tions, on his own responsibility, and therefore throws himself back on his party, merges his individuality in it, yields blindly to its dictation, and throws upon it the entire responsibility of his acts, which it must assume, or else go out of power, and let the opposition come in. The consequence is, that he surrenders his independence to his party in Congress, and, if that party is in the majority in both houses, brings about that amalgamation of the executive and legislative functions of government, which the Convention hoped by means of the executive veto to preThe terrible evil will be remedied only when we have an executive who adopts and acts on the sound principles proclaimed by our present worthy chief magistrate in his letters before his election, and in his noble Inaugural Address. But it is not easy in the present state of public opinion to act on those high and independent principles, and will not be, till the public mind by means of the press shall be brought more into harmony with those great conservative principles of government which have been so generally neglected for the last twenty years, but without which our liberties exist only in name, and wise and just government is but a dream.

It may be objected to the veto power, that it is seldom likely to be employed, except against such measures as secure a majority in Congress only by a union of some members of the party to which the executive belongs with the opposition, and which, since they combine, in some degree, the support of both parties, are the least likely to be hasty or unjust. That is, the negative will not be employed when it should be, and will be when it should not. Experience does not fully bear out this objection, but we grant that it has some force. In several instances the veto has been applied in the manner here supposed, and it is this fact that has led some of our Whig friends, contrary, as we must believe, to their general principles, to propose its abolition or modification. But we are conservatives, and we are loath to lay a rude hand on the Constitution. Experiments in amending constitutions, State or national, have not thus far proved very successful; and, in general, we find the amended constitution more in need of amendment than the original constitution itself. In almost every instance that has come under our knowledge, the so-called amendments adopted have proved a serious injury to the constitution, — have impaired its symmetry, rendered it less efficient, and made new alterations necessary; besides weakening in the public conscience that sacredness which should always attach to

the constitution of the state. Obvious anomalies which tend to defeat in practice the general design or intent of the constitution, or clauses originally good, but rendered injurious by social changes or revolutions which have subsequently occurred, we would, of course, have removed; but beyond that we believe it never prudent to venture. Nothing is more unwise or unstatesmanlike, than to alter a constitution for the sake of harmonizing it with changes which may have taken place in mere public opinion, or of conforming it to the demands of some newly invented or newly revived political theory. No constitution constructed in accordance with a political theory ever worked or ever will work well, for the simple reason that every theory is despotic, and no man, much less the mass of men, ever did or ever will act throughout life in accordance with a theory. Every man's life is full of anomalies, and it is far more with the anomalous in life and society than with the normal, or what comes within the rule, that government must deal. A constitution that preserves a systematic consistency throughout, is necessarily either impracticable or despotic. Governments are founded in practical reason, not in speculative reason; and good sense, aided by large experience, must determine their constitution, not speculation. The English, who have much good sense, but very little speculative genius, and who care little for systematic consistency, maintain a comparatively free government; the French and Germans, who are far their superiors in speculative science, and who draw out constitutions perfectly satisfactory to speculative reason, for ever alternate in practice between anarchy and despotism. No constitution will avert all evil; for what works evil to-day may work good tomorrow. By attempting to remove the evils which we occasionally suffer, we not seldom lose the good we are in possession of, and open the door to greater evils from which we are as yet free.

There is no question but the executive may employ his negative against measures in themselves wise and just, but if they are measures of great public importance, and such as the country is really prepared for, he can at best only delay them for a short time. The exercise of his negative is on the part of the executive an act of great personal responsibility, and one that he can forego if he chooses. The easiest way for him is to throw the responsibility on Congress, and approve whatever act Congress choose to pass; and he always will do so, unless he has some motive to do otherwise. If he does

otherwise, it must be either from a sense of duty, or from the hope of gaining public applause or support. In the first case, the example, in times like ours, of a president of the United States hazarding his popularity, staking his reputation, at the demand of honest conviction, or a conscientious regard to his oath of office, would, of itself, be a moral benefit to the country equal to any injury that could result from the temporary loss of the most important public measure he is likely to negative. Indeed, a few examples of the sort are much needed, to keep alive among us the memory of public virtue, and convince us that it is not entirely the dream of the romancer, or the fiction of the poet.

