proper court has decided improperly-the remedy is by resort to a higher court; and when the highest is reached, the law gives no further remedy. By "proper court" is meant not merely a duly constituted tribunal, but one having authority over the subject-matter in the particular case questioned. When the judgment is coram judice, neither error of fact or of law in the exercise of jurisdiction will render it a nullity. It must stand until reversed by an appellate court.1 "The cases are numerous," said C. J. MARSHALL, "which decide that the judg ments of a court of record having general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, although erroneous, are binding until reversed."2 The political department of the government has power, under the constitution, to organize the courts. The legislative power may prescribe modes of procedure. In the distribution of judicial power, Congress has given to the District Courts the admiralty and maritime original civil jurisdiction, and cognizance of seizures on land for statute forfeitures; made them the international prize courts of this country, and given them exclusive original jurisdiction of seizures of enemy property under Kenney, 15 Pick. 44; Lyman v. Fishe, 17 Id. 231; Hannibal & St. Jo. R. R. Co. . Schacklett, 30 M. 550; State . Schacklett, 37 Mo. 280; Kemp's Lessee . Kennedy, 5 Cr. 173; Knowles . Muscatine, 20 Iowa, 249; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 341; Griffin e. Mitchell, 2 Cow. 49; Rhode Island c. Mass., 12 Pet. 657. Walker . Wright, 30 Iowa, 325; Milne . Van Buskirk, 9 Iowa, 558; Martin e. Barron, 37 Mo. 305; Chase . Christianson, 41 Cal. 253; Bond v. Pacheco, 30 Cal. 530; Elliott v. Piersoll, 1 Pet. 328; Alexander v. Nelson, 42 Ala. 462; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 14; Southern Bank r. Humphreys, 47 Ill. 227; Davis v. Helbig, 27 Md. 452; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210; Covington . Ingram, 64 N. C. 123; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444. 2 Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 209. In the case of Tyler v. Defrees (11 Wall, 331, 344,) the Supreme Court of the United States said: "These proceedings do not come before us on a writ of error, to correct any irregularities or mere errors of law in the court which rendered the judgment, but they came before us collaterally as the foundation of defendants' title. According to the well-settled doctrine in such cases, no error can be regarded here, or could have been considered in the court below on the trial, that does not go to the extent of showing a want of jurisdict on in the court which rendered the judg ment condemning the property. (See Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wallace, and the numerous cases there cited.)" 3 Miller's Ex. v. United States, 11 Wall. 268; Tyler v. Defrees, Id. 331. the confiscation act of 1862, and concurrent original jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts under that of Aug. 6, 1861. All the District Courts being competent, that one has jurisdiction exclusive and original, into the territorial bounds of which the seized chattel is first brought, or in which the seized thing, whether real or personal, is found: presence of the res gives jurisdiction.1 "The only question of jurisdiction," said the Supreme Court in 18th of Howard, "is the power of the court over the thing-the subject-matter before them—without regard to the parties who may have an interest in it." § 86. Coram non judice. Where courts have no authority of law to act; where they have no jurisdiction over the parties, and where they have none over the subject-matter such as would enable them to divest owners' rights, the judgment is coram non judice.2 In determining whether a judgment is coram judice, we must not confound the erroneous exercise of rightful jurisdiction with the want of jurisdiction. It is only in the latter case that judgments are absolutely void because coram non judice.3 This distinction is observed in criminal cases as well as in civil. 4 And it has been applied to the power or authority of 1 Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 515; Parker v. Overman, 18 Id. 140; Clarke. New Jersey Steam Naviga tion Co., 1 Story, 541; Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sandf. Ch. R. 182; Pelham r. Rose, 9 Wall. 105; Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cr. 293; The Nassau, 4 W..ll. 634. 2 Voorhies v. Bank of the United States, 10 Pet. 474; Shiver's Lessee v. Lynn, 2 How. 43, 60; State of R. I. v. State of Mass., 12 Pet. 657, 718; Grignon . Astor, 2 How. 319, 338; Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Ohio State, 455; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 216; Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 404, 406; Mulford v. Stanzenboche, 46 Ill. 307. Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 456; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 80; Hobart v. Frost, 5 Duer, 673; Butler v. Potter, 17 Johns. 145; Prigg v. Adams, 2 Salk. 674; Henderson v. Brown, 1 Caine, 102; Easton v. Collender, 11 Wend. 90; Knowles . The City of Muscatine, 20 Iowa, 248; Smith v. Keene, 26 Me. 411; Godard v. Gray, Law R. 6 Queen's B. 139; Milne. Van Buskirke, 9 Iowa, 558; Walker v. Sleight, 30 Iowa, 310, 325; Martin v. Barron, 37 Mo. 305; Bond v. Pacheco, 30 Cal. 530; Chase v. Christianson, 41 Cal. 253; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 207-9. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Rex . Henworthy, 1 B. and Cress. 711, (8 Eng. C. L. 196); The King v. Ellis, 5 B. and Cress. 