Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 223, 29 Times L. R. 207, 57 Sol. Jo. 226, 6 B. W. C. C. 60 (blood poisoning followed injury to thumb).

Where a gardener was injured while at work in the garden by a nail passing through his boot and piercing the large toe, and died from tetanus which subsequently set in, it was held that he died from accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, where it was shown that persons working in stables and gardens are peculiarly subject to contract the disease of tetanus in suffering from any wound or cut, although it was not shown that he might not have contracted the disease elsewhere. Walker v. Mullins (1908) 42 Ir. Law Times 168, 1 B. W. C. C. 211.

It must be shown, however, that the blood poisoning or other disease from which the workman suffered was the result of an injury arising out of his employment.

Thus, in Jenkins v. Standard Colliery Co. (1911) 28 Times L. R. (Eng.) 7, where death was caused by blood poisoning following an abrasion of the skin, compensation was denied upon the ground that there was nothing to show that the abrasion was received in the course of the employment.

So, a workman who cut his finger at home, and subsequently contracted blood poisoning, cannot recover compensation where the poison germ might have been conveyed into the wound in any one of several ways other than the employment. Chandler v. Great Western R. Co. [1912] W. C. Rep. (Eng.) 168, 106 L. T. N. S. 479, 5 B. W. C. C. 254.

And the county court judge is not justified in drawing the inference of injury from accident arising out of and in the course of the employment where a collier died of blood poisoning due to an abscess in the knee, and there was no evidence to show how the abscess was caused, except that his work was in a very narrow space, which necessitated his working on his knees. Howe v. Fernhill Collieries [1912] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 408, 107 L. T. N. S. 508, 5 B. W.

wound was healing, and that the blood poisoning was caused by independent intervening cause, no compensation is recoverable for the added incapacity resulting from that intervening cause. Kill v. Industrial Commission, ante, 14.

There can be no compensation in the absence of proof that the death resulted from a disease which was caused by the accident. Woods v. Wilson [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 569, 29 Times L. R. 726, 6 B. W. C. C. 750; Taylorson v. Framwellgate Coal & Coke Co. [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 179, 6 B. W. C. C. 56.

But the fact that a workman who, after receiving an injury, was taken to a hospital, and thereafter was found to be afflicted with pneumonia, subsequently went to his home, contrary to the advice of his doctor, and died two days afterward, does not necessarily preclude a finding that his death resulted from the injury. Dunnigan v. Cavan [1911] S. C. 579, 48 Scot. L. R. 459, 4 B. W. C. C. 386.

So, where a workman died four years after the accident, and two doctors said the death was due to the accident, and two others thought the death was not, the county court judge was justified in holding that death did not result from the injury. Taylorson v. Framwellgate Coal & Coke Co. (Eng.) supra. Disease from which workman was

suffering at time of injury.

Compensation is not necessarily barred merely because the workman's impaired Physical condition at the time rendered him more susceptible to injury than a liamson [1908] A. C. (Eng.) 437, 1 B. W. normally healthy man. Ismay v. WilC. C. 232, 77 L. J. P. C. N. S. 107, 99 L. Jo. 713 (heat stroke); Maskery v. LanT. N. S. 395, 27 Times L. R. 881, 52 Sol. cashire Shipping Co. (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 428 (heat stroke); Golder v. Caledonian R. Co. (1902) 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 5th Series 123 (workman suffered from nephritis); Hughes V. Clover [1909] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 798, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1057, 101 L. T. N. S. 475, 25 Times L. R. 760, 53 Sol. Jo. 763, affirmed in [1910] A. C. 242, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 470, 102 L. T. N. S. 340, 26 Times L. R. 359, 54 Sol. Jo. 375, 3 B. W. C. C. 275, 47 Scot. L. R. 885 (rupture of aneurism of aorta); Groves v. Burroughes (1911) 4 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 185 (previous wound burst while workman was performing his ordinary work); Trodden v. J. McLennard & Sons (1911) 4 B. W. C. And where it was found that the C. (Eng.) 190 (workman's heart in

C. C. 629.

The death of a workman from blood poisoning caused by the sting of a wasp while he was driving an engine on his employer's farm is not caused by a risk peculiarly incident to the employment. Amys v. Barton [1912] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 40, [1911] W. N. 205, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 65, 105 L. T. N. S. 619, 28 Times L. R. 29, 5 B. W. C. C. 117.

