upon he was directed to drive his wagon to his employer's stable in Charlestown to be put up for the night. Driving his wagon to the stable for the night was part of Milliken's regular work. This order was given to Milliken about 5 o'clock in the afternoon at his employer's Boston office in Matthews street, near Postoffice square. "At some place between Postoffice square and the stable in Charlestown he was seized with such a loss of memory and mental faculties that he was unable to recognize streets and places, and on account of such disordered mental condition he became lost and unable to direct the horse to the stable." About 11 o'clock that night Milliken was seen driving the wagon in a private way in Burlington and was helped back to the public highway, whereupon he drove away in the direction of Lowell. At this time Milliken would not speak. At about 6 o'clock the following morning Milliken was found lying in a swamp in Woburn and-with the exception of his head-covered with mud and water. His hat was found on the "adjacent road" some 200 feet away, and the horse and wagon were found "by the side of said road, about half a mile distant, in the direction of Boston." Milliken was taken to a hospital at Woburn, where he died on October 14th, without recovering his memory. He "spoke in a delirium only of looking for his horse." The cause of his death was pneumonia, brought on by cold and exposure while lying in the swamp. The Industrial Accident Board found: "That the loss of memory with which the employee, Milliken, was seized, was not in itself a fatal disorder, and that he would not have met his death as he did but for the horse and wagon and his effort to get them to the stable." The dependent's contention is that Milliken's death was caused by pneumonia brought on by his falling into the swamp and lying there all night; that, under these circumstances, falling into the swamp and lying there all night was a personal injury which caused his death; and for this she relies on Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie [1913] S. C. 549, 50 Scot. L. R. 350, 1 Scot. L. T. 167, 6 B. W. C. C. 398, 4 N. C. C. A. 899, and Kelly v. Auchenlea Coal Co. [1911] S. C. 864, 4 B. W. C. C. 417, 48 Scot. L. R. 768. The fact that Milliken "would not have met his death as he did but for the horse and wagon and his effort to get them to the stable" goes no farther than to show that the personal injury suffered by Milliken was a personal injury "in the course of his employment." The difficulty in the case arises from the provision that the personal injury must be one "arising out of" as well as one "in the course of his employment." It was held in McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522, that the provision limiting the personal injuries for which compensation is to be made to those "arising out of" the employee's employment means that the nature and conditions of the employment must be such that the personal injury which in fact happened was one likely to happen to an employee in that employment. In that case it was said that there must be a "causal connection" between the employment and the injury. There is nothing in the employment of driving a wagon which makes it likely that the employee will alight from his wagon, wander to and fall into a swamp, and lie there all night. The distinction between the case at bar and a case within this clause of the act is well brought out by what is suggested by a remark of the majority of the Industrial Accident Board. If the horse driven by Miliken had run away, and Milliken had been thereby thrown out and killed, the personal injury in fact suffered in that case would have been one which, from the nature of his employment, would be likely to arise, and so would be one "arising out of his [the employee's] employment." But, as we have said, there is nothing in the employment of driving a wagon which makes it likely that the employee will alight from his wagon, wander to and fall into a swamp, and lie there all night. Sneddon v. Greenfield Coal & Brick Co. [1910] S. C. 362, 3 B. W. C. C. 557, 47 Scot. L. R. 337, much relied on here by the dependent, is another case which brings out the distinction. There a miner got lost in the underground ways of a mine and was killed by the exhaust steam from an engine which was not fenced off. See also Wicks v. Dowell & Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 225, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 572, 53 Week. Rep. 515, 92 L. T. N. S. 677, 21 Times L. R. 487, 2 Ann. Cas. 732. We find nothing in the other cases relied on by the dependent which calls for notice. It seems plain that if Milliken's death was caused by a personal injury, it was the one which happened some four or five years before the occurrence here complained of, and before the workmen's compensation act was passed. At that time he fell from his wagon, and, striking on his head, suffered as a result "an impairment of his memory." The decree of the Superior Court appealed from is reversed, and a decree should be entered declaring that the dependent has no claim against the insurer. So ordered. Annotation-Applicability of compensation act where insane workman commits suicide or suffers personal injuries. As to application and effect of workmen's compensation acts generally, see annotation, ante, 23. The decisions in RE SPONATSKI and MILLIKEN V. TRAVELERS' INS. Co., although differing upon the ultimate question of awarding compensation, are not conflicting in principle. In the former case the insanity of the workman was found to have been caused by the injury which he had received, and consequently his self-inflicted death was properly considered as the proximate result of the injury. In MILLIKEN V. TRAVELERS' INS. Co., however, the mental derangement from which the workman suffered