BOUNTY. See Allowances.

BURDEN OF PROOF. See Deed; Municipal Bonds, 3.
Where, in an action against a life-insurance company brought by an
administrator on a policy purporting to insure the life of the intes-
tate, one of the defences set up was that the answers of the latter to
certain questions propounded to him at the time of his application
touching his habits of life, &c., were untrue, the burden of proving
the truth of such answers does not rest on the plaintiff. Piedmont
and Arlington Life Insurance Co. v. Ewing, Administrator, 377.

CAPTURE. See Captured or Abandoned Property, 3-6; Insurrection.

CAPTURED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY. See Court of Claims, 2;
Insurrection.

1. Certain premises in Louisiana, belonging to a citizen of that State,
were, during his absence therefrom, seized as abandoned property
by the military authorities of the United States, who compelled the
lessee then in possession to enter into a new lease, and to pay to
them the rent thereafter due. Held, that the owner could not re-
cover of the lessee the rent for the period during which he had paid
it to the military authorities. Harrison v. Myer, Executrix, 111.`
2. A. sold cotton to the Confederate States, accepted their bonds in pay-
ment therefor, but remained in possession of it until its seizure by
the agents of the United States, who sold it, and paid the proceeds
into the treasury. Held, that A. cannot recover such proceeds in an
action against the United States. Whitfield v. United States, 165.
3. Notwithstanding active hostilities had ceased in Georgia, cotton,
although private property, captured by the military forces of the
United States, in obedience to an order of the commanding general,
during their occupation and actual government of that State, was
taken from hostile possession within the meaning of that term, and
was, without regard to the status of the owner, a legitimate subject
of capture. Lamar, Exr., v. Browne et al., 187.

4. What shall be the subject of capture, as against his enemy, is always
within the control of every belligerent. It is the duty of his mili-
tary forces in the field to seize and hold that which is apparently so
subject; leaving the owner to make good his claim, as against the
capture, in the appropriate tribunal established for that purpose. In
that regard, they occupy on land the same position that naval forces
do at sea. Id.

5. Unless restrained by governmental regulations, the capture of mov-
able property on land changes the ownership of it without adjudi-
cation. It was authorized by law, in any State or Territory in
rebellion against the government of the United States. Provision
was made (12 Stat. 820) as well for the collection of captured or
abandoned property as for its conversion into money to be deposited

CAPTURED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY (continued).

in the national treasury, and the claimant allowed within a prescribed time to sue in the Court of Claims, and to receive the net proceeds, on proof to its satisfaction, of his loyalty, and of his right to them. Id.

6. Neither the captors, nor the special agents of the treasury to whom they delivered the captured property, are liable to the owner thereof in an action at law for any thing by them done within the scope of their delegated powers. Acting for the government, they are protected by its authority; and he must look to it, not to them, for indemnity. Id.

7. It is incumbent upon a claimant, under the Captured or Abandoned Property Act, to establish by sufficient proof that the property captured or abandoned came into the hands of a treasury agent; that it was sold; that the proceeds of the sale were paid into the treasury of the United States; and that he was the owner of the property, and entitled to the proceeds thereof. United States v. Ross, 281. 8. Because the claimant's property was captured and sent forward by a military officer, and there is an unclaimed fund in the treasury derived from sales of property of the same kind, a court is not authorized to conclude, as matter of law, that the property was delivered by that officer to a treasury agent, that it was sold by the latter, and that the proceeds were covered into the treasury. Id.

CARONDELET COMMONS.

The deed of conveyance executed to the United States on the twenty-fifth day of October, 1854, by the city of Carondelet, of a part of the commons of Carondelet upon which Jefferson Barracks are situate, having been based upon an equitable compromise of a long-pending and doubtful question of title, is valid. City of St. Louis v. United States, 462.

CESTUI QUE TRUST. See Parties, 1.

CHARGE TO THE JURY. See Court and Jury.

CITIZENS. See Constitutional Law, 8-10.

COLLATERAL SECURITIES.

A creditor holding collaterals is not bound to apply them before enforcing his direct remedy against his debtor. Lewis, Trustee, v. United States, 618.

COLLISION. See Admiralty, 2-5.

COMMERCE. See International Law, 1-4.

1. The case of the City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103, decided no more than that the requirement from the master of a vessel of a catalogue of his passengers landed in the city, rendered to the mayor on oath, with a correct description of their names, ages, occupations, places of birth, and of last legal settlement, was a police regulation

COMMERCE (continued).

within the power of the State to enact, and not inconsistent with the
Constitution of the United States. Henderson et al. v. Mayor of the
City of New York et al., 259.

2. The result of the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, is that a tax demanded
of the master or owner of the vessel for every such passenger is a
regulation of commerce by the State, in conflict with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, and therefore void.

Id.

3. These cases criticised, and the weight due to them as authority con-
sidered.

Id.

4. A statute which imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condi-
tion on the ship-master as a prerequisite to his landing his passen-
gers, with an alternative payment of a small sum of money for each
one of them, is a tax on the ship-owner for the right to land such
passengers, and, in effect, on the passenger himself, since the ship-
master makes him pay it in advance as part of his fare. Id.

5. Such a statute of a State is a regulation of commerce, and, when
applied to passengers from foreign countries, is a regulation of com-
merce with foreign nations. Id.