If we suppose the executive by his veto seeks popularity, we must suppose there is a strong probability, at least, that his act will be sustained by the country, and therefore that there is not a clear, decided, and reliable majority in the country in favor of the measures negatived. If such be the fact, the measures, if of any great importance, ought not to pass; if of no great importance, it is of no great importance that they are defeated, and the matter is not worth quarrelling about. Measures of great importance, such as relate to finance, trade, and industry, and seriously affect the whole business and industrial interests of the country, in order to be beneficial must be permanent, and should never be adopted in the face of a minority which may be the majority to-morrow and repeal them. They should never be pressed, unless there is a reasonable prospect that they will so far meet the approbation of the country, that no party, on coming into power, will think of disturbing them. All measures of this sort produce an evil on their first adoption of no small magnitude; for they affect the standard of value, the relation of debtor and creditor, and operate, in some measure, as agrarian laws, though indirectly, and without its being perceived by every one. The oftener they are changed, the more insecure do they render property, and the more frequently do they take money from one man's pocket and put it into another's. We boast of the security of property in this country, and it is secure so far as direct attacks on it are concerned; but the fluctuations in the policy of the government for the last twenty years have really made it more insecure here than in any other civilized country, as we may see in the immense number of fortunes made, and a nearly equal number lost. The policy of the government will continue to be thus fluctuating as long as there is an attempt to fasten upon

the country any policy which has the support of only an accidental or temporary majority, a policy in which, when once adopted, all parties will not generally acquiesce. A measure, the repeal of which the opposition shall attempt as soon as passed, should never pass at all; because it can never work well, and will tend only to exasperate party spirit, to convulse the country, to corrupt the purity of elections, and by heated and violent contests destroy public virtue, and consolidate the despotism of party, as our experience too conclusively proves. To what else is due the party discipline and machinery now so ruinous? We say, then, if the executive is right in supposing the country will sustain him, and that the application of his negative will be popular, the application of it is not an evil; for it is better for the country that, under such circumstances, the measure, though good in itself, should be defeated, than that it should be suffered to pass. If the executive is wrong in his supposition, if the country does really demand the measure, or is prepared to sustain it, all the harm done is a little delay. Things are made no worse than they were before, and all that can be said is, that a good hoped to be realized is put off for a short period. This delay will, after all, be rather a benefit, for it will give time to consolidate public opinion, and to secure for the measure a greater likelihood of being permanent, when the new elections shall have prepared the way for its adoption. Taking this view of the question, and checking that impatience of our country which needs some checking in regard to legislation, as well as to other matters, we confess that we can see no serious evil that can result from the employment of the executive veto against even such measures of public policy as, if they could be adopted with the general approbation of the country, and with a reasonable prospect of being permanent, would be of great public utility, the only case in which it can ever be pretended that the exercise of the veto power can do harm. It should be borne in mind, that the veto power is purely negative. It gives to the executive no positive power of legislation, enables him to fasten no objectionable policy on the country, but merely gives him a conservative power, a pow er to preserve to some extent laws already in force, and to prevent or delay the adoption of new measures and a new line of policy. It is a power perfectly in accordance with conservative principles of government, and is repugnant to Democratic, but not to Whig doctrines. Opposition to it could come consistently enough from the Democratic party; from the

Whig party, it strikes us, not without some inconsistency. True, it has been used to defeat favorite measures of the Whig party; but it is no Whig doctrine to seek to carry measures in spite of the Constitution, or to attack the Constitution when it operates against us. We are sworn to the Constitution "for better or for worse," and we trust we are prepared to forego every public good not to be attained under it, and in accordance with its provisions.

It is said by some, that the executive veto cannot be legitimately employed except on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the measure negatived. This, we apprehend, is a mistake. No restriction of this sort, or of any sort, is to be found in the Constitution itself. The power to negative extends to all acts of Congress, and nothing is said as to the grounds on which it is to be applied. The executive is left sole arbiter of his reasons for applying his negative, save that he is to communicate them to Congress. Congress may judge of their sufficiency; and if by a majority of two thirds they judge them insufficient, they count for nothing, and the measure becomes a law in spite of them. It is clear, from the debates of the Convention, that the Convention did not intend to restrict the power to the simple constitutionality of the acts of Congress; that power is in the judiciary, and the executive veto, if so restricted, would have been superfluous. The Convention believed that acts might be passed, not absolutely unconstitutional, which, nevertheless, would tend to impair the independence of the executive, or would be impolitic or unjust, and it was to provide a negative on such acts, which the judiciary could not reach, that they gave the executive his qualified negative. The policy and justice, as well as the constitutionality, of acts of Congress are, then, we must believe, proper subjects for the executive to consider; and since to confine him to the question of constitutionality alone would deprive him of the power to maintain the independence of the executive department of government, we must hold that he not only is not, but ought not to be, so confined in the employment of his negative.

Our readers will perceive that we have given ourselves a considerable latitude of discussion. Our object has, indeed, been to defend the veto power, but at the same time to draw attention to those general principles of our Constitution and government, which, in the democratic excitement of the times, and the bustle and confusion created by party struggles, we are in danger of forgetting. We have wished to point out the place