was in no way connected with his employment. There was no chain of causation what Master and servant - workmen's compensation act death by lightning liability. Death by lightning while an employee is upon a dam, performing the duties of his employment, is not within a statute providing compensation in case of death from injury proximately caused by accident while the employee was performing services growing out of and incident to his employment, where the Industrial Commission has found upon substantial evidence that there was no hazard incident to or growing out of the employment substantially different from that of ordinary out-of-door work during a thunderstorm. For other cases, see Master and Servant, II. 1, in Dig. 1-52 N. S. a, C. 479, 45 Scot. L. R. 351, 1 B. W. C. C. 27. But insanity cannot be inferred merely from the fact that a workman who had received an injury to his eye, and was suffering great pain, committed suicide, although there was no other reason advanced for the act except the injury. Grime v. Fletcher [1915] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 734, 31 Times L. R. 158, 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 847, 8 B. W. C. C. 69 [1915] W. N. 43, 59 Sol. Jo. 233 [1915] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 250, 112 L. T. N. S. 840. And it is error for the county court suicide while insane as a result of an injudge to find that a workman committed jury, where the workman's body was found in a canal, and there was no evidence to show how he came to be in the canal, and there had been no symptoms of a suicidal tendency, although he had become depressed and irritable and restless as a result of the injury. Southall v. Cheshire County News Co. (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 251. W. M. G. Statement by Kerwin, J.: This is an appeal from a judgment affirming the findings and order of the respondent Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, dismissing the application of the appellant for compensation from the respondent Lindauer-O'Connell Company by reason of the death of her husband, John Hoenig. John Hoenig was employed by the respondent Lindauer-O'Connell Company, and while so employed, and on August 8, 1913, was struck by lightning and killed. The question involved is whether the order of the Industrial Commission should be disturbed. Mr. Albert H. Krugmeier, for appellant: The defendant company was liable under the compensation act for an injury caused by lightning to its employee in the course of his employment, irrespective of whether the industry combined with the elements in producing the injury. 1 Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation, 2d ed. pp. 335-338; Mundt v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R. Co. 31 Wis. 451; Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 124 Wis. 120, 102 N. W., 1915B, 877; International Harvester Co. v. 336; Hoffmann v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167, 147 Light Co. 127 Wis. 76, 106 N. W. 808; In- N. W. 53, 5 N. C. C. A. 822. ternational Harvester Co. V. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53, 5 N. C. C. A. 822. Messrs. W. C. Owen, Attorney General, and Winfield W. Gilman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Commis sion: Messrs. Brown, Pradt, & Genrich, for respondent company: The word "accident" is susceptible of different meanings; so that the meaning to be given to it as used in the compensation act is to be determined from the context and the general scope and purpose of the act. Ullman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 112 Wis. 163, 56 L.R.A. 246, 88 Am. St. Rep. 949, 88 N. W. 41; Dawbarn, Employers' Lia Johns. 358, 8 Am. Dec. 251; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 461, 36 L. ed. 226, 229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N. W. 422; Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 377, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 489, 133 N. W. 209, 3 N. C. C. A. 649; State v. Clark, 29 N. J. L. 96; Neacy v. If Hoenig's death was purely accidental, and not connected with his employment, applicant is not entitled to compensation. Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 37bility, p. 99; People v. Utica Ins. Co. 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 489, 133 N. W. 209, 3 N. C. C. A. 649; Milwaukee v. Miller, 154 Wis. 652, ante, 1, 144 N. W. 188, 4 N. C. C. A. 149, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 847; State ex rel. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 137 Wis. 80, 117 N. W. 846; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 153 Wis. 552, 141 N. W. 1119, 3 N. C. C. A. 707, Ann. Cas. | Milwaukee County, 144 Wis. 217, 128 N. 1914D, 655; Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co. 180 Mich. 168, ante, 22, 146 N. W. 665, 4 N. C. C. A. 851; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. An industrial accident is "something the 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. risk of which might have been contemplated 522; Milliken's Case, 216 Mass. 293, ante, by a reasonable person, when entering the 337, 103 N. E. 898, 4 N. C. C. A. 512; Bryant | employment, as incidental to it." v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458, 3 N. C. C. A. 585; Terlecki v. Strauss, 85 N. J. L. 454, 89 Atl. 1023, 4 N. C. C. A. 584. Hoenig was not, at the time and place of injury, exposed to a hazard from lightning stroke peculiar to the industry, or substantially differing from the hazard from lightning stroke of any out-of-door work. Kelly v. Kerry County Council, 42 Ir. Law Times, 23, 1 B. W. C. C. 194; Karemaker v. The Corsican, 4 B. W. C. C. 295; Warner v. Couchman [1911] 1 K. B. 351, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 526, 103 L. T. N. S. 693, 27 Times L. R. 