England,) turns the two phases of thought into the form of a simple syllogistic dilemma, where one horn is the only resting place from the other, and avoids and rejects thus the pantheistic extreme only in such a way as to lay himself open, in our estimation, to the charge of dualism. We distinguish, of course, as he also has done in our case, between his theory and himself, and speak of what the first is by necessary consequence, as it strikes our own mind, rather than by open and direct avowal; although at some points, the general consequence itself might seem to be not indistinctly allowed, in the particular propositions by which we find it indirectly affirmed. The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong, serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position. It shows this to be itself a dialectical extreme, whose very character it is always to condemn in a wholesale way, as its own opposite, all that is different from itself, or that carries towards it in any way the aspect of negation. No such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil.” — pp. 310, 311.

The Reviewer, while conceding that we were right in condemning the pantheistic conceptions, maintains, that, since we asserted their immediate contradictories as the truth in opposition to them, we fell into an opposite error, which he calls dualism, and this because the truth in opposition to them “ does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction.” That there is an error as well as a truth opposed to pantheisın, we do not deny ; that we asserted dualism, if he chooses so to call it, in opposition to pantheism, we concede, but not in the sense in which dualism is false. Dualism is false only when taken in the modern deistical sense, which, after acknowledging God as Creator of the world, denies him as Providence, as Conservator, and as Governor, and asserts that the world, now it is created, is sufficient for itself, and goes " ahead on its own hook," the sense common to most of our modern geologists, naturalists, or cultivators of the physical sciences, and advocates of the Baconian philosophy; or in the sense in which, as in Plato's Timæus, it asserts God on one side, and the eternity of matter on the other; or, in fine, in the Oriental sense, in which it asserts the dual origin of the universe, and of two original, eternal, self-existent, and mutually independent principles, or beings, one good, the other bad,—the old Manichæan doctrine, held by the Albigenses in the Middle Ages, and perhaps, in modern times, by the great body of Protestants, who boast of being their descendants and continuators. But the Reviewer will not pretend that we assert dualism in any one of these three senses; and the only sense in which he can pretend that we assert it is in the sense in which it asserts that creation is contingent, not necessary, and that God and the world are distinguished as creator and creature, cause and effect. That the truth in opposition to pantheism does not stand in an opposite error, we of course concede ; but that it does not stand on the other side, or side opposed to pantheism, we cannot concede, for if it does not, it is not the truth in opposition to it. There may be opposite errors, but the truth always stands between them, opposed to both, opposing one face to the one, and another face to the other.

The Reviewer is not satisfied with this. He holds that a great truth underlies pantheism, and another underlies dualism, and that our duty is to accept and harmonize the two. Neither is to be denied absolutely, but we must deny a little and affirm a little of both. This is all very well for a Protestant, who can have truth only as mixed with falsehood, and who can never make an affirmation or a denial without falling into error, but the Reviewer must excuse us for not consenting to place ourselves in his unpleasant position. Pantheism is either true or it is false, and if false it is to be denied absolutely, and no truth does or can underlie it; for if a great truth did underlie it, it would be founded in truth, and a doctrine founded in truth is true doctrine, not false. So of dualism ; it is either true or it is false, or true in one sense and false in another. If true in one sense and false in another, your business is to distinguish, and define in what sense it is true and in what it is false, and then to affirm it in the former sense, and deny it in the latter. In the sense it is false, o as a false doctrine, no great truth underlies it, for it is a perversion or denial of the truth. Let us have no eclectic or syncretic twaddle on the subject.

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