A blow on the head, which in all probability would have caused no serious injury to a normally healthy man, but which caused the death of the workman, who was suffering from an advanced stage of arterial sclerosis, may be held to be an accident. Milwaukee v. Industrial Commission (1915) 160 Wis. 238, 151 N. W. 247.

such condition that any slight exertion | been affected because of acute articular might have caused failure); Aitken v. rheumatism). Finlayson, B. & Co. [1914] S. C. 770 [1914] 2 Scot. L. T. 27, 51 Scot. L. R. 653, 7 B. W. C. C. 918 (stroke of apoplexy following unusual exertion); M'Innes v. Dunsmuir [1908] S. C. (Scot.) 1021 (cerebral hemorrhage; workman's arteries in a degenerate condition); Broforst v. The Blomfield (1913) 6 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 613 (fireman whose arteries were in a diseased condition suffered apoplectic stroke while raking out the fires); Doughton v. Hickman [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 143, 6 B. W. C. C. 77 (heart failure); Fennah v. Midland G. W. R. Co. (1911) 45 Ir. Law Times, 192, 4 B. W. C. C. 440; Wicks v. Dowell & Co. [1905] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 225, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 572, 53 Week. Rep. 515, 92 L. T. N. S. 677, 21 Times L. R. 487, 2 Ann. Cas. 732 (workman fell down hatchway upon being seized with epileptic fits); Woods v. Wilson (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 1067, 31 Times L. R. 273, [1915] W. N. 109, 59 Sol. Jo. 348, 8 B. W. C. C. 288 (peritonitis caused by perforation of the bowel, although organ was in a weakened and disordered condition due to chronic appendicitis).

"The mere circumstance that a particular man, in doing work arising out of and in the course of his employment, meets with an accident which a perfectly healthy man would not have met with, is no answer at all." Dotzauer v. Strand Palace Hotel (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) | 387 (man suffering from a disease of the skin injured by putting his hand into water containing soda and soft soap).

That the consequences of the injury were aggravated by the workman's physical condition at the time the injury was received does not prevent a recovery of compensation. Lloyd v. Sugg [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 486, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 190, 81 L. T. N. S. 769, 16 Times L. R. 65 (workman had gout in his hand, and jar caused hand to swell).

And where the progress and intensity of a disease are accelerated and aggravated by an accident, compensation will be allowed. Willoughby v. Great Western R. Co. (1904; C. C.) 117 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 132, 6 W. C. C. 28.

So the acceleration of previously existing heart disease to a mortal end sooner than otherwise it would have come is an injury within the meaning of the Massachusetts act. Re Brightman, post, 321, Fisher's Case (1915) 220 Mass. 581, 108 N. E. 361 (exertion brought on heart failure where valves of the heart had

Compensation is recoverable for incapacity due to accident, although there might also have been incapacity had there been no accident. Harwood v. Wyken Colliery Co. [1913] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 158, 82 L. J. K. B. N. S. 414, 108 L. T. N. S. 283, 29 Times L. R. 290, 57 Sol. Jo. 300, [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 317, [1913] W. N. 53, 6 B. W. C. C. 225 (workman was suffering from heart disease).

But no compensation is recoverable in respect to an incapacity primarily caused by a disease or the impaired physical condition of the workman at a time when he is doing his ordinary work in the ordinary way. Hensey v. White [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 481, 48 Week. Rep. 257, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 188, 63 J. P. 804, 81 L. T. N. S. 767, 16 Times L. R. 64 (workman ruptured blood vessel while doing ordinary work); O'Hara v. Hayes (1910) 44 Ir. Law Times 71, 3 B. W. C. C. 586 (workman suffered from progressive heart disease and was liable to die at any time); Swinbank v. Bell Bros. (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 48 (incapacity due to eczematous condition); Hugo v. Larkins (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 228 (erysipelas); Kerr v. Ritchie [1913] S. C. 613, 50 Scot. L. R. 434, [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 297, 6 B. W. C. C. 419 (heart disease coming on while workman was doing his ordinary work); Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. [1911] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 988, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 769, 104 L. T. N. S. 365, 27 Times L. R. 282, 55 Sol. Jo. 329, 4 B. W. C. C. 178 (the work

man died of angina pectoris not brought Coal Co. [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 488, 81 on by any exertion); Walker v. Lilleshall L. T. N. S. 769, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 192, 64 J. P. 85, 48 Week. Rep. 257, 16 Times L. R. 108 (blistered finger of workman came in contact with red lead); Spence v. Baird [1912] S. C. 343, 49 Scot. L. R. 278, 5 B. W. C. C. 542, [1912] W. C. Rep. 18 (advanced heart disease); Federal Gold Mine v. Ennor (1910; H. C.) 13 C. L. R. (Austr.) 276 (cerebral hemorrhage not in any way connected with work).