121, 4 B. W. C. C. 32, 55 Sol. Jo. 107; Blakey v. Robson, E. & Co. 5 B. W. C. C. 536, 49 Scot. L. R. 254, [1912] W. C. Rep. 86, [1912] S. C. 334; Rodger v. Paisley School Board, 5 B. W. C. C. 547, 49 Scot. L. R. 413, [1912] W. C. Rep. 157, [1912] S. C. 584; Craske v. Wigan, 101 L. T. N. S. 6, 2 B. W. C. C. 35, [1909] 2 K. B. 635, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 994, 25 Times L. R 632, 53 Sol. Jo. 560. The finding of the Industrial Commission that Hoenig was not exposed to a hazard from lightning stroke peculiar to the industry, or substantially differing from the hazard of lightning stroke of any ordinary out-of-door work, is final and conclusive. Davies v. Gillespie, 5 B. W. C. C. 64, 105 L. T. N. S. 494, 28 Times L. R. 6, 56 Sol. Jo. 11; Morgan v. The Zenaida, 2 B. W. C. C. 19, 25 Times L. R. 446; Northwestern Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 97, post, 366, 142 N. W. 271, Ann. Cas. W. 1063; Rice v. Ashland County, 108 Wis. 189, 84 N. W. 189. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458, 3 N. C. C. A. 585. The findings of the Commission are conclusive. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 105, post, 348, 141 N. W. 1013, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 995. Kerwin, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The court below, in affirming the findings of the Industrial Commission, held that the workmen's compensation act "limits compensation to those cases in which the accident grows out of the hazards of industrial enterprises and is peculiar to such enterprises," and further held that “an injured employee is entitled to compensation when the industry combines with the elements in producing an injury by a lightning stroke," and further found that it could not be said that there was not a substantial basis for the finding in the evidence taken before the Commission. We are inclined to agree with the learned court below in its conclusions and judgment in the case. It is insisted by counsel for appellant that there is no basis for the findings of the Commission. The Commission found that the deceased, John Hoenig, was in the employ of the respondent the Lindauer-O'Connell Company, and while performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment, at work on a dam on the Fox river in Wisconsin, received a stroke of lightning, which re sulted in his death; that, at the time and place when and where said Hoenig came to his death, it had been raining, and the rain was accompanied by thunder and lightning; that at said time and place deceased was not exposed to a hazard from lightning stroke peculiar to the industry, or differing subtantially from hazard from lightning stroke of an ordinary outdoor work; that the death of Hoenig was not proximately caused by accident, within the meaning of chapter 599, Laws of 1913. It is first insisted by counsel for appellant that under the Wisconsin compensation act liability exists for an injury caused by lightning to an employee in the course of his employment, irrespective of whether the industry combines with the elements in producing the injury, on the ground that the statute expressly gives compensation where three facts exist namely: (1) That the employer and employee are under the act; (2) that the employee was performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment: and (3) that the injury was proximately caused by accident, not intentionally self-inflicted. posed to a hazard from lightning stroke peculiar to the industry? The Industrial Commission held that he was not, and that the exposure to hazard from lightning stroke at the time and place of injury was not different, substantially, from that of the ordinary out-of-door work. The court below affirmed the findings of the Industrial Commission. True, the court in its findings said that, if the case were presented to it for a finding. from the evidence, it would not make the finding which was made by the Commission, and further found that a careful review of the evidence led the court to conclude that it could not say that there was not substantial basis for the finding of the Commission in the evidence taken before it. It is well settled both on principle and authority that the findings of the Commission should not be disturbed where there is any substantial basis for them in the evidence. Northwestern Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 97, post, 366, 142 N. W. 271, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 877; International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W. 53, 5 N. C. C. A. 822; Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 635, 150 N. W. 998; Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 105, post, 348, 141 N.. W. 1013, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 995; Stat. 1913, § 2394-19. The contention of appellant is that the statute is plain, and that there is no room for construction; that, where the three facts named exist, compensation follows, as matter of right, under the act. The act should be construed in the light of the history of its Counsel for appellant appears to rely with passage. Pursuant to chapter 518, Laws of confidence upon Andrew v. Failsworth In1909, a committee was appointed which industrial Soc. 90 L. T. N. S. 611, [1904] 2: vestigated and presented a report to the leg- K. B. 32, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 511, 68 J.. islature of 1911. This report tends to show P. 409, 52 Week. Rep. 451, 20 Times L. R.. the construction placed upon the act by the | 429. An examination of that case, however, committee, and that it was not intended to will show that it differs quite materially include other than industrial accidents or in its facts from the instant case. There "hazards incident to the business." Minne- the position of the injured person, as shown apolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Indus- by the evidence, was much more hazardous trial Commission, 153 Wis. 552, 141 N. W. because of the employment than ordinarily. 