to mislead you. But to claim that the jury are better judges of what the law may be than the Court, is about as reasonable as to assert that a plain farmer or merchant may be taken fresh from his plough or his counter, and be more capable of navigating and manœuvering a steam frigate, or to lead your armies to certain victories, than your admiral or commander-in-chief. In my opinion, you have just the same right to disregard the evidence of the witnesses who stood before you unimpeached in any matter respecting the facts involved in the cause, as you have to disregard what the Court may say to you, under an official oath, as to the law that may apply to the facts. A jury have the power, if they choose to exercise it, after having assumed the obligations of an oath, to say that they will neither believe the judge nor the witnesses, but decide upon the law and facts according to their own caprice, or the confidence which they may repose in the character of counsel on either side, but such is not the purpose for which juries were instituted, and they have no right so to act. When the witnesses in the cause have testified before you as to the facts, it is then the office of the judge, under his official oath, to testify to you in the spirit of truth, according to the best of his knowledge and ability, as to what is the law which may be applicable to those facts; and an honest jury will disregard neither the testimony of the witnesses nor the instructions of the judge, unless they are satisfied that corrupt motives have actuated them. They will leave the party where the law leaves him, to his legitimate redress, a writ of error to the appellate court."

Referring to the course of counsel in this illegitimate appeal to the jury in their argument on this point, and to their appeal, based on the number of their exceptions to the rulings of the Court, the judge made this further remark in vindicating the position and dignity of the Court: "In reference to these matters I may observe that, perhaps, I owed it to the dignity of the bench to have interrupted counsel in the conduct of the case in this particular, but in a cause involving the life of the prisoner upon the one hand and the vindication of the outraged justice of a nation in mourning upon the other, I deemed it my duty to cast not an atom in the one scale or in the other which might by any possibility tend to prejudice either side of the issue."

CHAPTER III.

TREATMENT OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE AND THEIR ANIMUS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT AND APPEALS TO THE POLITICAL PREJUDICES OF JURORS.

THE conduct of this trial on the part of the defense toward the witnesses for the prosecution was most remarkable. The law prescribes the methods by which testimony is to be discredited, and the eminent lawyers who defended the prisoner were of course well acquainted with the legal methods of impeaching testimony. That they did not confine themselves to these was not only unprofessional, but was calculated to create a suspicion that they had an intuitive perception of the fact that the methods known to the law would not avail them in this case. Hence from the first they attempted to influence the jury by treating the government witnesses with supercillious contempt, and even scorn.

They did not, however, stop here, but whenever they could find or make an occasion they would throw out insinuations against the witnesses en masse by side remarks intended for the ears of the jury.

They spoke of the witnesses who were kept together in a room, to be called as they were needed, as being in the "penitentiary," and added to this that "they would soon be in another penitentiary."

On the examination of Dr. McMillen, the surgeon of the ocean steamer "Peruvian," in whose charge Father La Pierre had placed Surratt under the name of McCarthy, and to whom Surratt had made confessions during his voyage across the Atlantic that were conclusive of his guilt, the counsel for Surratt made themselves so offensive that the witness was provoked to a retort in self-defense. This witness was intolerable to them because of the directness

and force of his testimony. In self-defense the Doctor was provoked into making the following remark: He said "he would tell the counsel (Mr. Merrick), and if he was not deaf, he could hear," and repeated his answer, adding that "Mr. Merrick had insulted witnesses the other day, and that it was the act of a coward and a sneak." The Court here cautioned the witness that such language was not becoming, but also remarked "that it was not becoming in counsel to try to worry witness into bad temper." Witness stated "that Mr. Merrick had remarked the other day that all the witnesses in the adjoining room ought to go to the penitentiary, or something to that effect; that he was just as good as Merrick."