An accident will not be inferred where

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, to the jury does not require reversal if the Appt.

In construing the language of the act we must have in mind the evident purpose and intent of the act to provide compensation Moon v. Order of United Commercial for workmen injured in hazardous underTravelers, 96 Neb. 65, 52 L.R.A. 1203, 146' takings, reaching "every injury sustained by

act is "personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment."
The English cases make no distinction be-
tween an accident and a fortuitous event as
used in our act, for they say in the case
above cited, in answering the contention
there made that an injury, to be within the
British act, must be caused by some for-
tuitous and external event, that "the word
'accident' is a popular word of very wide
meaning. Originally a grammarian's word,
it has been used from Dr. Johnson's
time until to-day, to mean 'that which
happens unforeseen, casualty, chance.' For
four years this man had successfully
used these muscles to lift this weight;
owing, perhaps to carelessness, perhaps
to a slip, perhaps to some other cause,
except disease, he snaps the fibers of
the muscles that had always successfully
done the work, and if any ordinary person
had been asked what had happened to him,
he would have said that the man had had
an accident, and I think the word would
have been rightly used. To me it is the
same as if he had been using a rope strong
enough for the purpose, and by overstrain
or sudden jerk the rope had snapped and
the beam had fallen upon him. That would
be an accident. In one case the work is
done by a rope; in the other by a set of
muscles. In each case the machinery is
normally fit for the work, but the unex-
pected happens, and the rope or muscle
snaps and there is an accident.
To my
thinking, there is in the word 'accident' al-
ways an element of injury. .
As to
the word 'fortuitous,' I do not think I need
trouble much about it. If the injury were
caused by disease, it is clear that the ap-
plicant could not recover; but I find as a
fact the man was not in any way diseased.
Indeed, it was not seriously contended that
he was. 'Fortuitous' means 'accidental,'
'casual,' 'happening by chance;' and I have
already said that, in my opinion, this in-
jury was caused by an accidental and for-
tuitous event."

a workman engaged in any such industry, | same act. The language of the British and make a sure and certain award therefor, bearing a just proportion to the loss sustained, regardless of the manner in which the injury was received" (State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466, 2 N. C. C. A. 823, 3 N. | C. C. A. 599, 117 Pac. 1101, and that the act should be liberally interpreted to the end that the purpose of the legislature, in suppressing the mischief and advancing the remedy, be promoted even to the inclusion of cases within the reason although outside the letter of the statute, and that every hazardous industry within the purview of the act should bear the burden arising out of injuries to its employees regardless of the cause of the injury. Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, post, 358, 136 Pac. 685, 4 N. C. C. A. 786. The sustaining of an injury while using extreme muscular effort in pushing a heavily loaded truck is as much within the meaning of a fortuitous event as though the injury were the result of a fall or the breaking of the truck. To hold with the Commission that if a machine breaks, any resulting injury to a workman is with in the act, but if the man breaks, any resulting injury is not within the act, is too refined to come within the policy of the act as announced by the legislature in its adop- | tion, and the language of the court in its interpretation. The machine and the man are within the same class as producing causes, and any injury resulting from the sudden giving way of the one, while used as a part of any industry within the act, is as much within the contemplation of the act as the other. When the appellant admits that the breaking of the truck because of the application of unusual force, with resultant injury to the workman, is covered by the act, then it must admit that the tearing of muscles or the rupture of fibers, or whatever it is that causes hernia, while exercising unusual effort, is likewise covered by the act; for there can be no sound distinction between external and internal causes arising from the same act and producing the same result. In Boardman v. Scott, 3 W. C. C. 33, a case arising out of the British workmen's compensation act, it was held that an internal injury caused to a person in a normal state of health was a fortuitous and unforeseen event, in a case where a workman, while lifting a heavy beam, suddenly tore several fibers of the muscles of his back. In Purse v. Hayward, 125 L. T. Jo. 10, 1 B. W. C. C. 216, it was likewise held that a workman in his master's field, who, finding that the grain had been trodden down by bullocks, stooped to raise it and sprained his left leg, was within the remedies of the

So that, so far as concerns the class of injuries for which acts of this character provide compensation, no sound distinction can be made between those resulting from accident and those resulting from some fortuitous event. The above reasoning is that employed by the county judge. Upon appeal (Boardman v. Scott, 85 L. T. N. S. 502) the judgment was affirmed, the court saying: "In determining the question whether the injury has been caused by an 'accident' or not, we must discriminate between that which must occur and that which need not necessarily occur in the course of the employment. If the thing must happen,