1119, 3 N. C. C. A. 707, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 655. Moreover, in that case the finding of the It seems quite clear that the injuries for county judge, awarding compensation, was which compensation is to be paid, under the affirmed. act, are such as are incidental to and grow out of the employment. Ibid.; Milwaukee v. Miller, 154 Wis. 652, ante, 1, 144 N. W. 188, 4 N. C. C. A. 149, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 847: Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co. 180 Mich. 168, ante, 22, 146 N. W. 665, 4 N. C. C. A. 851; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522; The Commission in its opinion said: Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. "There was testimony in this case of an ex458, 3 N. C. C. A. 585; Kelly v. Kerry Coun-pert nature for the purpose of showing that ty Council, 42 Ir. Law Times, 23, 1 B. W. C. C. 194. The question, therefore, arises whether the injuries received by Hoenig were incident to and grew out of the employment. This proposition turns upon the nature of the hazard to which deceased was exposed at the time and place of injury. Was he ex In the case now before us there was substantial basis in the evidence for the finding of the Commission to the effect that there was no hazard incident to or growing out of the employment substantially different from that of ordinary out-of-door work during a thunderstorm accompanied by rain. the employment of deceased at the water's edge was peculiarly dangerous from exposure to lightning. This evidence does not convince the Commission to a moral certainty that the employment was extrahazardous in this regard. It is admitted that the action of lightning is extremely freakish; and,. while it is more or less controlled by general law, there are so many different elements be set aside only upon the following entering into its control that we do not think the evidence in this case established that the deceased was in any position of exceptional danger because of the possibilities of lightning stroke." Section 2394-19, Stat. 1913, provides: "The findings of fact made by the board acting within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive; the same shall grounds: (1) That the board acted without or in excess of its powers. (2) That the award was procured by fraud. (3) That the findings of fact by the board do not support the award." Upon the record in this case we are convinced that the judgment of the court below must be aflirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Angell, Boynton, McMillan, Bodman, & Turner, for respondent: The death of Frank Klawinski, for which compensation is now asked by his widow, did not result from "a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employ ment," within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law, and she is not entitled to compensation. Kelly v. Kerry County Council, 42 Ir. Law Times, 23, 1 B. W. C. C. 194; Warner v. Couchman [1912] A. C. 35, 105 L. T. N. S. 676, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 45, 28 Times L. R. 58, 56 Sol. Jo. 70, 49 Scot. L. R. 681, 5 B. W. C. C. 177: Karemaker v. The Corsican, 4 B. W. C. C. 295; Mitchinson v. Day Bros. [1913] 1 K. B. 603, 82 L. J. K. B. N. S. 421, 108 L. T. N. S. 193, 29 Times L. R. Note. As to application and effect of workmen's compensation acts generally, see annotation, ante, 23. As to liability under workmen's compensation acts for death or injuries of employee by lightning, see annotation, post, 347. 267, 57 Sol. Jo. 300, 6 B. W. C. C. 190; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 Atl. 458; Craske v. Wigan [1909] 2 K. B. 635, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 994, 101 L. T. N. S. 6, 25 Times L. R. 632, 53 Sol. Jo. 560, 2 B. W. C. C. 35; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522; Amys v. Barton [1912] 1 K. B. 40, [1911] W. N. 205, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 65, 105 L. T. N. S. 619, 28 Times L. R. 29, B. W. C. C. 117. 5 Mr. W. Glenn Cowell, for claimant: The death of claimant's decedent was caused by "a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment," within law, which entitles her to compensation. the meaning of the workmen's compensation M'Niece v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. [1911] S. C. 13, 48 Scot. L. R. 15, 4 B. W. C. C. 351; Pierce v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co. [1911] 1 K. B. 997, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 831, 27 Times L. R. 299, 55 Sol. Jo. 363, 104 L. T. N. S. 473, 4 B. W. C. C. 242; Rowland v. Wright [1909] 1 K. B. 963, 77 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1071, 99 L. T. N. S. 758, 24 Times L. R. 852; Chitty v. Nelson, 126 L. T. Jo. 172, 2 B. W. C. C. 496; M'Lauchlan v. Anderson [1911] S. C. 529, 48 Scot. L. R. 349, 4 B. W. C. C. 376, Taylor v. Jones, 123 L. T. Jo. 553, 1 B. W. C. C. 3; Morris v. Lambeth, 22 Times L. R. 22; Birmingham Rolling Mill Co. v. Rockhold, 143 Ala. 115, 42 So. 96; Jarvis v. Hitch, In its return to a writ of certiorari in this cause the Industrial Accident Board certifies as follows: "That at the time of the injury for which compensation was sought herein, to wit, on the 15th day of May, 1913, respondent had accepted to become subject to the terms of act No. 10, Public Acts of Special Session of 1912, commonly known as the 'workmen's compensation law.' That on the 28th day of July, 1913, said Katherine Klawinski made application to the board of arbitration of a claim to compensation from respondent for the death of her husband, Frank Klawinski, on the 15th day |