On the following day, at the opening of the court, Mr. Bradley said: "If your honor please, before we proceed with the trial of this case, I beg leave to call the attention of the Court to an incident which occurred just before the adjournment yesterday, and to ask that the notes of the reporter may be read. Your honor was very much occupied at the time, and I desire that the record may be read in order that you may see what passed, and what led to the attack made by the witness upon the stand upon the counsel with whom I am associated, your honor, without having heard what passed at that time, if not in precise words yet in substance, censured the counsel to whom these observations were addressed. I think, in looking at it, your honor will see that there was no provocation given; and that if there was, it is due to the dignity of this court, and to the protection of the members of the bar, to which they are entitled at the hands of the Court, that some notice should be taken of what then passed." After the reading of so much of the report as related to the matter, the Court spoke as follows: "I did not hear what was said by the witness in regard to the gunboats, for the reason that I was at the time occupied in preparing some passes for a friend. When my attention was called to the remark made use of by the witness towards the counsel, I was under the impression that he had been provoked to it by something that had been said by the counsel. I cannot, however, perceive in the record which has been read anything which ought to have called forth, or which justifies, the expression of the

witness. I will say now to the witness, that although Mr. Merrick did say a few days ago, in regard to the witnesses who were in the adjoining room (which Mr. Bradley had called a penitentiary) that they (the witnesses) would soon be in another penitentiary, or words to that effect, it is not the privilege of a witness to take exception in the way he did to any remarks made in the court room. He may appeal to the Court to protect him if he is aggrieved.” [Turning to witness] "You must not, hereafter, in your examination, make use of any expressions to counsel which are at all insulting in their character, however much you may feel yourself aggrieved by remarks which they may have made in reference to witnesses generally, or in reference to yourself before your examination.

"In this connection it may not be improper to observe that I have never, in all my judicial experience, seen a case in which there has been so much trouble with regard to the examination of witnesses and so much bitterness of feeling displayed.

It may be all right, but I confess I see no reason why it should be so. I cannot, of course, enter into the feelings of counsel, and it is possible they may feel themselves aggrieved, and therefore regard themselves as justified in exhibiting this spirit. I will say, further, that I have never seen witnesses cross-examined with so much asperity as I have in the case now pending. It does not appear to me, therefore, as at all strange that witnesses should be worried into such remarks as this witness has uttered, especially when intimations are publicly thrown out by counsel as to their fitness for the penitentiary, and that, too, when some of the most respectable persons in the land, such, for instance, as General Grant and Assistant Secretary Seward, are among the number. And not even was the effect of the remark allowed to stop with the intimation, but when attention was called to it by the District Attorney, in the hope, I presume, that it would be recalled, it was repeated, and with the additional observation that the propriety of the remark could be shown. When such things occur it is not at all surprising that witnesses should come here prepared to avenge themselves by making insulting replies to the counsel. I deeply deplore it, and will endeavor, by most carefully observing all that

transpires, to prevent a similar recurrence on the part of either counsel or witnesses; but however watchful the Court may be, such things will occasionally break forth at times and under circumstances when, from not expecting it, it is impossible for the Court to check them." [Again addressing himself to the witness.] Dr. McMillen, you are highly reprehensible for having made such remarks as that to which exception has been taken. It was altogether out of place. If you felt yourself aggrieved by any remark, you should have called on the Court for protection. You will now proceed to give your evidence, and in a manner respectful to the counsel. If the counsel on either side shall treat you with what you conceive to be disrespect, you will appeal to the Court, and the Court will intervene for your protection. I would, however, suggest to gentlemen on both sides that in the examination of witnesses, if they will consult Quintilion and Allison in regard to their duty in this respect (and no doubt they have read the remarks of both these authors on the subject), they will find that those writers say nothing is to by gained by a bitterness of manner toward witnesses either on examination in chief or crossexamination, but that everything may possibly be gained by kindness and conciliatory manners; and I think it would be a decided improvement in this case if their suggestions were accepted. In the course of the five years that I was engaged in prosecuting criminal cases, I do not recollect ever to have had an unkind word with a witness on the one side or the other, and never in a civil case except on one occasion, when a witness of my own turned against me. Then I was led away by a natural quickness of temper. I advise that we should all, to the best of our ability, endeavor to control our tempers in conducting this case; and then there will be no fear of a repetition of the unpleasant occurrences that have happened during its progress."

To this Mr. Merrick replied: "I feel it incumbent upon me to say, after what has fallen from the Court, especially as your honor seems to have the impression that I intended my remarks to apply to all the witnesses, including Secretary Seward and General Grant, that while your honor misunderstood me in this regard, I do not believe I was misunderstood by some others outside, in