395, (11 Eng. C. L. 259); The King . Bourne et al., 7 Ad. & El. 58, (34 Eng. C. L. 36); assessors to levy taxes. Where they are destitute of authority to assess, the assessment is absolutely void; but not when they merely commit errors in an assessment which they are legally empowered to levy. A court, having jurisdiction to decide upon the question of its own jurisdiction, may erroneously determine such a vital point. Should such court maintain jurisdiction when it really has none, must the ruling stand unless reversed by an appellate court? or may it be treated, in a collateral action, as coram non judice and therefore absolutely void? It has been held that the erroneous ruling of such court with respect to its own jurisdiction, must stand till reversed, and that it is not questionable in a collateral proceeding. When the erroneous ruling is by a court of highest resort, so that it takes unwarrantable jurisdiction, the doctrine that it must stand as valid till reversed necessarily cuts off all remedy. § 87. Exhausted Jurisdiction. When a court has exhausted its jurisdiction over seized property or any subject matter, any further adjudication of it, or any subsequent disturbance of the judgment rendered before the jurisdiction was exhausted, would be coram non judice. When lower courts have finally acted. upon a thing, by declaring its status, no further judicial declaring thereof can be done, except in an appellate court. If the time allowed for taking the cause to the appellate court has expired without its removal thither, all jurisdiction as to the status of the thing is forever exhausted. Shepherd. Commonwealth, 2 Met. 419; Elliott . The People, 13 Mich. 365. 1 Freeman. Kenney, 15 Pick. 44; Lyman . Fishe, 17 Id. 231; People t. Supervisors, 11 N. Y. 563; Mygatt . Washburn, 15 Id. 316; Baily v. Buel, 59 Barb. 158; Han. & St. Jo. R. R. Co. v. Schacklett, 30 Mo. 550; State v. Schacklett, 37 Id. 280. Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo. 479; The St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co. v. Charles, 47 Id. 462-7; Weaver v. Devendorf, Denio, 117; Van Ren sellaer v. Whitbeck & Sharp, 7 Barb. 3 Hudson v. Gustier, 6 Cr. 281-5; H But, if timely taken to the appellate court, the cause may be adjudicated there to the exhaustion of the power of that court. And the court of the highest resort, in like manner, exhausts its jurisdiction when it has heard and determined. Any further hearing and determining, (unless before the maturity of the judgment rendered and by way of new argument or new trial,) would be absolutely void. When the Supreme Court of the United States has finally passed upon the status of a thing in a proceeding in rem, it cannot afterwards disturb the title to the thing which a purchaser has acquired by a sale to him properly made in furtherance of the decree. It cannot try and determine again, in a collateral action, the status of that thing which was before judicially declared for jurisdiction to pass upon the status was exhausted when the status was determined. The purchaser took the shoes of the libellant in whose favor the res was condemned. The plaintiff in a collateral attack upon such condemnation and title seeks to fight the battle over. He is not in the position of an attacker of a personal judgment, rendered in a cause in which he was not a party, but his standing is that of a defaulted party-one against whom the condemnation of the thing is res adjudicata. It may be said that if the Supreme Court should assume authority after the exhaustion of its jurisdiction, we are obliged to submit, since we can appeal to no higher tribunal. It is true that we must endure whatever wrong such assumption might produce in any suit; but, there is no presumption in favor of the rightfulness of judgments, provided want of jurisdiction is admitted or established. We must submit; but we are not precluded from showing the disorganizing tendency of such jurisdictionless action; we are not bound to presume that such action is right. Should a sovereign be the wronged party, it seems clear that he would not, by any such presumption, be bound to submit without remonstrance. A sovereign cannot be sued in personam, but his private property enjoys no immunity from a suit in rem. In an action in rem against The Charkieh, a vessel belonging It was to the Khedive of Egypt, a sovereign prince, it was held by the High Court of Admiralty in England, that a suit in rem to enforce a damage lien may be entertained without any violation of international law, though the owner of the res be the sovereign of a foreign state, and that such a suit may possibly be entertained even against property connected with the jus coronæ. The decision was by Sir Robert Phillimore, in 1873.1 stoutly contended, on the part of the Khedive, who had appeared under protest as claimant of the vessel, that he had immunity by reason of his sovereignty; but the court held that in a cause in rem, in which the sovereign was not personally sued, his property might be condemned to satisfy the lien; and there was condemnation. §87. Power to Determine Rights of Lien Holders. Though there be lawful custody by the court, of the res, there must also be jurisdiction over the rights of all persons therein, which can only be after notice; and any prior exercise of jurisdiction over such rights would be coram non judice and consequently void." In cases of limited notice, such as attachment proceedings when they are in rem, some actions to foreclose mortgages, and the like, the court acquires jurisdiction over the rights of the notified debtor only; and any exercise of jurisdiction over the rights of unnotified persons would be coram non judice and void. 3 In cases where notice is altogether omitted, except so far as a seizure from the owner creates the presumption of knowledge. on his part and that of others interested, the exercise of jurisdiction is coram non judice and void, in its attempted divestiture of the rights of persons neither notified in any way nor presumed by law to know of the proceedings. The pre $89. When Judicial Action is Presumed Lawful. sumption of law, subject to removal by showing previous exhaustion of jurisdiction or other grounds, favors the lawful |