6. It is no answer to the charge, that such regulation of commerce by a
State is forbidden by the Constitution, to say that it falls within the
police power of the States; for, to whatever class of legislative
powers it may belong, it is prohibited to the States if granted exclu-
sively to Congress by that instrument. Id.

7. Though it be conceded that there is a class of legislation which may
affect commerce, both with foreign nations and between the States,
in regard to which the laws of the States may be valid in the ab-
sence of action under the authority of Congress on the same subjects,
this can have no reference to matters which are in their nature
national, or which admit of a uniform system or plan of regula-
tion. Id.

8. The statutes of New York and Louisiana, here under consideration,
are intended to regulate commercial matters which are not only of
national, but of international concern, and which are also best regu-
lated by one uniform rule, applicable alike to all the seaports of the
United States. They are therefore void, because legislation on the
subjects which they cover is confided exclusively to Congress by
the clause of the Constitution which gives to that body the "right
to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Id.

9. The constitutional objection to this tax on the passenger is not re-
moved because the penalty for failure to pay does not accrue until
twenty-four hours after he is landed. The penalty is incurred by
the act of landing him without payment, and is, in fact, for the act
of bringing him into the State. Id.

10. The court does not, in this case, undertake to decide whether or not
a State may, in the absence of all legislation by Congress on the
same subject, pass a statute strictly limited to defending itself

COMMERCE (continued).

against paupers, convicted criminals, and others of that class, but is of opinion that to Congress rightfully and appropriately belongs the power of legislating on the whole subject. Id.

11. The statute of California, which is the subject of consideration in this case, does not require a bond for every passenger, or commutation in money, as do the statutes of New York and Louisiana, but only for certain enumerated classes, among which are "lewd and debauched women." Chy Lung v. Freeman et al., 275.

12. But the features of the statute are such as to show very clearly that the purpose is to extort money from a large class of passengers, or to prevent their immigration to California altogether. Id.

13. The statute also operates directly on the passenger; for, unless the master or the owners of the vessel give an onerous bond for the future protection of the State against the support of the passenger, or pay such sum as the Commissioner of Immigration chooses to exact, he is not permitted to land from the vessel. Id.

14. The powers which the commissioner is authorized to exercise under this statute are such as to bring the United States into conflict with foreign nations, and they can only belong to the Federal government. Id.

15. If the right of the States to pass statutes to protect themselves in regard to the criminal, the pauper, and the diseased foreigner, landing within their borders, exists at all, it is limited to such laws as are absolutely necessary for that purpose; and this mere police regulation cannot extend so far as to prevent or obstruct other classes of persons from the right to hold personal and commercial intercourse with the people of the United States. Id.

16. The statute of California extends, in this respect, far beyond the necessity in which the right, if it exists, is founded, and invades the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. It is, therefore, void. Id.

COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, DECISIONS OF. See Patents, 1. CONCESSIONS OF LAND BY THE MEXICAN OR SPANISH GOVERNMENT. See Public Lands, 9.

1. The Board of Land Commissioners, under the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 631), passed in 1855 a decree confirming a grant for all the land asked for in the petition, which was acquiesced in until 1872, when a petition praying that the estimate of quantity in the original petition be stricken out, and that the land as now claimed be confirmed, was presented to the District Court, Held, that the claimants are without remedy under any act of Congress. Williams et al. v. United States, 457.

2. In an action of ejectment for land in California, where both parties assert title to the premises, the plaintiff under a concession of the former government, confirmed by the tribunals of the United States,

CONCESSIONS OF LAND BY THE MEXICAN OR SPANISH
GOVERNMENT (continued).

and an approved survey under the act of Congress of June 14, 1860,
and the defendant under a patent of the United States issued upon
a similar confirmed concession, the inquiry of the court must ex-
tend to the character of the original concessions to ascertain which
of the two titles gave the better right to the premises; and, if these
do not furnish the means for settling the controversy, reference must
be had to the proceedings before the tribunals and officers of the
United States by which the claims of the parties were determined.
Miller et al. v. Dale et al., 473.

3. Where the original concessions in such cases were without specific
boundaries, being floating grants for quantity, the one first located
by an approved survey appropriated the land embraced by the
survey. Id.

CONDITION PRECEDENT. See Equity, 1; Land Grants, 2; Municipal Bonds, 2-6, 8, 10-13.

CONFISCATION. See Amnesty.

1. The act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. 589), is an act for the confiscation of enemies' property, and provides for the seizure and condemnation of all their estate. When it has been carried into effect by appropriate proceedings in any given case, the offender has no longer any interest or ownership in the thing forfeited which he can convey, or any power over it which he can exercise in favor of another. Wallach et al. v. Van Riswick, 202.

2. The joint resolution of even date with that act was designed only to qualify, and not defeat it. The provision therein, that "no proceedings shall work a forfeiture beyond the life of the offender," obviously means that they shall not affect the ownership of the land after the termination of his natural life; and that, after his death, it shall pass and be owned as if it had not been forfeited. It was intended for the exclusive benefit of his heirs, and to enable them to take the inheritance after his death. Id.

CONSOLIDATED BONDS. See Louisiana Consolidated Bonds.

CONSOLIDATION OF COMPANIES. See Corporations, 1-7.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Commerce, 1-16; Duty on Exports, 1;
State Railroad Tax, 2.

1. A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State courts is
not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship which the States
are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States to abridge. Walker v. Sauvinet, 90.

2. Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and manner of that protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, shall provide, and may be

H